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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
Proverbial Plato: 
 
Proverbs, Gnômai, and the Reformation of Discourse 
 
in Plato’s Republic 
 
 
by 
 
 
John Roger Tennant Jr. 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Classics 
 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
 
Professor Kathryn Anne Morgan, Chair 
 
 
 
This dissertation frames Plato’s Republic as an attempt to reform the state of discourse in 
a politico-discursive crisis that occurred toward the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth 
century BCE in Athens, by focusing on the previously unexplored role that proverbs and gnômai 
play in Plato’s creation of the ideal polis. Plato uses such commonplaces not solely for the 
purpose of lending his dialogue a more authentic character. Rather, they both elucidate the 
dynamics of power that inhere in the prevailing modes of Athenian discourse and provide a locus 
for Plato’s critique of the improper use of language. Plato reveals how discursive reform is 
inseparable from social and political reform. Proverbs, gnômai, and other rhetorical topoi serve 
collectively as one of the building blocks of a just society. Put simply, wordcraft is statecraft. 
Plato’s effort at discursive reform in the context of proverbial expressions that are 
themselves part of the larger Greek wisdom tradition parallels, in turn, the critique against poetry 
iii 
in the Republic. This is because many proverbs can be traced back to a particular poem and its 
poet. Condemnation of specific excerpted verses reflects, thus, not simply an objection to the 
purportedly immoral message Plato’s text attributes to such passages but, in addition, a 
recognition of the double life enjoyed by many of the verses as eminently quotable proverbs and 
gnômai. The “quotability” of poetry in a culture with a rich tradition of excerpting lines and 
compiling anthologies – part of the larger Greek educational and rhetorical framework that 
emphasized the memorization of poetry for use in argument, conversation and public speaking – 
poses an obstacle to any attempt to improve a society gone awry. Modern paroemiology has 
revealed that a key element of any proverb is the ease with which it can be recalled. Thus, to the 
extent that memorized lines of poetry are in fact proverbs and gnômai, such versified wisdom 
expressions must figure prominently in any effort at reform. 
I proceed book by book through the Republic, analyzing Plato’s use of proverbs and 
gnômai. Book 1 can be viewed as an evolutionary “progression of proverbs” that ultimately leads 
to the first of what will be several definitions of “justice” which Socrates and his interlocutors 
consider. I re-frame the attacks against poetry in Books 2 and 3 as an exposition of the contest 
among competing “sayings” (legomena) which are themselves part of the linguistic behavior that 
constitutes a society’s discursive practices or “vocabularies.” In my reading of Books 3-7, I 
examine the relationship between proverbial sayings and the theoretical construction of the ideal 
polis as we witness Socrates and his interlocutors draw time after time from the pre-existing 
reservoir of traditional proverbs. Lastly, I analyze Plato’s increasing self-reflexivity in the use of 
proverbs in Republic 8-10, which provides a meta-commentary on the task of communicating 
Plato’s philosophy through the medium of language. 
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A NOTE ON THE TEXT 
 
 
 
For convenience, the Greek text used throughout this text for Plato’s Republic (as well as the other 
dialogues) is from the Oxford Classical Text edition of Plato by John Burnet. All translations are 
my own, unless noted otherwise. 
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Chapter One – Plato, Proverbs, and Reform 
 
The proverb is the largest coded unit occurring in our speech and at the same time the shortest 
poetic composition. 
Roman Jakobson, Selected Writings 
 
“Philosophy,” so defined, is the attempt to apply and develop . . . vocabularies as poetic 
achievements rather than as fruits of diligent inquiry according to antecedently formulated 
criteria. 
Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity 
   
HAMM: 
Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday! 
 
CLOV (violently): 
That means that bloody awful day, long ago, before this bloody awful day. I use the 
words you taught me. If they don’t mean anything any more, teach me others. Or let me 
be silent. 
Samuel Beckett, Endgame 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
A persistent tone of disquiet pervades much of Plato’s work. Over and again the reader 
receives the distinct impression that something is profoundly amiss in the time and setting within 
which the dialogues take place and that some type of reform is urgently required. There is no 
mistaking the extent to which Socrates believes that Athens has taken a turn for the worse when 
he recites to the jurors in the Apology his standard rebuke of his fellow citizens (29d7-e2): 
Ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς µεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιµωτάτης εἰς 
σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρηµάτων µὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιµελούµενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς 
πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιµῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς 
βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιµελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; 
 
Oh best of men, as an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city and most well-
known for its wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed that you devote yourself 
to wealth, so that you will acquire as much as possible, as well as reputation and 
renown, but you do not have a care for, nor even give a thought to, truth and 
understanding and making your soul as excellent as possible? 
 
Part of what afflicts the world depicted by Plato seems to have something to do with 
language. In Book 10 of the Republic, Socrates describes the effort to do right in such a world as 
2 
a great struggle (µέγας ἀγών), one in which a man must labor to become good (χρηστὸν 
γενέσθαι) and not be swayed (ἐπαρθῆναι) from such end by esteem (τιµῇ) or money (χρήµασιν) 
or any office (ἀρχῇ οὐδεµιᾷ), and further, not even by (οὐδέ γε) – what may come as a shock to 
modern readers – poetry (ποιητικῇ)!1   
The first three are stumbling blocks familiar to anyone acquainted with the traditional 
motif of the path of righteousness and the difficulty of keeping to it. But poetry? When did a 
literary genre become an obstacle to moral improvement? It has been over fifty years since Eric 
Havelock famously summarized the startling impression the Republic leaves upon the reader: 
Plato speaks passionately in the tones of a man who feels he is taking on a most 
formidable opponent who can muster the total forces of tradition and 
contemporary opinion against him. He pleads, he argues, he denounces, he 
cajoles. He is a David confronting some Goliath. And he speaks as though he had 
no choice but to fight the battle to a finish. . . . If he thus exhorts us to fight the 
good fight against poetry, like a Greek Saint Paul warring against the powers of 
darkness, we can conclude either that he has lost all sense of proportion, or that 
his target cannot be poetry in our sense, but something more fundamental in the 
Greek experience, and more powerful.2 
 
Havelock identified the culprit in Plato’s estimation not as poetry in the modern sense, 
but rather as the cultural situation that existed in ancient Greece until the middle of the fourth 
century: the oral communication and transmission of poetry as an overarching educational and 
ethical tractate which dominated all of the important transactions and relationships of Attic 
society.3 It was not the genre of poetry itself that worried Plato but instead the fact that it served 
as “a massive repository of useful knowledge, a sort of encyclopedia of ethics, politics, history, 
																																																								
1 Resp. 608b4-8. 
2 Havelock 1963: 9, 4. 
3 Havelock 1963:  38-43. 
3 
and technology, which the effective citizen was required to learn as the core of his educational 
equipment.”4   
In addition, because the poetry of Plato’s time was experienced primarily through oral 
performance, memory played a critical role in poetry’s transmission: rhapsodes memorized their 
verses, actors memorized their lines, students learned many passages by heart as part of the 
Greek educational framework, and adults from all walks of life quoted lines of poetry that they 
had memorized in support of their arguments, the points they made in conversations, and their 
public speeches.5 Memorization of poetry was an essential precondition of daily life and 
conversation, as reflected in Aristotle’s claim in his Metaphysics that some people would not 
take seriously a speaker’s statements unless supported by the words of a poet.6   
In Havelock’s reading, Plato was deeply troubled by the deleterious psychological impact 
that internalizing verses of dubious moral value could have on the individual – hence, Plato’s 
seeming obsession with mimesis, a word we loosely translate as “imitation,” which Plato viewed 
as central to the oral experience of poetry. Havelock describes mimesis as a “state of total 
personal involvement and therefore emotional identification with the substance of the poeticized 
statement that you are required to retain.”7  
However, what has been left generally unexamined until now is the degree to which the 
memorization of poetry was enhanced by the gnomic character of many of the verses committed 
to memory – in other words, the extent to which the memorized verses qualified as genuine 
proverbs and gnômai. Modern paroemiologists take pains to emphasize how a key element of 																																																								
4 Havelock 1963:  27. 
5 See, e.g., Herod. 7.161; Plato, Laws 810e-811a; Prt. 338e-339a; Xen., Sympos. 3.5-6; See generally, Havelock 
1963: 55, n. 16; Ford 2010; Graziosi 2010; Halliwell 2000; Hunter 2014: 7, 77-8. 
6 Arist., Metaph. 995a7-8. 
7 Havelock 1963: 44. 
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any proverb is the ease with which it can be recalled. Such “memorability” is very often 
achieved with a clever arrangement of language.8 Indeed, according to Aristotle, it was precisely 
because of their “succinctness and adroitness” (συντοµίαν καὶ δεξιότητα) that the proverbs of old 
were preserved (περισωθέντα).9  
Moreover, in ancient Greece, proverbs crystallized ideas that had endured for long 
periods of time, and many had their origins in poems. They played a key role in the Greek 
wisdom tradition (sophia), the sages of which were often poets in their own right, such as Solon, 
the purported author of the popular proverb, chalepa ta kala (“fine things are hard things”).10 
This was a culture marked by a widespread practice of excerpting and anthologizing, where the 
sheer “quotability” of poetic verse and proverbial statement served to blur the line between the 
two, so that one is not surprised to discover that the poetic anthologies compiled were often 
gnomic anthologies, such as Hesiod’s Precepts of Cheiron (of which we unfortunately posses 
only a scant amount). 11 Knowing this, we can better understand Plato’s (in)famous attack on 
certain passages of poetry in the Republic (the Platonic dialogue that is the focus of this 
dissertation). 
Plato’s concern is, of course, the use – or more accurately the abuse – of memorable lines 
of poetry to support a morally dubious position. It certainly cannot have escaped Plato’s attention 
that Polycrates, in his Accusation of Socrates (written shortly after 395/4 BC), cited	Socrates’	alleged	use	of a famous proverb from Hesiod’s Works and Days, “Work is no disgrace, idleness 
is a disgrace” (ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος, 311) in an attempt to prove that 																																																								
8 Russo 1983: 121-2. 
9 Synesius, Encom. calv 22.2-4. 
10 The Platonica scholia on Resp. 435c and Hp.Ma.[Dub.] 304e father the saying on Solon, who coined it 
purportedly in response to Pittacus expressing concerns about Periander’s turn to tyranny: “And from that point, it 
developed into a proverb” (καὶ ἐντεῦθεν εἰς παροιµίαν ἐλθεῖν) (Greene 1938: ad loc). 
11 Hunter 2014: 76-77, 119. 
5 
Socrates was trying to justify tyranny. Polycrates charged that Socrates was teaching his 
followers “the most wicked sayings of the most famous poets” (τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν . . . τὰ 
πονηρότατα) in order to advance an antidemocratic ideology. In making his case, Polycrates 
relies upon the ambiguity of the two neuters, ergon and oneidos in Hesiod’s proverb, to argue 
that Socrates was justifying one’s acting as a tyrant because “no work is a disgrace.” Xenophon, 
however, attempted to rehabilitate Socrates by showing that Hesiod was referring in fact to moral 
work (ἀγαθόν τι, Mem. 1.2.56-7).12  (Plato himself takes up the Hesiodic proverb in the 
Charmides, where Critias uses it to draw a distinction between “making” [ποιεῖν] and “doing” 
[πράττειν].13) 
The leveling of such an accusation as that in Polycrates’ Accusation of Socrates reveals 
the potential for eminently quotable language to be weaponized (irrespective of whether we 
choose to label Hesiod’s line as poetry or proverb) in an Athens that, from the sense conveyed by 
Plato’s dialogues, had reached some sort of crisis point. The sheer quotability of such lines, in a 
culture where lines are excerpted and anthologies compiled, obviously poses an obstacle to any 
attempt to improve and reform the discourse of that society.14 To the extent, thus, that the 
memorized lines are in fact proverbs and gnômai, such expressions must figure prominently in 
any such reform. In other words, the condemnation of specific excerpted verses in Plato’s 
Republic reflects not simply an objection to the purportedly immoral message attributed to such 
excerpts but, in addition, a recognition of the double life enjoyed by many of the verses as 
readily quotable proverbs and gnômai.  
																																																								
12 See Graziosi 2010: 120-5; Hunter 2014: 208-10. 
13 Charm. 163b1-c8. 
14 Hunter 2014: 119. 
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Paroemiology as a general matter has received relatively scant attention in modern 
classical scholarship as concerns Greek literature. As André Lardinois noted in 2001, “Although 
classicists showed considerable interest in ancient Greek proverbial expressions before the 
Second World War, no detailed studies have appeared since then.” 15  Lardinois’ 1995 
dissertation, “Wisdom in Context: The Use of Gnomic Statements in Archaic Greek Poetry,” 
partially rectified this state of affairs with respect to archaic poetry.16 And more recently, Hanna 
Boeke’s The Value of Victory in Pindar’s Odes (2007) engages in a detailed study of gnomic 
statements in Pindar. Still, the gap remains to be filled with respect to Plato, especially insofar as 
expressions like proverbs and gnômai that make particular claims to wisdom and Plato’s use 
thereof, may elucidate what I argue is Plato’s re-conceptualization and attempted reformation of 
discursive practices so as to create, in effect, a new “wisdom” tradition – that is, the new 
discursive practice of philosophy. 
Prior studies of Plato’s use of proverbs have been more or less limited to cataloguing the 
proverbs, colloquialisms and various other quotations that appear in the Platonic corpus, while 
also referencing the frequency of such citations and their enhancement of Plato’s prose style.17 
For example, in a 1978 article on Greek proverbs, J.F. Kindstrand perceptively notes that Plato 
“has a great fondness for proverbs, using them more often than other prose writers of his age” 																																																								
15 Lardinois 2001: 93. One should note, however, that on the Latinist side, the state of affairs concerning 
paroemiological research is somewhat better, especially given the spate of interest arising in recent years 
surrounding Tacitus’ use of sententiae in his oeuvre. See, e.g., Kirchner 2001. 
16 Lardinois 2001: 93, n. 3 lists a few “notable exceptions” to the general dearth of scholarly literature on ancient 
Greek proverbs: J.F. Kindstrand, “The Greek Concept of Proverbs,” Eranos 76 (1978): 71-85; J. Russo, “The 
Poetics of the Ancient Greek Proverb,” Journal of Folklore Research 20 (1983): 121-30 and “Prose Genres for the 
Performance of Traditional Wisdom in Ancient Greece,” in Poet, Public and Performance in Ancient Greece, L. 
Edmunds and R.W. Wallace, edd. (Baltimore, 1997), 49-64; A. Lardinois, “Wisdom in Context: The Use of Gnomic 
Statements in Archaic Greek Poetry” (Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1995) and “Modern Paroemiology and the 
Use of Gnomai in Homer’s Iliad,” CP 92 (1997): 213-34; and Y.Z. Tzifopoulos, “Proverbs in Menander’s Dyskolos:  
The Rhetoric of Popular Wisdom,” Mnemosyne 48 (1995): 169-77. But as Lardinois points out, save for his 
dissertation, all are articles.  
17 See, e.g., Kindstrand 1978; Tarrant 1946, 1951, and 1958. 
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and “took over the proverbs as an element of the spoken language in order to give his dialogue a 
more authentic character,” thereby denoting Plato’s “great interest in, and even respect for, 
proverbs, which was probably not wholly without importance for . . . later development.”18 
Nevertheless, Kindstrand rejects the notion that there is any “problem worthy of special 
treatment” in analyzing Plato’s use of proverbs, since “there are no traces of a conscious theory 
behind this use.”19 I beg to differ. 
Plato’s manipulation of proverbs must be understood within the context of the great 
struggle that Socrates elucidates in Book 10 of the Republic. This is a world where one can 
actually be dissuaded from becoming a good person because, in significant part, of a discursive 
practice – indeed, arguably the single most influential discursive practice in Greek society of the 
time and one which necessarily contained a great many proverbs: poetry. 20  Moreover, this great 
struggle was framed by a society in the throes of a politico-discursive crisis. Discourse had 
begun to erode during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE), and people had come to distrust 
language. Thucydides famously illustrates this phenomenon in his narrative of the Corcyrean 
Revolution (3.82.4): 
καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. 
τόλµα µὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνοµίσθη, µέλλησις δὲ προµηθὴς 
δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχηµα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν 
ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν· 
 
Men changed the customary value of words to suit the individual facts of their 
positions. Reckless audacity was deemed loyal partisan courage; careful 
hesitancy, thinly-veiled cowardice; moderation, a pretext for unmanliness; and 
perspective of the whole situation, utter laziness. 
 
																																																								
18 Kindstrand 1978: 73. 
19 Kindstrand 1978: 73. 
20 Resp. 608b4-8. 
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As Jacqueline de Romilly exhaustively recounts, Thucydides’ tone in this passage is 
characteristic of that of many other authors of the time who were not philosophers but rather, 
writers such as dramatists and historians who, like Thucydides, adopted it “to describe the crisis-
ridden world in which they lived.”21  
Much of this crisis can be attributed to a problematization of language that occurred in 
large part because of teachings by the sophists. Here, one must exercise caution insofar as much 
of our view of the state of discourse in the Athens of Plato’s time is necessarily shaped by Plato’s 
own treatment of the sophistic movement and Plato’s unremitting efforts to distinguish Socrates 
from the sophists, towards whom Plato was “profoundly hostile.”22 Although working in the 
same tradition, Aristotle does affirm in his Rhetoric Plato’s treatment of the sophists: “In 
dialectic, sophist, refers to deliberate choice of specious arguments.”23 In addition Aristophanes’ 
satirical send-up of the sophistic manipulation of language and Socrates’ purported intimacy with 
sophistry in the Clouds contributes significantly to the charges brought by the “first set of 
accusers” against Socrates in Plato’s Apology (18a7-d2, 19b4-c5), where much of the hostility 
against Socrates arises from the perception that his activities include “making the weaker 
argument the stronger” (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, 18b8-c1). From the Clouds, one 
																																																								
21 de Romilly 1992: 138. See also Price 2001, who reveals with his sensitive reading of the Corcyrean stasis 
narrative how linguistic change necessarily attends stasis in a phenomenon Price calls “the transvaluation of words”: 
“Words, aside from failing as a vehicle for mutual understanding, become another violent and especially treacherous 
weapon in the arsenals of contending factions” (p. 81). 
22 Kerferd 1981: 1. The notion that Socrates was widely perceived at the time as a sophist is supported by Aeschines 
in his speech delivered against Timarchus in 345 BCE: “You, Athenians, put Socrates the sophist to death because 
he was shown to have educated Critias, one of the Thirty who overthrew the democracy” (Ἔπειθ' ὑµεῖς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, 
Σωκράτην µὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκώς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸνδῆµον 
καταλυσάντων) (Tim. 173.1-4, trans. Giannapoulou). 
23 Rhet. 1355b20: ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστὴς µὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (trans. Kennedy). Interestingly, Aristotle acknowledges 
in this same section of the Rhetoric the possibility that one could use the power of discourse unjustly to commit 
great harm (µεγάλα βλάψειεν), but this is the case with the use of all good things, save virtue. (εἰ δ' ὅτι µεγάλα 
βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώµενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάµει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν 
πλὴν ἀρετῆς). 
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discovers that Socrates and his ilk can teach you how to make an unjust argument (ἄδικον λόγον, 
116) so that you can avoid unpleasant civic obligations like repaying debts.  
Such thinking is consonant with the position advanced in the treatise commonly referred 
to as Double Arguments (Dissoi Logoi): “Double arguments” can be propounded with respect to 
good and evil. One argument holds that there exists no clear line between good and evil, given 
that circumstances define what is “good” or “bad.” The other argument insists that the two are in 
fact separate entities.24 This treatise, written shortly before 400, seems to reflect the influence of 
the famous sophist, Protagoras.25 Furthermore, similar sentiments appear in the poetry of 
Athenian tragedy, such as a line in Euripides’ Antiope: “One could make a struggle between two 
arguments on any subject, so long as he was a skilled speaker” (ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγµατος 
δισσῶν λόγων ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός),26 which Diogenes Laertius maintains is an 
axiom that originated with Protagoras.27 Such a position, in turn, can be seen as underpinning 
defenses of injustice, such as that of Eteocles in Euripides’ Phoenician Women, which he 
articulates in part by lines that are proverbs in their own right: “If to all what is noble and wise 
were the same thing, there would be no strife voiced in two ways among men” (εἰ πᾶσι ταὐτὸν 
καλὸν ἔφυ σοφόν θ' ἅµα, οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀµφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις, 499-500) and thus, “If injustice 
is required, best to do so for tyranny’s sake; but be pious in the rest” (εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, 
τυραννίδος πέρι κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τἄλλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρεών, 524-5). 
It is not difficult to imagine people quoting such lines in order to justify positions 
contrary to the vision of justice and a just society that Plato posits in the Republic. Indeed, as I 																																																								
24  Diels-Kranz 1966: frag 1.1-5: Δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τᾶι Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ 
τῶ κακῶ. τοὶ µὲν γὰρ λέγοντι, ὡς ἄλλο µέν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δέ, ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς µὲν 
ἀγαθὸν εἴη, τοῖς δὲ κακόν, καὶ τῶι αὐτῶι ἀνθρώπωι τοτὲ µὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν. 
25 de Romilly 1992: 76. 
26 Frag. 21.1-2, in Kambitsis: 1972. 
27 Vitae philosophorum, 9.51; Collard and Cropp 2008: 189, n. 1. 
10 
shall discuss in Chapter Five, another proverb about tyranny from Euripides, “Wise are the 
tyrants by converse with the wise” (“σοφοὶ τύραννοί” εἰσι “τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ”, 568a11-b1), 
receives pronounced criticism from Socrates and constitutes a reason for considering the 
banishment of Euripides’ tragedy from the ideal polis. Socrates takes the proverb to mean that 
any wise person in the Athens of his day and age ought to ensure that he remains a close ally of 
“tyrants,” i.e., the sort of men who are adept at pulling the levers of power. Socrates’ singling out 
of this proverb parallels the practice de Romilly describes with respect to the discourse and 
discursive practices generated by the sophists: “People seized upon the statements that they 
heard bandied about and the theses whose boldness had brought them to the public eye. From 
them they extracted excuses, rules of action, and practical consequences.”28  
In other words, the discursive crisis, occasioned in part by the sophistic manipulation of 
language and dual arguments, had very real repercussions for society at large. Plato recognizes 
that discursive practices are necessarily the foundation of any polity. Wordcraft is statecraft. 
Moreover, the “practical consequences” that result from discourse may well turn out to be 
inconsistent with the conventional meaning attributed to such discourse, when viewed within its 
original context, as the above proverbs from Euripides illustrate. Does anyone seriously believe 
that Euripides was in fact championing tyranny and the benefits to be accrued from courting 
tyrants as friends by his inclusion of such legomena in his tragedies? And yet, cited and repeated 
outside of their initial textual context, quotations of passages from various texts can take on a 
new life and new meaning. This is a dynamic that Thucydides’ Corcyrean stasis narrative 
captures all too well: the customary meaning of words (εἰωθυῖα ἀξίωσις τῶν ὀνοµάτων) is 
																																																								
28 de Romilly 1992: 139. 
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changed (ἀνταλλάσσεσθαί) to conform to the individual facts (ἐς τὰ ἔργα) of a situation as one 
deems fit (τῇ δικαιώσει). 
Moreover, this dynamic is well understood by modern paroemiology. No longer satisfied 
by a conceptual framework that views the meanings attributed to proverbs as (1) either inherently 
stable and limited to one, recurrent social situation or (2) purely contextual, arising out of the 
specific circumstances in which a proverb is used, modern paroemiology emphasizes the 
importance of intertextuality in proverb interpretation. As Stephen Winick explains, citing the 
work of Roger Abrahams and Barbara Babcock, “some kernel of meaning” inheres within a 
particular proverb text and is thus “carried over, while other elements of meaning emerge each 
time the proverb is recontextualized.”29 For example, the proverb “Money talks” may enjoy 
(what paroemiologists call) a “base meaning” of, in effect, “money wields enormous influence” 
and yet can also be used sarcastically in a different context, where ample financial resources 
have proved to be of no benefit whatsoever, so as to mean the precise opposite, “money is 
powerless.” 30  Similarly, the base meaning of the proverb can be altered by reuse and 
reformulation, particularly by a skilled wordsmith such as Nobel laureate Bob Dylan, “Money 
doesn’t talk, it swears.” If Dylan’s reformulation were to become the prevailing version of the 
underlying proverb, it is difficult to imagine the original ever being used again in anything 
approaching a laudatory manner.31  
																																																								
29 Winick 1998: 10 (quoting Abrahams and Babcock 1994: 17).  
30 See Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1981: 115-118, who provides a fascinating analysis of the wide array of different 
meanings that the proverb “Money talks” can assume because of “various convergences of social situation, 
participant evaluation, and interactional strategy.” 
31 Winick 1998: 18, provides a useful analysis of proverbs supplanted by newer versions: “. . . a ‘perverted,’ 
‘altered’ or ‘manipulated’ proverb may take its gnomic quality both from the original older proverb and from the 
very cleverness of the manipulation. This is made clearest in such new proverbs as ‘the early bird gets the worm, but 
the second mouse gets the cheese.” In his Rhetoric, Aristotle, too, recognizes the potential for new proverbs to 
supplant old ones, providing as an example a revised version of the Delphic Oracle’s famous “Nothing in excess”: 
“That business about ‘Nothing too much’ isn’t true either; one cannot hate the wicked too much” (καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ µηδὲν 
12 
I believe that we should conceive of this dynamic of proverb recontextualization as one 
that necessarily looks to what Stephen Halliwell calls the “external context of ethical reception 
and influence” of a particular quotation – i.e., a quotation taken out of its original setting where  
“internal context of narrative voice and situation” alone determines meaning.32 For example, 
irrespective of what we understand Euripides’ gnomic statements about tyranny and tyrants to 
mean within the context of the particular tragedies in which those statements appear, if they are 
detached and cited as justifications for why “tyranny pays,” their meaning is ultimately a 
function of their subsequent “ethical reception and influence.” For example, as I will discuss in 
Chapter Three, Adeimantus cites in Book 2 of the Republic what is arguably the single most 
famous proverb in all of ancient literature, Hesiod’s “easy-road-to-vice, hard-road-to-virtue” 
proverb in the Works and Days (287-92). However, he cites it not for the meaning one gleans 
from the original context of the didactic poem in which the proverb appears – namely, that one 
should pursue virtue even though the path leading to it is steep, rough, and arduous – but rather 
as the excuse that people will give for why they prefer being unjust to living justly: the former is 
just so much easier than the latter. In other words, Adeimantus interprets the proverb to mean, in 
effect, precisely the contrary of what a reading based on the internal context of narrative voice 
and situation would otherwise suggest. The ethical reception of the proverb as Adeimantus 
describes it and what he takes to be its subsequent corrosive influence on behavior have 
transformed the proverb into the polar opposite of Hesiod’s original. Plato’s text prominently 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν µισεῖν, 1395a33-4; trans. Kennedy). See my discussion in Chapter 5 of the 
transformation (attributed, perhaps erroneously to Mahatma Gandhi) of the lex talionis in Exodus 21: 24-5: “eye for 
eye, tooth for tooth . . .” by addition of the phrase “and the whole world goes blind,” along with its similarity to 
Callicles’ transformation of a proverb cited by Socrates in the Gorgias.  
32 Halliwell 2000: 112.  
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foregrounds this perceived misuse of Hesiodic proverb (which, of course, also belongs to the 
genre of poetry) and the deleterious effects of that misuse on society. 
We can now begin to understand better why Plato takes aim at poetry – or more 
accurately, certain passages of poetry – in the Republic, especially in light of the fact that so 
many proverbs trace their origins to poems, the primary repository of knowledge and 
overarching ethical tractate for the Greeks. Proverbs, by their very nature, are detachable from 
the text (or contextual situation) in which they are first used. Moreover, they carry normative 
authority. As Abrahams and Babcock explain (within the context of the more modern use of 
proverbs than the analogous discursive practice of fifth/fourth century Athens), 
Proverbs . . . achieve their primary ontological status through their use in actual 
face-to-face situations where they carry the force of appearing to embody norms 
and are therefore voiced by ones who appear to represent society. Secondarily, 
they may be detached from such interactional situations and still carry some of the 
meaning of these norms if not always their power to persuade and move. 
Detachability involves a process of de-situation and re-situation, transforming an 
item from one interactional exchange situation to one in which it is embodied in 
some medium of record (such as the printed page or phonograph record). This 
transforming process places the item in a new context, a new speaker-hearer or 
performance-audience relationship. . . . All proverbs . . . rely upon reflexive self-
referencing (calling attention to their proverbial character) as one means of 
establishing their differences from the surrounding talk, and thus their integrity 
and detachability. The proverb’s capacity to maintain itself both within an 
interactional situation and outside of it exemplifies a basic feature of language as 
a system of signs.33 
 
The proverb, thus, is a powerful discursive tool for shaping the behavior of a society’s members. 
It constitutes a discursive practice in and of itself that Plato cannot do without, if he is to create a 
new discursive practice of philosophy in the hope of reforming a society deep in the throes of a 
politico-discursive crisis.  
																																																								
33 Abrahams and Babcock 1994: 417-18. 
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Adeimantus’ citation of Hesiod’s famous “two roads” proverb reflects Hesiod’s own 
genius in offering sayings ripe for later appropriations by the Greeks in different cultural 
contexts. Modern classicists have used terminology that sounds very much like that of 
paroemiologists in explaining how Hesiod achieved lasting influence with his Works and Days. 
For example L.G. Canevaro claims that Hesiod uses the twin devices of “detaching” and 
“tethering” to create a work that can be read in both a coherent, linear way and in a fragmented, 
excerpting way.34 “Detachability” is carefully balanced against the overarching didactic purpose. 
In other words, verses and passages that might be detached in their own right for application in a 
separate context are masterfully tethered to the overall didactic thrust of the poem. Similarly, 
Hugo Koning describes how Hesiod employs terms that enjoy a “catchword factor.”35 In the 
“two roads” proverb, for example, the terms kakotes and arête are sufficiently broad to be 
applied to any number of contexts.36 M.L. West points out that in their original context, they 
most likely had to do with “inferiority” and “superiority” with respect to material property.37 
However, their potential for broader application and expansion of meaning resulted in a proverb 
that came to be applied to innumerable textual situations, ranging from the morality of actions to 
philosophic excellence.38 It is no wonder, then, that Plato too would make use of Hesiod’s 
famous proverb in a number of different contexts within the Republic, as I will outline in the 
																																																								
34 Canevaro 2015: 31-82. 
35 Koning 2010a: 144-49. 
36 This observation parallels arguments by Hunter 2014: 2-3, that emphasize the poem’s potential for “extendability” 
and “extrapolation” by later writers and thinkers of “useful” (chrêsimon) information so as to extend the range of the 
poem’s many wise utterances (assorted gnômai, maxims, precepts, etc.) to “similar things” (homoeida), as the third 
century Stoic, Chrysippus, maintained. 
37 West 1978: 229. 
38 See my discussion in Chapter 2.2. 
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succeeding chapters. As Canevaro puts it, Hesiod’s saying “captured the imagination of the 
ancients.”39 
Plato’s starting point in attempting to span the discursive divide that had riven Athenian 
society necessitates that he draw from the storehouse of proverbs already deeply rooted within 
Greek culture and discourse. Moreover, Plato’s characters’ frequent invocation of gnômai, and 
proverbs in support of the various arguments they advance during their extended examination of 
justice and the ideal polity in the Republic, demands that the reader continually assess the 
purported legitimacy of, and claims to truth-status asserted by, such wisdom expressions. In a 
world where a society’s discursive practices are increasingly being challenged, no particular 
form of discourse can be taken for granted – not the poetry handed down for generations from 
the revered poets of old such as Homer and Hesiod, not the myths that comprise the subject 
matter of such poetry and which underlay so much of Greek thought and culture at the time, and 
not, as is relevant to my dissertation, the gnômai, proverbs, and other expressions of proverbial 
wisdom that constituted a large share of the Greek wisdom tradition (sophia). All is grist for 
Plato’s great discourse-reforming mill.40 
That Plato – as I maintain – appropriates and reconfigures proverbial statements of 
wisdom as part of his larger project of discursive reform so as to create the new genre of 
philosophy accords with Richard Martin’s observation that we can see from the Greek wisdom 
																																																								
39 Canevaro 2015: 7. 
40 My thinking here parallels Adi Ophir’s argument that the “Platonic dialogue brings to the surface of discourse 
what is so often forbidden – perhaps never again allowed – to appear there: the struggle to establish a new order 
within discourse, a strife for every discursive practice, the power invested in the process of establishing and 
maintaining discourse as a set of rules, differentiations and exclusions” (Ophir 1991: 6). Kathryn Morgan describes 
the matter more generally as follows: “Plato takes contemporary cultural forms and redefines their content and 
application” (Morgan 2009: 552). Nancy Worman acknowledges that Plato’s “dialogues clearly take up the 
challenge of exploring how th[e] degradation of Athens’ power and control came about” (Worman 2008: 156). And 
Halliwell recognizes that “the Republic reinterprets features of traditional thought by translating them into a new 
vision of human possibilities” (Halliwell 2000: 108).  
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tradition, as epitomized by the Seven Sages and their assorted “sayings,” how “the social use of 
artful speech and metaphor becomes a powerful tool for influencing events.”41 One should add 
here that such influence can happen only if you get others to adopt your terms, your phrases. In 
the words of the social historian James Obelkevich, “Political authority and proverbial authority 
have been allied since at least the time of Solomon.”42 Indeed, the Greeks often cited gnomic 
expressions in their law courts, so much so that one is hard-pressed to draw a clear line between 
nomoi (“laws”) and gnômai.43 If Plato is to succeed in wresting discursive authority from the grip 
of the then-prevailing traditions of wisdom in ancient Greece, he will have to contend with 
propounders of such gnomic legomena (e.g., the archaic sages, among others) on their own 
“proverbial” turf. 
It is important to note that the effort to win lasing influence over people by crafting 
compelling legomena is remarkably consonant with the description that modern philosophers of 
language and political thought have described as the fundamental means by which any 
community – political, scientific, or artistic, for example – is formed: via the interplay of 
competing discourses. Perhaps more than any other thinker, Richard Rorty has captured the 
essence of this idea. Rorty describes an unending series of “language games” in which 
competing discursive practices – what he calls “vocabularies” – vie with one another for 
predominance, for example, “the vocabulary of ancient Athenian politics versus Jefferson’s, the 
moral vocabulary of Saint Paul versus Freud’s, the jargon of Newton versus that of 
Aristotle . . .”44 
																																																								
41 Martin 1993: 118. 
42 Obelkevich 1987: 215.   
43 Lardinois 1995: 5-6. 
44 Rorty 1992: 5. 
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According to this model, the vocabulary that comes to prevail in a language game is 
determinative of the community that it constitutes and whose practices in turn constitute it. Thus, 
to the extent that Plato correctly views the Athens of his day as in a state of moral disrepair, such 
a state of affairs would, consistent with Rorty’s conception, invariably be linked with the 
competing “vocabularies” of the day, which necessarily include those employed by the sophists 
as well as by the participants in fundamentally destabilizing events such as the Corcyrean stasis 
of the Peloponnesian War.45 This is the politico-discursive crisis that one senses in reading 
Plato’s dialogues and which seems to impel the numerous calls for and efforts aimed at reform, 
articulated primarily by Socrates. It was, after all, a discursive practice that served as the vehicle 
for the state-ordered death of Plato’s mentor: forensic oratory in an Athenian court of law.46 
Indeed, A.A. Long has made the intriguing suggestion that Plato essentially “never stops 
rewriting the Apology,” noting that “as long as Plato retained personal hopes of reforming a 
society, . . . he held on to Socrates.”47 
If Plato is to reform Athenian society along the lines suggested in the Republic, it follows 
that he must alter profoundly the then-current discursive terrain, the ground upon which any 
society – including the ideal polis of the Republic – is invariably built. As Rorty elucidates, 
because philosophy is itself subject to the language game insofar as it consists of “a contest 
between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new 																																																								
45 See Balot 2004: 91-2, who argues convincingly that the sort of violence that occurred in Corcyra in 427 BCE led 
to men “attacking their shared understanding of key evaluative terms” which resulted ultimately in “damage [to] the 
free speech and trust upon which the Athenian democracy was based – which in turn led to a violent Greek world 
and, later in the narrative, to civic breakdown at Athens in 411 BC.” 
46 It is difficult to read as anything other than a lament over a corrupted state of discourse Socrates’ description of a 
man, previously freed from the famous “cave” of Book 7, “compelled” upon his subsequent return “to contend in 
courtrooms and elsewhere over the shadows of the just and to wrangle over the images of these things in the minds 
of those who have never seen justice itself” (ἀναγκαζόµενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ 
δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλµάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαµιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαµβάνεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν 
αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην µὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων, 517c-e) (trans. Shorey with modification).  
47 Long 1998: 132. 
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vocabulary which vaguely promises great things,” its “method” is ultimately akin to that of 
“utopian politics or revolutionary science.” What is this method? Rorty explains as follows, 
The method is to describe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have 
created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to 
adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic 
behavior, for example, the adoption of new scientific equipment or new social 
institutions.48 
 
The effort to re-envision the world requires a new discursive practice, a new vocabulary. This is 
Plato’s writerly project in creating the new literary genre of philosophy – a project which is also, 
by Rorty’s definition, a socio-political project.49 
A sustained examination of Plato’s use of various discursive practices and devices in the 
creation of philosophy as a new literary genre has certainly not been a task neglected by modern 
classicists and historians of ancient philosophy. For example, Andrea Nightingale has explored 
the complex dynamics that link the Platonic dialogue with other genres of Greek literature,50 
Kathryn Morgan has focused on the ambiguous role played by myth in the Platonic corpus,51 and 
Ruby Blondell has analyzed the specifics of Plato’s portrayal of the individual characters 
peopling the dialogues.52 Following in these scholars’ footsteps, I seek to expand the scope of 
																																																								
48 Rorty 1992: 9. 
49 I would argue that my claim here is not dissimilar from that of Deborah Steiner regarding Hesiod’s Works and 
Days, a work that of course is a virtual anthology of gnomic statements. As Steiner convincingly maintains (2007: 
179), “From the proem of Hesiod’s poem on, morality is bound up with discourse and with the speeches and songs 
performed by gods and men. These, as well as the larger composition within which they are embedded, are the 
means for articulating the author’s vision of a community ruled by dikê, while modes of speaking, diction, and style 
can determine and reveal a speaker’s ethos, values, and moral outlook.” See my discussion in Chapter 3.3. 
50 Nightingale 1995. 
51 Morgan 2004. 
52 Blondell 2002. 
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their approaches and analyses so as to encompass Plato’s use of proverbs and gnômai within the 
theoretical framework offered by Rorty and other theorists.53 
The power that proverbs exert to influence behavior is undeniable. This explains their 
prevalence throughout the Greek wisdom tradition and their prominence in poetry. Of all the 
discursive devices that one can imagine Plato considering in order to effect societal change, 
proverbs would seem to fall toward the top of any list ranked in order of priority and importance. 
Indeed, two of the most famous expressions in all of antiquity assume the discursive shape of 
gnômai, the Oracle at Delphi’s enigmatic pronouncements: “Know thyself” and “Nothing to 
excess.”54 Such legomena are foundational to Greek thought and living. 
 
1.2. Defining Proverbs and Gnômai  
  
Here it is necessary to define what I mean when I use the terms “proverbs” and “gnômai” 
(or “gnomes”).55 As will become clear, for purposes of this dissertation, the two are essentially 
interchangeable and fall under the general categories used by scholars of “wisdom expressions,”  
“generalizing expressions,” or tellingly, “proverbial expressions.”56  
																																																								
53 For example, the work of Michael Oakeshott 1975: 78. Oakeshott argues that “a morality is neither a system of 
general principles nor a code of rules, but a vernacular language.” See my discussion in Chapter 3.3.  
54 Aristotle characterizes the phrases as “popular sayings” (δεδηµοσιεθµένα, Rhet. 1395a). 
55 The English word “gnome” (meaning “short pithy statement of a general truth”) does not, obviously, use a macron 
over the “o.” The English plural, “gnomes,” however, seems to me less elegant than the transliterated Greek, 
gnômai, which to my eye appears best when italicized and fitted with a macron over the “o” (notwithstanding the 
choice of some scholars such as Lardinois to neither italicize nor use the macron). My allowance for “gnome” but 
not “gnomes” has no doubt something to do with the plural form evoking more readily than its singular counterpart 
the image of a garden filled with eponymous garden “gnomes.” Thus, I will exercise a slight inconsistency in using 
the English term for the singular (“gnome”) and the transliterated Greek (gnômai) for the plural, unless referring to 
another scholar’s use of the term “gnomes” or using the actual Greek lettering (i.e., γνώµη and γνῶµαι, along with 
παροιµία and παροιµίαι). 
56 See Lardinois 2001: 93-4; Russo 1997: 50-64. I am hardly the first classicist to conflate the terms “gnômai” and 
“proverbs.” In a 2005 Princeton/Stanford Working Paper, Martin, both a classicist and folklorist, moves seamlessly 
from an analysis of how proverbs operate to an application of that same analysis to “gnomic examples” from 
Euripides utilized by Aristotle in that section of his Rhetoric that treats of both proverbs (paroimiai) and gnômai. 
Similarly, Lardinois, although asserting initially in his 1995 dissertation that “Greek gnomai are not the same as 
proverbs” (p. iii), nevertheless turns immediately to paroemiology (pp. 1ff ) for his general methodology in 
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In ordinary, everyday usage, the terms “proverb” and “gnome” are nearly synonymous: 
any random search of various and sundry dictionaries reveals that both words mean in essence a 
pithy saying that expresses a general truth, fundamental principle, or piece of advice. 57 
Synonyms offered for both words include “maxim,” “saying,” “saw,” “adage,” “axiom,” 
“aphorism,” “apothegm,” “epigram,” “dictum,” “precept,” and “words of wisdom.”  
Although some scholars are accustomed to translate γνώµη as used by Aristotle in his 
Rhetoric as “maxim,”58 modern paroemiologists such as Joseph Russo insist that the difference 
between maxims (read: gnômai) and proverbs amounts to very little, especially since Aristotle 
himself “was aware of the impossibility of clearly separating the two” as reflected in his 
observation that “some proverbs are also maxims (γνῶµαί)” (ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιµιῶν καὶ γνῶµαί 
εἰσιν, 1395a19-20). 59  While some paroemiologists prefer to call metaphorical wisdom 
expressions (e.g., “A stitch in time saves nine”) proverbs and literal wisdom expressions in the 
form of abstract principles (e.g., “Honesty is the best policy”) maxims or aphorisms, most 
modern paroemiologists consider both types to be genuine proverbs.60 Aristotle also identifies in 
his Rhetoric two other terms that scholars include within the general category of “wisdom” or 
“generalizing” expressions: hypothêkai (“instructions”) and apopthegmata (“terse pointed 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
analyzing “gnomic statements in archaic Greek poetry”, an approach which he places within what paroemiologist 
Joseph Russo calls the “new contextual approach to the study of proverbial expression in Greek literature” (p. 2; 
emphasis added). This move is consistent with Lardinois’ lumping all wisdom expressions, including both gnômai 
and paroimiai, under the single term, “saying”, and acknowledging that the term γνώµη “can comprise” other types 
of wisdom “sayings” (such as παροιµία, ὑποθήκη, and ἀπόθεγµα) (pp. 5, 19). Moreover in his 2001 article, 
Lardinois places the terms παροιµια (“proverb”) and γνῶµη (gnome) (in addition to ὑποθήκη and ἀπόθεγµα) under 
the general categories of “proverbial expressions” and “proverb-like expressions” (Lardinois 2001: 93-4).  
57 For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “gnome” as a “short pithy statement of a general truth; a 
proverb, maxim, aphorism or apothegm” and proverb as a “short, traditional, and pithy saying; a concise sentence, 
typically metaphorical or alliterative in form, stating a general truth or piece of advice; an adage or maxim.” 
58 See, e.g., Freese 2006: 279-89; Kennedy 1991: 164-8; Russo 1997: 56. 
59 Russo 1997: 56. 
60 Russo 1997: 56. See also Dundes 1981: 52-3. 
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sayings”). Aristotle’s analysis suggests that of the four, “gnome” was the most generic term and 
could encompass the others.61  
Given such instability of terminology, it is not surprising that modern paroemiology has 
struggled, largely in vain, to draw any clear boundaries between proverbs and other generalizing 
expressions, let alone devise a sufficient definition for the term “proverb.” The paroemiologist 
Archer Taylor famous rejected out of hand the possibility of formulating any strict definition for 
“proverb:” 
The definition of the proverb is too difficult to repay the undertaking; and should 
we fortunately combine within a single definition all the essential elements and 
give each its proper emphasis, even then we would not have a touchstone. An 
incommunicable quality tells us this sentence is proverbial and that one is not. 
Hence no definition will enable us to identify positively a sentence as 
proverbial.62  
 
Based on all of the foregoing, I will not be drawing any bright line distinctions between 
the terms “gnome” (γνώµη) and “proverb” (παροίµια) and will follow, at times, Lardinois’ 
practice of using the word “saying” or its transliterated Greek equivalent, legomenon, to refer to 
all wisdom expressions.63 This makes particular sense in light of the fact that τὸ λεγόµενον is 
often used by Greek authors for prefacing a proverb.64  
Ι will, however, signal a distinction between gnômai and proverbs when it becomes 
necessary to highlight a differentiation based upon Aristotle’s locating gnômai specifically and 
exclusively within poetic texts. As Lardinois emphasizes, “It is important to remember that 
Aristotle used the word γνώµη explicitly for sayings which he found in early Greek poetry.”65 																																																								
61 See Lardinois 1995: 19. 
62 Taylor 1958: 3; see Lau, Tokofsky, and Winick 2004: 2-14, for a good overview of the various attempts by 
paroemiologists to define “proverb.”   
63 Lardinois 1995: 5-6. 
64 Russo 1997: 53. See, e.g., Resp. 362d6, which I discuss in Chapter 2.2. 
65 Lardinois 1995: 20, n. 68. See, e.g., Rhet. 1395a13-14, 1395a15, 1395a16-17. 
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Such labeling causes Lardinois to denote all of the “wisdom expressions” that he surveys in 
archaic Greek poetry as gnômai, even though some of these must certainly constitute paroimiai 
as well, as Aristotle himself makes clear. Take for example, a verse attributed to the Greek poet 
Stasinus, author of the Cypria: “Foolish is the man who, having killed the father, leaves the 
children behind” (νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει), which Aristotle himself cites as 
an example of both a gnome and a proverb and which Lardinois includes in a general list of 
“Gnomai in selected authors.” 66 
Aristotle’s location of gnômai within poetry has no doubt contributed to scholarship’s 
tendency to attach the term “gnome,” rather than “proverb,” as a general label to any wisdom 
expression found in Greek poetry – despite, again, the fact that many such expressions identified 
as gnômai could just as easily be deemed proverbs. Of especial prominence in this regard is the 
famous Pindaric gnome, the designation assigned by scholars to the generalizing expression 
often included by Pindar at the end of his myths.67 However, an expression like that which falls 
at the close of Olympian 11, “Neither a tawny fox nor loud-roaring lions could change their 
inborn nature” (τὸ γὰρ ἐµφυὲς οὔτ' αἴθων ἀλώπηξ//οὔτ' ἐρίβˈροµοι λέοντες διαλλάξαιντο ἦθος, 
19-20), is surely of a piece with the English proverb “Leopards do not change their spots,” 
notwithstanding the choice by Pindar scholars such as Elroy Bundy to assign it the appellation of 
“gnome.”68 
Part of the reason behind the scholarly tendency to assign the term gnômai to 
generalizing expressions found in poetry likely relates to yet another tendency, namely, that of 
considering age and repetition as the crucial factors in determining what qualifies as a proverb. 																																																								
66 Compare Arist., Rhet. 1376a6 with 1395a16-17 and Lardinois 1995: 278, 297. Clement of Alexandria (Strommata 
7.2.19) attributed the line to Stasinus; see Kennedy 1991: 105, n. 256. 
67 See, e.g., Bundy 1962: 28, 52. 
68 Bundy 1962: 28. 
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Lardinois, for example, conceives of proverbs as “being anonymous and passed on from one 
generation to the next,” factors which Lardinois asserts gnômai may (but need not) have, since 
Aristotle speaks of “coining a gnome” (γνωµοτύποι).69 But while age and repetition may prove 
useful for methodological reasons, such as the compiling of proverb collections, it soon becomes 
clear that what amounts to a “canonicity by virtue of repetition” approach to defining proverbs 
soon falters. How many times must an item be repeated, or how long must it have existed, before 
it is considered a genuine “proverb”?70 Folklorist Wolfgang Mieder puzzles over this question, 
conjecturing only that “our feeling tells us that a week would be too short, but perhaps a year 
would be long enough to be considered proverbial.”71 This is clearly an unworkable standard. 
Indeed, as more modern approaches to paroemiology have disclosed, it is entirely 
possible for new proverbs to be coined – proverbs which, like the gnômai identified by Aristotle 
in particular poems and authored by particular poets on particular occasions, are attributable in 
fact to specific speakers/writers. As an example, Winick offers criminal defense attorney Johnnie 
Cochran’s phrase “If it doesn’t fit, you must acquit,” which proved to have considerable 
influence in the Los Angeles jury’s acquittal of O.J. Simpson on charges of murder in 1995.72 
Winick uses Cochran’s newly coined phrase to illustrate the claim by Kenneth Burke that the 
rhetorical power of proverbs lies in their ability to “name typical, recurrent situations.”73 As 
Winick explains, “By using a proverb, even a new one, Cochran suggested that O.J. Simpson’s 
case was not unique, that the situation Simpson was in was recurrent in our society. Simpson’s 
																																																								
69 Lardinois 1995: 12-13 (citing Arist. Rhet. 1395a7). 
70 Winick 1998: 38-9, rightly calls into question what he calls the “canonicity by virtue of repetition” approach to 
defining proverbs and raises the questions I pose here. 
71 Mieder 1993: 6; see Winick 1998: 39.  
72 Winick 1998: 58-9, 66-7. 
73 Burke 1967: 293. 
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position was thus recast as typical: the (black) defendant railroaded by evidence that ‘doesn’t fit’ 
the prosecution’s case.”74 Relying in part on Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “speech genres” as well 
as ethnographic fieldwork, Winick argues persuasively that “proverbiality ought to be part of the 
current communicative force, rather than part of the history, of an utterance.”75 For Winick, 
“‘proverb’ is more a quality of language activity than an atomistic item, more verb than 
noun; . . .‘a proverb’ is a thing largely by virtue of being enacted or performed” and thus “to 
speak or write proverbially, ‘to proverb,’ is to use certain strategies of intertextual reference in 
order to achieve a rhetorical end.”76 Indeed, it is precisely for the rhetorical end of politico-
discursive reform that, as I argue in this dissertation, Plato employs proverbs and gnômai from 
the pre-existing Greek literary tradition and, in turn, offers new variations – in effect new 
proverbs and gnômai – in the creation of his new literary genre of philosophy. 
Winick’s idea of a proverb as something that is “enacted or performed” parallels 
Aristotle’s definition of a gnome as a “showing forth” (ἀπόφανσις, Rhet. 1394a22). Martin, in 
his own analysis of the performative aspect of a speaker’s use of proverbs, notes how the verb 
“to make a display” (ἀποφαίνεσθαι) gives us the noun apophansis.77 But even apart from this 
mutual emphasis on performance, Aristotle’s definition in full of a gnome shares considerable 
ground with modern paroemiology’s definition of a proverb: 
A showing forth (ἀπόφανσις) not of particular things such as what sort of a man a 
certain Iphicrates is – but in general (καθόλου); and not about everything – such 
as straight is opposite to curved – but about all that has to do with actions (περὶ 
																																																								
74 Winick 1998: 66-7. 
75 Winick 1998: 66-7. 
76 Winick 1998: 66-7. 
77 Martin 2005: 11. 
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ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί) and what is to be chosen or avoided (αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά) with 
regard to action.78 
 
Lardinois renders Aristotle’s formulation of gnome into a more workable definition: “a 
generalizing statement about a particular action.”79 There are two key respects in which this 
definition bears a marked similarity to what, for modern paroemiologists, defines proverbs and 
separates them from clichés and figurative expressions. First there is the “generalizing” 
component of gnômai. For modern paroemiologists, a proverb by definition states “a general 
truth that everyone would accept as important and useful to recall . . .”80  Second, a gnome’s 
concern with “what is to be chosen or avoided (αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά) with regard to action” finds a 
close analogue in what modern paroemiologists see as “the illocutionary force of directives” that 
resides in proverbs. Proverbs, in contrast to other general sayings, “expect or demand action” (as 
Cochran’s memorable new proverb aptly illustrates).81 
It is worth considering why Aristotle himself acknowledges that “some proverbs are also 
gnômai” (ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιµιῶν καὶ γνῶµαί εἰσιν, 1395a19-20), notwithstanding the 
substantive similarities between Aristotle’s definition of gnome and that of proverb by modern 
paroemiologists. As stated earlier, Aristotle cites numerous examples of gnômai from poetry – 
for example, “No right-thinking man should ever have his sons taught to be surpassingly wise” 
from Euripides’ Medea.82 Further, just before acknowledging that some proverbs are also 
gnômai, Aristotle describes how certain gnômai have become “frequently quoted and common” 
																																																								
78 Arist., Rhet. 1394a21-5 (trans. Martin): ἔστι δὴ γνώµη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ µέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον 
ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καµπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ 
πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν . . .  
79 Lardinois 1995: 12. 
80 Russo 1983: 121. 
81 Martin 2005: 4. 
82 Eur., Med. 294-5: χρὴ δ' οὔποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ//παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς·  
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(τεθρυληµέναις καὶ κοιναῖς, 1395a10-11). Among the examples he provides are Hector’s famous 
rejoinder to the seer Polydamas’ warnings in Iliad 12, “One bird sign is best: to fight for one’s 
country,”83 and the aforementioned verse attributed to the semi-legendary, early Greek poet 
Stasinus, author of the Cypria, “Foolish is the man who, having killed the father, leaves the 
children behind.”84 As Aristotle cites the latter expressly as a proverb (παροιµία) in the section of 
the Rhetoric that deals with quoting poets, oracles, proverbs, and well-known persons as 
witnesses, one may reasonably conclude that the repeated and widespread usage of this gnome 
has, for Aristotle, apparently resulted in its attaining the definitional status of a proverb. Put 
differently, for Aristotle, what Lardinois acknowledges as the “considerable overlap” between 
gnômai and proverbs appears to turn upon the frequency and extent of a gnome’s later usage by a 
large number of people. As Lardinois explains, “Aristotle realized that gnomes could develop 
into common sayings and, conversely, he must have concluded that some paroimiai were 
originally gnomai.”85 
In addition to explaining in his Rhetoric the close proximity between proverbs and 
gnômai, Aristotle apparently devoted an entire treatise to proverbs, where he opined that 
paroimiai are “the remnants of ancient philosophy lost in the great destructions of mankind, 
which were saved because of their succinctness (syntomia) and adroitness (dexiotês).”86 Modern 
paroemiologists have made use of both these elements in formulating their own definitions of 
proverbs, both in the ancient and the modern context, seizing upon the second element, 
adroitness (dexiotês), as indicating some sort of stylistic enhancement that, when coupled with 																																																								
83 Arist., Rhet. 1395a14 (quoting Il. 12.243:  εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀµύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης).  
84 Arist., Rhet. 1395a16-17: νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.  
85 Lardinois 1995: 16-17. 
86 Synesius, Encom. calv. 22.2-4 (trans. Lardinois): παλαιᾶς εἰσι φιλοσοφίας ἐν ταῖς µεγίσταις ἀνθρώπων φθοραῖς 
ἀπολοµένης ἐγκαταλείµµατα, περισωθέντα διὰ συντοµίαν καὶ δεξιότητα.  Diogenes Laertius lists among Aristotle’s 
voluminous writings a book on proverbs (Vitae philosophorum, 5.26). 
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succinctness (syntomia), results in handy, pungent phrases that are easy to recall and reuse.87 
With respect to dexiotês, Russo likens ancient Greek proverbs to their more modern English 
counterparts by dint of their shared use of rhyme, alliteration, and assonance – what Russo calls 
their “jingle” phenomenon.88 Both ancient Greek and modern proverbs often display a kind of 
“acoustic intensification” as displayed in the Greek kakou korakos kakon ôon (“a bad egg from a 
bad crow”) and its English analogue, “a bad bird, a bad egg.”89 Russo’s observation in this 
regard is consistent with historical linguist Calvert Watkin’s emphasis on the sonic complexity of 
poetic language in what Watkins calls  (rightly, in my estimation) a proverb in Hesiod’s Works 
and Days (which Lardinois, in accordance with his views outlined above, deems a gnome) (Op. 
25-6):  
καὶ κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ 
 
Potter vies with potter, and builder with builder, 
and beggar with beggar, and bard with bard. 
 
Watkins perceptively notes how the first set of phonetic figures “is alliterative, k- k- k-, the 
second more complex, k – t- t – kt- t – kt-, while the third shows alliteration with variation in the 
distinctive feature of aspiration: pt- pt- phth- .”90 
																																																								
87 Russo 1983: 121-22. Russo accordingly defines the proverb as “a brief, well-shaped complete sentence, 
understood by its users as anonymous in authorship, existing in the language for a long time in almost invariant 
form, stating a general truth that everyone would accept as important and useful to recall, and, because of this 
antiquity and accuracy of insight, sanctioned or almost ‘sanctified’ by the culture as wisdom of the elders, that must 
be taken seriously, must be accorded ‘weight,’ when spoken.” 
88 Russo 1983: 122. 
89 Russo 1983: 122. Indeed, we will see in Chapter 4 how Socrates uses the reverse of this proverb in Republic 5 – 
kallista archomenos . . . kallista teleutêseien (“the one who begins best likely ends best”) – to guide the debate on 
the equality of men and women. 
90 Watkins 1995: 30-1 (emphasis in original). In Chapter 4.1, we will see how Socrates employs elements of this 
proverb and then “re-forms” it to be a legomenon far more conducive to his vision of the ideal polis than Hesiod’s 
original. 
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Notwithstanding such instances of dexiotês, paroemiologists also take pains to emphasize 
that many proverbs, both ancient and modern, have no “striking structural features whatsoever” 
but make their point in plain language, such as the English proverb “Love is blind” and its 
ancient Greek analogue typhlos ho Erôs.91 This potential absence of any highly stylized language 
is apparently another feature shared by both proverbs and gnômai as Aristotle defines them. For 
example, Aristotle points to a rather plain gnome from Book 18 of the Iliad: “The Wargod is 
common” (ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος). 92 
There is also the matter of length. While both Aristotle and modern paroemiologists look 
to succinctness (syntomia) as a potential marker of proverbs, paroemiologist and literary scholar 
B.J. Whiting cautions that while a proverb “is usually short, it need not be . . .”93 Lardinois 
fastens upon syntomia as a quality not always shared by gnômai, given that the some of the 
examples of gnômai provided by Aristotle occupy as much as two metrical lines.94 Following 
Whiting’s observation, however, one could just as easily say the same of the proverb, “You can 
fool all of the people some of the time, and you can fool some of the people all of the time, but 
you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” Clearly, length alone is not dispositive. 
In light of all of the above, therefore, my working definition of proverb (which 
encompasses the Greek gnome, often translated by scholars as “maxim”) is as follows: a 
generally short, pithy statement that makes a generalizing assertion about the way the world 
works and thereby expects action by the listener (or reader), often (although not always) marked 
by certain structural features such as rhyme, alliteration and assonance indicative of stylistic 
																																																								
91 Russo 1983: 125. 
92 Rhet. 1395a15 = Il. 18.309: ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος. 
93 Whiting 1994: 80. 
94 Lardinois 1995: 14, n. 46. 
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enhancement and, lastly, the meaning of which cannot be understood comprehensively without 
reference to the particular context in which the statement is used.  
 The question of anonymity remains, insofar as Lardinois, drawing upon anthropological 
research, believes that gnômai are akin to the “wise words” of the Western Apache – that is, 
sayings which are the property of a particular speaker – whereas proverbs are anonymous, passed 
down from one generation to the next.95 Similarly, paroemiologists often think of proverbs as 
anonymous and existing in the language for so long a time that they have become nearly 
invariant in form.96 However, it is possible for proverbs to achieve this invariant status while still 
maintaining a link to their original coiner. A good example is the English proverb “All they that 
take up the sword shall perish with the sword” which, of course stems from the original Greek 
saying (πάντες γὰρ οἱ λαβόντες µάχαιραν ἐν µαχαίρῃ ἀπολοῦνται) in the New Testament’s Book 
of Matthew.97 It is reasonable to assume that a sizable number of people today would be able to 
identify Jesus of Nazareth as the ostensible coiner of the proverb. So too, in the ancient context, 
the common Greek proverb, “Hard is the good” (χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά), was attributed to Solon, as 
mentioned earlier. In short, proverbs may be, but need not necessarily be, anonymous.98 
It will be useful at times during the course of my argument in this dissertation to draw a 
distinction between gnômai and proverbs where a contrast needs to be made between “sayings” 
(legomena) that have clear origins in poetic texts and those that appear to have arisen exclusively 
out of folk culture. For example, as we will see in Chapter Two, Socrates refers obliquely to a 
common rural folk saying in Republic 1: “If a wolf catches sight of a man it renders him 																																																								
95 Lardinois 1995: 5 (citing Basso 1976). 
96 Russo 1983: 121. 
97 Ev.Matt. 26.52. The phrase is included as a proverb in Strauss 1998’s Concise Dictionary of European Proverbs. 
98 It is also possible for an anonymous proverb to gain so singular an association with a particular individual that 
s/he comes to be considered the ostensible coiner of the proverb. An example of this is Theodore Roosevelt’s use of 
a proverb of unknown origin, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”  
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voiceless”, which although a proverb, seemingly has no poetic origin and thus, would arguably 
be excluded from Aristotle’s definition of gnômai.99 It is helpful when one comes across such 
folk proverbs to acknowledge the distinction drawn by Aristotle in his Rhetoric between 
proverbs as “popular” or “demotic” sayings – that is, sayings that are “frequently quoted and 
common” (τεθρυληµέναι καὶ κοιναί, Rhet. 1395a10-17) – and, by contrast, gnomic statements 
that belong to the wisdom tradition of sages, whose cultural prestige and authority scholars such 
as Leslie Kurke set in opposition to “lower” generic forms such as prose fable.100 
 
1.3. Proverbs and Plato’s Republic 
 
Insofar as Plato’s Republic holds pride of place among Plato’s dialogues, both with 
respect to Plato’s views on the potential societal damage wrought by certain discursive practices 
and to the larger consideration of what constitutes a just society, the Republic serves as my 
primary text for exploring Plato’s use of proverbs (although I will refer on occasion to other 
Platonic dialogues). In addition, because the Republic is a progressive work, proceeding step by 
step inexorably forward in linear fashion toward a vision, as fully fleshed out as possible, of the 
ideal polis and the non-instrumental definition of justice which animates it, I will lead the reader 
through a book-by-book exploration of the Republic that looks to Plato’s use of proverbs as a 
guide for reading this most celebrated of Platonic dialogues.  
The authority and influence of proverbs is apparent from the very opening of the 
Republic, where Socrates and the elder Cephalus cite dueling adages from poetry. Accordingly, 
in Chapter Two, I show how these sayings turn into a “progression of proverbs” that effectively 																																																								
99 Resp. 336d5-7. The tenth century Byzantine Greek farming manual, the Geoponica, describes this curious saying 
in a section of the text that lists other popular, agricultural superstitions concerning animals: Geop. 15.1.8. See my 
discussion in Chapter 2.6. Of course, we cannot know for certain whether this “wolf” proverb, seemingly folkloric in 
its pedigree, might not ultimately be traced back to some now-lost poetic text. I am grateful to Andrea Nightingale 
for this observation. 
100 Kurke 2011: 330. 
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contain the first definition of “justice” in the dialogue. This definition, after having assumed 
several different formulations, ultimately takes the following form: “Just it is, to render to each 
what is owed him.” However, this pithy statement is only the beginning for Plato. Rather than 
offering a finalized “proverbial” utterance that seeks to end all conversation, Plato subjects this 
proverb to the cross examination of philosophic dialogue and subsequently weaves in other 
proverbs, several of which are demotic folk proverbs.  
In Chapter Three, I offer a new investigation into Plato’s attacks against poetry in 
Republic 2-3. In these books, Plato exposes what amounts to a contest among proverbs, many of 
which are excerpted from poems, all competing for influence over the Greek youths who learned 
them in school. Here lies the core of my argument that proverbs are an important component of 
any society’s dominant discursive practices or “vocabularies.” Because poetry constituted the 
Greeks’ prevailing vocabulary from which Greek culture derived its conceptual and moral 
framework, the “poetic” proverbs, i.e., those that had poetic provenance, figure significantly in 
Plato’s criticism of poetry. Poetry’s “false” view of the world is to be found in significant part in 
its proverbs. As I argue, we cannot understand Plato’s attack on poetry without also analyzing 
his treatment of proverbs. Plato wants only truly “just” proverbs to prevail in the agon of 
competing vocabularies. 
In Chapter Four, I examine the relationship between proverbial sayings and the 
construction of the ideal polis in Republic 3-7. In these books, Socrates and his interlocutors use 
numerous proverbs in their development of an ideally just state. Not surprisingly, many 
traditional proverbs run counter to the ideology of the just city. The interlocutors approach this 
problem by reinterpreting the proverbs or altering their formulations. In this way, Plato “re-
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forms” discourse. He develops a new vocabulary consistent with his notion of a state founded on 
justice. 
Finally in Chapter Five, I close by analyzing Plato’s increasing self-reflexivity in the use 
of proverbs in Republic 8-10. I argue that the proverbs in this last section of the dialogue offer a 
meta-commentary on the task of setting forth Plato’s philosophy in the medium of language. 
Plato uses proverbs that underscore the impermanence and potential fallibility of his own 
philosophic and discursive project – for example, the proverb “more malleable than wax is 
language.” At the close of the Republic, Plato indirectly acknowledges that his writing is 
ultimately subject to the agonistic dynamic found in the Greek literary tradition: no one can have 
the proverbial last word. Plato thus recognizes that his new mode of discourse – philosophy – 
necessarily enters into a larger agon of discursive practices. Accordingly, Plato cannot do 
without discursive devices that possess the same power to “bewitch” (κηλεῖν) and to “charm” 
(ἐπᾷδειν) as poetry – poetry which, as a result, is ultimately not to be categorically banished from 
the ideal state. The persuasive authority and influence of proverbs enjoy some connection to 
properties similar to those possessed by poetry. These cannot be discarded outright as Plato 
creates his new discursive practice of philosophy, aimed at upending the compromised and 
discredited set of prevailing discursive practices in Athens and thereby offering a radically new 
way of thinking and acting in the world. 
This dissertation arose out of my continued attempts to grapple with the singularity of 
Plato’s achievement on both the philosophical and literary level: How did this enigmatic author, 
using the voices of characters – primarily the voice of Socrates – in his dialogues, manage both 
to express ideas that proved decisive for Western thought, provoking controversy to this day, and 
to create works of unparalleled literary artistry? And what prompted him to do so? The very least 
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we can say is that something extraordinary happened in the encounter between a central figure in 
the late 5th century Athens intellectual debates, who famously wrote nothing and was ultimately 
put to death, and a younger man from a prominent family who, both as a visionary thinker and 
virtuosic writer, brought the whole of the Greek literary tradition to bear in the production of his 
oeuvre. 
The observation that the utopian character visible in so much of Plato’s writing and 
thought is necessarily a product of both politico-historical circumstances and literary-generic 
influences borders on the axiomatic. Yet understanding the extent to which socio-political reform 
and discursive reform are intertwined in Plato’s writing would seem to go a long way toward 
beginning to answer the twin questions I pose above. To my mind, proverbs – poetic 
compositions in their own right with imperatival force and the rhetorical power to name recurrent 
situations – demonstrate like no other form of discourse the interconnectedness between 
discursive practice and political practice. Moreover, reading Plato with a focus on his use of 
proverbs allows us to understand better that particular aspect of Plato’s utopianism that has 
proved alarming for so many readers: the seeming censorship of poetry. If it is less a matter of 
banning poetry outright than of recognizing the potential danger posed by quoting particular 
verses – especially those verses that enjoy a double life as proverbs – in a manner antithetical to 
a just society, Plato’s philosophy begins to resemble less rigid dogmatism than informed literary 
criticism. We begin to read Plato anew. We begin to see how “re-formed” verses, reformed 
proverbs, contain the potential to reform the discourse of a society that put to death the man 
whom Plato would ultimately look to as the principal literary embodiment of his utopianism, his 
vision of political and discursive reform. 
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Chapter Two – Republic 1:  Proverb’s Progress 
 
 
I don’t think writers are sacred, but words are. They deserve respect. If you get the right 
ones in the right order, you can nudge the world a little or make a poem which children 
will speak for you when you are dead. 
 
       Henry the playwright in Tom Stoppard’s The Real Thing 
 
 
2.1. Questioning Language’s Adequacy 
 
The Republic almost doesn’t begin. World literature’s foremost treatment of justice 
nearly breaks down before it gets started.101 Indeed, it comes as almost a shock after the 
dialogue’s justly famous opening sentence, narrated by Socrates about how he and Glaucon went 
down to the Piraeus to watch a festival in honor of the goddess, Bendis – a sentence to which 
Plato reputedly devoted painstaking labor and made successive revisions102 – to discover that the 
dialogue threatens to collapse with a threat of physical violence, albeit one that is seemingly in 
jest (327b1-c14): 
προσευξάµενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῇµεν πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν 
ἡµᾶς οἴκαδε ὡρµηµένους Πολέµαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραµόντα τὸν παῖδα 
περιµεῖναί ἑ κελεῦσαι. καί µου ὄπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόµενος τοῦ ἱµατίου, Κελεύει 
ὑµᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέµαρχος περιµεῖναι. Καὶ ἐγὼ µετεστράφην τε καὶ ἠρόµην ὅπου 
αὐτὸς εἴη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὄπισθεν προσέρχεται· ἀλλὰ περιµένετε. Ἀλλὰ 
περιµενοῦµεν, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων. 
Καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον ὅ τε Πολέµαρχος ἧκε καὶ Ἀδείµαντος 
ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς 
ποµπῆς. 
Ὁ οὖν Πολέµαρχος ἔφη· Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ µοι πρὸς ἄστυ ὡρµῆσθαι ὡς 
ἀπιόντες. 
Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 
Ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡµᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσµέν;   
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 																																																								
101 On Justice (ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ) was the Republic’s traditional second title, although one presumably not conferred 
until a later time, since neither Aristotle nor antiquity in general referred to it as as such. Jowett 1911: 5.  
102 Dionys. Hal., Comp. 25.209-218; Resp. 327a1-4: Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ µετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος 
προσευξόµενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅµα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόµενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον 
ἄγοντες (“I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, son of Ariston, to give my prayers to the goddess and 
because I also wanted to see how they were going to celebrate the festival, since this was the first time”). 
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Ἢ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ µένετ' αὐτοῦ. 
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἓν λείπεται, τὸ ἢν πείσωµεν ὑµᾶς 
ὡς χρὴ ἡµᾶς ἀφεῖναι; 
Ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεῖσαι µὴ ἀκούοντας; 
Οὐδαµῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. 
Ὡς τοίνυν µὴ ἀκουσοµένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. 
 
After having made our prayers and watched the festival, we headed back toward 
town. As we were making our way home, Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, spied us 
from afar and ordered his slave boy to run and tell us to wait for him. And the 
slave boy, coming up from behind, grabbed hold of my cloak and said, 
“Polemarchus bids you to wait.” And Glaucon replied, “We will definitely wait.” 
And then a little while later, Polemarcus arrived, along with Adeimantus, 
Glaucon’s brother, and Niceratus, son of Nicias, and some other men, apparently 
from the procession. 
Then Polemarchus said, “Socrates, you seem as if you are starting to head back 
to town.” 
“Not a bad guess on your part,” I replied. 
“Well, do you see how many of us there are?” he asked. 
“I sure do” 
“Well okay then,” he continued, “either prove yourselves stronger than us or 
remain where you are.” 
I then replied, “Isn’t there yet one other option left, namely, that we might 
persuade you that you should let us go?” 
He retorted, “But would you really be able to persuade men unwilling to 
listen?” 
“No way at all,” replied Glaucon. 
“Well all right then, we’re not going to listen, you can be sure of that.”  
 
In seriocomic fashion, Plato illustrates the ever-present frailty of language: it may 
ultimately prove inadequate to a speaker’s task of communicating effectively and meaningfully 
with another human being. How could Socrates and Glaucon ever hope to persuade men who 
refuse to listen? Plato signals the possibility that all linguistic-based means of communication are 
potentially subject to breakdown. Nothing guarantees that language can bridge division between 
communicants, not even Plato’s own finely crafted prose.   
Why does Plato choose to highlight this incapacity of language, this frailty of discourse, 
by positing a confrontation with a partner unwilling to engage in any meaningful dialogue?  
Certainly there is the famous irony, noted by many commentators, of Polemarchus’ playful threat 
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of violence if Socrates and Glaucon do not prove themselves “the better men” (κρείττους 
γένεσθε) – an irony unmistakable to a Greek audience, given that the actual violence suffered by 
the historical Polemarchus at the hands of the Thirty Tyrants only a few years after the events 
dramatized in the Republic.103 The real Polemarchus was arrested and imprisoned along with his 
brother, the orator Lysias; the property of the brothers was confiscated; and Polemarchus was 
ultimately ordered to drink hemlock.104 A shared dialogue among the Republic’s ten characters in 
the Piraeus is a world apart from the ruin visited upon Athens by the historical “Ten in the 
Piraeus” – the famous ten put in charge under the supervision of the Thirty Tyrants. Plato’s 
character, Polemarchus, knows not what demons he invokes when he jests that force trumps 
discourse. 
But there is an even deeper level of discomfiture with language, a distrust of any 
presupposed efficacy of the written or spoken word, which I maintain Plato seeks to impart to, 
and thus disquiet, his reading audience. That the exchange among the men occurs in the form of 
a shared witticism fails to mitigate the deadly serious implication of their remarks: Language, at 
its best, may simply be inadequate to bridge the divide between opposing parties and, at its 
worst, may utterly fail to prevent violence among men who refuse to listen. Attaining a shared 
discourse to arrive at a more just state comprised of more just individuals is the task Plato sets 
for himself in the Republic. The magnitude of this task is vast indeed, and Plato’s opening makes 
clear that no reader should blithely presume otherwise.  
The purpose of my dissertation is – as I have outlined in Chapter One – to demonstrate 
the extent to which proverbs are a critical component of Plato’s ambitious endeavor. One of the 																																																								
103 There is a general scholarly consensus that the Republic’s dramatic date is circa 410-411. See generally Boeckh 
(vol. iv) 1874:  437ff.  The Thirty Tyrants held power during an eight-month period from 404-403.  
104 Lysias escaped by bribing his captor and later had Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty, tried for the murder of his 
brother. 
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potential ways to reach across a discursive divide to men who refuse to listen (µὴ ἀκούοντας) 
might be to begin with a common “saying” (legomenon), one whose meaning – at least initially, 
on its face – seems apparent to all those who are engaged in the conversation. By beginning with 
proverbs that are already an essential component of the Greek wisdom tradition (sophia), Plato 
demonstrates how dialogue concerning one of the most important subjects imagineable – i.e., 
how people might live and behave more justly toward one another – can begin between 
individuals who have very different conceptions of just what “justice” is. 
The first book of the Republic sets the dialogue as a whole in motion, and this chapter of 
my dissertation will demonstrate how proverbs prove crucial to the interlocutors’ arrival at the 
first definition of justice and then move beyond it. Given what I maintain to be the especial 
prominence of proverbs in Republic 1 and their essential role in setting the stage for the rest of 
the dialogue, Book 1 merits a chapter on its own. As I explained in my opening chapter, I shall 
walk the reader through how Plato frames the progression of the Republic by foregrounding 
proverbs in the ongoing discourse. After first outlining a “progression of proverbs” that leads to 
the interlocutors’ initial definition of justice, I will then turn to an examination of that definition 
subjected to Socrates’ philosophic scrutiny, focusing in particular on how the task of riddling 
through the potential meanings a proverb may assume when looked at in new ways and applied 
to new situations mirrors the task of riddling over whether a speaker is speaking with irony. This 
analysis is important given the emphasis scholars have traditionally placed upon Socrates’ use of 
irony in Plato’s dialogues. I close the chapter by demonstrating Plato’s use of “folk” or 
“demotic” proverbs during Socrates’ encounter with the arch-sophist, Thrasymachus.  
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2.2. Cephalus and Socrates: Proverb versus Proverb 
 
The first major exchange of the Republic occurs between Socrates and Cephalus, 
Polemarchus’ aged father. During this conversation, the reader witnesses a remarkable duel of 
poetic quotations and sayings, all marshaled by Socrates and Cephalus in support of their 
respective positions on the topic of the supposed consolations of wealth in old age. Many of 
these quotations from poetry and other assorted sayings are, in fact, proverbs. Taken together as 
a series, they amount, in my reading, to a “progression of proverbs” that ultimately leads to the 
first definition of “justice” in the Republic. It is striking that Plato chooses in significant part to 
use proverbs as the literary device to initiate the interlocutors’ discussion of the primary subject 
of the dialogue, reflecting, I maintain, Plato’s demonstration of how common legomena – put 
differently, a shared discursive practice – might serve as the starting point for attempting to span 
societal division. 
After the mock threat of violence, the assembled characters repair to Cephalus’ home in 
the Piraeus. Cephalus begins the conversation with an Homeric sounding line. “You don’t come 
down to visit us very often, Socrates” (Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δὲ θαµίζεις ἡµῖν καταβαίνων, 328c6), 
says Cephalus in greeting as the men arrive. As more than one commentator on the Republic has 
observed, Oὐ δὲ θαµίζεις ἡµῖν approximates formular wording found (1) at Iliad 18.386 and 425, 
when both Charis and Hephaestus ask Thetis why she has chosen to visit their home at this 
particular moment since she has “not come much before this” (πάρος γε µὲν οὔ τι θαµίζεις) and 
(2) at Odyssey 5.88, when Calypso queries Hermes to the same effect with the identical 
formula.105 																																																								
105 D.J. Allan 1940: 82, is inclined to read οὐ τι (as did Astius) in place of Plato’s οὐ δὲ (found in the majority of the 
mss.), for Cephalus would then be quoting directly from Homer. Allan observes that “Cephalus is fond of quotation” 
and makes the further claim that “the whole scene here is slightly Homeric.” Shorey 1982: ad loc., also agrees that 
Cephalus’ “language recalls the Homeric formula, πάρος γε µὲν οὔτι θαµίζεις . . .”; Cf. Adam 1980: ad loc.    
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While Homer’s formular wording in these instances may not constitute a proverb in strict 
conformity with my definition as set forth above in Chapter One, it does have a proverbial 
quality by dint of the combination of a verb in the present tense (θαµίζεις) with an adverb that 
refers to past time, “before” (πάρος). Indeed, in his Vorlesungen über Syntax, Jacob Wackernagel 
cites this specific formula as an example of the “timeless present,” which, he notes, “alternates 
sometimes with the subjunctive and sometimes with that strange creature, the gnomic aorist.”106 
Moreover, in order to illustrate the quintessential use of the “timeless present,” Wackernagel 
turns to proverbs, citing the proverb “ἁ χεὶρ τὰν χεῖρα νίζει : manus manum lauat : eine Hand 
wäscht die andere (all, ‘one hand washes the other’).”107 As Wackernagel explains, 
Here the present forms – νίζει, lauat, wäscht – do not signify that this washing is 
proceeding now, in the present moment, as I speak, but that it proceeds in general, 
that it was so in the past and that it will be so in the future, too: it is something of 
general validity, which happens, or may happen, at any and every time.108 
 
One detects here a marked similarity between Wackernagel’s notion of how the tense “proceeds 
in general” and conveys a “general validity” with what I maintain to be a primary attribute of 
proverbs, in accordance with my definition: proverbs make a generalizing assertion about the 
way the world works and thereby expect action by the listener.109 There is something in the 
manner of a proverb at work in the Homeric phrase πάρος γε µὲν οὔ τι θαµίζεις. It is a 
generalizing statement with an imperatival aspect: the speaker subtly refers to the recurrent 
situation of the recipient’s past absence(s) with an implied demand that the recipient visit more 
regularly than has been his past practice.  
																																																								
106 Wackernagel 1926/2009: 158/203; Edwards 1991: ad loc.  
107 Wackernagel 1926/2009: 157/202. The English equivalent of the proverb is “You scratch my back, and I’ll 
scratch yours” or “One good turn deserves another.” 
108 Wackernagel 1926/2009: 157/202. 
109 See my full definition of proverb in Chapter 1.2. 
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Indeed, Cephalus’ “citation” of the Homeric source text serves to convey a mild 
chastisement – i.e., you don’t come to see me very often, down here in the Piraeus – which 
conforms to the valence of the Homeric formula employed by Charis, Hephaestus, and Calypso. 
Cephalus certainly goes on to make this point more clearly: “You ought to have. For if I still had 
the capacity to come to town without difficulty, you wouldn’t need to come here, but we would 
come see you.”110 As with the scenarios in Homer from where Cephalus’ phrase seems to 
originate, something more was expected in the past and thus is now demanded of the visitor in 
the present, who therefore suffers a faint rebuke for not satisfying a pre-assumed standard of 
cordiality. 
Moreover, by using language resonant of Homeric formula with a poetic pedigree, 
Cephalus vests himself with an immediate authority and recognizable erudition. As I pointed out 
in Chapter One, Aristotle in his Metaphysics makes the claim that some people will not take 
seriously a speaker’s arguments unless a poet’s words are cited in support.111 It was the Greeks’ 
practice to invoke poetic texts for the purpose of articulating and justifying any position or point 
of view.112 Cephalus, with his opening remark, adheres to that practice. To put it slightly 
differently, this is no random beginning to what will evolve into a profound engagement with the 
subject of justice, but rather an opening that originates from the words of a poet considered to be 
the virtual progenitor of Greek thought and culture.113 All roads lead to Homer, and Socrates 
faces a large task in propounding his own first remarks in response to such preeminent authority. 
																																																								
110 Resp. 328c7-d1: µέντοι. εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάµει ἦ τοῦ ῥᾳδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σὲ ἔδει 
δεῦρο ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ἡµεῖς ἂν παρὰ σὲ ᾖµεν. 
111 Arist., Metaph. 995a7-8. 
112 Halliwell 2000: 94-5. See, e.g., Herod. 7.161, where the Iliad is quoted to support a political position. 
113 See Havelock 1963: 28, who describes the Greek “conception of Homer as the Hellenic educational manual par 
excellence.” 
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Cephalus’ opening address to Socrates reveals how for the Greeks, people’s behavior is 
to be judged in part by standards pre-formulated in certain traditional expressions, frequently 
finding their origins in poetic texts. Any attempt by Socrates to alter discursive practice in the 
service of socio-political reform, on both the micro-level of his immediate interactions with his 
interlocutors, and on the macro-level of society at large must, at least in part, be grounded in pre-
established and pre-articulated formulations that are as compelling as the phrases with which 
they compete. In addition it is often difficult to separate certain proverbs and gnômai from the 
poetic logoi in which they find their origin – the citations of which are used to lend authority to a 
speaker’s discourse. Halliwell rightly notes that in “certain cases, we may be dealing with 
language that already had the status of quasi-proverbial sayings or catch-phrases,” of which 
Cephalus’ opening remark is arbuably one.114 And since for the Greeks, there was often little 
distinction between gnômai and nomoi,115 Cephalus’ deft deployment of Homeric phrase as a 
commentary and judgment on Socrates’ behavior is unsurprising if not entirely inevitable.  
Plato accentuates in his portrayal of Cephalus the central role that language, that 
discourse (logos), played in Greek life and thought. The joy – there is really no better word – that 
the Greeks derived from seasoned verbal exchange is apparent in Cephalus’ rather touching 
explanation of why Socrates’ company in shared conversation is so important to him: “You 
ought now to come here more frequently. I’d have you know that by however much all the rest 
of the pleasures of the body are dying away, the desires and pleasures of good conversation [αἱ 
περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυµίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί] increase all the more.”116 Logos is central to 
																																																								
114 Halliwell 2000: 97. 
115 Lardinois 1995: 5-6. Lardinois observes that because the Greeks cited gnomai in their law courts, even the 
difference between “laws” (νόµοι) and gnomic expressions “was not always clear cut.” 
116 Resp. 328d1-4: νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι. ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔµοιγε ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶµα 
ἡδοναὶ ἀποµαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὔξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυµίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί. 
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Cephalus’ enjoyment of and participation in the world. At the close of Book 9 of the Republic, 
Glaucon famously observes that the ideal community that Socrates, he, and the other 
interlocutors are attempting to construct necessarily exists in logos (592a10-b5). If Plato’s 
Socrates is to found justice in logos, he must observe the pre-established standards by which the 
Greeks considered certain logoi more compelling – namely, those supported by poetic 
authority.117 
And so in response to Cephalus’ citation of Homer, employed in something approaching 
the manner of a proverb (insofar as it instructs Socrates that the world functions by virtue of 
reciprocity in social intercourse and that better is expected of him in the future), Socrates is 
compelled to use words invested with a similar level of authority. In this he does not fail. After 
first emphasizing that he, in fact, takes great pleasure in conversing with the elderly (χαίρω γε 
διαλεγόµενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις, 328d7-e1), Socrates opens the discussion that will 
ultimately extend to the dialogue’s famed search for a non-instrumental definition of justice. He 
asks a question that concerns a subject clearly within Cephalus’ knowledge and experience but 
outside of Socrates’ own: old age. More importantly, he frames this deferential query first in 
language that finds its origin in Hesiodic proverb and second in a direct quotation from Homer. 
Indeed, the proverb that Socrates’ query first seems to evoke is from the most-cited lines 
of the entire Hesiodic oeuvre: the famous motif of two roads, one easy and smooth leading to 
vice, the other difficult and rough, leading to virtue, which Lardinois describes as a “double 
gnome.” 118 The extant literature expressly quotes this passage some twenty-six times; as 
																																																								
117 See Morgan 2004: 1-2, for an extensive analysis of how ancient philosophers both used and reconfigured the 
poetic and mythological tradition to serve their larger philosophic project: “These thinkers had to work with existing 
linguistic and literary resources. There was no option to make a fresh start, free from the constraints of previous 
language, since language itself is a creature of convention.”  
118 Lardinois 1995: 193. 
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mentioned previously, L.G. Canavero emphasizes how these lines “captured the imagination of 
the ancients.”119 Socrates says “I believe we ought to learn from the elderly, just as if from those 
who have journeyed on a certain road, one that we too perhaps must travel, just what sort of path 
it is, rough and difficult, or undemanding and easily traversable” (δοκεῖ γάρ µοι χρῆναι παρ' 
αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων ἣν καὶ ἡµᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία 
τίς ἐστιν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος 328e1-4). While not every commentator on 
Plato’s Republic has noted proximity to Hesiod’s proverb,120 I maintain that the resonance is 
palpable (Op. 287-92): 
τὴν µέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι 
ῥηιδίως· λείη µὲν ὁδός, µάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει· 
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν 
ἀθάνατοι· µακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶµος ἐς αὐτὴν 
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,   
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. 
 
Easily and frequently is Villainy seized; for the road is easy and very near. 
But before the road of Excellence the deathless gods have placed sweat. 
And the way to it is long and steep and rough at first.  But when one 
arrives at the summit, then it is easy, even though remaining difficult. 
 
The imagery of an easy and smooth path to wickedness juxtaposed against a long, hard 
and steep slog to virtue conforms powerfully and readily to the experience of most people, past 
and present. Indeed, we have our own corresponding modern proverb: “No pain, no gain.”121 
Koning observes that those lines of Hesiod’s poetry which came to enjoy such a rich Nachleben 
as the famous “two roads” passage did so because of three qualities: (1) they addressed a subject 
of considerable interest, (2) there was something new and original to the expression with regard 																																																								
119 Canevaro 2015: 7-8. See also Koning 2010a: 144. 
120 Ast. (1819-32) and Adam (1980) view Plato’s language as suggested by Hesiod, while neither Jowett and 
Campbell (1894) nor Allan (1965) mention any connection. In the commentary to his Loeb translation, Shorey 
(1982) notes the similarity between the two passages. 
121 Moreover, the imagery of divergent roads, the choice of which will profoundly affect the future course of one’s 
life, remains as durable now, with such works as Robert Frost’s The Road Not Taken, as it was in Hesiod’s time.   
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to form and content, and (3) they were broad enough in scope to be adaptable and capable of 
application to numerous different contexts. As outlined in Chapter One, Koning calls this 
proclivity of certain lines for future repeated quotation their “catchword factor.” In the case of 
the “roads” passage, it is indisputable that (1) aretê and the means by which to attain it were of 
central interest to Greek thought, (2) the divergent roads motif was highly original (M.L. West 
cites a Sumerian proverb and a Norse saying as the closest parallels122), and (3) the potential 
application of the road imagery and the terms kakotēs and aretê to any number of contexts 
proved broad indeed.123 Theognis uses them for their moral import,124 Xenophon looks to them 
to depict a vision of philosophic excellence,125 Plutarch and Philo use them as a meta-comment 
on the philosophic enterprise,126 Pindar employs them to contrast the “well-trodden” path of 
Homer with the “deep path” of Hesiod,127 and Prodicus famously uses them to construct the 
myth of two women, representing the roads to virtue and vice, that Heracles encounters.128 If 
Hesiod’s poem represents the first genuine instantiation of an anthology of gnômai – a genre that 
came to enjoy wide influence in the fourth century, with Works and Days serving as its 
figurehead – then the “two roads” passage arguably represents the foremost gnome among 
gnômai, given the frequency of its later citation and use by subsequent authors. It amounts to 
ancient literature’s equivalent of “going viral.” 
																																																								
122 West 1978: ad loc. 
123 Koning 2010a: 144-5. 
124 Thgn. 1027-8. 
125 Xen. Mem.2.1.20. 
126 Plut. Mor.77D. Philo De Ebriatate 150. 
127 Pind. Pae.fr.52h.11-20 
128 Prodic., frag. B2 Diels-Kranz = Xen., Mem.2.1.21-34. See Canevaro 2015: 7-8, for these citations, as well as a 
more extensive summary of the quotations of Hes. Op. 287-92. 
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Of course the very breadth of a verse’s potential for extrapolation and extendability to 
other, different contexts poses a risk of over-interpretation: What might seem an echo of an 
original is in fact nothing of the sort. The reader, rather, has lost sight of the “real” author 
altogether. As one of the anonymous readers for Richard Hunter’s 2014 Hesiodic Voices 
complained, “not every uphill climb is an allusion to Hesiod, surely.”129 Such a risk certainly 
exists in this instance, where Socrates does not quote Hesiod directly but simply employs the 
Hesiod-like motif of a road (ὁδός) with adjectives parallel to Hesiod’s own descriptive formulae, 
i.e., Plato’s τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή and ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος vis-à-vis Hesiod’s τρηχὺς, χαλεπή, and 
ῥηιδίως. Moreover, later in Book 2, Plato will in fact quote expressly an abbreviated section of 
the “two roads” passage when Adeimantus notoriously crops the lines so as to emphasize kakotês 
in making the claim that most people would rather take the easy road to villainy (Resp. 2.364c5-
d3).130 Why then has Plato not chosen to do so here, so as to leave no doubt? Despite the 
ambiguity, Hunter insists that “there is . . . indeed something ‘Hesiodic’ about the opposition 
between the possible paths of old age, the τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή and ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος, which 
Socrates evokes . . .”131 I concur, and maintain further that Adeimantus’ express quotation of a 
purposefully cropped section of Hesiod’s “two roads” passage supports an inference that 
Socrates’ invocation of a remarkably similar motif is intended to remind his interlocutors and us 
of Hesiod’s original. 
First, we should recall that Cephalus’ prompt for Socrates’ Hesiodic response was not a 
direct citation of Homer but rather a more subtle reference, with a pronounced Homeric 
undertone. A proportionate response would seem to call less for direct poetic quotation than a 																																																								
129 Hunter 2014: 34-5. 
130 See my extensive analysis of Adeimantus’ “misuse” of the two-roads passage from Hesiod in Chapter 3.2. 
131 Hunter 2014: 35, n. 86. 
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phrase more obliquely, but nonetheless palpably, imbued with a prior poet’s words – words that 
bear some relevance to the particular subject addressed, in this instance, old age. There is also a 
pleasing symmetry between Cephalus’ opening of the discourse in language resonant of Homer 
and Socrates’ rejoinder using a motif worthy of Hesiod.   
Within the long tradition of poetic citation and allusion in later Greek literature, Homer 
and Hesiod very often travel together.132 It is not surprising that Plato should follow in this 
tradition. Additionally, if Plato is to portray Adeimantus in Book 2 as misapplying Hesiod’s lines 
to champion a meaning that is their precise opposite – that is to say, the “divergent roads” 
proverb from Works and Days was most certainly intended to impel its Iron Age audience to 
strive for arête and not kakotês as Adeimantus sophistically manipulates the verse to imply – 
there is all the more reason that Plato should demonstrate a use of poetry consistent with the 
ideal of justice after which Socrates and his interlocutors strive, in addition to the extrapolation 
and extension of poetic authority to conversations, arguments, and speeches in support of that 
ideal. 
There is also the unmistakable contrast between Cephalus’ opening with a line from the 
progenitor of epic narrative and Socrates’ commencing with language rich in allusion to a 
famous double gnome from the undisputed father of didactic poetry. Plato deftly juxtaposes the 
narrative and didactic traditions, and Socrates’ preference for a crystallized gnomic expression 
over epic tale-telling suggests reservations on his (and Plato’s) part about the value to be gleaned 
from narrative and applied to his philosophic and reformist aims. It is worth reflecting that the 
first two instances of Socrates’ direct speech that we encounter in the Republic are, first, an 
expressed desire to avoid physical violence by means of verbal persuasion (327c7-14) and, 
																																																								
132 Hunter 2014: 12. This is one of Koning’s (2010a) major themes. 
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second, the invocation of didactic proverb (328e1-4). Irrespective (or perhaps because) of the 
challenges inherent in bridging the divide between communicants via discourse, Socrates opts 
for the equivalent of Hesiodic proverb in his opening query to Cephalus, in what will turn out to 
be an extended dialogue with many interlocutors on all manner of subjects.  
As a substantive matter, the parallel between Socrates’ query and Hesiod’s verse works 
well in the context of the conversation. Socrates’ question amounts to the following: “Will I have 
to contend with difficulty in traversing the road of old age, as I most certainly must in leading a 
life of excellence; or will it be easy, just like the way in which one slips effortlessly toward 
kakotês?” We should recall here modern paroemiology’s insistence that context is crucial in 
understanding a speaker’s use of a proverb.133 By re-framing the Hesiodic gnomic motif of the 
easy road to vice contrasted with the difficult road to virtue within the context of Socrates’ query 
to Cephalus about the nature of old age, Plato highlights the issue that will be of central concern 
in the Republic: the counterintuitive acceptance of the necessity to live justly for justice’s sake 
alone, without thought to incidental rewards, hard though that may be. And he does this within 
Socrates’ deference to Cephalus on a subject exclusively within the elder man’s purview, old 
age. Socrates’ question, thus, is prescriptive at the same time that it is deferential, deftly invoking 
poetic authority in the form of a Hesiodic proverb – in measured and proportionate response to 
Cephalus’ mild chastisement, invoking Homer – about the importance of striving toward aretê 
no matter how difficult the journey. Socrates’ Hesiodic proverb-based response allows the 
conversation between the two men to begin in earnest. 
																																																								
133 See, e.g., B. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1981: 111-120; A. Lardinois 1995: 1; R. Martin 2005: 5; J. Russo 1983: 126. 
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Socrates immediately follows up his Hesiodic rejoinder with the express quotation of a 
familiar phrase, found in numerous and varied texts, including Homer, the Homeric Hymns, 
Hesiod, and Herodotus (328e4-7): 
καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίµην ὅτι σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἶ 
τῆς ἡλικίας ὃ δὴ “ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ” φασιν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον 
χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.   
 
Moreover, from you, with pleasure, might I learn how it seems to you, since you 
are already at that period of age, which the poets describe to be “upon the 
threshold of old age,” whether it is a difficult time of life or just how you report it. 
 
“On the threshold of old age” is an image used frequently by ancient authors of both verse and 
prose.134 If Socrates’ previous invocation of poetic authority in language reminiscent of Hesiodic 
proverb had been somewhat oblique, there is certainly no mistaking now Socrates’ adherence to 
the Greek tradition of citing the poets in order to enhance his point. And while I would not 
classify the formula ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ as an actual proverb  (at least in this instance) but simply as 
figurative speech – i.e., what Martin would call a cliché135 – one could imagine certain contexts 
in which the phrase could be employed as part of a proverb, as the English proverb “The hardest 
step is that over the threshold” suggests.136 More to the point, Socrates makes clear in his act of 
directly quoting from poetry that his response to Cephalus is all of a piece. Just as Cephalus is 
capable of citing poetic authority in initiating the conversation with Socrates to include a 
reproach for Socrates’ infrequent visits, so too is Socrates adept at poetic allusion in offering a 
polite rejoinder, replete with Hesiodic proverb and Homeric phrase that also highlights one of the 
central concerns of Plato’s Republic: the difficulty of the path to excellence, in old age or any 
age. 																																																								
134 See, e.g., Iliad xxii.60, xxiv.487, Od. xv.246, 348, xxiii.212; Hymn. Aphr. 106; Hes. Op. 331; Hdt. iii.14. 
135 Martin 2005: 3. 
136 Strauss 1998: 1343. 
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There is a further connotation, I want to suggest, that the word oudôs –“threshold” – 
carries in this context, in addition to its association with the entrance to life’s final stage. One 
may well recall Odysseus disguised as an old beggar, questioning the swineherd Eumaios in 
Book 15 of Homer’s Odyssey, regarding the fate of Odysseus’ parents: “Come tell me now about 
the mother of godlike Odysseus / and his father, whom he left behind on the threshold of old 
age” (εἴπ' ἄγε µοι περὶ µητρὸς Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο / πατρός θ', ὃν κατέλειπεν ἰὼν ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ, 
346-7). So, too, in Book 23, Penelope attributes the misery (ὀϊζύν) the gods have betstowed upon 
Odysseus and her to the couple’s longevity, delighting in youth and then reaching the threshold 
of old age (ἀγάσαντο παρ' ἀλλήλοισι µένοντε / ἥβης ταρπῆναι καὶ γήραος οὐδὸν ἱκέσθαι, 210-
12). 
I want to suggest that polymetis Odysseus, who spends almost half of the Odyssey in 
disguise as an old, lowly beggar, bears a marked resemblance to Socrates, a man who defies easy 
class categorization. Nancy Worman observes that Socrates “bears a unique relationship to both 
the elite games of the symposium and the crude talk of the agora.”137 This is precisely the sort of 
chameleonic character who is just as at home sparring with the elite literati of the day, wielding 
dueling citations of verses (many of which are proverbs) learned and memorized from the works 
of the poets, as he is (we shall see) in deploying the more demotic proverbs of folk-wisdom, the 
sayings of the common people, in conversations with those whom he meets on the street or in the 
marketplace. To put it in Odyssean terms, this is a man who can hold his own against both lordly 
suitors and lowly beggars. We will see later in this chapter how some of the folk proverbs and 
sayings employed by Socrates make use of the vocabulary and imagery of a “low” idiom, 
consistent with what Worman describes as Plato’s “depiction of the philosopher as a low outsider 
																																																								
137 Worman 2008: 159. 
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who is (like, for instance, the disguised Odysseus) really more noble in attitude than those 
around him.”138 The roots of Socrates’ low-idiom discourse lie, per Worman, “in iambos and 
perhaps originally in anti-epic figures like Thersites and the beggar Odysseus.”139 And we will 
see (in Chapter 2.3) this identification between Socrates and Odysseus as old beggar developed 
even further in the Republic – e.g., one of the few verses to receive approbation by Socrates as 
worthy of quotation in Kallipolis is uttered by Odysseus in beggar’s guise: “Bear up heart of 
mine. For you have endured far worse than this” (τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' 
ἔτλης, Resp. 390d5 and Od. 20.18). For now, it is sufficient simply to note the parallels between 
the two figures and the means by which Plato subtly signals them to us through Socrates’ use of 
the phrase ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ in his poetically- and proverbially-rich rejoinder to Cephalus. 
Cephalus, in turn, responds enthusiastically to Socrates’ query about old age, and he does 
so first by reference to what he himself describes expressly as a proverb (παροιµία): “Often some 
of us of about the same age get together, thereby confirming the old proverb” (πολλάκις γὰρ 
συνερχόµεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸν παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασῴζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν 
παροιµίαν, 329a2-4). Cephalus, interestingly, does not quote the proverb itself, whatever it may 
be; it is enough simply to refer to what he has in mind as an “old saw” (Paul Shorey’s 
translation) and presume that Socrates and the rest of those in attendance understand the 
reference precisely. In other words, Cephalus’ use of the phrase “old saw” (τὴν παλαιὰν 
παροιµίαν) coupled with some other element in his response assumes a level of shared discourse 
and mutual understanding. The mere mention of the term paroimia is enough to achieve a level 
of commonality among communicants.   
																																																								
138 Worman 2008: 153, n. 2. 
139 Worman 2008: 155. 
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Scholars have derived the actual proverb that Cephalus has in mind from his phrase 
“having about the same age” (παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες): ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει (literally, “same 
age delights same age”), whose meaning is equivalent to that of our own familiar proverb, “birds 
of a feather flock together.”140 Indeed, Benjamin Jowett translates Cephalus’ entire sentence as 
“Old men flock together; they are birds of a feather, as the proverb says.”141 Shorey, who 
translates the proverb as “like to like”, makes the interesting suggestion that it may enjoy some 
relationship to Homer’s “as ever, the god brings like and like together” (ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁµοῖον ἄγει 
θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁµοῖον) which the goatherd, Melanthius, utters in reviling the swineherd Eumaios 
and Odysseus in beggar’s guise, when Melanthius comes upon Eumaios leading the faux tramp 
into town (Od. 17.218).142 Shorey’s attribution gains strength from what I maintain to be 
Socrates’ previous invocation of Odysseus disguised as beggar in his use of the phrase ἐπὶ 
γήραος οὐδῷ. Cephalus is responding in kind – one might even say “like to like” – with his use 
of Homeric proverb. The men are trading back and forth in poetic allusions sharing similar 
themes, couched in proverbial or near-proverbial statements. We will see this dynamic repeated 
again and again in the Republic. 
It is also notable that Cephalus’ proverb bears more than a passing resemblance to what 
we will see in Book 4 is Socrates’ provisional definition of justice, articulated in an expression 
that itself constitutes a gnome: “Justice is the doing of one’s own” (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν . . . 
																																																								
140 See, e.g., Adam 1980: ad loc.; Allan 1965: ad loc.; Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc.; Shorey 1982: ad loc. The 
proverb also appears in Socrates’ “first speech” in the Phaedrus (240c1-2), which H.N. Fowler translates as “birds 
of a feather flock together.” Akin to Cephalus’ need only to use an abbreviated phrase containing the term ἡλικίαν 
along with the word “proverb” (παροιµία) to evoke his listening audience’s recall of the full proverb (i.e., ἧλιξ ἥλικα 
τέρπει) is our contemporary colloquial shorthand “Birds of a feather” to call to mind the entire proverb. 
141 Jowett 1911: ad loc. 
142 Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
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δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, 433a8-9).143 As I will discuss in Chapter Four, this formulation is world 
literature’s first articulation of what has come to be known as the “Unique Aptitude Doctrine” 
(UAD), the theory that society is best served by each individual doing what she is best suited for 
and nothing else. Indeed, one might well rephrase the UAD as “like to like.” Doing what is akin 
to – i.e., “like” – one’s natural aptitude is what achieves justice for both the individual and 
society at large. Plato has again foreshadowed a major theme of the Republic with the opening 
utterances of the dialogue’s interlocutors, grounded as they are in proverbial adages. It is as if the 
Republic finds the initial progression of its narrative in its leading characters’ exchange of 
proverbs. One proverb follows another, all leading up to what will be the interlocutors’ various 
attempts to pin a definition on the concept of justice. 
Ramona Naddaff explains this phenomenon as reflecting a restraint necessarily imposed 
upon Plato’s Socrates by his society’s existing discursive practices and traditions: just as 
Cephalus uses poetry as “an encyclopedic and reliable sourcebook to reflect wisely on such 
varied topics as bodily desires [and] old age . . .,” so too does Socrates require “poetic musings 
as the material base to examine the concept of justice dialectically,” and, thus, he “uses the 
poetic meditations as the necessary hermeneutical horizon against which to present his later 
novel definition of justice as ‘one man, one art.’”144 Naddaff’s interpretation amounts to another 
way of articulating what Halliwell describes as the established Greek tradition of citing the poets 
in order to bolster one’s position on any particular subject under examination.145 
																																																								
143 See my discussion in Chapter 1.2 as to why this expression of an abstract principle qualifies as a proverb. 
144 Naddaff 2002: 12-13. 
145 Halliwell 2000: 96. Halliwell rightly notes how the works of the poets served as a “collection of materials stored 
up in the imagination – a source of phrases, ideas, motifs, and images that might be recovered in conversation, 
argument or public speech . . .” 
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My argument is that Socrates makes use of formulations by poets precisely to accomplish 
the larger project of discursive reform. The musings of the poets cannot be so easily cited and 
then discarded, irrespective of their “philosophic limitations” (Naddaff’s phrase). Rather, they 
must be reworked, reformulated, so as to achieve the greater “reform” on the level of both the 
individual and society that Plato’s Socrates seeks. If an underlying theme of Plato’s Republic is 
the equivalency between “soulcraft” and statecraft, I would go one step further in arguing that 
“wordcraft” is soulcraft is statecraft. 
As I have tried to show, the very first words emanating from both Cephalus and Socrates 
are quotations (or near quotations) of poetic authority (e.g., Cephalus’ οὐ δὲ θαµίζεις ἡµῖν and 
Socrates’ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ coupled with Hesiodic proverb). By contrast, Naddaff’s reading 
emphasizes how the men’s “logos, in turn, instigates the first direct citation of a poet” only at the 
point where Cephalus, following up on his reference to the proverb ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, now 
expressly cites Sophocles (329b7-c4) for the proposition that he is grateful for no longer being 
interested in “matters of love” (τἀφροδίσια) at his age but, rather, “has gotten away from the 
equivalent of a raging and savage master” (ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποδράς). 
I, however, want to go beyond Naddaff so as to draw attention to just how crucial poetic 
formulations were to the ancients’ practice of and capacity for striking up a conversation and 
achieving, from the very outset of the exchange of words, some degree of mutual understanding 
with another person. 146 Each poetic allusion and formulation calls for a co-equal response. The 
initiator of the conversation (in this instance, Cephalus) can have confidence that his respondent 
(here, Socrates) picks up on his poetic allusion and can answer in kind. The respondent, Socrates, 
then in turn does the same, and the conversation proceeds. What is interesting from my 																																																								
146 To be fair, Naddaff in a footnote does qualify her emphasis on Cephalus’ direct citation of Sophocles by noting 
Socrates’ earlier allusion to Hesiodic proverb by dint of his “two roads” motif. Naddaff 2002: 139, n. 6.   
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perspective is how intricately and intimately proverbs are bound up with the men’s respective 
poetic allusions and formulations. It is by Socrates’ deft manipulation of these, as we shall see, 
that Plato begins to sketch out a vision of a reformed discourse underlying a reformed and just 
state comprised of just individuals.    
 Socrates counters Cephalus’ vision of old age borne well (bolstered by citation of poetic 
authority from Sophocles) with a phrase that has the syntactic and semantic shape of a proverb: 
In response to Cephalus’ claim that it is not old age in itself that determines whether the path of 
life is difficult or easy but a man’s “disposition” (τροπός), Socrates first announces that many 
believe that old age proves easy for a man like Cephalus, not by virtue of his tropos, but rather 
because of his sizeable wealth (οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι, 329e3-
4). Socrates then appends what paroemiologists call a literal, non-oppositional proverb: “For they 
say that many are the consolations for the wealthy” (τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραµύθιά φασιν 
εἶναι, 329e4-5.) 147  While Shorey points out that this phrase bears some similarity 
(anachronistically) to a line of verse from Anaxandrides,148 its seeming authority is more a 
function of its quotation by numerous people – i.e., “they say” (φασίν) – than from attribution to 
any specific poet. In other words, Socrates now attempts to counter Cephalus’ direct citation of 
poetic authority with what seems to be a widely quoted statement of proverbial wisdom.  
We see here what folklorists have described as the universal social function of proverbs:  
they are a device for externalizing and distancing authority.149 As the folklorist Alan Dundes 
explains, the phrase “they say” serves to project the responsibility for the proverb’s admonition 																																																								
147 See my discussion of the definitional parameters of “proverb” in Chapter 1.2. While some paroemiologists may 
prefer to denominate literal, nonoppositional proverbs such as “Honesty is the best policy” and “Virtue is its own 
reward” by some other term (e.g., “maxim” or “aphorism”), most modern paroemiologists consider them to be 
genuine proverbs. See Russo 1997: 52; Dundes 1981: 52-53. 
148 Shorey 1982: ad loc. (citing Stob. Florileg. 68). 
149 Martin 2005: 5. 
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onto an anonymous past. This function makes proverbs especially useful in generational 
encounters, for example, when a parent scolds a child. As Dundes explains, “The parent is but 
the instrument through which the proverb speaks to the audience.”150 Similarly in this instance, 
Socrates is but the instrument by which the proverb attributing Cephalus’ self-vaunted 
equanimity in the face of old age to his wealth, not his disposition, is spoken. It is not Socrates to 
whom Cephalus must answer in kind but the larger community and its traditions, handed down 
from previous generations – i.e., the “they” of phāsin. 
Cephalus is compelled to acknowledge that there is some truth in what the people say and 
then responds, again in kind, with a proverb he attributes to Themistocles (329e6-330a3): 
καὶ λέγουσι µέν τι, οὐ µέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται· ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεµιστοκλέους εὖ 
ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουµένῳ καὶ λέγοντι ὅτι οὐ δι' αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν 
εὐδοκιµοῖ, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ὢν ὀνοµαστὸς ἐγένετο 
οὔτ'ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος.   
 
There’s something to what they say, although not as much as they suppose. But 
the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little 
island of Seriphus grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself 
but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever 
have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an 
Athenian.151 
 
It is as if the dialogue has now arrived at a point where the characters are landing their respective 
blows via dueling proverbs. Paroemiologists and folklorists have long noted how the proverb’s 
																																																								
150 Dundes and Arewa 1964: 70. 
151 Trans. Shorey (with modification). 151See Russo 1997: 58-9. From a hyper-technical standpoint the statement that 
Cephalus attributes to Themistocles falls under the heading of apothegm per the original definition as supplied by 
Russo: a “wise and pithy saying uttered by a distinguished individual at [an] opportune or critical moment.” Russo 
explains, however, that the two separate terms “proverb and “apothegm” represented for the Greeks the development 
over time of multiple terminology with overlapping meanings and that an apothegm ultimately came to be 
understood as a “virtual synonym of the maxim or gnome.”As explained in Chapter 1.2, for purposes of my 
dissertation there is no functional difference between a proverb and an apothegm. 
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social function of externalizing and distancing authority acts similarly to judicial precedent: the 
one who wins any verbal dispute is the one who best applies proverbs to the situation at hand.152   
 This dynamic is, of course, consistent with the general Greek cultural practice of 
quotation. In Plato’s Republic, the reader bears witness to the dialogic interplay of the 
interlocutors’ repeated invocations of assorted proverbial expressions of wisdom in support of 
their respective positions from a virtual storehouse of such sayings collected over time and that 
came to be associated with the Greek wisdom tradition (sophia). Per Halliwell’s reading, Plato 
evinces a tendency throughout his work to “embed” issues of ethical concern inside his 
representation of the Greek practice of quotation. Plato’s tendency in this regard is consistent 
with the Greek tradition of quotation’s “propensity to locate within poetic texts specific 
‘utterances’ or ‘sayings’, rhêmata, which may then be treated as encapsulating important 
insights, principles, or views of life . . .”153 Indeed, this propensity harmonizes with the sophia 
tradition. 
But I want to emphasize a further point: the propensity to cite certain rhêmata extends 
beyond the poetic sayings that seem to fall most naturally and easily under the rubric of the 
Greek wisdom tradition. Halliwell acknowledges this: the “category of ‘sayings’ is, of course, 
much wider than that of poetry, and could include anonymous proverbs, folk wisdom, and the 
pronouncement of non-poetic sages.”154 As we have just seen, one of Socrates’ rejoinders to 
Cephalus is in the form of what appears to be the citation of a popularly quoted saying with no 
																																																								
152 Martin 2005: 6, citing J. Messenger 1959, who documents the use of proverbs in some African societies within 
the judicial process as legal precedents for arguing a litigant’s case. 
153 Halliwell 2000: 98. 
154 Halliwell 2000: 98. Halliwell explains further that “poet is ‘in competition’ (ἐρίζοντα, [Resp.] 343d3) with 
philosopher, and their disagreement can be traced and read, on Socrates’ view, in the conflicting sayings in which 
they condense their moral wisdom.”  
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specific poetic pedigree (i.e., “For they say that many are the consolations for the wealthy”).155  
Moreover in Plato’s literary engagement with the Greek cultural practice of quotation and 
citation, the characters’ adoption of the convention – especially in the case of Socrates – serves 
as a springboard by which the speakers (throughout the dialogues) can begin to refashion, 
reformulate and openly compose their own quotable wise words, which themselves qualify as 
genuine proverbs under my definition.156  
Accordingly, Cephalus appends his own proverb to his citation of the adage he attributes 
to Themistocles – an adage that he frames similarly to the Themistoclean template but now 
applied to the particular context and subject matter under discussion with Socrates, namely, 
whether wealth allows a person to bear old age more easily than the one who lacks wealth 
(330a3-6): 
καὶ τοῖς δὴ µὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, 
ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικὴς πάνυ τι ῥᾳδίως γῆρας µετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι οὔθ' 
ὁ µὴ ἐπιεικὴς πλουτήσας εὔκολός ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο. 
 
That same principle [i.e., the one embodied in Themistocles’ proverb] applies 
well to those who aren’t wealthy and who endure old age with difficulty, because 
neither would a right-thinking man endure all that easily old age coupled with 
poverty, nor would a wrong-headed man become content unto himself, even being 
wealthy. 
 
On the level of structure and syntax, Cephalus’ newly minted wisdom statement possesses 
several of the attributes that Russo identifies as characteristic of the ancient Greek proverb. The 
adage divides neatly into two halves of roughly equal length, affording the sentence a rhythmic 
balance that supports what Russo describes as the “apparently universal tendency toward binary 
structure in proverbs.”157 In addition, the parallel structure reflected in the line’s repetition of the 																																																								
155 Resp. 329e4-5: τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραµύθιά φασιν εἶναι. 
156 See my definition of proverb in Chapter 1.2 
157 Russo 1983: 124. 
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same words and grammatic-syntactic structure serves to underline the juxtaposition between the 
“right-thinking man” (ὁ ἐπιεικὴς) and the “wrongheaded man” (ὁ µὴ ἐπιεικὴς). And on the level 
of content, the adage concords easily with Themistocles’ version: the “right-thinking man” 
corresponds to Themistocles, hypothetically born in Seriphus, and the “wrongheaded man” 
corresponds to the man from Seriphus, born in Athens (again, according to Themistocles’ 
hypothetical). So, semantically and syntactically Cephalus proves himself to be an able wielder 
and assembler of proverbial expressions of wisdom, worthy of no less exemplary a Greek model 
than Themistocles. 
One should note that Plato’s Cephalus has in fact altered the Herodotean version of the 
story, in which the critic of Themistocles is Timodemus of Aphidnae who, out of envy, insists 
that Themistocles would never have received honors from Sparta had he not been an Athenian.  
In Herodotus’ telling of the story, Themistocles retorts, “I would not have been honored by the 
Spartans had I been from Belbina, nor would you, sir, even being an Athenian” (οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ ἐὼν 
Βελβινίτης ἐτιµήθην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὔτ' ἂν σύ, ὤνθρωπε, ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος, Hdt. 7.125). 
In Plato’s version, the island of Belbina (a small island about two miles south of Sunium in the 
entry of the Saronic Gulf, today the island of Saint George) has become the Cycladic island of 
Seriphus and Themistocles’ detractor a Seriphean; most commentators assume that Herodotus’ 
version is the more accurate of the two accounts.158 But as James Adam has made clear, it was 
the Platonic version that “afterwards held the field.”159 
While the alteration of a few small details might, on first consideration, appear 
insignificant in the rendition of a proverb, the critical role in the larger Greek educational and 
rhetorical framework of the fourth century practice of compiling gnomic anthologies and 																																																								
158 See Adam 1980: ad loc.; Allan 1965: ad loc.    
159 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
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students’ memorization of gnômai demonstrates the importance, I maintain, of an author’s 
quotability quotient.160  Plato may well have set his generic sights on creating, as part of his body 
of uniquely philosophic writing, his own collection of gnômai which would have the potential to 
be cited repeatedly in the manner of the gnômai from Hesiod’s Works and Days and Precepts of 
Cheiron. Thus, alter a few of the tangential, background facts of a proverb, include the now 
refashioned adage within the larger argument about how a person may bear the indignities of old 
age with equanimity, and you have the potential to see your version become the version that 
future generations will read, memorize, and recite verbatim.161 In nearly a single stroke, Plato 
alters Themistocles’ saying as told by Herodotus and affixes his own, new proverb – relayed by 
Cephalus – so as to rework and personally contribute in his own way to the ongoing Greek 
tradition of quoting and compiling the pithy maxims that comprised an integral part of Greek 
sophia. It is in such passages as this section of the Republic that Plato’s reformist sensibility 
emerges. 
While the refashioned proverb is, of course, Cephalus’ (and not Socrates’) handiwork, the 
reformulation ultimately arises from Plato, who has given us a more fully-dimensioned view of 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of wealth in enduring life’s hardships if one is not 
reasonably minded (µὴ ἐπιεικὴς), and of the limitations faced even by one who is reasonably 
minded (ἐπιεικὴς) when afflicted with poverty. Plato reveals how Socrates’ more uni-
dimensional proverb  (“They say that many are the consolations for the wealthy”) is insufficient 
to the task of Socrates and Cephalus achieving mutual understanding and agreement. The 
																																																								
160 See generally, A. Ford 2010; B. Graziosi 2010; R. Hunter 2014: 7, 77-8.  
161 This approach is consistent with the observation by Mark Griffith1990: 195, that in the agon of Greek writers’ 
attempts to outdo their rivals’ versions of traditional stories and themes, proposing new or alternate lineages, 
parentages, and origins was a common means of distinguishing one’s own rendering of a commonly treated subject. 
See Chapter 3.3 for my discussion of this dynamic in the context of competing versions of the “Ring of Gyges” 
stories in Herodotus and the Republic.  
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wisdom of the many (φασίν) has been successfully refuted. On the level of what Lardinois would 
describe as the “narrative context” of the dialogue – that is, how the proverbs spoken by the 
author himself or his characters relate to the narrative of the work as a whole and the audience162 
– Cephalus has coined a better maxim than Socrates, but one that is still incapable of 
demonstrating why a man should live justly for justice’s sake alone, rather than for any external 
rewards that living justly might confer. 
It is in the exchange of dueling adages that Plato subtly hints once again, as at the 
opening of the dialogue, at the ever-present potential for failure of communication between 
parties whose values differ too fundamentally from each other. Socrates asks Cephalus whether 
he inherited his wealth or acquired it on his own, since in Socrates’ estimation, men who are 
themselves the source of their riches are far more enamored of their wealth than those who 
inherit it.  Socrates asserts that it borders on the impossible for him to converse with the former, 
as such men care about nothing except their money.163 Fortunately for Socrates, Cephalus 
appears to him to fall into the camp of the latter. Cephalus confirms that Socrates has correctly 
assessed his pedigree and concurs with Socrates’ observation on the difficulty of conversing with 
“self-made” men.164 
At this point in the Republic, the narrative discourse begins to turn toward the key subject 
of the dialogue, justice. After Socrates asks what Cephalus has discovered to be the greatest 																																																								
162 Lardinois 1995: 2-3. In addition to the “narrative context” Lardinois identifies what he calls the “discourse 
context” which consists of the immediate linguistic context of the gnome (e.g., “what kind of words or phrases 
accompany it”) and the “social context,” that is, the relationship between the speaker of the gnome and his or her 
addressee.  
163 Resp. 330c6-8: χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ συγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον. The corrupting 
influence of wealth as manifested in particular by its proclivity to render all other subjects meaningless is a theme 
repeated throughout Plato’s dialogues. See, e.g., Ap. 29d6-e3; Symp. 173c2-d3. One wonders how Plato might have 
depicted the conversation between Socrates and Cephalus proceeding at this juncture, if Plato had depicted Cephalus 
as a man who had acquired his wealth entirely on his own. For whatever reason, Plato forgoes what appears to be the 
greater discursive challenge. 
164 Resp. 330b1-c9. 
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benefit (τί µέγιστον . . . ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι) conferred by his wealth, Cephalus responds by 
suggesting that it is the peace of mind he enjoys as he approaches death, because his wealth 
enables him to make sacrifices to the gods and to fulfill any debts owed. The result is that 
Cephalus is not plagued by fears of punishment in the afterworld, the stories of which (λεγόµενοι 
µῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου) often appear far more real to one at the end stages of life than they 
previously did, operating as a source of ridicule (καταγελώµενοι τέως) when a man passed 
through a younger stage of life.165 To bolster his point, Cephalus quotes a gnome from Pindar, 
adding to it his idea of a man freed from the fears of torments in the afterlife by virtue of his 
wealth: “With him lives sweet Hope, heart-fostering nurse of old age, which most of all steers 
mortals’ much-veering judgment.”166 For Cephalus, wealth ensures that one will never, not even 
unintentionally, cheat or lie to his fellow man (τὸ γὰρ µηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ 
ψεύσασθαι) and may depart to the afterlife owing neither sacrifices to the gods nor mammon to 
man (µηδ' αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήµατα, 331b1-3). 
From Cephalus’ reasoning, Socrates extracts what he understands to be Cephalus’ 
definition of justice: to tell the truth and to pay back one’s debts (ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ 
τις ἀποδιδόναι, 331d2-3). This formulation amounts to the first formal definition of justice in the 
Republic. It is worth pausing to note how the interlocutors arrived at such an articulation: by 
working through a progression of dueling proverbs and poetic citations, traded back and forth, 
culminating in what will now serve as the point of departure for all succeeding attempts to define 
justice. 
  
																																																								
165 Resp. 330d1-331a1.  
166 Resp. 331a6-9; Pi., frag. 214 Maehler: γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν / ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ / ἐλπὶς ἃ µάλιστα 
θνατῶν πολύστροφον / γνώµαν κυβερνᾷ (trans. Race). 
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2.3. Proverbs, Elenchus, and the Question of Truth 
 
At this moment one might read into Plato voicing through his characters’ “proverb’s 
progress” an overarching condemnation of the entire Greek tradition of poetic citation and the 
use of various legomena in support of an argued position. Why? Because such unilateral 
pronouncements have not been subjected to the elenchus. Absent rigorous examination using the 
dialectic process, one cannot be sure that bald sayings, despite whatever poetic beauty and 
seeming wisdom they may possess, impart the truth. Martin, for example, argues that in many 
ways the Greek wisdom tradition saw its end in the figure of Socrates, a man who “constantly 
broke the frame of performance by confronting his audience in dialogue and refusing to rely on 
the power of emphatic, unidirectional self-representation.”167 Backing such an interpretation is 
Socrates role-playing the casuist towards the general principle that Cephalus has outlined by 
virtue of the men’s successive citations and reformulations of various sayings (331c1-9): 
Παγκάλως . . . λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσοµεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι ἄν τίς τι παρά του 
λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε µὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; οἷον 
τοιόνδε λέγω· πᾶς ἄν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος 
ὅπλα, εἰ µανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι οὔτε χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ 
ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα ἐθέλων τἀληθῆ λέγειν 
 
Beautifully said, Cephalus. But are we going to say that this is, without caveat, 
justice itself, that is, telling the truth and paying back debts, or is it possible to 
perform these very actions sometimes justly and sometimes unjustly? Here’s an 
example. Everyone would presumably say that if someone borrowed weapons 
from a sane friend, he should not return the weapons if the friend demanded them 
back after he had gone mad; the borrower wouldn’t be acting justly in such a case, 
nor would he who chose to speak only the truth to such a man. 
 
																																																								
167 Martin 1993: 124. Martin’s conception of Socrates as “endpoint” to the particularly Greek evolution of sages 
parallels Morgan’s vision of Socrates as self-conscious inheritor and canny re-inventor of the wisdom tradition that 
was connected with Delphic religion and authority: “Neither a prolix deliverer of Pythian orations, nor a dedicator of 
gnomai, he is the ideal exegete of Apollo’s pronouncements and instructions, since he reacts to the god on an 
ongoing basis, through his life. And that is why Socrates is not a Sage, a Sophos, but something more realistic, a 
philosophos” (Morgan 2009: 566). 
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It is undeniable that in quintessential Socratic fashion, the chinks in Cephalus’ proverbial 
armor have been exposed, and one is inclined to applaud Socrates’ sharp capacity for reasoning 
and argumentation. Yet Plato does not leave a reader wholly comfortable with a response of 
unreserved praise. First, there is the ever-present risk of seeming a mere quibbler if one adopts a 
casuist’s approach. There are obviously exceptions to every rule, and one flirts with the prospect 
of being painted with the broader brush of sophistry – a coloring that Plato presumably sought to 
avoid in sketching the portraits of his master in his dialogues – when one argues from the letter, 
rather than the spirit, of the law.168 One also wonders just how much credit Socrates should in 
fact be given for putting an ultra-fine point on an admittedly broad principle that serves to 
provide comfort to an old man nearing the end of his life. It is, after all, immediately following 
this challenge by Socrates that Cephalus retires from the conversation. 
Moreover, on the level of metapoetics, Plato has just tossed what is potentially an 
enormous spanner in the works of his entire literary endeavor. Socrates has just held out the 
express possibility that “truthfulness” (ἀλήθεια) is not necessarily commensurate with “justice” 
(δικαιοσύνη). The ramifications of this for any discursive project, not the least of which is 
Plato’s own prose, are far-reaching. How are we to trust any discourse in the first instance? How 
are we to place faith in any discursive practice as having even the slightest potential to provide 
us with a clearer understanding of our world and ourselves? In addition, if justice may 
necessitate, even if only on occasion, the telling of falsehoods, how are we to conceive of the act 
of “telling?” Who precisely is the “teller” we can trust, and whose “justice” dictates the 
potentially false communications made in the service of such “justice?” On which such 
																																																								
168 See, e.g., Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc. 
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occasions is falsehood justified? And is there a “true” discourse that might impart to us 
knowledge of what the category of such occasions necessitating falsehoods is? 
In short, we seem to have reached a moment not unlike that in the proem of Hesiod’s 
Theogony, where the Muses enigmatically proclaim to Hesiod during his Dichterweihe, “We 
know how to say many false things similar to genuine things / and we know how, when we want, 
to proclaim true things” (ἴδµεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύµοισιν ὁµοῖα, / ἴδµεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωµεν 
ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι, 27-8). The Republic’s contemplation of the possibility that the truth will not 
always be told in the service of justice stands in marked contrast to the Apology, where Socrates 
promises without qualification to tell the jurors “the whole truth” (πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, Ap. 
17b8), presaging our own modern-day standard by which witnesses swear before testifying in 
court.169 By contrast in Book 3 of the Republic, Socrates will demonstrate all too vividly his 
ability to speak falsehoods in the purported furtherance of justice when, drawing upon Hesiod’s 
model in the Works and Days, he establishes the  “noble lie” of the myth of the races which he 
insists must be told to Kallipolis’ inhabitants. How are we to explain the difference between 
Plato’s two texts? Is the question simply one of genre – that is, in the Apology, Plato is working 
with forensic oratory, whereas the Republic is something wholly different? 
The Republic’s explicit confrontation of poetry’s role in society helps explain, I think, 
Socrates’ foray into what appears a hazy netherworld between truth and falsehood in poetic 
representation, where strict demarcations may be avoided. We arrived at this initial definition of 
justice (i.e., telling the truth and paying back debts) not by the elenchus, but by a progression of 
proverbs and quotes from poetry, a sizable number of which themselves qualify as proverbs. But 
it is worth asking whether a dialogue among multiple parties can truly be said to have 
																																																								
169 Tennant 2015: 46. 
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“progressed” if such progress occurred through the participants’ trade in poetic proverbs and 
quotations rather than by true dialectic and elenctic cross-examination. 
I contend that it would be a mistake to interpret the Republic (and the rest of Plato’s 
oeuvre) as evincing nothing but skepticism toward poetry and other compelling, poetry-like 
formulations of language (such as proverbs) that have not necessarily been tested via the 
elenchus for their relative truth or falsity. While it is nonetheless true – and indeed, is certainly a 
large part of my argument throughout this dissertation – that Plato found many of the pre-
existing formulations of wisdom at the level both of formal poetry and of folk culture ultimately 
inadequate to express and represent the content of his philosophic project, the power of the 
sophia tradition and of quoting poetry that often had a gnomic quality was not, in Plato’s 
estimation, to be summarily discounted. I would add to Martin’s analysis that while Plato’s 
Socrates may well have broken the frame of the sages’ performative use of quotations from 
poetry, he could not have done so without employing the pre-existing discursive tools at his 
disposal.170 Creating the new discursive practice of philosophy necessarily rested upon Plato’s 
ability to employ the then-current modes of discourse. By doing this, Plato is able to call into 
question the truth status of these very modes of discourse. This is a crucial move in inventing the 
new genre of philosophy – a genre in which the wisdom tradition’s “power of emphatic, 
unidirectional self-presentation” no longer holds undivided sway. 
Halliwell explains that one detects in Plato’s citations of poetry:  
a constant interplay between Plato’s willingness to reflect and even perpetuate, 
with modifications, the traditional power of poetic authority, and his need to 
submit this authority – by a whole repertoire of dramatic, linguistic, and 
conceptual means – to the standards of discourse and reason embodied in, and 
advocated by, his own philosophical writing.171 																																																								
170 See Morgan 2004: 1-2. 
171 Halliwell 2002: 109. 
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Thus, it is not simply a matter of summarily dismissing all of Plato’s build up to the first 
definition of justice as a faulty assemblage of progressing proverbs – a good number of which 
enjoy a poetic provenance – to be jettisoned once the dialogue gets down to the more serious 
business of elenctic inquiry. 
Indeed, Socrates in fact commends in Book 2 “making falsehood like truth as much as 
possible, in such a way that we make it useful” (ἀφοµοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι µάλιστα, 
οὕτω χρήσιµον ποιοῦµεν, 382d2-3).172 Truth-telling is apparently not an entirely straightforward 
affair in either Socrates’ own discursive practice or poetic expression. Some sort of alliance 
seems to exist between the two. 
Plato consistently demonstrates a keen awareness of the persuasive power of certain types 
of figurative speech, to which unquestionably belong proverbs – again many of which have their 
origin in poems. It would therefore be a mistake to reduce, as commentators on the Republic 
reaching as far back as Cicero have done, the citation of proverbs in this section of the dialogue 
to the overly simplistic generalization that (in the words of Jowett and Campbell) “poetical and 
proverbial expression . . . is better suited” to an elderly, good-natured gentleman like Cephalus, 
who possesses “the mannerism and garrulity of age, the love of anecdote and quotation” than to 
the younger men of a later generation, “deeply versed in the Sophistical and dialectical 
method . . .” 173  As we shall see, Plato’s sustained use of proverbs throughout his work 
demonstrates the considerable influence such figurative speech continues to hold over the 
																																																								
172 For the proximity of Resp. 382d2-3 to Op. 27-8 see Belfiore 1985; Pratt 1993: 146-56. 
173 Jowett and Campbell 1894: 16. See generally Cicero Ep. Ad Att. 4.16: 3.1-9.  
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discourse of all ages, not just that of the elderly, including even Sophistic and dialectic discursive 
practices.174 
 
2.4. Elenchus Meets Proverb: Socrates and Polemarchus 
 
Dismayed by Socrates’ attempt to dismantle with casuistry Cephalus’ definition of justice 
as the obligation to tell the truth and pay back one’s debts,175 Polemarchus comes to his father’s 
aid. He interrupts Socrates and announces that Cephalus’ definition is attributable in fact to the 
famed poet Simonides, thereby lending the weight of poetic authority to the phrase. Cephalus 
then departs to return to his religious offerings, unsettled no doubt by Socrates’ deft disassembly 
of what was surely an article of faith concerning the meaning of “acting justly.”   
One should note that Polemarchus does not supply a definition of justice that would put 
to rest Socrates’ complaint that Cephalus’ “definition” of justice is in fact no definition (Οὐκ ἄρα 
οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνης, 331d2). Instead, Polemarchus paraphrases Simonides so that he is 
able to reformulate Cephalus’ definition with the result that it assumes the discursive shape of a 
proverb: “Just it is, to render to each what is owed him” (τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόµενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι 
δίκαιόν ἐστι, 331e3-4). Crucially important, this phrase is not relevant to the discussion of justice 
as a line of poetry per se – indeed, it hardly qualifies as a line of poetry and is not found in any of 
the extant writings of Simonides – but rather as a sort of stand-alone maxim encapsulating a 
particular conception of what it means to be just. My interpretation supports Halliwell’s 
conjecture that “the treatment of a poetic text as logos is here perhaps accentuated by the manner 
																																																								
174 Apposite to my observation here is Halliwell’s claim that there exists a “recurrent tension” throughout Plato’s 
oeuvre between the demands of “discursive reason” and “certain kinds of intensely heightened and transformed 
consciousness” such as “poetic experience” that are “not wholly amenable to rational analysis” and, moreover, that 
Plato’s writing evinces an “aspiration to find a way of unifying” such tensions (Halliwell 2011: 158-9). 
175 Resp. 331c1-d3. 
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in which Polemarchus paraphrases, rather than strictly quot[es] from, Simonides.” 176 
Polemarchus’ paraphrase of Simonides’ purported saying constitutes a literal nonoppositional 
proverb such as “Honesty is the best policy” and “Virtue is its own reward,” as I explained in 
Chapter One.177   
Polemarchus’ invocation of Simonides calls into service the Greek wisdom tradition 
given Simonides’ association with the legendary Seven Sages, ironically, by dint of Plato’s own 
portrayal in the Protagoras of Simonides’ incorporation into his poem (the Ode to Scopas) Sage 
Pittakos’ saying “It is hard to be good” (χαλεπὸν . . . ἐσθλὸν ἔµµεναι ).178 Polemarchus’ citation 
of Simonides initially throws Socrates back on his heels, as he confesses that he is at pains to 
disbelieve (ἀπιστεῖν) such a “wise and godlike man” (σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος, 331e5-6). It is 
tempting to read Socrates’ comment as ironic and, further, his subsequent dismantling of the 
gnome “Just it is, to render to each what is owed him” by elenctic qustioning of Polemarchus 
(332a1-336a10) as evincing Plato’s univocal prioritizing of discursive enquiry over gnomic 
pronouncement. Morgan is no doubt correct in her observation that “authoritative gnomic or 
oracular utterances are useful only as a starting point for philosophic investigation and are not an 
end in themselves,” echoing Gregory Vlastos’ similar claim that Socrates refuses his 
interlocutors the ability to “quote some wise man’s answer – as Polemarchus does in Republic 
1,” because he expects his interlocutors to defend any “wise man’s” answer as their own.179 But 
while it is true that proverbs are insufficient to serve by themselves as the foundational element 																																																								
176 Halliwell 2000: 106. 
177 Dundes 1981: 52-3; Russo 1997: 52. See my discussion of the definitional parameters of “proverb” in Chapter 
1.2.  
178 Prt. 339ff. We derive our knowledge of the Seven Sages and the associated tradition from a variety of sources, 
stretching from Hipponax through Stobaeus, but most of it is contained in Book 1 of Diogenes Laertius. See Martin 
1993: 109. 
179 Morgan 2009: 552; Vlastos 1983: 34. 
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in Plato’s assembly of the Republic’s philosophic and reformist project, the larger Greek 
tradition of quoting lines from poetry and citing the poets and Sages is too powerful and too 
central to Greek cultural and linguistic practices to shed. That tradition needs to be reworked and 
reformed in the service of Plato’s own generic ends. 
To assert otherwise would be to ignore what actually occurs during the elenchus in which 
Polemarchus is compelled to defend his gnome, reputedly authored by Simonides. If the vision 
of philosophy championed by Plato’s Republic were truly one where discursive questioning 
forever trumped gnomic pronouncement, why then does Plato not simply depict Socrates 
discrediting Polemarchus’ proverb, author and all, Simonides be damned?  Why should Socrates 
concern himself in the slightest about Simonides’ purported authorship?180 On the contrary, the 
elenctic process depicted in this section of the dialogue that leads to Polemarchus’ acquiescence 
hardly amounts to a thoroughly sound argument, much less an unequivocal renunciation of 
Simonides and his reputation for wisdom. As Halliwell remarks, “If anyone has been refuted 
here, then, it is surely Polemarchus, not Simonides . . .”181 Rather than condemning Simonides as 
a know-nothing poet, as one might expect (à la Socrates’ treatment of poets and their purported 
wisdom in the Apology182), Socrates takes measures to defend him and, by implication, the 
possible attribution of other gnomic statements to him. It is only the particular gnome in 
question, in addition to Simonides’ purported authorship as suggested by Polemarchus, that 
draws fire from Socrates.   
After compelling Polemarchus by a series of somewhat dubious elenctic moves to 
concede that the maxim is not an adequate definition of justice and thus, could not possibly have 																																																								
180 Elsewhere in Plato’s oeuvre, Socrates professes disinterest in the sources and origins of propositions that exhibit 
wisdom, caring only for whether they prove to be true or not. See, e.g., Phdr. 275b3-c2.  
181 Halliwell 2000: 107. 
182 Ap. 22a8-c8. 
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been said by anyone wise (οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών, 335e4), Socrates not only upholds the 
reputation for wisdom ascribed to Simonides but brings him within the fold of the Seven Sages: 
“So we will fight, both you and I in common cause, if anyone claims that Simonides said this or 
Bias or Pittakos or any other of the wise and blessed men” (Μαχούµεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ 
ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Σιµωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἤ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν 
σοφῶν τε καὶ µακαρίων ἀνδρῶν, 335e7-9).183 
While the commentators are nearly unified in their confidence that here, too, Socrates 
displays razor-sharp irony in his use of the words “wise and blessed” (σοφῶν τε καὶ 
µακαρίων),184 such confidence would be better founded if (1) the sophia tradition and practice of 
quoting and citing poets and sages did not possess as strong a command over the Greek 
imagination, as Halliwell and others have demonstrated185 and (2) the arguments Socrates uses to 
undermine Polemarchus were not so anemic, as the commentators themselves acknowledge.186 
With respect to the first point, Plato risks losing the confidence of his readership if his chief 
protagonist presents himself as condemning the wisdom tradition root and branch. As discussed 
previously, citation of poetic authority, much of which was formulated in proverbs and gnômai, 
was one of the primary methods of persuasion. No matter how radical Plato might have been in 
his reformist vision, he could not – nor, I maintain, would he have wanted to – discredit 
altogether the entire rhetorical and educational framework of the Greek literary tradition, upon 
																																																								
183 Bias and Pittakos were, of course, counted among the ranks of the Seven Sages according to tradition. See Prt. 
343a1-5. 
184 See, e.g., Jowett and Campbell 1894; Allan 1965; Adam 1980: ad loc. 
185 See Halliwell 2000: 94-99; A.L. Ford 2010: 146-9; B. Graziosi 2010: 113; R. Hunter 2014: 7, 77-8.    
186 See, e.g., Adam 1980 (p. 80, n. 32) who acknowledges that Socrates’ “argument is unsound and not intended to 
be serious . . .” 
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which his own writing was necessarily based.187 In many ways our grasp of Plato and the 
purpose behind his prolific output is enhanced by emphasizing, in addition to the breadth and 
novelty of his philosophic thought, his extraordinary, nearly singular skill at bringing the whole 
of the Greek literary tradition to bear in the production of his oeuvre. Far better, then, for a writer 
of such capacity to depict his chief character as attributing a saying that he wishes to discredit to 
someone already discreditable in the eyes of his audience than to cast aspersions on the tradition 
itself and the most notable fonts of that tradition, the poets and legendary Sages, with whose 
company, for whatever reason, Plato associates Simonides in more than one dialogue.188 Socrates 
does exactly this when he hypothesizes that the author of Polemarchus’ ill-advised gnome must 
have been, instead of Simonides, “Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban or 
some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit” (Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ 
Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσµηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἤ τινος ἄλλου µέγα οἰοµένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός, 
336a5-7). 189 
While I would agree with those scholars who see Plato as deftly undermining the 
presumption of the sophia tradition that wisdom necessarily resides in the gnômai of the poets 
and Sages,190 it would be too facile and reductive to interpret as ironic every laudatory statement 
																																																								
187 This is not to ignore the strong condemnation of certain passages of poetry in Books 2-3, and the motif of 
poetry’s banishment from the ideal polis which reaches its culmination in Book 10. However, as I shall discuss in 
Chapters 3 and 5, Plato’s “critique” of poetry is far more nuanced than normally supposed. In addition, as I shall 
explain at length in Chapter 5, the curious “epilogue” to the discussion of poetry’s banishment in Book 10 casts 
severe doubt on whether there is even to occur any banishment of poetry. 
188 Prt. 339ff; Resp. 331ff. In the Protagoras, Socrates goes to great lengths to defend Simonides against Protagoras’ 
assertion that Simonides’ Ode to Scopas is flawed because of inconsistency. Marian Demos explains that “Socrates’ 
reaction to Protagoras’ attack on Simonides can be understood as an attempt to preserve the stature of a traditional 
transmitter of παιδεία, in the case of Simonides, the poet educator for the χορός, and to reject the audacious claims 
of the sophist” (1999: 16). 
189 Trans. Shorey. 
190 See, e.g., Martin 1998: 124, who argues that Socrates and his deployment of the elenchus mark the endpoint of 
the Sages and the accompanying tradition of performative wisdom; Morgan 2009: 564, who observes that appeals to 
gnomic wisdom as an authority can be used to “cut off discussion” and, thus, a “worry about the authority of 
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by Socrates of that tradition and its practitioners191 – or, to put a finer point on what we mean by 
ironic, as making use solely of what Vlastos calls “simple irony” as opposed to “complex irony, 
a distinction which I shall address in the next section of this chapter. A better and more balanced 
interpretation is that Plato is advancing his characters’ exploration of what it means to be just by 
first hinging their discussion on a gnome attributed to a sage poet, then calling into question the 
propriety of such gnome, and finally re-attributing that gnome, which has been shown to embody 
anything but an adequate sense of justice, to any one of several other famous “wise” men, whom 
one would be hard pressed to exalt as standard bearers of justice. Periander was a famous despot, 
who ruthlessly cut down his rivals, as Herodotus records (5.92).192 Plato, thus, takes pains to 
exclude him from the ranks of the Seven Sages, as is apparent in Socrates’ naming Periander as 
the potential author of the fatally flawed gnome and in Protagoras’ wholesale omission of 
Periander’s name from the list of the Seven, in Plato’s dialogue that bears the famous sophist’s 
own name.193 Perdiccas was a Macedonian king whose son Archelaus was an unscrupulous 
tyrant, as detailed in Plato’s Gorgias.194 Xerxes was of course the hated monarch of Persia who 
attempted to invade Greece. And Ismenias was a Theban who was widely known to have 
received large bribes from the Persians. Moreover, as D.J. Allan notes, while Ismenias did not 
commit his misdeeds until after Socrates’ execution, “Plato, in the warmth of his disapproval, 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
maxims is present” in this particular exchange between Socrates and Polemarchus; Kurke 2011: 330, who opposes 
the authority and prestige of the Sages against the low genre of prose fable, which she connects to Sôkratikoi logoi. 
191 Halliwell 2011: 158-9, rightly complains that the now “dominant consensus” in all branches of scholarship, not 
just the specialist literature, that engages with Plato (e.g., history of philosophy, literary criticism/theory, art theory, 
and aesthetics) views Plato as “uncompromisingly hostile” to poetic expression per se, thereby “ignor[ing] crucial 
signals of Platonic ambivalence toward poetry” – poetry which, again, is the source of a great number of gnômai and 
proverbs.   
192 See Martin 1993: 111, for a more extensive discussion of Periander’s misdeeds. 
193 Prt. 343a1-5. 
194 Grg. 471a1-d2. 
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defies chronology.195 In other words, Plato playfully distorts the conventional notions of who 
should be considered Sages and just what sort of wisdom may or may not be contained in their 
reputedly “wise” maxims. 
 
2.5. Riddling Gnômai and “Complex Irony” 
 
A sensitive reader who (1) ponders whether Socratic irony is at play in the text and (2) 
considers the author’s use of proverbs will notice an interesting parallel: Both irony and proverb 
can (and often do) assume a riddling aspect. Dundes makes clear that it is common for a saying 
to have a “double life” as both a proverb and a riddle. For example, the Burmese phrase “The 
one who does not know about it may walk over it; the one who knows about it will dig it up and 
eat it” is a riddle when the “referent” (i.e., the “answer”) is a potato or any crop which grows 
underground and a proverb when it applies to a situation where someone is ignorant of 
something valuable that is nearby but not readily apparent.196 Context, as is the case with all 
proverbs, determines the precise meaning.197 
Similarly, context is crucial for determining whether a speaker is using irony, if we mean 
by irony the modern definition, “The use of words to express something other than, and 
especially the opposite of [their] literal meaning” (Webster’s) and not what Vlastos maintains 
was irony’s initial sense in Greek literature, “the intention to deceive.”198 Vlastos gives the 
example of a criminal “fence” trying to pawn off a ring he knows to be a fake: He is not being 
																																																								
195 Allan 1965: 92. 
196 Dundes 1981: 51. 
197 See Chapter 1.2. The Fante, a subgroup of the Akan people, in Ghana and the Ivory Coast have a proverb that 
conveys this very sense: “There is no proverb without the situation” (Finnegan 1981: 27; Lardinois 1995: 1). 
198 Vlastos explains that the modern definition of irony accords with Quintilian’s contrarium ei quod dicitur 
intelligendum est (Inst. Orat. 9.22.44) but not with the Greek meaning that, per Vlastos, existed before Plato’s 
depiction of Socrates resulted in a change to that definition. Originally, eirôneia meant “the intention to deceive,” 
“dissimulation” (LSJ, s.v. I). See Vlastos 1991: 21-44. 
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ironic when he says to a jewelry dealer, “Can I interest you in a diamond ring?” He is simply 
acting with the intent to deceive; otherwise, lying would be a standard form of irony. In contrast, 
he would be ironic if he were to say the same thing to his ten-year old daughter who might be 
wise enough to know the truth but – and this is the crucial point – would have to riddle out for 
herself the meaning of her father’s statement, its irony, that if the ring really were a priceless 
diamond, her father would not be about to hand it over to a her. 
The history of proverbs masquerading as riddles enjoys an illustrious provenance, 
epitomized, as they are, most famously in the Oracle at Delphi’s enigmatic pronouncements.  
Indeed, it is hard to imagine two more famous or more puzzled-over gnomic maxims than 
“Know thyself” and “Nothing to excess.” So too, the task of detecting when one speaks with 
irony can be just as puzzling. To take a famous example from Shakespeare, when precisely 
should the audience watching a performance of Julius Caesar understand Marc Antony’s 
repeated use of the phrase “And Brutus is an honourable man” during his funeral oration for 
Caesar to have become ironic? In other words, when are we to understand that Antony is now 
confident that he has swayed the assembled crowd to his side regarding the assassination of 
Caesar and away from the crowd’s previous belief in Brutus’ position resulting from Brutus’ 
own prior speech and thus can now use the suggestive phrase ironically? Similarly, how can the 
reader – and in particular, the commentators referenced above – be sure that Socrates is ironic 
when he describes Simonides as sophos, not once but several times, and further, when he 
includes Simonides, Bias, and Pittakos among the ranks of the “wise and blessed men” (τῶν 
σοφῶν τε καὶ µακαρίων ἀνδρῶν)?199 
																																																								
199 Scholars in recent years have begun to reassess their former propensity to find a great many instances of Socrates 
speaking ironically throughout the dialogues. See, e.g., Wolfsdorf 2007: 184, who insists that “Socrates is rarely 
verbally ironic” and that the scholarly tendency to see irony often at work reflects a faulty hermeneutics that 
prioritizes realism and intertextual consistency over imagism and dramaturgy: “Plato takes liberties in his treatment 
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I suggest that proverb mirrors irony and irony, proverb by virtue of their shared riddling 
component and further, that this mirroring phenomenon is on especial display in this section of 
the dialogue where Polemarchus’ gnome of purported Simonidean origin is put to elenctic 
challenge. Let us return to the question of whether a reader might be justified in reading 
Socrates’ statement that “it is difficult to disbelieve Simonides because he is a wise and godlike 
man” (Σιµωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀπιστεῖν – σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ, 331e5-6) as ironic, 
notwithstanding my earlier arguments to the contrary.200 Following Vlastos’ reasoning, the issue 
cannot be resolved simply by our belief that Socrates is, in effect, pulling Polemarchus’ leg when 
he describes Simonides as “wise and godlike.” The text must provide us credible grounds for 
believing that Polemarchus himself, too, recognizes the irony or is at least capable of 
understanding, after riddling through the statement, that Socrates does not mean what he says.201 
If Socrates is not being ironic, then he is either lying to Polemarchus, as is Vlastos’ 
criminal hypothetical “fence,” or he is telling the truth. There is also a fourth possibility, namely 																																																																																																																																																																																		
of this character that transgress realism.” Ferarri 2015 refuses to go as far as Wolfsdorf in dismissing Socratic irony 
but does follow Wolfsdorf’s separation of the character of Socrates from Plato the writer – an interpretive move 
which causes Ferrari to “take Socrates at his word” in a greater number of instances than he had done previously. 
200 See my discussion in Chapter 2.4. 
201 Iakovos Vasiliou 1999 would likely disagree with this statement, given his belief (p. 465) that “Vlastos’ stricture 
that the irony must be understandable to the interlocutor is unreasonably strong.” However, I find that Vasiliou’s 
notion of “conditional irony” (a conditional with an antecedent that attributes knowledge to an interlocutor is used 
ironically by Socrates if the reader has good reason to believe that Socrates does not believe the antecedent) risks 
minimizing the importance that dialogic exchange holds for Plato’s dialogues to the extent that it appears to 
prioritize what Vasiliou calls “the outer frame,” i.e., the relation between the text and reader over, “the inner frame,” 
i.e., the relation between Socrates and his interlocutors. Vasiliou is no doubt correct that an interlocutor might well 
end up being completely deceived by Socrates’ “conditional irony” (e.g., Euthyphro by Socrates’ conditional that if 
Euthyphro knows what piety is, Socrates must become his pupil, Euthphr. 4e4-5a4) while the reading audience 
would nevertheless recognize the irony. However, the interpretive gain offered by such a reading is offset by the 
resulting devaluation of the possibility of meaningful dialogic exchange between the two characters (i.e., Socrates 
and his interlocutor) if some potential does not exist on the part of the interlocutor to discern that Socrates is in fact 
speaking ironically. Indeed, Socrates’ interlocutors are potentially reduced to little more than straw men under such 
a reading, and we are left with a Socrates who is simply “winking” at Plato’s reading audience. While this may 
occur at times in the dialogues (and, indeed, as I shall argue in Chapter 2.6, does in fact occur during Socrates’ 
exchange with Thrasymachus, but during Socrates’ direct narration to the reader), any over-reliance on what is, in 
effect, a “Socrates-winking-at-the-audience” interpretation risks undermining the presumption that meaningful 
dialogue can and does occur in Plato’s dialogues.  
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that Socrates is employing what Vlastos calls “complex irony.” In such a reading Socrates would 
mean both that Simonides is wise and is not wise, for in complex irony, per Vlastos, “what is 
said both is and isn’t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in 
another.”202 But no matter which of the four scenarios Plato’s text depicts – i.e., (1) Socrates is 
entirely serious when he calls Simonides “wise and godlike,” (2) he is lying to Polemarchus, (3) 
he is being ironic, (4) he is using “complex irony” – both Polemarchus and the reader will have 
to riddle out the meaning of Socrates’ statement, if irony is at all a potential interpretation. This 
is especially true if “complex irony” is a possibility, as then we must puzzle over how Socrates 
can believe both that Simonides is in some sense wise and in another unwise. 
We are in a position similar to that of Socrates himself in the Apology, where he is 
compelled to ponder the Delphic Oracle’s enigmatic utterance that no one is wiser than Socrates:  
“What it the world does the god mean and why ever does he riddle (αἰνίττεται) so? . . . Whatever 
does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For he clearly isn’t lying. For that would not be 
right of him.”203 While one might find it difficult to defend the god’s pronouncement that “no 
one is wiser [than Socrates]” (ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία µηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι, Ap. 21a6-7) as a 
genuine proverb – even though one could certainly imagine repeated use of the phrase over time 
resulting in a proverb à la “You don’t tug on Superman’s cape” – it seems undeniable that the 
task of riddling over a proverb mirrors the task of riddling over a potentially ironic statement.204 
																																																								
202 Vlastos 1991: 31. 
203 Ap. 21b3-7: Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; . . . τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐµὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ 
γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέµις αὐτῷ. Following Adam and Adam’s lead in seeing a possible “allusion to 
some form of proverbial speech resembling that in Theognis” in Socrates’ claim in the Protagoras that the “wisest 
appears more beautiful” (τὸ σοφώτατον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι, Prt. 309c11-12), one is tempted to see something 
similar here in the Apology, when Socrates rephrases the Delphic Oracle’s sophôteron as sophôtaton. See Adam and 
Adam 1940: ad loc. 
204 This is not to say that all proverbs appear immediately to be riddling upon first encounter – although certainly 
some proverbs are more opaque than others, such as “A friend in need is a friend in deed” which has multiple 
meanings, as Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1981: 113-14, discloses. Indeed, as I have attempted to show in this chapter, 
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The text at this particular point in the Republic does not provide immediate evidence that 
Polemarchus understands Socrates to be ironic. There is nothing even close to what occurs in the 
Phaedrus, when after Socrates describes Phaedrus’ recitation of Lysias’ speech as so 
“miraculous” (Δαιµονίως) that he was quite “overcome” (ἐκπλαγῆναι) by it, Phaedrus instantly 
accuses Socrates of being ironic: “So you see fit to make fun of it?” (οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ παίζειν; 
234d1-7).205  Here, by contrast, Socrates follows up his professing Simonides to be “wise” with 
an affirmative declaration about the poet and the gnome attributed to him: “Clearly he didn’t 
mean this, the very thing that we were just talking about, the return of something lent to anyone 
whosever demands it, even if he’s not thinking straight.”206 Of course, this statement does not 
foreclose the possibility that Socrates might have been speaking ironically (either with “simple” 
or “complex” irony), but we do not yet have enough textual support to say one way or another. 
Now it is true that Socrates’ statement which falls just before the declaration might be taken as 
continuing some type of irony contained in Socrates’ assertion that Simonides is wise – i.e., 
“Perhaps you understand, Polemarchus, whatever in the world [Simonides] means, but I 
don’t”207 – but, again, there is no textual support for any firm conclusion. At best, if we are to 
foreclose the possibilities that Socrates is either categorically lying or categorically telling the 
truth when he says these particular words, the most we might surmise is that we have a statement 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the Republic’s opening conversation between Cephalus and Socrates amounts to a demonstration that one way of 
reaching across a discursive divide is to commence with common sayings, whose meanings – at least initially, on 
their face – seem apparent to everyone in the discussion. And yet, the deeper one delves into what any one saying 
might really mean in a particular context and given a particular usage, the more the meaning of even relatively 
unambiguous proverbs must be riddled through. This is particularly true when one subjects proverbs to philosophic 
scrutiny as Socrates does here with the gnome attributed to Simonides. See Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1981:115-118, 
who provides a fascinating description of all the varied and numerous meanings the relatively straightforward 
proverb, “Money talks,” can assume, depending upon context and usage. 
205 Trans. Fowler. 
206 Resp. 331e8-332a1: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγοµεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεµένου τι ὁτῳοῦν µὴ 
σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι.  
207 Resp. 331e6-8: τοῦτο µέντοι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, σὺ µέν, ὦ Πολέµαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ· 
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akin to a modern-day trial lawyer who adopts a folksy manner in displaying a sort of complex 
irony before a jury: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, perhaps my opponent is capable of 
understanding so subtle an argument as his client’s position in this case, but it’s beyond the ken 
of a simple country lawyer like myself.” The statement is false modesty, but it is not entirely 
untrue. In other words neither Socrates nor my hypothetical “country lawyer” considers the 
particular argument/proposition at issue to be one that is right or appropriate and in that sense, 
then, it lies beyond their respective capacities for comprehension. We must riddle out further 
Socrates’ exact position with respect to Simonides’ own riddling gnome about justice. 
Now, it is certainly the case that Socrates’ inquiries about the meaning of the line 
attributed to Simonides have contributed mightily to the line’s opacity. What at first seemed 
relatively clear to Polemarchus has now been thrown into doubt by Socrates’ line of inquiry. 
Would it really be “just” to return weapons borrowed to a lender who is no longer sane? Socrates 
has made the line riddling by virtue of his queries. Such a move, of course is entirely consistent 
with Socrates’ practice of inducing aporia on the part of his interlocutors concerning subjects 
whose meaning they thought they had fully grasped before being subjected to Socrates’ elenchus, 
as we see occur throughout Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues. However, Socrates could not have 
achieved this inducement of perplexity, if the line itself was not subject to multiple 
interpretations, as many proverbs are, depending upon the specific context and usage. Indeed, it 
comes as no surprise that for the Greeks there was a close relation between nomoi and gnômai, 
given the ever-present problem in legal jurisprudence of applying what might at first seem 
relatively straightforward legal prescripts to new and unforeseen situations.208  
																																																								
208 For example, does the relatively unambigous First Amendment of the United States Constitution – “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .” – allow Nazis to march in an area inhabited by many 
Jewish survivors of the Holocaust? Both state and federal courts “riddled” over this question in the mid-1970’s until 
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After Polemarchus clarifies in response to Socrates’ elenctic inquiry that Simonides 
meant by his gnomic statement to invoke the traditional, popular Greek moral code of “helping 
one’s friends and harming one’s enemies” (332a9-10), Socrates’ response reveals even more 
clearly the parallel between riddling irony and riddling proverb: “So it’s likely then that 
Simonides riddled, in the manner of the poets, as to what is the just” (Ἠινίξατο ἄρα . . . ὡς 
ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιµωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἴη, 332b9-c1). Adam sees further irony at work 
here, claiming Socrates is not “serious” and certainly “knew” what Simonides “meant to say”.209 
Assuming that Adam is correct, Polemarchus must then be supposed to have to puzzle through 
for himself Socrates’ brand of irony. Otherwise it is not irony per se but outright dishonesty by 
Socrates, which would make no sense in this particular context. According to this reading, Plato 
is depicting one of his characters grappling with the challenge of solving the riddle of Socrates’ 
irony (leaving aside entirely, for the moment, the reader’s own struggle with interpreting this 
complex exchange!) and moreover, this irony is on display as the two men attempt to decipher 
the precise meaning of a proverbial maxim that has been described – at least on the surface of the 
text – as “a riddle” written in “the manner of the poets.” Irony and proverb are conjoined in their 
mutual riddling component. 
In other words, to the extent Plato’s character of Socrates makes use of irony and 
especially that type of irony which Vlastos deems “complex,” the riddling aspect of such irony 
parallels – and in some sense might even be said to be conjoined with – the riddling quality also 
present in some of the proverbs and gnômai that Socrates and his interlocutors encounter and 
which they, in the course of their discussion, begin to reformulate in the service of Plato’s larger 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the United States Supreme Court ultimately ruled in the affirmative in a 5-4 decision, National Socialist Party of 
America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
209 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
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project of discursive reform. Vlastos gives as examples of Socrates’ use of complex irony – i.e., 
instances where what is said both is and isn’t what is meant – Socrates’ famous twin disavowals 
of knowledge and teaching.  According to Vlastos, 
Each of these is intelligible only as a complex irony. When he professes to have 
no knowledge he both does and does not mean what he says. He wants it to assure 
his readers that in the moral domain there is not a single proposition he claims to 
know with certainty. But in another sense of “knowledgeable,” where the word 
refers to justified true belief – justifiable through the peculiarly Socratic method 
of elenctic argument – there are many propositions he does claim to know. So too, 
I would argue, Socrates’ parallel disavowal of teaching should be understood as a 
complex irony. In the conventional sense, where to “teach” is simply to transfer 
knowledge from a teacher’s to a learner’s mind, Socrates means what he says:  
that sort of teaching he does not do. But in the sense which he would give to 
“teaching” – engaging would-be learners in elenctic argument to make them 
aware of their own ignorance and enable them to discover for themselves the truth 
the teacher had held back – in that sense of “teaching” Socrates would want to say 
that he is a teacher, the only true teacher; his dialogue with his fellows is meant to 
have, and does have, the effect of evoking and assisting their own effort at moral 
self-improvement. 210 
 
Of course, Plato does not spell out the precise interpretation that Vlastos gives to these 
twin disavowals by Socrates. Socrates’ interlocutors – and, by extension, Plato’s readers – must 
puzzle out for themselves just what Socrates means, as with an enigmatic proverb. Indeed, if one 
could begin to treat the Delphic oracle’s cryptic “no one to be wiser [than Socrates]” (µηδένα 
σοφώτερον εἶναι) as a proverb in its own right (as suggested earlier), such phrase, such proverb, 
becomes emblematic of, in Vlastos’ words, this “mysterious, enigmatic figure” of Socrates, 
whose words and deeds, whose very life, have proved to be an engaging puzzle for generations 
																																																								
210 Vlastos 1991: 32. While numerous scholars have contested Vlastos’ conceptions of Socratic irony in recent years, 
even Vlastos’ critics acknowledge that “Vlastos’s work on irony [is] the definitive word on Socratic irony for many 
Plato scholars  . . .” Vasiliou 1999: 457 (quoting Gordon 1996: 131). In Chapter 4.3, I will offer a reading that looks 
beyond Vlastos to work by philosopher Jonathan Lear (and Richard Bernstein’s treatment of Lear’s ideas) that 
draws from Kierkegaard’s writings on Socratic irony in my reading of a section from Book 4. For now, however, I 
find Vlastos’s concept of “complex irony” more useful than other alternatives – e.g., Vasiliou’s notions of 
“conditional” and “reverse” irony (Vasiliou 1999 and 2002) which, to my thinking, are subsumed within Vlastos’s 
complex irony – in explaining what is at play in this exchange between Socrates and Polemarchus in Book 1. 
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of thinkers.211 Does Socrates really believe Simonides to be “wise”? Is he truly confused about 
what was meant by the quotation attributed by Polemarchus to Simonides (and the subsequent 
gloss on it of “helping friends and harming enemies”)? And if he is being ironic, then it is the 
task of both Polemarchus and ourselves, Plato’s readers, to riddle out just what Socrates means. 
And we must do this, like Polemarchus, in the overall context of interpreting a gnomic statement 
about justice. 
I want to be clear that there is much to commend for taking Socrates at his word about 
Simonides’ purported wisdom. But to the extent that irony may be present, without clear textual 
support that those present with Socrates understand their role in the joke – i.e., to be fooled with 
in order to make Socrates’ intended meaning apparent – Plato’s text requires that the characters 
and Plato’s readers riddle over the irony in order to comprehend the larger significance, much as 
Vlastos has done with respect to Socrates’ disavowals of knowledge and teaching.   
Whether speaking with irony or not, Socrates conjectures that what Simonides had in 
mind (διενοεῖτο) when he riddled (ἠινίξατο) in a poetic (ποιητικῶς) manner about justice, was 
the “return of what is fitting to each” (τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι), and “this he labeled 
that which is owed (τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόµασεν ὀφειλόµενον, 332b9-c3).” Just like the earlier phrase, 
“Just it is, to render to each what is owed him” (τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόµενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν 
ἐστι, 331e3-4) and Polemarchus’ later gloss on it, “To help friends and harm enemies” (Τὸ τοὺς 
φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, 332d7), Socrates’ hypothesized re-articulation of 
Simonides’ original definition of justice has, again, the discursive shape of a gnome. As Morgan 
notes in a separate context, the use of the neuter (τὸ) has the effect of turning a statement into a 
																																																								
211 Vlastos 1991: 37. 
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kind of maxim or adage.212 As we reflect on whether Socrates is being ironic (including where 
and when specifically in this passage of the dialogue), the two characters work through the 
meaning of the gnomic statement attributed to Simonides by formulating their own gnomic 
statements which are themselves reformulations of the purportedly Simonidean original. Again, 
irony and proverb are seemingly conjoined by virtue of Plato’s literary artistry in their shared 
proximity to riddle.  
  Then, just like a seasoned trial attorney who is thoroughly skilled in the art of cross-
examination, Socrates employs a series of leading questions to propel Polemarchus toward ever 
more morally-repugnant variations on the original gnome such as “Of whatsoever someone is a 
skilled guard, so, too, is he a skilled thief” (Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φὼρ δεινός, 
334a5) and “If the just man is skilled at guarding money, so too is he skilled at stealing it” (Εἰ 
ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτει δεινός, 334a6-7). Following Dundes’ 
analysis, these phrases would qualify as “oppositional proverbs,” the form of which is of 
considerable antiquity, as one can see in the ancient Sumerian proverb, “Who builds like a lord, 
lives like a slave / Who builds like a slave, lives like a lord.”213 These proverbs culminate finally 
in Socrates coining two outrageous legomena, “So, the just man is a certain type of thief” 
(Κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, 334a10) and “Justice is a certain kind of thievery, albeit for the 
benefit of friends and the harm of enemies” (ἡ δικαιοσύνη . . . κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ 
µέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, 334b3-5), both of which enjoy a close proximity to 
literal nonoppositional proverbs.214 While there is no doubt that Socrates is not seriously 
proposing that these statements adequately represent justice, the label of irony (whether simple 																																																								
212 Morgan 2009: 555, n. 19 (citing Adam and Adam 1940) in reference to Plato’s Protagoras, 309c11-12.  
213 Dundes 1981: 55; See also Russo 1997: 52. 
214 Dundes 1981: 52-3; Russo 1997: 52. 
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or complex) also does not seem to fit very well these or any of Socrates’ prior, troubling 
reformulations of Simonides’ purported original. Rather, such reworkings are equivalent to any 
good trial lawyer’s demonstration to the witness being cross-examined that an initial position the 
witness articulated – in Polemarchus’ case, the original gnome he attributed to Simonides – leads 
in fact to absurd results, results antithetical to the original position. Here, the results are in the 
form of ever more preposterous proverbs. 
To drive the point home, Socrates then attributes the outrageous maxims to none other 
than Homer: “You likely learned this from Homer, for that man reveres Odysseus’ maternal 
grandfather, Autolycus, and also reports that he surpassed all men in both thievery and 
perjury.”215 Here one can safely maintain that Socrates speaks with some type of irony, given 
Polemarchus’ immediate acknowledgement that he “no longer knows what he was talking 
about.”216 And with this admission, both he and the reader glimpse how wrongly attributing ill-
conceived adages to poets, sages, and other cultural authority figures, in conformity with the 
Greek wisdom tradition and the concomitant practice of memorizing and quoting poetry, can 
have unintended and sometimes disastrous results. One must approach and practice the traditions 
of sophia and poetic quotation and citation with all due care. Philosophic examination of lines 
should occur before one quotes them. Socrates presses the point, telling Polemarchus that it will 
certainly turn out to be the case that “the just man is a certain kind of thief” (Κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ 
δίκαιος) if one follows the definition of justice “according to you and according to Homer and 
according to Simonides” (κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' Ὅµηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιµωνίδην), namely, that justice 
consists of acting for the “benefit of friends and for the harm of enemies” (ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ µέντοι τῶν 
																																																								
215 334a10-b3: καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὁµήρου µεµαθηκέναι αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς µητρὸς 
πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καί φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνῃ θ' ὅρκῳ τε. 
216334b7: οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον. 
84 
φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, 334a10-b6). In other words, you had best be careful about 
whom you quote and what precisely you quote them as saying in their poetry, as their purported 
sayings may evolve into guiding proverbs and maxims that, in turn, may substantially influence 
people’s lives and behavior, for better or for worse. Plato draws our attention to the power of 
language like no other ancient author. 
Duly chastened, Polemarchus nevertheless persists in his argument that justice must have 
something to do with helping friends and harming enemies. After Socrates sidetracks 
Polemarchus for a moment with a series of nettlesome questions about how some people who 
seem to be friends are in fact enemies and vice versa, and Polemarchus, in turn, is forced to 
clarify his position to be, in effect, that one justly helps only those who both seem to be and are 
in fact friends (with the same principle applying to harming enemies), Socrates posits a moral 
principle: harming anyone, even enemies, renders them worse with respect to that specific virtue 
that is a distinctly human quality: justice. Socrates puts it thus: “By necessity, my friend, is it the 
case that men who are harmed become more unjust” (Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτοµένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι, 335c6-7).217 While this statement does not meet the 
criteria of a proverb per se, it draws ever closer to the famous proverbial maxim that Paul would 
in time articulate in his Epistle to the Romans: “Recompense no man evil for evil” (µηδενὶ κακὸν 
ἀντὶ κακοῦ ἀποδιδόντες, 12:17).218  Although Plato does not reformulate the prior, ill-conceived 
proverb, “Just it is, to render to each what is owed him” (τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόµενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι 
δίκαιόν ἐστι, 331e3-4) to the degree Paul does (e.g., note the use in both proverbs of a form 
derived from the verb, ἀποδίδωµι “to pay back”), Socrates does offer this final formulation of the 																																																								
217 Socrates was famous in antiquity for the principle that one should never do wrong under any circumstances, as 
famously articulated in Plato’s Crito (49a5-6): οὐδαµῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν. Of course, in the 
Crito, the definition of justice is taken for granted and not a source of dispute as in the Republic. 
218 King James trans. 
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legomenon: “It is not the function of the just man to do harm, neither to friend nor anyone 
whomsoever, but the function of his opposite, the unjust man” (Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν 
ἔργον, ὦ Πολέµαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου, 335d11-
12). This phrase appears to fall within the parameters of what Dundes calls a “multi-descriptive 
element proverb” in which both topics and the comments on them are members of contrastive 
pairs, such as “Man proposes, but God disposes.”219 Here, the “unjust man” (ἄδικος), whose 
purpose or “function” (ἔργον) is “to do harm” (βλάπτειν) is juxtaposed with the “just man” 
(δίκαιος), whose function is the precise “opposite” (ἐναντίον). 
With this reformulated proverb, Plato depicts Socrates putting the lie to the fiction that 
was the original proverb – one attributed (falsely, as it now seems) by Polemarchus to sage 
Simonides. Indeed, Socrates makes it abundantly clear that no wise man could have said such a 
thing (335e1-5): 
Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόµενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησίν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ 
νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς µὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ 
φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαµοῦ γὰρ 
δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡµῖν ἐφάνη ὂν βλάπτειν. 
 
So if someone says that it is just to render to each what is owed him, and he has in 
mind by this that harm is owed to enemies and benefit to friends by a just man, it 
was no wise man who said such a thing. For he was not speaking the truth.  
Because in no way does it appear just to us to do harm to anyone whomsoever. 
 
Instead, we are led to conclude that the fatally-flawed proverb must have been the 
handiwork of men hardly enjoying a reputation for justice – i.e., Periander (now summarily 
removed from the ranks of the Seven Sages), Perdiccas, Xerxes, or Ismenias (anachronistically 
transported by Plato into this dialogue). Under no circumstances should we be quoting such 
men’s phrases, their proverbs, nor have these historical figures any rightful place in the Greek 
																																																								
219 Dundes 1981: 59. 
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wisdom tradition as do Simonides, Bias and Pittacus, whose own proverbs are presumably worth 
citation.220 Plato has, in the person of Socrates, alerted the reader to the importance of exercising 
the Greek practice of quotation and citation of the poets and their sayings in a morally 
responsible fashion, with an eye toward justice. 
It would be absurd to believe that Socrates is in any way ironic when he states that “it 
was no wise man who said these things” (οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών, 335e4), that is, that 
justice consists of helping friends and harming enemies. This is precisely the formulation of 
justice that Socrates wants to discredit. So is it at all possible that Socrates is actually being 
ironic when in the very next breath he argues that we should not attribute, therefore, the 
misguided maxim to “Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or anyone else of the wise and blessed men” 
(Σιµωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακὸν . . . ἤ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ µακαρίων ἀνδρῶν, 335e8-8), 
as the commentators maintain? I would argue that to read Socrates’ statement as simple irony – 
i.e., that he actually means the opposite of what he says – would make little or no sense in the 
context. It would undermine what Socrates has accomplished: the discrediting of Polemarchus’ 
flawed proverb, one that Socrates has shown was wrongly attributed to Simonides. However, as 
we and Polemarchus riddle our way through Socrates’ statement, we may come to conclude that 
Socrates is, in fact, exercising a type of complex irony as described by Vlastos. He means that, 
on one level, Simonides and Bias and Pittacus are most certainly wise, as they represent a 
longstanding tradition of Greek wisdom and citing poetic authority, from which Plato’s own 
writing necessarily arises and of which it makes continual use. Poetry is compelling, for all the 
power that figurative language necessarily brings to bear over the reader’s imagination. Plato is 
not about to unilaterally disarm himself of one of the most compelling discursive practices 
																																																								
220 Resp. 335e1-336a3. 
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available to the Greek world of his time. Accordingly, Plato does not, in his dialogues, simply 
and solely depict uniform demonstrations by Socrates of the elenchus, albeit with his standard 
literary virtuosity. The underlying literary tradition and discursive practices of which Simonides, 
Bias, and Pittacus are part have too much to offer Plato’s own writing to be discarded entirely. 
However, in another sense, the traditional poets, Sages, and other assorted, literary and cultural 
authority figures are certainly not wise, to the extent that the sophia tradition and the practice of 
citing poetic authority (such as their own) in support of a speaker’s arguments and positions are 
subject to misuse and abuse and are in urgent need of reform. Indeed, such discursive practices 
are a fundamental part of the larger politico-discursive crisis that I maintain lies at the core of 
Plato’s literary and philosophic concerns. We shall see the alleged culpability of the poets in this 
regard become much more apparent in Books 2, 3, and 10 of the Republic. 
 
2.6. “Talking Trash” and Telling Old Wives’ Tales with Thrasymachus 
 
One of the more dramatic entrances in literature occurs next, when the arch-sophist 
Thrasymachus violently interrupts Socates’ and Polemarchus’ disquisition on what would 
constitute a proper maxim for justice. Thrasymachus is an ethical skeptic in the extreme, a man 
whom the philosopher Bernard Williams deems an “immoralist,” representing the view that 
attachments to conventional notions of ethical values, like justice, are irrational and inferior to 
“self-interested strategies.” Another of Plato’s characters who fits this mold is Callicles in the 
Gorgias. Such men epitomize a type of brutal Realpolitik – indeed, a Realpolitik which, in 
Williams’ words, “kept the empire together by ruthless and unprincipled means” notwithstanding 
“the aspirations of Periclean democracy at home.”221 Few thinkers in the history of philosophy 
																																																								
221 Williams 2006: 97. See also Adam 1980: 25: “‘Might is Right’ was the only argument by which the existence of 
the Athenian empire could be defended before the tribunal of Greek public opinion . . .” 
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rival Plato in the scope of his attempts both to engage seriously with such cutthroat perceptions 
of the political world (and, by extension, their adherents) and to counter them with persuasion 
and force.222 
While Socrates’ encounter with Thrasymachus has understandably generated much 
commentary over the centuries, we may gain new purchase on the text by viewing the exchange 
as a continuing struggle – a struggle that I maintain is apparent throughout the whole of Book 1 – 
over the formulation of proverbs. In other words, we are witnessing a contest over proverbial 
expression that accurately and compellingly conveys the meaning of the point of focus. At stake 
is the formulation of a pithy saying that will (1) adequately capture the “right” meaning of justice 
(i.e., “right” according to the prevailing party’s definition) and (2) express it in a manner 
captivating and memorable enough to retain lasting relevance. 
The contentiousness of this battle over how to render language into compelling 
expression of a subject, as well as the magnitude of the stakes, is reflected in the vivid language 
Plato employs to describe Thrasymachus’ dramatic entrance into the conversation (336b1-6): 
Καὶ ὁ Θρασύµαχος πολλάκις µὲν καὶ διαλεγοµένων ἡµῶν µεταξὺ ὥρµα 
ἀντιλαµβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθηµένων διεκωλύετο 
βουλοµένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάµεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, 
οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἧκεν ἐφ' ἡµᾶς ὡς 
διαρπασόµενος. 
 
And Thrasymachus repeatedly was attempting to interrupt the conversation all the 
while we were talking but had been prevented by the others who were sitting, 
wanting to hear the end of the argument. As we were wrapping things up and I 
finished my comments, he was no longer able to contain himself, but having 
coiled himself up like a wild beast, he hurled himself at us as though he were 
about to tear us limb from limb. 
 
Aside from impressing upon the reader a near-visceral sense of the boiling rage 
represented by a figure like Thrasymachus, a man who espouses the ethically bankrupt 																																																								
222 Williams 2006: 97. 
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“immoralist” position, Plato’s evocative language here serves as a template for how would-be 
stylists of figurative expression might convey a memorable and riveting image (even though 
nothing here reaches proverb status). Indeed, Demetrius would go on to appropriate Plato’s 
imagistic language in his manual On Style to describe how a writer should handle his linguistic 
tools: “Just as wild beasts coil themselves before they attack, the spoken word should also draw 
itself taut to form a sort of coil for forceful impact” (ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία συστρέψαντα ἑαυτὰ 
µάχεται. τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη συστροφὴ καὶ λόγου καθάπερ ἐσπειραµένου πρὸς δεινότητα, Eloc. 
8).223 
After noisily barging into their midst (εἰς τὸ µέσον φθεγξάµενος), Thraysmachus bluntly 
and summarily dismisses the ideas expressed by a now thoroughly “frightened” (δείσαντας) 
Socrates and Polemarchus as just so much “garbage” or “nonsense” (φλυαρία) and accuses the 
men of “playing the fool” (εὐηθίζεσθαι, 336b7-c2). For Thrasymachus, Socrates’ and 
Polemarchus’s efforts to craft a proverb encompassing nothing less than the meaning of justice is 
drivel: they have been “talking nonsense” – or to use the English slang expression, “talking 
trash.”224 
 Thrasymachus now makes his own demands on how the assembled party should proceed 
in formulating a proper gnome for justice (336c6-d4): 																																																								
223 See Purves 2019: 97-103, who, using examples from Homer, Pindar, and Henry James, reveals how the imagery 
of beasts in a coil or crouch and ready to leap is strongly evocative of a “prelude to . . . some as yet unspecified 
event around the corner.” In her analysis of Odysseus’ final action at the close of the Odyssey – “after coiling 
himself up, he swooped forward like a high-flying eagle” (οἴµησεν δὲ ἀλεὶς ὥς τ' αἰετὸς ὑψιπετήεις, 24.538) – 
Purves reveals that “Demetrius uses the same verb (συστρέφω: to gather oneself together in preparing to spring) 
that the exegetical scholia use to explain ἀλείς . . .” (p. 100, emphasis in original). 
224 The Cambridge Dictionary provides two meanings for the expression “talk trash”: (1) “to say things that do not 
have a lot of meaning” and (2) “to criticize other people, especially unfairly or cruelly.” The first meaning of the 
expression accords with Thrasymachus’ use of the terms phluaria and huthlos at this point in the men’s exchange. 
We shall see the second meaning come into play when Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of being a sukophantês in his 
arguments at 340d-341a. A number of commentators explain this term in part as a description of one bent on 
“damaging a man’s personal reputation and credit.” Adam 1980:  ad loc. See also Schneider 1833 (quoted by 
Adam): ad loc.: scilicet existimationis et pecuniae detrimentum facturus sibi videbatur sophista ideoque Socratem 
se, quamquam frustra, impugnare in sequentibus quoque criminatur. 
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καὶ ὅπως µοι µὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν µηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιµον µηδ' ὅτι τὸ 
λυσιτελοῦν µηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον µηδ' ὅτι τὸ συµφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς µοι καὶ 
ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξοµαι ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιούτους λέγῃς. 
 
And don’t you be telling me that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or 
the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely 
whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any such drivel as that!225 
 
Plato’s depiction of Thraysmachus’ forceful, boisterous intrusion into the conversation is 
remarkable for several reasons. First, as Worman argues, “we have all of the elements that 
characterize the confrontations between the lowbrow Socrates and the haughty sophists,” among 
them the fact that “Socrates appears weak and . . . speaks drivel . . .”226 I would add to Worman’s 
analysis that Thrasymachus cleverly perceives precisely what is at stake in the dialectic 
exchange: Socrates’ attempt to reform the conventional discourse on justice by undermining 
traditional “proverbial” formulations of its definition. Thrasymachus, who is about to offer his 
own, notorious maxim for what justice is – namely, “the advantage of the stronger” (τὸ τοῦ 
κρείττονος συµφέρον, 338c2) – attempts to preempt the field by dismissing as “such drivel” 
(ὕθλους τοιούτους, 336d4) the types of synonyms that Socrates might have employed in the 
dialectic process to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the nature of justice, e.g., “that 
which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous” (ὅτι τὸ 
δέον ἐστὶν µηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιµον µηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν µηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον µηδ' ὅτι τὸ 
συµφέρον, 331c6-d2). Again, as illustrated earlier, the use of the neuter (τὸ) has the effect of 
turning a statement into a proverb.227   
Then consider Thrasymachus’ use of the word ὕθλος, which the LSJ defines as “idle talk, 
nonsense,” and most tellingly, when used with the genitive plural “old women” (γραῶν), means 																																																								
225 Trans. Shorey. 
226 Worman 2008: 206. See also Adam 1980: ad loc., who notes that the idiom ὅπως µοι µὴ κτλ. “is colloquial and 
abrupt, almost rude . . .” Such is the degree of the sophist’s contempt for the philosopher. 
227 Morgan 2009: 555, n. 19. 
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“old wives' gossip.” Socrates himself uses the word in this way in Plato’s Theaetetus: “The right 
motive is not that one should seem innocent and good – that is no better, to my thinking, than an 
old wives’ tale . . .” (τὸ δ' οὔ, ἵνα δὴ µὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα µὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ 
λεγόµενος γραῶν ὕθλος, Tht. 176b6-7).228 Here in the Republic, the full valence of the term 
ὕθλος, as used by Thrasymachus in his bellicose demand to Socrates, makes it clear that the 
arch-sophist will accept nothing less than a clear and precise definition of justice, not just the 
equivalent of some old wives’ tale. 
Socrates then, narrating in the first-person, describes directly to the reader his reaction to 
Thrasymachus’ belligerence, in one of the more richly allusive and truly enigmatic passages of 
the entire work (336d5-7):  
Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβούµην, καί µοι δοκῶ, εἰ 
µὴ πρότερος ἑωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐµέ, ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. 
 
And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with 
fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have 
lost my voice.  
 
This is the earliest reference in Greek literature to a popular adage from rural folklore that 
if a wolf sees a man first, the man becomes dumb.229 The tenth century, Byzantine Greek 
farming manual, the Geoponica, describes this curious saying in a section of the text that lists 
other popular, agricultural superstitions concerning animals. And interestingly, the Geoponica 
attributes the saying directly to Plato: “If a wolf catches sight of a man it makes him weak and 
tongue tied, says Plato in the Republic, but if the man sees the wolf first it becomes weaker.”230  
One might describe such a piece of proverbial folk wisdom less than charitably as an “old wives’ 																																																								
228 Trans. Cornford. 
229 See generally Adam 1980: ad loc.; Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc.; Allan 1965: ad loc.; Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
The saying appears elsewhere, e.g., in Theocr. 14.22 and Virgil, Ecl. 9.53.  
230 Geop. 15.1.8 (trans. Dalby): ὁ λύκος προορῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸν καὶ ἄφωνον ποιεῖ, ὡς ὁ 
Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις αὐτοῦ φησιν· ὀφθεὶς δὲ πρότερος ὁ λύκος αὐτὸς ἀσθενέστερος γίνεται. 
92 
tale.” A modern-day analogue might be “Step on a crack, break your mother’s back.”231 There is 
delicious irony in Socrates sharing the equivalent of an “old wives’ tale” as he describes his own 
disequilibrium that results from Thrasymachus accusing Socrates himself of telling “old wives’ 
tales” (ὕθλους), as part of his and Polemarchus’ efforts to posit a proper proverb concerning 
justice. As the reader ponders Plato’s wordplay, the circle becomes whole. What sort of old 
wives’ tales are the sophists themselves spinning as they quote and articulate proverbial maxims 
in support of their definitions of justice? 
This is also the first instance in the dialogue of Plato’s use of a lower-brow folk proverb, 
as opposed to the higher-culture maxims of poets and sages, emblematic of the wider penchant 
for generic hybridity that characterizes so much of Plato’s oeuvre.232 Plato displays a remarkable 
(and at times, genuinely courageous) level of rhetorical ecumenism in the discourse he 
employs.233 Such generic hybridity is a powerful engine for what I maintain to be Plato’s project 
of discursive reform, particularly with respect to Plato’s agonistic engagement with the Greek 
wisdom tradition. Martin makes a persuasive case that Hesiod’s Works and Days – traditionally 
believed to have been composed for “the peasant of Boeotia rather than the Ionian aristocrat” – 
rightly belongs to the genre of “wisdom composition” precisely because of Hesiod’s “most-
important poetic strategy for constructing such an open-ended advice composition” namely, “the 
inclusion of a number of other genres”, two of which, not surprisingly, are “songs and proverbs” 																																																								
231 Regina Austin (2002: 173, n.1) explains that this phrase is documented among “black folk sayings” and may have 
its origin in the notion from a bygone era that stepping on the cracks of wooden floor boards not properly nailed 
down can cause the boards to fly up, causing injury. 
232 See, e.g., Nightingale 1995: 2: “It is noteworthy that the same man who voices such a ringing condemnation of 
generic impurity in the Laws exhibits a positive hankering for the hybrid in so many of his texts: again and again, 
Plato mixes traditional genres of discourse into his dialogues and disrupts the generic boundaries of both his own 
texts and the texts that he targets.” 
233 See, e.g., Grg. 494e1-8, where after Socrates invokes the profoundly disturbing image of a lewd “catamite” 
(κίναιδος) as representing the logical culmination of Callicles’ claim that the man who satisfies his appetites to the 
fullest is the happiest of men, Callicles accuses him of debasing the conversation: “Are you not ashamed, Socrates, 
to lead our discussions into such areas?” (Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;).   
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with roots in oral folklore.234 The intermixing of sages’ maxims with folk proverbs in radically 
new and meaningful juxtapositions creates the potential to upend the existing discursive 
world.235  
As Mikhail Bakhtin observes, generic hybridity, because of its folkloric, “carnival sense 
of the world, possesses a mighty life-creating and transforming power, an indestructible 
vitality.”236 Plato masterfully imbues with this hybridity the person of Socrates, a figure who 
defies class categorization and proves capable of holding his own both at the level of elite 
discourse in the symposium and with the cruder sort of talk that one finds in the agora.237 Indeed, 
Socrates show himself to be a master of widely divergent “speech genres,” a term that Bakhtin 
uses to describe the complex sets of values and “residues” of past behavior that he sees as 
underlying language, and which, in turn, shape and guide both future behavior and specific 
utterances. Gary Morson and Caryl Emerson summarize well this complex notion of speech 
genres and how such genres operate within a larger discursive context: 
To know a language is to command a repertoire of its speech genres, which means 
to understand more than ‘language’ in the narrow sense. Each genre implies a set 
of values, a way of thinking about kinds of experience, and an intuition about the 
appropriateness of applying the genres in any given context.238 
  
																																																								
234 Martin 1992: 11 (quoting the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetics) and 22. 
235 See Morgan 2017: 181, who makes a similar point regarding Plato’s conjoining of disparate images in the similes 
his Socrates offers for transformational effect: “Socrates’ discursive practice is characterized by . . . image-making 
that brings together seemingly disparate elements and fuses them into one to create new possibilities.” 
236 Bakhtin 1984a: 107-108. Bakhtin describes generic hybridity as follows: “a multi-toned narration, the mixing of 
high and low, serious and comic; . . . wide use of inserted genres – letters, found manuscripts, retold dialogues, 
parodies on the high genres, parodically reinterpreted citations; . . . a mixing of prosaic and poetic speech, living 
dialects and jargons . . ., and various authorial masks . . .” 
237 Worman 2008: 159. 
238 Morson and Emerson 1990: 290-2. 
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As we shall see, Socrates provokes Thrasymachus’ ire precisely because he knows how to wield 
a lower-register, folk-based speech genre in a context that seems entirely inappropriate to such 
genre. 
But first, we must address exactly how the superstitious folk wisdom concerning a wolf’s 
rendering a man voiceless by spying him first qualifies as a genuine proverb.239 In addition, what 
does Plato’s use of this folk proverb reveal at the point it appears in the dialogue? 
The scholarship of the paroemiologist G.L. Permyakov provides guidance. Permyakov 
acknowledges a close similarity between what he terms “signs and omens used in rural life and 
bits of farming wisdom” (e.g., “A horse snorts for bad weather”), which fall under the general 
heading of “analytical clichés,” and proverbs and aphorisms, in their outward, morphological-
syntactic structure.240 However, since these clichés express “only one concrete meaning and 
allow of no extended interpretation,” they ultimately fail as “proverbs” in Permyakov’s analysis. 
Permyakov explains the difference, comparing the folk superstition “When the rooster crows out 
of the usual time, cold weather will let up” with the genuine proverb, “The sun will rise whether 
the rooster crows or not.” The latter, unlike the former, admits of “extended interpretation” in 
that it refers not only to the particulars that it describes – what paroemiologists call the realia – 
“but to all similar situations” for which it serves as a model.241 Another set of contrasting pairs of 
this type further elucidates the difference – the omen “A dog’s howl portends eternal rest” can be 
juxtaposed with a proverb containing the same realia, “A dog’s bark is carried around by wind” 
or another similar proverb, “A dog barks, but the caravan goes on.” The former is monosemantic: 
it does not allow of various interpretations, since “eternal rest” can only be interpreted as 																																																								
239 The saying was in fact characterized in antiquity as a proverb by several ancient grammarians. See, e.g., Serv. ad 
loc.; Donat. ad Ter. Ad.  537 (lupus in fabula): “silentii indictio est in hoc proverbio . . . .”  
240 Permyakov 1979: 29, 85. 
241 Permyakov 1979: 85-6. 
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“death.” The latter phrases, by contrast, admit of various applications: Permyakov explains that 
they have been used to refer to “a gossip monger, an irresponsible politician or a mud-slinging 
pen-pusher.” The basic meaning of these twin proverbs remains the same: “No matter how much 
a given subject (‘dog’) may talk (‘bark’), its efforts are in vain (‘carried around by wind’) and the 
cause will not suffer (‘the caravan goes on’).”242 
Here, too, as with Cephalus’ reference to (but not direct quotation of) the proverb “like to 
like” (ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει), we are not provided with the “wolf” adage itself.243 Plato leaves it to 
the reader to recall the omen from folklore and construct the relevant words which, following the 
Geoponica’s formulation, we might render simply as “If a wolf catches sight of a man it renders 
him voiceless.” At first blush, the saying appears to be merely a piece of rural superstition 
qualifying solely as an analytical cliché, not a proverb. Permyakov allows, however, for the 
possibility that some analytical clichés can be used in a metaphoric sense, providing as an 
example the omen “Autumn fog promises cold wind”, which can be used to describe “a gloomy 
social situation.” Relevant to my analysis is Permyakov’s acknowledgement that in such a case, 
“it would be not an omen, but a proverb, homonymous to the former.”244    
Unlike the term “eternal rest” in the superstition concerning a howling dog, the realia of 
the wolf omen Socrates obliquely references – i.e., both the wolf and the man rendered voiceless 
– refer not solely to themselves but can be understood metaphorically also. The upshot of the 
proverb seems alike in certain respects to the English proverbs “He who hesitates is lost,” “Delay 
always brings danger,” and “Procrastination is the thief of time,” where the quick-acting wolf 
and the dilatory man stand in for industriousness contrasted with languor. An analogous proverb 																																																								
242 Permyakov 1979:  85-7. 
243 Resp. 329a2-4. 
244 Permyakov 1979: 87. 
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in German even uses the image of a wolf: “Der Letzte wird vom Wolfe gefressen” (“The last is 
eaten by the wolf”). Twin proverbs in Dutch and German have a similar meaning and employ the 
imagery of literally empty mouths, replacing the man (who has no voice in his mouth) with the 
wolf itself: “Schlafendem Wolf läuft kein Schaf ins Maul” and “De slapende wolf loopt geen 
schaap in den mond” (“A sleeping wolf runs no sheep into his mouth”). The demand made by 
these particular proverbs on their listeners is clear: act promptly or you will find yourself with 
literally nothing in your mouth – i.e., food, according to the particular realia of the proverb, but a 
metaphorical reading allows a connection to language, voiced from the mouth. Lastly, another 
English proverb uses both the image of an empty-mouthed wolf and a man who admits of 
nothing but failure: “The idle wolf wins little meat, nor the sleeping man success.”245  
Applying the message of the wolf-omen-turned-proverb to the passage from the Republic 
in which it is referenced (but, again, not expressly quoted) by Socrates, the implications for the 
task facing Socrates – and by extension, Plato’s text – are unmistakable: Socrates must beat 
Thrasymachus to the proverbial punch in articulating the “right” and most compelling proverb 
concerning justice. Put differently, Plato must outpace the immoralist position embodied in 
Thrasymacheanism by creating a new discourse (part of the new genre of philosophy) possessing 
the capacity to articulate in ever more compelling and eminently quotable ways – something 
approaching Hesiod’s oft-cited “two roads” simile, perhaps – a non-instrumental definition of 
justice. If Socrates, if Plato, should fall short in this effort, then in every practical sense, they and 
their ideas are rendered “voiceless.” Whatever proverbs, gnômai, or other generalizing 
expressions that Plato might formulate in furtherance of discursive and societal reform will be 
rendered mute. Voice finds its instrument in language. And the power of language rests in its 
																																																								
245 All of these proverbs are collected in Strauss 1998. 
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capacity for repeated quotation, Koning’s “catchword factor,”246 given the fourth century’s 
rhetorical and educational framework that placed a premium on selective anthologizing and 
excerpting of quotable sayings. As Hunter explains, the fact that this excerpting and 
anthologizing habit “had a firm hold in Athenian culture by Plato’s day . . . made it a particularly 
powerful opponent to the moral project which Plato sets himself in the Republic;” indeed, as 
Adeimantus remarks to Socrates in Book 2, there are so many sayings of magnitude (τοιαῦτα καὶ 
τοσαῦτα λεγόµενα) that young men can “flit” (ἐπιπτέσθαι) from passage to passage just like 
bees, with the result that, as Hunter puts it, “there will always be a suitable poetic defence for 
any moral stance.” 247    
Plato’s text must meet this challenge. And part of the method Plato will employ to 
counter sophistic representations of justice will be the integration within his generically-hybrid 
text (à la Hesiod’s advice composition, teeming with quotable verses) of the sort of folk sayings 
that are exemplified in the wolf proverb. He will pull out the generic stops, not limiting himself 
solely to the poetry of the Sages and the more elite discourse of the symposia. The omission in 
Plato’s text of the specifics of the wolf omen seems evidence that the saying was well known to 
the audience at the time and was already firmly possessed of Koning’s catchword factor. Plato 
will take it one step further, deploying the omen-turned-proverb in furtherance of his own 
reformist project. If the saying is viewed as an ὕθλος, Plato’s reference to the folk proverb 
highlights that it is the “trash-talking” sophists like Thrasymachus who are in fact telling old 
wives’ tales (ὕθλους) concerning justice. If it is viewed as a serious proverb, one worth heeding, 
then it reveals that Plato will not be rendered silent, “voiceless” (ἄφωνος) in this all-important 
struggle with the immoralists. Thus, Plato finishes the oblique reference to the wolf proverb by 																																																								
246 Koning 2010a: 144-5. 
247 Hunter 2014: 119. See my discussion in Chapter 3.2 
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depicting a Socrates capable of overcoming the discursive challenge personified by 
Thrasymachus: “But then, just as he was beginning to turn savage because of our discussion, I 
spied him first, so that I attained the capacity to respond” (νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο 
ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἷός τ' ἐγενόµην ἀποκρίνασθαι, 336d7-
e1). 
As the two men’s competition proceeds over an appropriate “quotable” representing their 
respective conceptions of justice, Socrates chafes against Thrasymachus’ effort to limit the 
lexical parameter of his attempted formulations. Socrates complains that Thrasymachus’ 
strictures are the equivalent of querying how much twelve equals and then prohibiting the 
answers that “twelve equals two times six or three times four or six times two or three times 
four” since Thrasymachus will not accept “any such nonsense” (τοιαῦτα	φλυαρῇς).248 So, too, 
after Thrasymachus defines justice as “the advantage of the stronger” (τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος 
συµφέρον, 338c2), Socrates rightly objects that Thrasymachus previously had precluded 
Socrates from defining justice in terms of “advantage” (συµφέρον, 336d2): “So your reply, 
Thrasymachus, is that the advantageous constitutes the just, even though you forbade me from 
answering that way . . .” (τὸ συµφέρον µὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύµαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι – 
καίτοι ἔµοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως µὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίµην, 339a6-8). Creating a memorable gnomic 
saying for justice requires employing words that pack a punch – words that, to paraphrase 
Demetrius who used Plato’s imagery describing Thrasymachus’ entrée in his own stylistic advice 
on this score, are coiled taut with forceful impact. The more such words (like συµφέρον) that 
Thrasymachus can deny to Socrates the better, in the men’s contest to compose a winning, 																																																								
248 Resp. 337b1-4:  µὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δὶς ἓξ µηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα µηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο µηδ' ὅτι τετράκις 
τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξοµαί σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς. One cannot help but be struck by the proximity of Socrates’ 
hypothetically prohibited responses to the archetypal untruth represented by the phrase “Two plus two equals five,” 
used by numerous writers such as Samuel Johnson, Victor Hugo, and, most famously, George Orwell.  
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memorable proverb on justice. The word “advantage” or “interest” (συµφέρον) – tightly 
wrought, as it is, into the neuter substantive used here from the all-purpose and wide-ranging 
verb sympherō which can mean “to bring together, to contribute” and “bring into conflict” in 
addition to numerous other significations – will prove to be a crucial lexical building block in the 
men’s attempts to outdo each other in their fight to formulate the winning gnome on justice. 
Thrasymachus, after becoming frustrated when Socrates does not categorically rule out 
the possibility (Οὐκ ἂν θαυµάσαιµι . . . εἴ µοι σκεψαµένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν) that he might answer in 
one of the ways and with some of the terminology he has expressly forbidden (ἀπαγορεύειν, 
ἀπειπεῖν, 337c6-10), vaunts that he is about to reveal (δείξειν) a better definition of justice (περὶ 
δικαιοσύνης, βελτίω τούτων, 337d1-2). In addition, he makes a clever play on the traditional 
judicial formula that is read to a man found guilty, “What do you deserve to suffer or pay?” (τί 
ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν ἤ ἀποτεῖσαι;), by asking Socrates, “What will you deserve to suffer?” (τί ἀξιοῖς 
παθεῖν; 337d2) if Socrates were to forced to concede that Thrasymachus had invented a better 
formulation of justice. In retort, Socrates more than meets the sophist’s challenge at wordplay by 
parrying with a deft reworking of the same judicial formula, using paronomosia so as to 
transform it into his own, new proverb. Moreover, it becomes a proverb that can serve as a pithy 
encapsulation of Socrates’ vision of both the purpose of a dialectic exchange (the very sort in 
which he and Thrasymachus are presently engaged) and of a far better judicial system than one 
modeled upon traditional flawed representations of justice (e.g., “helping friends and harming 
enemies”). Socrates’ new rhyming gnome is: “It befits one to learn [mathein] from the one who 
knows.  So this is what I deserve to suffer [pathein]” (προσήκει δέ που µαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· 
καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν, 337d4-5). More important to any sound conception of justice 
than inflicting a penalty for the one adjudged guilty to suffer (pathein) are education and 
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reformation, in other words, the opportunity for the wrongdoer to learn (mathein). So, too, 
should Socrates’ and Thrasymachus’ dialectical exchange on the subject of justice have as its end 
the men’s mutual enlightenment (mathein) rather than the defeat of one by the other so that he 
must suffer (pathein).249  
Socrates thus reveals by his new formulation that in all considerations of what constitutes 
the just, pathein constitutes an impoverished approach; rather, the subject is properly understood 
in terms of mathein. Socrates’ new formulation, his new proverb – “It befits one to learn from 
the one who knows” (προσήκει δέ που µαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος) – is discursive reform at its 
best. Thrasymachus can do nothing but respond with a grudging admission in the form of a 
sarcastic compliment that Socrates has, for the moment, outfoxed him on the terrain of wordplay,  
“Very cute of you” (Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, 337d6). And true to form, the best that Thrasymachus can do is 
return to the traditional judicial formula, now bringing in its other lexical component, left 
unmentioned until this moment – the payment of a fine (ἀποτεῖσαι): “But in addition to 
‘learning’ (µαθεῖν) you must also pay money” (ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ µαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον, 
337d6-7). Socrates then responds, “Surely, whenever some comes into my possession” (Οὐκοῦν 
ἐπειδάν µοι γένηται, 337d8). Thrasymachus’ misguided attempt to reframe the judicial formula 
to his advantage has only served to remind the reader of the vast difference between Socrates and 
the sophists concerning the education of those who come to learn (mathein) from them. 
Thrasymachus and his ilk demand payment of a fee (apoteisai); Socrates asks for nothing, as is 
evidenced by his penury.250 Even to attempt to conceive of “learning” (mathein) – as is also the 
																																																								
249 See, e.g., Grg. 458a1-7, where Socrates makes clear that he is the sort of man who would “gladly be refuted” 
(τῶν ἡδέως µὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων) if he should say “something that is untrue” (τι µὴ ἀληθὲς) since “it is a greater 
good to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another therefrom” (µεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν 
ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ µεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι). 
250 See also Phdr. 266c, where Socrates describes Thrasymachus as eager to make money; see D. Nails 2002: 289.   
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case with justice – in such terms as “payment” (apoteisai) and “suffering” a penalty (pathein) is 
already to get things wholly wrong. Plato is presenting an entire world imagined anew through a 
new proverbial formulation of the now-discredited judicial formula. 
One should not underestimate, however, Thrasymachus’ own proverb-building skill  
during the sequence of thrusts and parries between sophist and philosopher, as they each attempt 
to construct the most unassailable gnome on justice. And by “unassailable,” I mean both at the 
bar of reason and by virtue of the compelling use of the sort of language that is apparent in so 
many of the proverbs and gnômai of the discourse of the time. Thrasymachus clearly believes 
that he himself has hit the mark with his gnomic pronouncement, “The just is nothing other than 
the advantage of the stronger” (εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συµφέρον, 
338c1-2) which, as described earlier, constitutes a literal nonoppositional proverb such as 
“Discretion is the better part of valor.”251 Immediately after somewhat pompously announcing 
his formulation (Ἄκουε δή, 338c1), Thrasymachus promptly belittles Socrates for not instantly 
conceding its merit: “Well, why don’t you applaud? No, of course, you’ll do anything but 
that.”252 
Like many a good gnome, Thrasymachus’ proclamation compels his interlocutors, as 
well as Plato’s reading audience, to riddle through it. Indeed at one point, Polemarchus and 
Clitophon trade interpretations over what precisely Thrasymachus means by his enigmatic 
statement, after Socrates has further muddied the waters by compelling Thrasymachus to admit 
that rulers and the stronger (ἄρχοντες τε και κρείττονες) sometimes are mistaken in the laws they 
																																																								
251 Dundes 1981: 52-3; Russo 1997: 52. Thrasymachus’ devaluation of justice through his literal, nonoppositional 
proverb operates in the same way that the lyric from songwriter Kris Kristofferson and Fred Foster’s 1969 song “Me 
and Bobby McGee” serves to subvert the traditional notion that “freedom” is necessarily a good thing: “Freedom’s 
just another word for nothing left to lose.”  
252 Resp. 338c2-3 (trans. Shorey, with modification): ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις. 
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lay down and thus unintentionally act for the benefit of the ruled (τοῖς ἀρχοµένοις). 253 
Polemarchus asserts that Socrates has revealed a fundamental weakness in Thrasymachus’ 
formulation, whereas Clitophon counters that Thrasymachus simply meant that what a ruler, the 
“stronger,” orders is that which he believes to be to his advantage” (ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὑτῷ 
συµφέρειν, 340a1-b8). One is reminded here of the penchant, prominent in the fourth century, 
for debating over what an author meant by an ambiguous proverb, such as Demosthenes’ and 
Aeschines’ dueling forensic orations over the meaning of Hesiod’s enigmatic gnome on rumour 
– “light and easy to acquire, painful to bear, and hard to escape . . . and she is some sort of 
god”254 – or Xenophon’s dispute with Polycrates over the interpretation Polycrates gives to 
another proverb in Hesiod (as previously discussed in Chapter One), “No work is a disgrace, 
idleness is a disgrace” (ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος, Op. 311) and Socrates’ 
appropriation of it in Polycrates’ Accusation Against Socrates.255 To have their respective 
proverbial formulations of justice quoted and debated over by future audiences is the ultimate 
goal of both Thrasymachus and Socrates. This is equally true for Plato in the philosophic prose 
he creates to further discursive and societal reform. If he could keep getting quoted, cited, and 
debated, he might well be able to alter the prevailing discourse (along with the traditional 
conceptions) concerning justice. 
Thrasymachus is certainly aware of these stakes. Immediately after Socrates attempts to 
clarify the point of debate between Polemarchus and Clitophon by asking if in fact 
Thrasymachus meant by “the advantage of the stronger” that which appears to the stronger to be 																																																								
253 Resp. 339b7-e8. 
254 Hes., Op. 761-4: κούφη µὲν ἀεῖραι / ῥεῖα µάλ', ἀργαλέη δὲ φέρειν, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀποθέσθαι. . . . θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ 
αὐτή. See my discussion in Chapter 1.1. 
255 Compare Aeschin., In Timarch. 129-30 and De falsa legat 114-5 with Dem., De falsa legat., 243-4; see Xen., 
Mem. 1.2.56-7, as well as my discussion in Chapter 1.1. of how the proverb also apprears in the Charmides (163b1-
c8), where Critias uses it to draw a distinction between “making” (ποιεῖν) and “doing” (πράττειν). 
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to his advantage (regardless of whether it really is), Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of being, in 
effect, a “swindler” or “lout” with language and argument (Συκοφάντης . . . ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, 
340d1). Ιndeed, Thrasymachus’ response bears all the markings of a man who thinks that he has 
shown Socrates to be a disingenuous cheat and, therefore, a poor choice for coiner of gnômai, 
expressing mock disbelief that Socrates would ever call a physician “a physician when he is in 
the act of making a mistake concerning his sick patients” or a mathematician “a mathematician 
when he errs in the act of calculating.”256 Rather, according to Thrasymachus, “we only talk this 
way in a manner of speaking” (λέγοµεν τῷ ῥήµατι οὕτως, 340d5); in point of fact, “no 
craftsman, wise man, or ruler, if you will, makes a mistake whenever he is actually ruling, but 
everyone speaks as if it were the case that ‘the physician’ erred or ‘the ruler’ erred’” (δηµιουργὸς 
ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἁµαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἥµαρτεν 
καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥµαρτεν, 340e4-6).   
If one plays the “swindler” or “scoundrel” (sukophantês) with the fundamentals of how 
we use language (logos) – which in this context obviously assumes the form of “argumentation” 
(hence the multivalent term, logos) – then the ideas that one aims to express, and the gnômai by 
which one aspires to articulate them memorably so that they might ultimately become integral to 
the Greek rhetorical and educational framework, will amount to little more than a shyster’s 
tricks, the very sort of fraud perpetrated by a sukophantês. Worman rightly notes that the term 
sukophantês “has connotations of boldness and deceit, both of which . . . are often attributes of 
aggressive, pandering talkers familiar from Aristophanes.”257 There is, too, little doubt that some 
																																																								
256 340d2-5: ἰατρὸν . . . τὸν ἐξαµαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάµνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαµαρτάνει . . . ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς 
ἂν ἐν λογισµῷ ἁµαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἁµαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁµαρτίαν; 
257 Worman 2008: 206. The verb sukophanteô and the noun sukophantês are notoriously difficult to translate in this 
passage. Given that sycophants were “habitual prosecutors” who very often initiated legal actions without good 
reason, it is understandable that Jowett translates Συκοφάντης . . . ἐν τοῖς λόγοις as “argue like an informer,” but that 
rendering seems to fall short of what precisely Thrasymachus finds at fault with Socrates’ manner of discourse. 
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irony is at play in Plato’s portrayal of Thrasymachus accusing Socrates of playing games with 
language, given what we know of Thrasymachus’ reputation in antiquity. Aristophanes depicts 
Thrasymachus as a “hairsplitter” in Banqueters258 and in the Phaedrus, Socrates warns Phaedrus 
that it is in fact Thrasymachus who “knows best how to inflame a crowd and, once they are 
inflamed, how to hush them with his words’ magic spell” and that he “is as good as producing 
slander as he is at refuting it.”259  
Leaving aside entirely the substance of Thrasymachus’ clarification of his gnome’s 
meaning, Socrates presses Thrasymachus solely on his accusation by first asking “You think that 
I’m a swindler in my argumentation?” (δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν; 341a5). Then, after 
Thrasymachus confirms as much, even accusing Socrates of “using violence” in the way he 
handles language (βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ, 341b1-2) and vowing not to let Socrates “play the knave 
and scoundrel” (κακουργεῖν καὶ συκοφαντεῖν, 341b9) against him in discourse, Socrates 
responds, as the master conversationalist he is, with a proverb: “Do you think that I would be so 
mad as to try to shave a lion and knavishly play with words against Thrasymachus?” (Οἴει γὰρ 
ἄν µε . . . οὕτω µανῆναι ὥστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύµαχον; 341c1-2).  
This proverb is so rare that it seems to occur nowhere else in classical Greek.260 The 
scholiast asserts that the proverb has as its focus those who attempt something that is either 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Shorey’s “you argue like a pettifogger” is little better and seems hopelessly out of date. Grube’s “you are a false 
witness in arguments” is somewhat closer to the meaning that Thrasymachus appears to intend, a meaning which 
Jowett and Campbell’s commentary convey with the phrase “You are a sharper . . . in argument.” The epithet 
“sharper” seems to me, indeed, very close to the true sense of the term in this passage, hence my rendering it as 
“swindler” and “scoundrel” (or perhaps “lout”) “with language/argument.” I am grateful to David Blank for his 
observation that we simply may not possess the full range of semantic connotations that the term sukophantês had 
for the Greeks of Plato’s time. See generally Hornblower and Spawforth 2003: 1459; Ober 1989: 173-4.    
258 Banq., frag. 198 Kock; See Nails 2002: 288.   
259 Phdr. 267c9-d2: ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅµα δεινὸς ἁνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισµένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν . . . 
διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος (trans. Nails).   
260 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
105 
against their own interests or simply impossible to accomplish.261 There can be little doubt that it 
is ultimately the source of the English saying, “To beard a lion” as construed in the English 
proverb, “Hares may pull dead lions by the beard.”262 Given the phrase’s lack of any poetic 
pedigree, it seems reasonable to assume that it was a folk saying, along the lines of the wolf 
proverb to which Socrates had alluded earlier.263 Thrasymachus, thus, has gone from being a 
wolf that might render Socrates voiceless in the men’s battle over an expression that properly 
conveys the concept of justice, to a lion that Socrates would provoke at his peril if he played 
captious games with language, ignoring the conventional ways people speak (τῷ ῥήµατι οὕτως, 
340d5). However, Socrates has just proven himself to be the real master of words and phrases, 
deploying a folk proverb whose staying power remains evident today. 
Thraysymachus expresses utter contempt for the way Socrates conducts the verbal 
exchange: “Once again, you amount to nothing, with respect to this” (οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα, 
341c3). Jowett and Campbell provide a good paraphrase and explanation of this dismissive retort 
to Socrates: “‘Although you made a fool of yourself at this too,’ i.e., at cheating Thrasymachus 
as you would have also done at shaving a lion if you had attempted it.”264 Thraysmachus simply 
cannot conceive or acknowledge that Socrates has any genuine skill in logos. On the contrary, 
Socrates seems a mere trickster, and Thrasymachus continually belittles him as doing nothing 
more than “making mischief in the argument” (κακουργῆσαι µάλιστα τὸν λόγον, 338d4). 
Worman explains that the “heavy emphasis in this passage on abusive terms for a quibbling, 
																																																								
261 Greene 1938: ad loc.: παροιµία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτῶν τι ἢ ἀδύνατον ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων λεγοµένη. 
262 Allan 1962: ad loc.; Strauss 1998: 96, 374, 1101. 
263 336d5-7. 
264 Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc. 
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underhanded way of talking suggests that it is somehow important that Thrasymachus be seen to 
aggress Socrates in this way.”265 
What is so provocative about Socrates’ manner of argument, of discourse, that causes 
Thrasymachus to react so strongly? So pronounced is the level of Thrasymachus’ revulsion at 
Socrates’ argument and speech that at one point he calls Socrates “loathsome” (βδελυρός, 338d3) 
and at another derides him as needing a nurse (τίτθη) to “wipe his snotty nose” (κορυζῶντα 
περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀποµύττει δεόµενον, 343a4-8). 
Scholars such as Worman and Blondell have noted the demotic, even coarse, element that 
seems to pervade much of Socrates’ speech. Worman, for example, describes as “vulgar” 
Socrates’ rejoinder to Thrasymachus’ definition of justice that if the just is in fact the advantage 
of the stronger, does that mean that eating “beefsteak” (τὰ Βόεια κρέα, 338c7-d2) amounts to 
justice because it makes an athlete stronger?266 Blondell, similarly, takes note of Socrates’ 
“demotic intellectual personality” and “discourse . . . marked by a homespun style,” replete with 
a “notorious use of analogies from everyday life” as evinced by his various craft-examples which 
“cover low or servile activities . . .”267 
It seems clear that this demotic element to which both Worman and Blondell rightly draw 
our attention also extends to Socrates’ use of proverbs, as is apparent in his deft deployment of 
the folk saying about shaving a lion, which provokes Thrasymachus’ summary dismissal of 
Socrates as “amounting to nothing” (οὐδὲν ὢν, 341c3). As is the case in his use of other genres 
of discourse, Socrates is a master of both the highbrow and lowbrow when it comes to gnômai 
and proverbs. And it is precisely this intermixing of the two registers that provokes 																																																								
265 Worman 2008: 7. 
266 Worman 2008:  205-6. 
267 Blondell: 2002: 76. 
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Thrasymachus’ wrath. Here Bakhtin’s concept of “speech genres” becomes relevant. As Bakhtin 
observes, “Many people who have an excellent command of a language often feel quite helpless 
in certain spheres of communication precisely because they do not have a practical command of 
the generic forms in the given spheres.”268 Such is the plight of Thrasymachus vis-à-vis Socrates. 
To use a modern analogy, it were as if some “fast-talking” lawyer, with his folksy examples and 
experience in filing purportedly frivolous lawsuits (in other words, a sukophantês),269 had 
suddenly “crashed” a scholarly symposium and attempted to challenge one of the faculty 
presenter’s ideas with vocabulary and turns of phrase far different from – one could say beneath 
– the language customarily used at these events 
Blondell observes what she calls a “‘democratic’ versatility in [Socrates’] mastery of 
varied genres of discourse, from oratory to literary criticism, and in his remarkably detailed 
familiarity with various aspects of the material world and the crafts.”270 It is precisely such 
generic versatility – a versatility that reflects Plato’s generic hybridity – that possesses the 
capacity to alter the world, in accordance with Bakhtin’s vision. As Worman argues, “Socrates 
consistently aligns himself against power and perceptible (i.e., aristocratic) virtues. His discourse 
mirrors this stance; as mentioned, it is usually full of the humble stuff of daily life, which 
disgusts and irritates highbrow, spirited sophistic types.”271 
Much of the appeal of proverbs and gnômai lies precisely in the commonness, the 
ordinariness, which characterizes many of them. By commonness, I mean both the fact that such 																																																								
268 Bakhtin 1986: 147. 
269 Indeed, one could well argue that sukophantês is the fifth- and fourth-century analogue of an “ambulance 
chaser,” an unethical personal-injury lawyer who cares only for monetary reward, not the merit of the cases he files 
in court. See, e.g., MacDowell 1995: 75: “Aristophanes presents sycophancy as if it were a regular, though 
disgraceful, profession, rather like prostitution.” 
270 Blondell 2002: 75. 
271 Worman 2008: 165. 
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sayings have come to be quoted repeatedly over time by many people as well as the ordinary 
realia (e.g., shaving, animals, elements from folk superstition, etc.) of which they are often 
comprised. Such discourse might well appear out of place in more rarified settings, in the 
presence of more elite company. Yet, as Aristotle recognized, herein lies the attraction of such 
“common” speech. In his Rhetoric, after first noting that “rustic folk are especially good gnômai-
users and readily display them” (οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι µάλιστα γνωµοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως 
ἀποφαίνονται), he advises that one ought to make use of such “common” (κοιναῖς) and 
“frequently quoted” (τεθρυληµέναις) sayings for two reasons: (1) “because they are common, 
they seem to be true, as everyone is in agreement about them” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς 
ὁµολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, 1395a) and (2) because of “the vulgarity of the 
listening audience” (τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν) who “are delighted” (χαίρουσι) to hear 
“views that they hold themselves severally” (τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ µέρος ἔχουσιν, 1395b). 
Yet it is precisely the common and vulgar element of this discourse that those preferring 
a more sophistic manner of discussion find offensive and off-putting. In Plato’s Gorgias, Polus 
protests against Socrates’ treatment of Gorgias by claiming that Socrates “takes the discussion 
into areas that are the height of boorishness” (εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς 
λόγους, Gorg. 461c3-4) and Socrates himself later acknowledges that the subject matter of his 
discourse is “rather boorish” (ἀγροικότερον, Gorg. 462e6). In other words, while all things 
agroika, “boorish” or “crude,” have the potential to offend the sophisticated class, it is the 
agroikoi, the “boorish yokels” as it were, who, according to Aristotle, are most inclined to use 
and hear gnômai – i.e., they are malista gnōmotypoi – given “their vulgarity” (τὴν φορτικότητα). 
For the more refined set, agroikia is of a piece with phluaria, the  “nonsense” or “trash” 
that Socrates trades in. As Callicles derides Socrates in the Gorgias, “You keep talking about 
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food and drink and doctors and nonsense [phluaria]. I am not talking of these things” (Περὶ 
σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, Gorg. 490c8-d1). 
Something similar is at work when Thrasymachus reviles Socrates with his “snotty nose” insult. 
Immediately after the lion-shaving proverb, Socrates attempts to dismantle Thrasymachus’ 
definition of justice by employing his tried-and-true craft analogies, the first of which is that of 
the doctor (ἰατρός, 341c5). It is through use of such craft analogies that Socrates provides 
support for his ever more compelling turns of phrase – verbal constructions that I would liken to 
proverbs – by which he ultimately undermines Thrasymachus’ position and causes the arch-
sophist to blush (Θρασύµαχον ἐρυθριῶντα, 350d2), something Socrates has never before 
witnessed. For example, Socrates coins a proverb with the following: “Let us put it this way:  a 
just man aims to surpass not his like but his unlike, whereas for an unjust man, it is both his like 
and his unlike” (Ὧδε δὴ λέγωµεν, . . . ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ µὲν ὁµοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνοµοίου, 
ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁµοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοµοίου, 349c11-d1). He then provides further support for 
this proverb and links it with another step essential to his argument by analogizing it to the craft 
of a musician: when tuning a lyre (ἁρµοττόµενος λύραν), a musician would not seek to surpass 
another musician in “the tightening and loosening of the strings” (ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν 
χορδῶν) but he would seek to surpass a “non-musician” (ἀµούσου, 349e10-16). Here the 
proverb-like quality of Socrates’ formulations is strengthened all the more by the phrases’ 
proximity to the famous Hesiodic proverb that also concerns competing craftsmen, “Potter vies 
with potter and builder with builder, and beggar envies beggar, and bard bard.”272 Of course in 
the new Socratic proverbs, the zero-sum game inherent in Hesiod’s vision of the craftsmen’s 
																																																								
272 Op. 24-5. 
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agon wih fellow craftsmen is removed entirely. Socrates’ is the new, more humane vision, and 
we shall see this theme developed further in Book 4. 
Socrates’ conjoining of proverbs taken from ordinary crafts like medicine and lyre-
playing is all part of seducing Thrasymachus to accede ultimately to the logically infirm 
argument that we are what we are like, which has the direct effect of reversing Thrasymachus’ 
original position: the just man ends up being intelligent and wise because he seeks to surpass 
only his unlike, i.e., the ignorant, and the unjust man ends up being unintelligent and unwise 
because he seeks to surpass his like, i.e., the ignorant. Thrasymachus cannot help but blush that 
he has been duped so handily by such phluaria, assembled with the help of ta agroika.  As Adam 
notes, Socrates’ argument rests upon a fallacy akin to the a dicto secundum quid ad dictum 
simpliciter.273 Nonetheless, Socrates ultimately succeeds in eliciting Thrasymachus’ assent to 
such phluaria because of his compelling, proverbial formulations, built in part on homespun 
material of a type more common and vulgar than Thrasymachus and his sophistic set are 
accustomed. The immoralist has been outdone by a man who demonstrates that he can wield 
gnômai more deftly than even the author of “Justice is nothing more than the advantage of the 
stronger.”   
Plato also demonstrates, with Socrates’ tour-de-force display of gnome-formulation in the 
service of a patently fallacious argument, that not all proverbs are to be trusted, despite their 
captivating language and clever constructions. One must not, like Thrasymachus, allow oneself 
to be hoist on one’s own proverbial petard. In Plato’s view, “Just it is, to render to each what is 
owed him,” akin to “Justice is a certain kind of thievery, albeit for the benefit of friends and the 
harm of enemies,” and “Justice is nothing more than the advantage of the stronger,” are little 
																																																								
273 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
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more than “old wives’ tales.” These are not true proverbs, worthy of citation and quotation by 
future readers. And with this realization we are able to appreciate the exquisite irony in Plato’s 
narrative near the close of Republic 1. Thrasymachus, beaten at his own maxim-building game 
and having just been asked by Socrates whether he remembered that he had once maintained 
justice to be a powerful thing (ἰσχυρόν, 350d7) grumbles in feeble retort: “Go ahead and 
question away. And I’ll just answer you as one does to old wives spinning their tales, ‘Very 
good’” (ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶνταῖς τοὺς µύθους λεγούσαις, “εἶεν” ἐρῶ, 350e2-
4). With that, the wolf that was Thrasymachus demonstrates that he is rendered voiceless, as he 
answers mechanically in agreement with Socrates for the remainder of Book 1. By virtue of his 
skillful deployment of proverbs and gnômai, Socrates has altered the discourse. Plato’s project of 
reform is underway. 
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Chapter Three – Republic 2 and 3:  The Use and Abuse of Proverbs 
 
 
I have defined “dialectic” as the attempt to play off vocabularies against one another, rather than 
merely to infer propositions from one another. . . . A more up to date word for what I have been 
calling “dialectic” would be “literary criticism.” 
                
Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity 
 
 
A morality is neither a system of general principles nor a code of rules, but a vernacular language. 
 
        Michael Oakeshott, Of Human Conduct 
 
 
I don’t know, that’s all words . . . all words, there’s nothing else. 
 
                  Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable 
 
 
3.1. Contemplating “Release” from Logos 
 
The second book of Plato’s Republic begins curiously: Socrates describes to the unnamed 
audience of his narrative (that is to say, to us, the readers of Plato’s text) how he had thought that 
at this point in his dialogue with his various interlocutors, the discourse (logos) had come to an 
end. And significantly, he uses language connoting “release,” “deliverance.” The Greek 
infinitive ἀπηλλάχθαι means literally to have been “set free or released from a thing” (LSJ, s.v. 
B.1). Socrates puts it thus, “And so, after having said these things, I thought that I had been 
released from the discourse [logos]” – or, in Adam’s rendering of λόγου, “that I had been 
released from speaking”274 – “whereas in point of fact, it turned out, so it seems, to have been a 
prologue” (Ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤµην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, 
προοίµιον, 357a1-2). 
To be sure, the passive of ἀπαλλάσσω is often translated as “have done with” or “make 
an end of,” but the upshot remains the same: the cessation of something is contemplated, in this 																																																								
274 Adam 1980: ad loc., argues that “λόγου=τοῦ λέγειν, not ‘the discussion’ (Jowett) which would be τοῦ λόγου.”  
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instance, of the logos, of speaking (τοῦ λέγειν), with the verb’s persistent undertone of release 
still present. It is interesting that Plato marks the beginning of yet another chapter with the idea 
that the logos can – and here, should, by all rights – end, at least in the estimation of his primary 
character and the narrator of his text, Socrates, who thinks momentarily that he has been released 
from discourse.275   
The pairing of various forms of the verb ἀπαλλάσσω with logos in the sense conveyed 
here is relatively infrequent in ancient Greek literature. But in two of the key places that the 
combination does occur, we receive the unmistakable impression of near contempt for logos. In 
Euripides’ Medea, after detailing her plans to kill Jason’s bride, Medea exclaims “But now I put 
an end to this talk” (ἐνταῦθα µέντοι τόνδ' ἀπαλλάσσω λόγον, 790) just before she determines to 
murder her children. When the chorus objects and urges her not to commit such a horrible deed, 
Medea chides them: “From this point forward, all words are superfluous” (περισσοὶ πάντες οὑν 
µέσωι λόγοι, 819). Donald Mastronarde affirms that the meaning conveyed by τόνδ' ἀπαλλάσσω 
λόγον in this instance constitutes “an unusual use of this highly flexible verb.276 Similarly, in 
Sophocles’ Electra, the sinister Paedagogus chides Orestes and Electra for what he perceives as 
their dalliance in “joyous” (σὺν χαρᾷ) logos immediately following the recognition scene and 
their jubilant reuniting with one another. He urges them to dispense with their words and get on 
with the dirty business of killing both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus: “Have done now (νῦν 
ἀπαλλαχθέντε) with lengthy speeches (τῶν µακρῶν λόγων) and with this insatiable over-joyous 
outcry . . . since in such matters delay is reprehensible, but to make an end is supreme 
																																																								
275 See my argument at the beginning of Chapter 2 that Republic 1 opens with Plato signaling the distinct possibility 
that discourse could all too easily end, possibly even in violence, if the communicants are unwilling to listen to one 
another. And tellingly, in Republic 1, logos holds the potential “to release” (ἀφεῖναι) willing communicants from the 
threat of violence (Resp. 327c9-12).  
276 Mastronarde 2002: ad loc. 
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(ἀπηλλάχθαι δ' ἀκµή)” (El. 1335-38).277 J.H. Kells explains how both the first aorist passive 
(ἀπαλλαχθέντε) and the first perfect passive (ἀπηλλάχθαι) “have a heavy, harsh sound which 
seems to emphasize contempt” for the “delaying tactics of Orestes and Electra” as evinced in 
their prolonged discourse.278 
Why would Socrates use the same expression in describing his own logos with his 
interlocutors? Why should he portray discourse as something he thinks he “has been released 
from” or “has put an end to,” employing a verb with a valence that, per Kells, can suggest a 
shade of contempt? I want to propose that again, as with the opening of the Republic in Book 1, 
Plato demonstrates an exquisite sensitivity to the possible futility of discourse, particularly where 
the pivotal role that the manipulation of language can play in a larger, humanitarian disaster is all 
too clearly evident (even if only in Plato’s perception of things). This is an age where, after all, 
brutal civil war was marked – as Thucydides explains – by opposing sides perversely shifting 
(ἀντήλλαξαν), as they deemed fit (τῇ δικαιώσει), the customary value of words (τὴν εἰωθυῖαν 
ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνοµάτων) in order to suit the individual facts (ἐς τὰ ἔργα, 3.82.4) of the situation 
(that is, of the bloody stasis in Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War).279 How could one not 
desire, on some level, to be “released from,” “to have done with,” language that so sorely lacks 
any consistency or integrity? Indeed, it is precisely that which stands apart from logos – what 
one might describe as “logos-less” or, more literally, “thought-less” (alogistos, LSJ, s.v. I.) – that 
is honored in the world Plato confronts in his writing. Kells artfully compares the Paedagogus’ 
chiding of Orestes and Electra’s extended logos with passive forms of the verb ἀπαλλάσσω to 
Thucydides’ further comment on the language- and value-shifting stasis at Corcya where 																																																								
277 Trans. J.H. Kells (with modification). 
278 Kells 1973: ad loc. 
279 See Gomme 1970: ad loc., where he cites and explains Dionyisos’ paraphrase of τῇ δικαιώσει: “ἄλλως ἠξίουν 
αὐτὰ καλεῖν; they ‘claimed the right’ to impose new interpretations on old words.” 
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“thoughtless daring [tolma alogistos] was considered partisan courage, and prudent hesitation 
was deemed prettified cowardice” (τόλµα µὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνοµίσθη, 
µέλλησις δὲ προµηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, Th. 3.82.4)280    
There is, of course, no question that Sophocles’ Paedagogus and Plato’s Socrates differ 
radically in their respective approaches to such a world turned-upside-down, where the 
customary meanings of words have been upended: the Paedagogus prizes action over the 
fruitless tedium of discourse, while Socrates espouses philosophy that at its most basic level 
stands in opposition to the prevailing discursive practices of Plato’s day (e.g., to the sophistical 
rhetoric of orators like Gorgias). Yet there is a level of pessimism evinced by both men toward 
the pre-supposed efficacy of “the word” that cannot be ignored.281 The Paedagogus discards 
discourse altogether: better to use brute force in a world that honors brute force. By contrast, 
Socrates understands that he must remain committed to logos, but nonetheless worries aloud to 
Thrasymachus (in Book 1) that the two men may not be “capable of having a discussion with one 
another according to conventional practice” (εἴχοµεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νοµιζόµενα λέγοντες, 
348e) given the seemingly enormous gulf in values and language which threatens to make 
mutual understanding impossible. And since the men’s logos ultimately proves to be largely 
inconsequential in light of Thrasymachus remaining unconvinced by Socrates’ arguments – as 
illustrated by Thrasymachus mechanically responding “yes” and “no” to Socrates’ questions at 
the close of Book 1 – it really comes as no surprise that Socrates speaks at Book 2’s opening in 
terms of “having been released from,” “having done with” (ἀπηλλάχθαι) discourse. It will have 																																																								
280 Kells 1973: 212. Civil war broke out in Corcyra in 427. We have no evidence whatsoever for the date of Electra. 
But even if the play were written and performed before the Corcyrean stasis, this would not preclude Sophocles’ 
perception that the combination of the Peloponnesian War and the sophistic enlightenment were calling into 
question previous social and educational verities. 
281 Of a similar mindset is the Messenger in Euripides’ Medea, who asserts that “mortals who seem to be wise and 
are concerned with logos bring upon themselves the greatest folly” (τοὺς σοφοὺς βροτῶν / δοκοῦντας εἶναι καὶ 
µεριµνητὰς λόγων / τούτους µεγίστην µωρίαν ὀφλισκάνειν, 1225-27). 
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to be enough that Thrasymachus has been rendered silent, in effect, “voiceless” (ἄφωνος, 
336d5), even if he remains unpersuaded.282   
And yet, Socrates realizes all that was just a “prologue” (τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, 
προοίµιον).283 He seems to recognize the fancy in thinking that one could ever “put an end to” or 
come to “have been released” (ἀπηλλάχθαι) from logos. It is as if Socrates has reached a moment 
analogous to that of the twentieth-century modernist writer, Samuel Beckett, whose work had as 
its primary aim “the end of language” but who also realized that a discourse which seems to lead 
nowhere must nevertheless continue.284 As Beckett writes at the close of his aptly named The 
Unnameable, “You must say words, as long as there are any . . . I can’t go on. I’ll go on.”285  So, 
too, must Socrates, must Plato, “go on” with logos, despite and at the same time precisely 
because the debased state of discourse demands as much. As Eric Voegelin observes, “The issue 
at stake is that of communication and intelligibility in a decadent society.”286 There can be no 
release from the need to bridge the discursive divide that existed in the society of Socrates and 
his greatest pupil, notwithstanding Plato’s display of apparent pessimism over the efficacy of the 
word.287 																																																								
282 See my discussion at the end of Chapter 2 of how Thrasymachus comes to occupy the position of the man 
rendered voiceless (ἄφωνος) in the folk proverb about the quick-acting wolf spying first a dilatory man.  
283 Socrates’ view in this regard seems to parallel the tradition among both ancient and modern scholars that regards 
Book 1 of the Republic as a separate work written earlier by Plato, perhaps as a sketch for the Gorgias, and then 
ultimately used as the introduction to the rest of the Republic, composed at a later date (see, generally, Shorey 1982: 
x; Vlastos 1991: 248-51). Socrates says, in effect, that Book 1 was just a proem, a remark that amounts to a kind of 
meta-recognition on Plato’s part that the subject needs more detailed treatment. It is telling, thus, that Plato’s 
writerly strategy for the remainder of the Republic, following the initial “proem,” is to begin anew in Books 2 and 3 
with the poets. I am grateful to Kathryn Morgan for this observation.  
284 L. Hill 1990: 162. 
285 Beckett 1958: 404. 
286 Voegelin 1957: 29.   
287 In his Seventh Letter, Plato voices his profound doubt that the subjects he treats can ever be expressed in words 
as other subjects are (ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαµῶς ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα µαθήµατα, 341c5-6). Even if the Seventh Letter is not 
authentic, the fact that ancient tradition views Plato as having held this view speaks volumes about Plato’s thoughts 
on language and its presumed (in)efficacy. 
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Language is the medium in which Plato must work, efficacious or not. Justice may prove 
a most elusive quarry,288 one especially resistant to capture by even the most comprehensible of 
terms, let alone words whose meanings have been inverted as Thucydides describes. Plato, 
however, has no choice but to use the prevailing discursive practices of his day, flawed as they 
might appear to be, in order to do what his interlocutors demand. Further, this is something that 
no one else has ever yet (οὐδεὶς πώποτε) accomplished, as Adeimantus puts it, “set forth in 
poetry or private conversation, sufficiently by discourse, that [injustice] is the greatest of all evils 
that the soul contains within itself, but that justice is the greatest good” (οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν 
ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς τὸ µὲν µέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὑτῇ, 
δικαιοσύνη δὲ µέγιστον ἀγαθόν, 366e7-9). As was the case with Republic 1, we shall see 
firsthand the role that proverbs and gnômai must necessarily play in any such undertaking, with 
the progression of the dialogue in Books 2 and 3. 
 
3.2. The Abuse of Proverb 
 
Books 2 and 3 of the Republic are rightly famous (or, depending on one’s perspective, 
notorious) for the severity of the attacks they level against certain passages of poetry, as Socrates 
and his interlocutors attempt to reach a non-instrumental definition of justice for both the 
individual and the state. Such attacks may be explained in large part by the fact that for the 
Greeks, poetry was not equivalent to our modern conception of poetry as a highly stylized form 
of literary expression, often separated from the day-to-day business of life and work in what we 
																																																								
288 Indeed, in Republic 4, Socrates uses the vivid simile of himself and his companions as “huntsmen surrounding 
the copse” in which justice, their quarry, hides (νῦν δὴ ἡµᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάµνον κύκλῳ 
περιίστασθαι, 432b7-8). 
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take to be the “real world.”289 Poetry seems today to be more a rhetorical luxury than an essential 
component of a properly functioning society. 
By contrast, poetry for the Greeks was not simply a literary genre. Rather, as I described 
in Chapter One, it was a key component of ancient Greek culture until the middle of the fourth 
century. Oral communication and transmission of poetry was the overarching educational and 
ethical tractate that dominated all of the important transactions and relationships of Attic 
society.290 Thus not surprisingly, memorization of poetry was an essential precondition for daily 
life and conversation. As mentioned previously, Aristotle observes in his Metaphysics that some 
people would not take seriously a speaker’s statements unless supported by the words of a 
poet.291 Accordingly, students learned many passages by heart as required by Greek pedagogy, 
and adults from all walks of life quoted lines of poetry that they had memorized in support of 
their arguments, in the points they made in conversations, and in their public speeches.292 
But if poetry could be “abused” to support a morally dubious position, the “quotability” 
of poetry in a culture where lines are excerpted and anthologies compiled (often of gnômai, à la 
Hesiod’s Precepts of Cheiron) poses an obstacle to any attempt to improve society gone awry.293 
The discursive practice of selective quotation of memorable poetic passages constitutes a 
potential impediment to social reform. Accordingly, social reform necessarily entails discursive 
reform. 
																																																								
289 One thinks here of New York Governor Mario Cuomo’s famous observation, “You campaign in poetry; you 
govern in prose” (Kolbert: 2015). 
290 E. Havelock 1963: 27, 38-43. See my discussion in Chapter 1.1. 
291 Arist., Metaph. 995a7-8. 
292 See, e.g., Herod. 7.161; Plato, Laws 810e-811a; Prt. 338e-339a; Xen., Sympos. 3.5-6; See generally, Havelock 
1963: 55, n. 16; A. Ford 2010; B. Graziosi 2010; S. Halliwell 2000; R. Hunter 2014: 7, 77-8. 
293 Hunter 2014: 119; see my discussion in Chapter 1.1. 
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After Adeimantus intervenes in Socrates’ conversation with his brother, Glaucon, early in 
Book 2 of the Republic, he provides a stunning example of how poetry can be misused to 
obstruct the reform of ideas about justice and attaining the desired non-instrumental formulation 
of justice for its own sake. Glaucon had been arguing that Socrates must provide a definition of 
justice that demonstrates why justice should be sought for its own sake, not for any benefit that it 
may happen to confer – in short, a non-instrumental definition of justice. Importantly for my 
thesis, several of the verses that Adeimantus quotes from memory in his demonstration are 
gnômai and proverbs. (We will return to the specifics of Glaucon’s argumentation shortly, as 
they, too, in their own way involve a misuse of proverb.) In accordance with my definition of 
proverb in Chapter One, I shall use the terms “gnome” and “proverb” interchangeably unless 
there is a specific reason for denoting a particular phrase as either a proverb (παροίµια) or a 
gnome (γνώµη) either (1) because a text expressly refers to a particular phrase as a “proverb” 
(παροίµια) or (2) because there is a need to draw attention to the poetic origin of particular 
gnômai, based upon Aristotle’s having used the word γνώµη explicitly for sayings which he 
found in early Greek poetry, a practice which many scholars have seen fit to follow.294 The latter 
distinction proves useful insofar as it serves to highlight Aristotle’s apparent view that gnômai 
could evolve over time into paroimiai, if they were to become “frequently quoted and common” 
(τεθρυληµέναι καὶ κοιναί, Rhet. 1395a10-17). For my purposes, this also helps to distinguish 
proverbs that have clear origins in poetry from those that might have arisen primarily out of folk 
culture. 
We should first note how Socrates expresses his acceptance of Adeimantus intervening at 
this juncture into the conversation, when Adeimantus insists that Glaucon has not exhaustively 
																																																								
294 Ar., Rhet. 1395a10-23; see my discussion in Chapter 1.2; Lardinois 1995: 16-17. 
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covered the relevant concerns that anyone seeking a non-instrumental definition of justice must 
address. Socrates invites Adeimantus into the discussion by way of what he describes explicitly 
as a “saying” (τὸ λεγόµενον), which is a term often used to preface a proverb: “Well then, let a 
brother help a brother” (Οὐκοῦν . . . ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη, 362d6). Indeed, the scholiast defines 
this saying as a “proverb” (paroimia) and locates its source in Homer.295 In Book 16 of the 
Odyssey, Odysseus disguised as a poor beggar asks his son Telemachus whether he finds his 
non-existent “brothers” (κασιγνήτοις) inadequate to the task of overthrowing the greedy suitors 
who plague Penelope, insofar as “a man relies upon such men in fighting when a great quarrel 
arises” (οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ//µαρναµένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ µέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται, Od. 16.97-8).296   
We are about to witness Adeimantus demonstrate how a number of proverbs stand 
squarely in the way of anyone who aspires to conceive of justice as a good in and of itself. It 
seems only fitting, thus, that Plato should deftly mark the beginning of such a demonstration 
with its own introductory proverb, quoted by Socrates. Here, however, the “help” to be offered 
borders on the perverse, insofar as Adeimantus stands ready to aid (παρείη) a brother whose 
previous demands of Socrates in defending justice as a non-instrumental good were themselves 
alone sufficient (ἱκανά), as Socrates protests, to “pin him to the mat” (καταπαλῖσαι) and render 
him “incapable of helping justice” (ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ, 362d8-9). “Let a 
brother help a brother,” indeed.  
Adeimantus then proceeds to quote a select number of proverbs – described generally as 
“sayings” (λεγόµενα, 365a5) – which fall into two categories: those that praise justice for the 
																																																								
295 Greene 1938: ad loc.: παροιµία ἀδελφὸς †ἀεὶ παρείη ὅτι προτιµητέον τοὺς οἰκείους εἰς βοήθειαν (emphasis in 
original). 
296 See my discussion in Chapter 2.2 of the parallel between Socrates and Odysseus disguised as a poor, old beggar. 
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benefits it confers rather than praising justice in and of itself (αὐτὸ, 363a1),297 and those that 
point to the ease and pleasure of vice and describe how gods angered by a man’s injustice may 
be appeased with sacrifices in a universe where too often just men suffer tragedy while the unjust 
live without affliction (i.e., the “problem of Job”). The former contain legomena from Hesiod’s 
Works and Days – specifically from a section that Lardinois describes as the poem’s Dikê-
paraenesis, which itself “consists almost entirely of long, expanded gnomes, interrupted by four 
sets of imperatives . . . and an interesting soliloquy in which Hesiod draws some of the 
consequences of his Dike-paraenesis for himself.”298 Plato’s use of gnômai in his prose from this 
particular source seems apt, given that one might well describe the better part of the Republic 
itself as a Dikê-paraenesis. However, the gnômai that Adeimantus quotes support a proposition 
entirely different from that which is of central importance to the Republic, namely, that justice is 
to be sought for its own sake, not for the rewards it brings or the ways in which it enables one to 
avoid penalties and punishment. Moreover, Adeimantus employs the gnômai not only in support 
of the polar opposite to the Republic’s non-instrumental definition of justice, but, further, to 
illustrate how benefits and rewards accrue not to a person who really is just but to anyone who 
merely seems to be just (δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ, 363a2-3). 
Adeimantus cites the “noble Hesiod” (ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός) and quotes lines excerpted 
from the lengthy gnomic exposition on the merits of dikê which follows the famous parable of 
the hawk and the nightingale in the Works and Days.299 Per Adeimantus’ reading, these gnômai 																																																								
297 The full phrase is αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην. Adam 1980: ad loc., explains that here “αὐτὸ is ipsum, ‘by itself,’” in light 
of the fact that “αὐτὸ may be thus used even when the feminine of the article is present.”  
298 Lardinois 1995: 194. Lardinois definition of “gnome” (based upon that of Aristotle in his Rhetoric) is, as I 
explained in Chapter 1.2, remarkably close in key respects to how modern paroemiologists define a proverb: “a 
generalizing statement about a particular action” (Lardinois 1995: 12). 
299 Hesiod, Op. 202-12. The fable of the hawk and nightingale differs radically from the gnomic exposition of dikê’s 
merits that follows in Hesiod’s didactic poem, since the fable concludes with a proverb that seems to endorse the 
law of the jungle after the hawk seizes the nightingale: “Foolish is he who seeks to vie with the stronger;  / for he 
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guarantee that for the man who seems “just from his good repute (ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιµεῖν . . . τῷ 
δικαίῳ, 363a4-5) oak trees will bear “acorns on their tops, bees in their middles (ἄκρας µέν τε 
φέρειν βαλάνους, µέσσας δὲ µελίσσας)” and “fleecy sheep are weighed down with wool 
(εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄιες . . . µαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι).”300 The lines’ lesson here seems clear: one should 
strive to be just – or rather, according to Adeimantus’ gloss, to acquire a reputation for justice – 
in order to receive the good things that result. 
Adeimantus continues to press the point by describing still more extensive benefits 
(µακροτέρους . . . µισθοὺς) that allegedly accrue to those who seem just: “For they say that 
hereafter remain unfailing the children’s children and the stock of the pious and oath-keeping 
man” (παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου, 363d3-
4).301  While the Scholiast finds the origin of this saying in Herodotus,302 the more likely 
candidate is yet another, earlier use of the same gnome in Hesiod’s Works and Days given that 
Adeimantus has just quoted expressly from Hesiod and is about to do so again barely one 
Stephanus page later, as we shall see in a moment. Moreover, the gnome that Adeimantus 
appears to paraphrase – but not quote expressly – is the concluding gnome of Hesiod’s Dikê-
paraenesis, from which Adeimantus obtained his previously quoted lines. Indeed, as Lardinois 
explains, it is the last of Hesiod’s three gnômai on justice which expand a long gnome about the 
law of Zeus303 (282-5): 																																																																																																																																																																																		
loses and suffers pain in addition to shame” (ἄφρων δ', ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν· / νίκης τε 
στέρεται πρός τ' αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχε, 210-11). 
300 Resp. 363b1-3 (quoting Op. 234-5). 
301 Trans. Shorey (with modification). 
302 Greene, C.G. 1938: ad loc.: ἐξ Ἡροδότου (6.86) ἀπὸ τοῦ δοθέντος χρησµοῦ Γλαύκῳ τῷ Λάκωνι ὠς Ἀνδρὸς 
δ᾽εὐόρκου γενεή µετόπισθεν ἀµείνων. See also Adam 1980: ad loc. In Herodotus, the Delphic Oracle warns Glaucus 
the Spartan about the son of Horkos who pursues the man who swears falsely. The last verse of the oracle is 
identical to Op. 285: ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ µετόπισθεν ἀµείνων.  
303 Lardinois 1995: 193. 
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ὃς δέ κε µαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀµόσσας 
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ, 
τοῦ δέ τ' ἀµαυροτέρη γενεὴ µετόπισθε λέλειπται· 
ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ µετόπισθεν ἀµείνων. 
 
He who lies, deliberately swearing falsely in his testimony, 
is himself irreparably hurt by harming the just, 
and the family he leaves behind is even more obscure 
but better is the stock hereafter of the oath-keeping man.304 
If we were to follow the thinking of Aristotle in his Rhetoric concerning how some 
proverbs began as gnômai and then became “frequently quoted and common” (τεθρυληµέναις 
καὶ κοιναῖς, 1395a10-11), it would seem that Plato in the person of Adeimantus is revealing how 
both the gnômai that are expressly quoted and attributed to a specific author – e.g., Adeimantus’ 
first quotation of Works and Days, lines 234-5 – and the paroimiai that subsequently evolve 
following their initial debut as gnômai in a poetic text into frequently quoted sayings – e.g., 
Adeimantus’ subsequent paraphrase of Works and Days, lines 282-5 – have the potential to be 
used as authority for morally dubious ends. Adeimantus is employing the full force of proverb to 
justify why men do not practice justice for its own sake but rather for its collateral benefits. 
Adeimantus then shifts to describing how, while everyone (πάντες) lauds justice and self-
control (σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη), they also find these things to be unpleasant and 
laborious (χαλεπὸν µέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον). By contrast, everyone acknowledges that “injustice and 
licentiousness are pleasurable and easily acquired, but shameful only because of law and 
custom” (ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ µὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ µόνον καὶ νόµῳ 
αἰσχρόν, 364a1-4). And how do people justify such a morally questionable position?  
Adeimantus gives an explanation that amounts to an anachronistic citation of Aristotle’s advice, 
namely, that people quote the poets in support of their view: “For all of these arguments, they 
																																																								
304 See Hunter 2014: 118, n. 200, who argues convincingly that Plato uses κατόπισθεν for Hesiod’s µετόπισθε(ν). 
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bring in the poets as supporting witnesses concerning the ease of obtaining vice” (τούτοις δὲ 
πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις µάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται οἱ µὲν κακίας πέρι, εὐπετείας διδόντες, 364c5-6). 
Moreover, the lines of poetry which Adeimantus maintains are quoted by those people 
who want to justify the ease of vice vis-à-vis the difficulty of virtue, constitute one of the most 
famous and most-quoted gnômai in Greek literature, the ubiquitous “two roads” passage from 
Hesiod’s Works and Days, with its memorable image of two divergent roads, one of vice and one 
of virtue.305 Indeed, I think it reasonable to consider these lines as having achieved the status of a 
proverb under Aristotle’s analysis, precisely because they were quoted so often and repeated so 
widely in the ancient world.   
Adeimantus, however, crops the lines to make a claim entirely counter to the didactic 
thrust of the passage as it appears in Hesiod’s original: instead of the hard road of virtue, the easy 
road to vice receives approbation in Adeimantus’ selective quotation, in order to support 
Ademiantus’ claim that most people, regrettably, would rather take the easier road to villainy 
(364c5-d2306): 
τὴν µὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι 
ῥηϊδίως· λείη µὲν ὁδός, µάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει· 
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν 
 
Easily and frequently is Villainy seized; for the road is easy and very near. 
But before the road of Virtue the [deathless] gods have placed sweat. 
 
Adeimantus conveniently omits the second half of the proverb (Op. 290-2): 
 
ἀθάνατοι· µακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶµος ἐς αὐτὴν 
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,   
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. 
 
And the way to it [Virtue] is long and steep and rough at first.  But when one 
																																																								
305 Hesiod, Op. 287-92. The extant literature expressly quotes the passage some twenty-six times.  
306Quoting Op. 287-9.     
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arrives at the summit, then it is easier, even though remaining difficult.307 
 
What in Hesiod’s original had been an exhortation to pursue the hard, yet righteous path now 
becomes, in Adeimantus’ selective quotation, an excuse to yield to one’s baser instincts.   
Hesiod’s original seems in many ways to be the Hesiodic analogue of the aforementioned 
Greek proverb, “Hard is the good” (χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά) which Socrates and his interlocutors quote 
twice elsewhere in the Republic, specifically with respect to the difficulty of the inquiry they are 
undertaking in the dialogue.308 Thus, if one were to follow the course of action seemingly 
demanded by Adeimantus’ (mis)-citation and (mis)-use of Hesiod’s gnome turned-paroimia, the 
participants in Plato’s Republic would be justified in setting aside their inquiry altogether, in 
putting an end (ἀπηλλάχθαι) to their discourse, as Socrates had briefly envisioned at Book 2’s 
opening. Better and far easier to do what everyone else does and then summon the gnômai of the 
poets and proverbs as support: Don’t scruple to commit wrong so long as you maintain the 
appearance of being just. Attempting the hard path of acting justly for justice’s sake is a fool’s 
errand. 
Indeed, barely one Stephanus page later, Adeimantus provides what Adam calls an 
“audacious application of the proverb χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά” – “outrageous” may be more accurate – 
in proffering as a rejoinder to anyone who objects that it is “not easy for a wrongdoer to escape 
detection indefinitely” (οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα, 365c6-7) this ersatz bit of wisdom:  
“And so, too, is neither any other big endeavor easy” (Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές. . .τῶν 
																																																								
307 I omit from my translation ἀθάνατοι, as it belongs to the previous line, which Adeimantus cropped. 
308 Resp. 435c8, 497d10. The scholium on 435c attributes the proverb to Solon, revealing that, as was the case with 
Hesiod’s two-roads motif, the saying began as a gnome, if we follow Aristotle’s view that gnômai which become 
frequently quoted also qualify as paroimiai. In addition, a variant of the same proverb is at issue in Protagoras’ and 
Socrates’ dueling interpretations of Simonides’ “Ode to Scopas” in Plato’s Protagoras (339b1ff.).  
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µεγάλων, 365c7-d1).309 The world and its hitherto notions of traditional morality are turned 
upside down when proverbs are employed in ways that invert their usual meanings. 
Adeimantus is, of course, playing devil’s advocate. He understands full well the hazards 
posed by the selective quotation of proverbs, many of which find their origins in poetry, e.g., the 
gnômai from Hesiod that he so “audaciously” applies. Indeed, after quoting another gnome (from 
Homer)310 and before launching into even more quotations and sayings, Adeimantus sums up 
precisely the problem that lies at the very heart of Plato’s concerns (365a4-b1): 
Ταῦτα πάντα . . . ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόµενα ἀρετῆς πέρι 
καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιµῆς, τί οἰόµεθα ἀκουούσας 
νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόµενα ὥσπερ 
ἐπιπτόµενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον 
ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; 
 
My dear Socrates, what do we suppose is the effect of all these sayings, so many 
and of such sort, as to how men and gods hold in esteem both virtue and vice, on 
the souls of the young men who hear them, however many are well-suited and 
capable of flitting upon them like bees and gathering from them whatever sort of 
person a man would be and the way by which having proceeded, he might lead his 
life the best? 
 
Then, to illustrate his point as he leads up to his outrageous misapplication of chalepa ta 
kala in support of vice rather than virtue, Adeimantus takes Socrates (and Plato’s reader) through 
a near dizzying display of multiple sayings, quotations, paraphrases, and poetic excerpts, several 
of which qualify as genuine proverbs. His purpose is to illustrate the potentially damaging effects 																																																								
309 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
310 The Homer excerpt is Plato’s freely-edited version of Phoenix’s words to Achilles in Il. 9.407-501: “Propitiable 
by prayers are the gods, whose anger men turn aside, entreating by sacrifices and gentle prayers, libation and the 
savour of burnt fat, whenever someone sins or transgresses” (λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί, / καὶ τοὺς µὲν θυσίαισι καὶ 
εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν / λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι / λισσόµενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁµάρτῃ, 
364d6-e2). Lardinois classifies the passage as a gnome because, as outlined in Chapter 1.2, he follows Aristotle’s 
practice of denoting the lines found in early Greek poetry that make a generalizing assertion about human actions 
and thereby prescribe whether to adopt or reject them, as gnômai. Lardinois 1995: 7-13, 20, n. 68, 280-81. In 
addition, the suppressed copula of the first clause, the polyptoton of λιστοὶ -– λισσόµενοι, the general categories of 
“gods” (θεοὶ) and “men” (ἄνθρωποι), the axiological terminology (ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁµάρτῃ), and the assonance in 
general of Plato’s appropriated version of Homer’s poetry are all potential markers of proverbs (see generally Most 
2008: 146). 
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wrought by ta legomena. What Adeimantus does in the course of only a few lines amounts to a 
demonstration in miniature of my larger point, that proverbs and their skillful deployment 
constitute one of the key battlegrounds on which the struggle is waged for influence over 
people’s behavior and the resulting formation of a society that necessarily reflects that society’s 
prevailing discursive practices. We are, and we become, what we speak. 
Rorty elucidates how any reform-oriented politics worthy of the name “utopian” seeks to 
create “a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby 
causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for example, the 
adoption of new scientific equipment or new social institutions.” 311  This helps explain 
Adeimantus’ concern about the effect of “so many” legomena “of such sort” (τοιαῦτα καὶ 
τοσαῦτα λεγόµενα) on the young men who are “well-suited and capable” (εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ) of 
making use of them for the purpose of constructing their very identities and living their lives 
(συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι, 365a6-
b1). In the parlance of Rorty, Adeimantus illustrates the significance of the “contest” between 
competing “vocabularies” or “language games” which constitute the fundamental way human 
beings formulate their beliefs about the world, e.g., “the vocabulary of ancient Athenian politics 
versus Jefferson’s, the moral vocabulary of Saint Paul versus Freud’s, the jargon of Newton 
versus that of Aristotle, the idiom of Blake versus that of Dryden . . .”312 The reigning 
“vocabularies” of any particular era and culture – including that era and culture’s oft-quoted 
sayings, which frequently take the form of proverbs – both shape and reflect the conceptual, as 
well as moral, framework of the community at large.  
																																																								
311 Rorty 1989: 9. 
312 Rorty 1989: 9. 
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Adeimantus’ tour-de-force exposition of this contest among differing legomena – i.e., 
part of the linguistic behavior that constitutes a “vocabulary” in Rorty’s sense of the word – is 
worth quoting at length (365b1-366b2): 
λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὑτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ Πότερον δίκᾳ 
τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐµαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ 
µὲν γὰρ λεγόµενα δικαίῳ µὲν ὄντι µοι, ἐὰν µὴ καὶ δοκῶ ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν 
εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζηµίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης 
παρεσκευασµένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί 
µοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιµονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ 
τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα µὲν καὶ σχῆµα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐµαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς 
περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν 
κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. “Ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν 
ὄντα.” Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, φήσοµεν, τῶν µεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅµως, εἰ 
µέλλοµεν εὐδαιµονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ 
λανθάνειν συνωµοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξοµεν, εἰσίν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι 
σοφίαν δηµηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ µὲν πείσοµεν, τὰ δὲ 
βιασόµεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην µὴ διδόναι. “Ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν 
οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν.” Οὐκοῦν, εἰ µὲν µὴ εἰσὶν ἢ µηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν 
ἀνθρωπίνων µέλει, τί καὶ ἡµῖν µελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε καὶ 
ἐπιµελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσµεν ἢ ἀκηκόαµεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν νόµων καὶ 
τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις 
τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν καὶ ἀναθήµασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόµενοι, οἷς ἢ 
ἀµφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἀδικηµάτων. δίκαιοι µὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήµιοι µόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόµεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ 
ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόµεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦµέν τε καὶ λισσόµενοι 
ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁµαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήµιοι ἀπαλλάξοµεν. “Ἀλλὰ 
γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου δίκην δώσοµεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωµεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες 
παίδων.” Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόµενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ µέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ 
λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἱ µέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ 
προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόµενοι, οἳ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν µηνύουσιν. 
 
One might reasonably ask himself that saying from Pindar, “Shall I ascend the 
loftier wall by justice or by crooked deceptions and lead my life, fortified all 
around, in this way?” For the sayings affirm that for me actually being just, if I 
don’t seem to be so, there is nothing advantageous, but toil and manifest loss. 
However, a godlike life is promised to the unjust man who has procured for 
himself a reputation for justice. Therefore, since “the seeming is what masters the 
truth,” as the wise men say, and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself 
without stint. For I must draw ‘round myself as my front and my exterior a 
shadow painting of virtue, but I must also drag behind me the shifty and profit-
hungry fox of that most sage Archilochus. “But,” someone says, “Not forever 
easy is the task of lying hid for the wrongdoer.” “So, too,” we shall say, “neither 
is any of the other great endeavors easy.” But nevertheless, if we are going to be 
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happy, by this way we must journey, as the path of our discourse leads. . . . “But 
against the gods neither secrecy nor force can avail.” But if there are no gods or 
they have no care for mankind, why should we be concerned about eluding them? 
And if they do exist and pay heed, surely we do not know or have not heard of 
them other than from custom and their pedigrees traced by the poets, the same 
men who say how the gods are such that they can be persuaded and turned aside 
by sacrifices and gentle prayers and votive offerings, men whom we ought to 
believe in both ways or in neither way. So if we must believe them, then we must 
commit injustice and then make sacrifices from the fruits of our wrongdoing. For 
as just men we will only be free from punishment by the gods, but we will be 
thrusting away from ourselves the profits of injustice. But as unjust men we will 
shall win those profits and by praying, although we transgress and sin, we shall 
get off scot free by persuading them. “But in Hades then shall we pay the penalty 
for the crimes we have committed here, either we ourselves or our children’s 
children.” “But my dear friend,” a calculating man will say, the expiatory rights 
and the delivering gods have great power, as the greatest cities testify and the 
children of the gods, those who have become poets and prophets, the men who 
reveal that things are in this way.” 
 
Let us consider in detail this breathtaking array by Adeimantus of the various legomena 
playing off one another in a bid for their hold on the young men’s collective imagination. He 
begins with a fragment from Pindar that crystallizes the decision every human being must face as 
to how to live life: will one strive to achieve success – rendered metaphorically as scaling the 
loftier wall (τεῖχος ὕψιον) – by living a life guided by justice (δίκᾳ) or by more Machiavellian 
means (σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις)? The question appears to be rhetorical given that the answer ought to 
be obvious: follow the path of righteousness.   
But what do the other numerous legomena advise as to this decision? First they say 
(φασιν) that it makes no difference whether I am truly just (δικαίῳ µὲν ὄντι), but only if I seem 
(δοκῶ) to be so. The former is of no advantage (ὄφελος οὐδέν) but amounts only to toil and self-
evident loss (πόνους δὲ καὶ ζηµίας φανεράς). By contrast, however, “It is said that a godlike life 
is in store for the unjust man who procures for himself a reputation for justice” (ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν 
δικαιοσύνης παρεσκευασµένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται). This phrase has the markings of a 
proverb: short and pithy with enhanced stylistic features such as figura etymologica coupled with 
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alliteration (ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης) and homoioptoton (θεσπέσιος βίος), introduced by the 
telltale legetai which epitomizes the universal social function of proverbs: to externalize and 
distance authority.313 As modern paroemiology and folklore studies make clear, phrases like “it 
is said” serve to project the responsibility for the proverb’s admonition onto an anonymous 
past.314 
In support of this proverb, misguided as it is, Adeimantus then offers yet another, 
“Therefore, since ‘It is the seeming,’ as the wise men make clear, ‘that masters the truth’ and is 
lord of happiness, we must devote ourselves entirely to that” (οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς 
δηλοῦσί µοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιµονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον 
ὅλως, 365c1-2). The scholium on Euripides’ Orestes (verses 235 and 782) attributes this proverb, 
τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται, to Simonides.315  And so once again, as in Book 1, Simonides 
is pressed into service to bolster a position contrary to the non-instrumental definition of justice 
that the discussants seek.316 Here, however, only some unnamed sophoi, not Simonides, are 
expressly cited. We seem then to have a saying that has evolved into a proverb after beginning its 
elocutionary life as a Simonidean gnome, consistent with Aristotle’s view that oft-quoted gnômai 
evolve into paroimiai. The saying has developed to a point where its core message – appearance 
is stronger than reality – is read as underlying situations as diverse as Orestes’ maintaining that it 
is better to look healthy when in fact you are sick (Or. 235-6)317 and Adeimantus’ claim that 
seeming just is superior to being just. 
																																																								
313 Martin 2005: 5. 
314 Dundes and Arewa 1964: 70. 
315 Schwartz: 1966 (Scholia vetera in Euripidem): ad loc.; Simonides, frag. 93.1.1 Page. 
316 Resp. 331d4ff; see my discussion in chapter 2.4. 
317 δόξαν γὰρ τόδ' ὑγιείας ἔχει· κρεῖσσον δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν, κἂν ἀληθείας ἀπῆι. 
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Adeimantus then appears to try his own hand at proverb-building, with the following 
saying that conjoins the central idea of the just-quoted proverb “It is seeming that masters the 
truth” with the idea that there is profit to be gained from being unjust: “I must draw ‘round 
myself as my front and my exterior a shadow painting of virtue, but I must also drag behind me 
the shifty and profit-hungry fox of that most sage Archilochus” (πρόθυρα µὲν καὶ σχῆµα κύκλῳ 
περὶ ἐµαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα 
ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην, 365c2-6). While the fox certainly enjoyed a 
reputation in Greek literature as the “embodiment of cunning,” in large part due to Archilochus’ 
verse,318 nowhere else but here do we find that fox melded together with architectural imagery on 
the order of a building’s “front and exterior” (πρόθυρα . . . καὶ σχῆµα). The meaning of 
Archilochus’ saying seems not far afield from the proverb, “Speak softly and carry a big stick,” 
used by Theodore Roosevelt in support of a U.S. foreign policy backed by robust military action, 
which is itself arguably a variation of the proverb-like phrase “iron fist in a velvet glove.” 
Whether his mixed metaphor of the prototypical crafty fox and the frontal structures of buildings 
really works all that well on a poetic level, Adeimantus is essentially attempting to demonstrate 
via his newly-coined saying that new proverbs will continue to develop out of the wrongheaded 
poetic formulations already extant and currently being committed to memory by those young 
men disposed and capable (εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ) of employing them as further justification for 
pursuing the potential profits to be reaped from unjust actions. 
Adeimantus then takes up the opposing position by creating an imaginary respondent to 
counter the sayings offered in support of maintaining the pretense of justice while acting to the 
contrary. “‘But,’ someone says, ‘not forever easy is the task of lying hid for the wrongdoer’” 
																																																								
318 Adam 1980: 84-5. See Archilochus, frags. 174.2, 185.5, 201.1 West. 
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(Ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα, 365c5-6). This rather plain saying 
bears a marked resemblance to a noted gnomê from Bacchylides᾽ fourth dithyramb: “For it is not 
always easy for the doer not to meet with evil” (οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον αἰὲν ἔρ / δοντα µὴ 'ντυχεῖν 
κακῷ).319 This saying, in turn, reflects a moral familiar to many Greeks, exemplified by such 
other, similar gnômai as Aeschylus’ “‘For him who does, suffering,’ that is what the old, old 
saying states” (δράσαντα παθεῖν, τριγέρων µῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ, Ch. 313-14),320 and Pindar’s “It is 
fitting that the one doing something, too, should suffer” (ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν ἔοικεν, N. 4.32).  
Such gnômai articulate the lex talionis, the ancient doctrine of retaliation, an “eye for eye, tooth 
for tooth . . .”321 Adeimantus, thus, is seemingly paraphrasing a similar gnome from Bacchylides 
to illustrate the magnitude of the task faced by anyone who believes that one can commit 
wrongdoing under the pretense of seeming just: one must also succeed in forever escaping the 
talio.322 
In response to this Bacchilydean-style proverb positing how tremendous a feat it is for a 
wrongdoer to escape detection indefinitely, Adeimantus then offers his audacious (mis)-
application of the proverb, chalepa ta kala (i.e., “So, too, is neither any other big endeavor 
easy”) as discussed previously. Moreover, he then bolsters the mis-applied proverb with a new 
saying that itself is resonant of Hesiod’s divergent paths, the easy way leading to vice and the 
difficult to virtue: “But nevertheless, if we are going to be happy, in this way we must go, as the 
tracks of our discourses lead” (ἀλλ' ὅµως, εἰ µέλλοµεν εὐδαιµονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη 																																																								
319 Dith. 4.43-4, in Jebb 1967: 394.  
320 Trans. Sommerstein. 
321 In Plato’s Crito (49c4-6), Socrates repudiates the lex talionis in what Vlastos (1991: 179-99) argues is a stunning, 
salutary step forward for humanity: ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱπολλοί φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ 
δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Οὐδαµῶς. 
322 See Shorey 1907: 235, who rightly disagrees with Jebb’s interpretation that the verse refers to the unbroken series 
of Theseus’ victories, proving that Theseus is under divine protection, given the saying’s proximity to “a familiar 
and pertinent Greek moral” exemplified by other gnômai such as Pindar’s ῥέζοντά τι καὶ παθεῖν ἔοικεν, N. 4.32 
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τῶν λόγων φέρει, 365d1-2).323 We now have what I would argue is a proverb that functions on a 
metapoetic level by referencing the function of proverbs themselves, of influential discursive 
practices in general, in other words, those logoi which “lead” (φέρειv): they persuade us to act in 
a manner consistent with their respective generalizations as to how the world works. Which of 
Hesiod’s two proverbial paths the “meet and capable” (εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ) young men will 
ultimately choose to take will in large part be determined by the dominant “vocabularies” (in 
Rorty’s terminology) to which those young men subscribe. The gnômai and proverbs that the 
young men have committed to memory by virtue of their traditional Greek education will 
ultimately lead them via the “tracks of their discourses” (τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων). The danger, of 
course, lies in the fact that too many of those sayings – as Adeimantus reads them – point in the 
direction of the easier path to injustice. 
Adeimantus then summons what seems yet another proverb to counter the notion that 
injustice pays indefinitely, with no final comeuppance: “‘But against the gods, stealth and 
violence are of no avail” (“Ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν”, 365d6-7). 
One might well argue that this rather plain statement, for which we have no apparent poetic 
pedigree, does not rise to the level of a genuine proverb. I could counter by observing, again, that 
many proverbs are composed of plain language and that any proverb’s meaning necessarily 
depends on the specific context in which it is used.324 Here, there seems little doubt that 
Adeimantus’ newest rejoinder to an imaginary proponent of the “injustice pays” line of thought, 
with its generalization about the impossibility of escaping the gods’ own justice and sotto voce 
prescription to act justly, serves most assuredly as a proverb in the context in which it is used: 																																																								
323 Adam 1980: ad loc., conjectures that the words ἴχνη φέρει come from Archilochus. 
324 Russo 1983: 125, explains that many proverbs, both ancient and modern, have no “striking structural features 
whatsoever” but make their point in plain language such as the English proverb “Love is blind” and its ancient 
Greek analogue typhlos ho Erôs.  
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rebut opposing proverbs. Yet even to concede that the statement fails as a genuine proverb is to 
make the more significant point: so powerful are the competing gnômai and proverbs holding the 
opposite position – namely, that it is better to reap the rewards of injustice but appear to be just – 
that society’s present attempts to formulate new sayings and proverbs in the service of justice are 
a poor match in the contest between vocabularies for their hold over the public imagination. As 
Adeimantus complains only a few paragraphs hence, “No one has ever set forth sufficiently in 
discourse, neither in poetry or ordinary private conversation that [injustice] is the greatest of 
evils . . . but justice is the greatest good” (οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις 
ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς . . . δικαιοσύνη δὲ µέγιστον ἀγαθόν, 366e7-9). That Adeimantus 
fails to formulate an elegant and effective proverb in support of justice should surprise no one. 
Adeimantus then replies to his own most recent proverb – or perhaps poor imitation of 
one – with an absolutely devastating response: “But if there are no gods or they do not care about 
mankind, why should we be concerned about eluding them?” (Οὐκοῦν, εἰ µὲν µὴ εἰσὶν ἢ µηδὲν 
αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων µέλει, τί καὶ ἡµῖν µελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; 365d7-e1). What makes this 
retort so powerful – leaving aside entirely the issue of whether it constitutes a proverb325 – is its 
implicit recognition of the contingency of all human efforts to make sense of the world in 
language. At its most immediate level, Adeimantus’ statement is equivalent to an atheist’s 
assertion that they cannot be guilty of blasphemy since for them there is no God. An atheist 
chooses to describe (or better, to conceive of) the world with a vocabulary – no doubt replete 
with its own sayings and proverbs, like any vocabulary – that is entirely separate from the 
believer’s vocabulary, with its own set of proverbs, sayings, etcetera. And thus, on a more 
profound level, Adeimantus is again making another metapoetic observation: the “language 																																																								
325 To be sure, a question can in fact constitute a proverb, e.g., “Why buy the cow when milk is so cheap?” See 
Winick 1998: 36. 
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game” that he has been in the process of demonstrating by his display of competing sayings, 
maxims, proverbs, gnômai, etcetera is itself contingent.326 There is no final vocabulary that will 
be absolutely determinative on the subject of justice (or on any subject for that matter). It is 
impossible to have “the last word” on anything. There will always be new and different 
vocabularies that shape our thinking on any subject – indeed, vocabularies which determine ab 
initio what we even conceive as a “subject” of our discourse. We are close here to the thinking of 
philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn and Mary Hesse who have argued that scientific 
revolutions are “metaphoric redescriptions” of nature, not “insights into the intrinsic nature of 
nature.”327 Relevant, too, is Nietzsche’s definition of “truth” as “a mobile army of metaphors.”328  
If we substitute “proverbs” or “gnômai” or, more broadly, “discursive practices” (i.e., logoi) for 
Nietzsche’s “metaphors,” we begin to see Adeimantus’ larger point. Proverbs and sayings are 
part of the larger contest for creating the overarching vocabulary as regards justice.   
Adeimantus thus sets up well the critique that Plato is making regarding the potentially 
deleterious effect of certain sayings and their repeated quotation on the broader society. As 
Hunter explains, 
One of the clear lessons of Adeimantos’ speech, with its easy citations of Hesiod, 
Homer, Pindar and Archilochus, a lesson both explicitly spelled out and 
demonstrated through the style of the speech, is that the “quotability” of poetry, 
enshrined in the excerpting and anthologizing habit which already had a firm hold 
in Athenian culture by Plato’s day, made it a particularly powerful opponent to 
the moral project which Plato sets himself in the Republic; the young man who 
wants to decide (like Prodicus’ Heracles) which course of life he should follow, 
the life of justice or the life of deceit, can “flit” from passage to passage like a bee 
– there will always be a suitable poetic defence for any moral stance.329 
 																																																								
326 See Rorty 1989: 50. 
327 Rorty 1989: 16; Hesse 1980. 
328 Rorty 1989: 17 
329 Hunter 2014: 119. 
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Indeed, Adeimantus is quick to point out that any existence the gods may enjoy is 
intimately connected with the “custom” of society’s traditional discourse, in particular, on the 
poets’ verse: “And if they do exist and pay heed, surely we do not know or have not heard of 
them other than from custom and their pedigrees traced by the poets” (εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε καὶ 
ἐπιµελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσµεν ἢ ἀκηκόαµεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν νόµων καὶ τῶν 
γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν, 365e1-3). So if this is the case, if our prevailing vocabulary as 
concerns the gods comes from the poets, well, those “same men” (αὐτοὶ οὗτοι) tell us that the 
gods can be “turned aside” (παράγεσθαι) from punishing us for our sins, having been 
“persuaded” (ἀναπειθόµενοι, 365e2-5) by the sorts of things we learn only by virtue of the poets’ 
gnômai, enshrined in our collective memory. 
To illustrate his point, Adeimantus re-quotes a phrase he had cited earlier from a Homeric 
gnome that stipulates one of the means by which the gods can be persuaded to forgive one’s 
acting unjustly for profit’s sake: beseech them with “gentle prayers” (εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν, 
365e4).330 If one is to subscribe to this line of thought arising from the poets’ gnômai, if one 
“must believe/obey” (πειστέον) the poets’ vocabulary, then one “must also commit injustice and 
make sacrifices from the fruits of his sins” (ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικηµάτων, 365e6-
366a1). 
Adeimantus makes one final show of an attempt to counter this dominant line of 
discourse with a statement containing some figura etymologica resonant of Adeimantus’ prior 
paraphrase of an Hesiodic gnome: “But in Hades then shall we pay the penalty for the crimes we 
have committed here, either we ourselves or our children’s children” (Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου δίκην 
δώσοµεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωµεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων, 366a4-6).  In “children’s children” 
																																																								
330 From Iliad 9.949. See note 310. 
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(παῖδες παίδων) we detect the weak echo of Adeimantus’ previous reference to Hesiod’s gnome 
from the Dikê-paraenesis of Works and Days, according to which the progeny of the oath-
keeping man – i.e., his “children’s children” – is superior to that of the perjurer.331 However, the 
faint traces of this countering Hesiodic vocabulary and its attendant gnômai are seemingly no 
match for a hypothetical “calculating man” (λογιζόµενος) whom Adeimantus “quotes” to wind 
up his stunning display of the power of memorized gnômai, proverbs, and other assorted sayings:  
“The expiatory rites and the delivering gods have great power” according to the “the greatest 
city-states which say these things and the children of the gods, having become both poets and 
prophets, who reveal that things are in this way” (αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ µέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, 
ὡς αἱ µέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόµενοι, οἳ 
ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν µηνύουσιν). In sum, the world’s currently ascendant vocabulary – pronounced 
by the “greatest city states” and by their traditional transmitters of customs and values, the poets 
– is incapable of persuading men to be just for justice’s own sake. And so, the need for 
discursive reform – for a new “vocabulary” as concerns justice – could not be greater. 
To be sure, the problem for Plato lies not solely with the fact that Adeimantus is quoting 
poets. It is, more specifically, the particular quotability of the lines that Adeimantus chooses, as 
noted by Hunter.332 Of the eight genuine excerpts from poetry cited by Adeimantus (three from 
Hesiod, two from Homer, one from Pindar, one from Simonides, and one from Archilochus) 
more than half qualify as gnômai – gnômai which by definition, according to Aristotle, also 
necessarily constitute proverbs to the extent that they become “common and frequently quoted” 
																																																								
331 Compare Resp.363d3-4 (“For they say that hereafter remain unfailing the children’s children and the stock of the 
pious and oath-keeping man” [παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου]) 
with Op. 285 (“Better is the stock hereafter of the oath-keeping man” [ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ µετόπισθεν 
ἀµείνων]). 
332 Hunter 2014: 119. 
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(τεθρυληµέναις καὶ κοιναῖς).333 While poetry alone may lend itself more than other discursive 
practices to memorization (by such structural features as meter and rhyme) and thus to 
preservation, the extent to which certain verses from poetry also constitute gnômai and proverbs 
increases all the more those verses’ “quotability” – a “quotability” which Hunter rightly 
emphasizes as a source of poetry’s power.334 Linguistic expressions that are particularly quotable 
would seem to be stronger candidates than other expressions for inclusion in any instantiation of 
Rorty’s concept of a “vocabulary.” If the current, prevailing vocabulary concerning justice – 
evinced by the many “quotables” that Adeimantus offers – is to be replaced, “re-formed,” with a 
new discourse, then the widespread practice of selecting, citing, and quoting proverbs and 
gnômai must be reimagined, re-thought, in Plato’s project of discursive and societal reform. 
 
3.3. Tales of Two Gyges: Plato’s Proverbs versus Herodotus’ 
 
Before Adeimantus had taken the reins of the colloquy with Socrates to demonstrate the 
pervasive, undesirable influence of ta legomena on young men’s souls, Glaucon had proffered 
two thought-experiments designed to elucidate why men will always choose injustice over 
justice. The first of these two experiments involves what appears to be a reworking of 
Herodotus’ famous account of Gyges and Candaules, the King of Lydia.335 As Herodotus tells 
the story, Candaules compels Gyges, a close confidant and member of his royal guard, to view in 
secret his wife undressing so that he can witness firsthand her extraordinary beauty. After 
																																																								
333 Rh. 1395a10-11. 
334 Hunter 2014: 119. 
335 The second thought-experiment (360e1-62c8) concerns the contrast between two men, one of whom has the 
reputation and accompanying social rewards for being perfectly just but who is, in fact, perfectly unjust, and the 
other who, although in reality is a perfectly just man, is mistakenly perceived to be absolutely unjust, so much so 
that he is tortured to death. 
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discovering that Gyges has seen her nude, the queen forces Gyges first to slay Candaules and 
then to take her as his own wife and assume power as monarch in Candaules’ place. 
In Plato’s rendering, however, Gyges is a shepherd, not a member of the king’s court, and 
the story, as Glaucon tells it, also includes a thunderstorm, an earthquake, and a hollow bronze 
horse with a corpse wearing a magical ring inside, a ring which turns its wearer invisible.  Plato’s 
Gyges finds and dons the ring so that he can slay the king and seduce his wife. The moral of 
Glaucon’s story is that any man, given the choice of whether to wear the magic ring of 
invisibility, would undoubtedly do just as Gyges did. 
Given the divergence of the two versions of the stories, questions invariably arise. Is 
Plato’s Gyges the same person as Herodotus’ Gyges? Why is there no ring in Herodotus’ 
account? Any number of interpretations have been offered in an attempt to reconcile the two 
versions. Many scholars have searched for an original, some Urtext of the Gyges story, as did 
Kirby Flower Smith in an influential 1902 article that sought to “reconstruct the old popular tale 
of Gyges” by using a wide variety of sources, including comparative material from Greek and 
Near Eastern literature, as well as such authors as Damascenus, Ptolemaius Chennus, and 
Philostratus, in addition to Herodotus and Plato.336 Other scholars like Andrew Dyck have 
claimed that Plato’s “folktale version” is in fact the original, while Herodotus’ account is but a 
“secondary rationalization.”337 In contrast, Adam argues on philological grounds that Plato’s 
account is unconnected to Herodotus’, given Glaucon’s characterization of the protagonist as “an 
ancestor of Gyges the Lydian” (τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, 359d1) – that is, not the Gyges of 
Herodotus’ historical account but rather his homonymous ancestor.338 Andrew Laird, following 																																																								
336 Smith 1902: 263. See Laird 2001: 13-14, for a good summary of Smith’s efforts and reconstruction of the legend.  
337 Dyck 1996: 539-40. 
338 Adam 1980: 70, 126-7. 
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Adam’s lead, has emphasized that “Glaucon’s protagonist is frequently identified with Gyges 
himself, generally with little or no justification” in support of Laird’s larger point that Plato 
largely invents Glaucon’s version of the tale, thereby revealing the salutary benefit of fictional 
fabrication to philosophic argument (à la Descartes’ “evil genius”).339 And most recently, Gabriel 
Danzig has made the intriguing claim that Herodotus’ version of a seemingly “innocent” Gyges, 
forced against his will to view a naked queen, kill her husband and take his throne is, in essence, 
an educational “riddle” for his audience to solve. That is, Herodotus’ version is simply a second-
hand account that attempts to rationalize the usurpation of a throne – history having been written 
by the victor (Gyges) rather than the loser (Candaules). Danzig argues that Plato then essentially 
re-writes the Herodotean version so as to strip away the ambiguities of Herodotus’ portrait of 
Gyges, and instead reveal that “what for Herodotus are amusing anecdotes about the way the 
world works are for Plato grave endorsements of injustice.”340 
I believe that if we now shift our focus to the particular dimension of the twin stories 
which concerns differing and competing formulations of proverbial wisdom, we may gain a 
fuller understanding of what Plato seeks to achieve with the story of Gyges’ ring. Rather than 
attempt to harmonize Herodotus’ and Plato’s versions or, conversely, definitively separate them, 
in part by philological emphasis on Plato’s phrase, “an ancestor of Gyges the Lydian” (τῷ Γύγου 
τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, 359d),341 we should instead view the authors’ twin stories as continuing the 
longstanding Greek agonistic tradition of the pre-classical poets, in Mark Griffith’s words, to 
“contest and contradict” their rivals’ poetic formulations of preexisting themes, “to tell and retell 
																																																								
339 Laird 2001: 12, 14. 
340 Danzig 2008: 184, 191. 
341 In contrast to Adam, Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc., attempt to make Plato’s Gyges the same as Herodotus’ 
by suggesting that the text be amended to either (1) τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ or (2) Γύγῃ τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ 
Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, so that the Gyges in the Republic becomes the ancestor of Croesus.    
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traditional or new stories.”342 I would argue that the “agonistic stance” exemplified in the many 
assorted genres that Griffith rightly describes as “confrontational and antithetical” – for example, 
the matched speeches and battlefield vaunts in the Homeric epics, the debate scenes in tragedy, 
the epirrhematic agon and invective of Old Comedy, the antiphonal thrênos over the dead, the 
insult-battles of iambos, the amoibaia and short prize-poems (ancestors of Theocritean pastoral), 
and the sympotic skolion343 – reveals an appreciation on the part of some ancient authors for the 
same dynamic that Rorty identifies in his theory of competing “vocabularies.” Moreover, the 
object of Plato’s and Herodotus’ variant – once could say “competing” – Gyges stories, I 
maintain, is proverbial expression. As was the case with Adeimantus’ display of numerous 
legomena – all vying for prolonged status as quotable proverbs with concomitant influence over 
the demos – the tales of two Gyges concern the question of which proverbs will exert a lasting 
hold over the Athenian populace’s conception of justice.344 
In Herodotus’ account of Candaules and Gyges, one finds not just one or two, but three 
separate proverbs: believing that Gyges did not fully appreciate his wife’s beauty, Candaules 
cites the proverb, “The ears are less trustworthy than the eyes” (ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισι 
ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλµῶν, Hdt.1.8.2) while forcing Gyges to spy upon his wife in the act of 
undressing. Gyges, in turn, resists and cites two proverbs: (1) “When a woman takes off her 
dress, she takes off her shame” (Ἅµα δὲ κιθῶνι ἐκδυοµένῳ συνεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή, 
Hdt.1.8.3) and (2) “Everyone mind his own affairs” (σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ, Hdt.1.8.4).345  																																																								
342 Griffith 1990: 187. 
343 Ibid., 193. 
344 Socrates even employs the imagery of a contest after Glaucon has set forth in full his two thought-experiments:  
“Bravo, my dear Glaucon!  How powerfully you scour clean each of your ‘two men’ as if a statue for the prize in a 
competition” (Βαβαῖ, . . . ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωµένως ἑκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις 
τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, 361d4-6) (trans. Shorey, with modification). 
345 Trans. Russo (with modification). 
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Russo explains that Herodotus’ proverb-rich account demonstrates the result of transgressing a 
proverb: Candaules loses his kingdom because he repudiates “two compelling pieces of 
proverbial wisdom,” and Gyges, who knows the right proverbs but is compelled to violate them, 
attains the kingdom but not in a lasting way: the Delphic oracle reveals that the kingship will not 
survive past the fifth generation (Hdt.1.13).346 
Overlooked, however, is the subtle reference by the queen to the famous “two roads” 
proverb of Hesiod. When the queen confronts Gyges after he has seen her naked, she offers him 
a “choice” (αἵρεσις) described in what by now should be very familiar imagery (1.11.2): 
Νῦν τοι δυῶν ὁδῶν παρεουσέων, Γύγη, δίδωµι αἵρεσιν, ὁκοτέρην βούλεαι 
τραπέσθαι· ἢ γὰρ Κανδαύλην ἀποκτείνας ἐµέ τε καὶ τὴν βασιληίην ἔχε τὴν 
Λυδῶν, ἢ αὐτόν σε αὐτίκα οὕτω ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ. 
 
Now Gyges, I am giving you the choice of which of two roads you wish to take 
that lie before you. Either kill Candaules and take me and the kingship of Lydia or 
you must die immediately.347 
 
Of course, the queen’s demand raises the choice framed by the Hesiodic proverb to a 
morally excruciating level: kill (and usurp) or be killed. But this is precisely Herodotus’ point: 
Gyges recognizes almost immediately that a virtual Hobson’s choice has been put to him and, 
not surprisingly, elects to live. Herodotus’ version of the Gyges tale makes no pretense that a 
man would ever choose Hesiod’s harder road to virtue if that road necessitated his death. Yes, 
some element of justice is undeniably present in Herodotus’ tale. Candaules forfeits his kingdom, 
arguably because he ignored Gyges’ two proverbs (as Russo maintains). And Gyges’ lineage 
ultimately loses the kingship, due arguably to Gyges’ inability to rise to the superhuman height 																																																								
346 Russo 1983: 127-28. Russo provides no explanation of Candaules’ citation of the proverb “The ears are less 
believable than the eyes,” aside from its numeric relation to Gyges’ proverbs: “Gyges may have more proverbs, but 
King Candaules has more power . . .” 
347 The choice of which road to take serves as an important metaphor for Herodotean historiography in general. See, 
e.g., Purves 2010: 122, who underscores the frequent observation “that the narrative of the Histories, which 
proceeds (probainô) through a number of cities, and which stops and decides which ‘roads’ to go down at various 
points on its journey, depends greatly on the model of traveling along a path or route.” 
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of literal self-sacrifice required to elect the queen’s version of Hesiod’s more difficult road to 
virtue, per the proverb. But that limited element of justice does not mitigate the damage that has 
been done to Hesiod’s original. 
Indeed, the takeaway from Herodotus’ version of the tale, which Glaucon’s own variation 
emphasizes, is that self-interest will necessarily lead the actor to opt for injustice over justice.  
Just as Herodotus’ Gyges really had no choice, so too does Glaucon illustrate his Gyges as 
possessing no choice once he discovers the ring of invisibility (360b2-c2):  
εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίω γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν µὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ 
ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαµάντινος, ὃς ἂν µείνειεν ἐν τῇ 
δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολµήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ µὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ 
καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅτι βούλοιτο λαµβάνειν, καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας 
συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσµῶν λύειν οὕστινας 
βούλοιτο, καὶ τἆλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. 
 
If there were two such rings, and a just man should put on one and an unjust man 
the other, there would be no one made of such steel, so it seems, who could hold 
to righteousness and keep away from, and not reach out to grab, the goods of 
others, since it would be possible for him to take fearlessly whatever he wanted 
from the marketplace and to go into peoples’ homes and lie with whomever he 
desired and kill, as well as release from prison whomever he wanted and do other 
such things, given that he would be the equivalent of a god.  
 
Such is the pitiful condition to which Hesiod’s “two roads” proverb has been reduced in 
Glaucon’s version of the Gyges tale: there really is no choice of “roads.” Everyone will choose 
the path to injustice, whether compelled by pain of death or swayed by access to a “godlike” 
(ἰσόθεον) power. Glaucon’s variation of the Gyges story continues Herodotus’ own erosion of 
whatever force Hesiod’s proverb once held for people, to prompt them to choose the more 
difficult path of virtue. We can see, too, how Glaucon’s undermining the core message of the 
Hesiodic proverb by dint of his Gyges tale mirrors the damage Adeimantus inflicts, both by 
cropping select lines from Hesiod’s passage and by misapplying the adage’s popular analogue, 
chalepa ta kala so as to mean the precise opposite of Hesiod’s original. In addition, Glaucon’s 
144 
version omits entirely the other proverbs that Herodotus’ Gyges cites in vain to Candaules – 
namely, “When a woman takes off her dress, she takes off her shame” and “Everyone mind his 
own affairs.” 
Interesting, however, is the proximity of the latter – σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ – to 
Socrates’ own definition of justice in Book 4 of the Republic, which itself has the shape of a 
proverb: “Justice is the doing of one’s own” (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν . . . δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, 433a8-
9).348 Might then we detect in the Republic’s version of what was presumably a highly popular 
story, the recognition by Plato that such a proverb-laden tale, at least as Herodotus tells it, did not 
adequately express the sort of proverbial wisdom necessary to underpin the vision of justice 
articulated in the Republic? Might the Republic’s Gyges story, incorporated within the larger 
framework of the dialogue as a whole and ultimately concluded, as we shall see in a moment, by 
its reappearance in Book 10, represent Plato’s own effort to recast the tale in a new light, one 
consistent with the sort of proverbial wisdom Plato was after? If so, such an attempt would be 
entirely in accord with (1) Griffith’s view of the agonistic dynamic inherent in Greek authorship 
stemming from the pre-Classical period and (2) Rorty’s vision of vocabularies in competition 
with one another for dominance over a culture and its ways of thinking. 
Towards the beginning of Herodotus’ account, Candaules complains that Gyges does not 
appear to be convinced of his wife’s surpassing beauty by his “speaking” about it (Γύγη, οὐ γάρ 
σε δοκέω πείθεσθαί µοι λέγοντι περὶ τοῦ εἴδεος τῆς γυναικός, Hdt.1.8.2). This is, of course, the 
task faced by all authors, by all tellers of tales (including those tellers of “fiction” in the service 
of philosophy, per Laird): peithein legonti, to convince by telling. Similarly, those vocabularies 
of Rorty’s come to hold sway do so precisely by their “speaking” (legousin) more compellingly, 																																																								
348 See Ophir 1991: 170, who compares the Herodotean proverb with a similar formulation of justice by Socrates, 
also in Book 4: “Having and doing of one’s own” (ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις, Resp. 433e12-13). 
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more persuasively, than their rivals. Plato is not about to be outdone by prior storytellers of the 
Gyges tale. It is his lexicon of justice – a justice pursued for its own sake, irrespective of the 
rewards or the detriments accrued by adhering to it alone – that must, and will ultimately come 
to, have the most lasting and compelling force of all prior accounts of justice. 
This reading would help explain why Plato chooses to describe Glaucon’s Gyges as the 
“ancestor to Gyges the Lydian” (τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, 359d1). In the agon of Greek 
writers’ attempts to outdo their rivals’ versions of traditional stories and themes, proposing new 
or alternate lineages, parentages, and origins was a common means of distinguishing one’s own 
rendering of a commonly treated subject.349 If Plato wants to “re-form” Herodotus’ telling of the 
Gyges tale, altering what might seem to be some of the relatively minor details of the story from 
its very beginning – e.g., “Once upon a time, an ancestor of Gyges the Lydian” not “Once upon a 
time, Gyges” – is an excellent method of marking one’s own version definitively. 
How then does Plato make use of the Gyges tale so that the moral of its story is 
ultimately in keeping with the theme of the Republic? First, there is the obvious magnitude of the 
challenge put to Socrates, to which both of Glaucon’s two thought-experiments and Adeimantus’ 
citation of a host of legomena contribute. This enhances all the more the drama of the dialogue.  
After both Glaucon and Adeimantus have presented their challenges, Socrates describes himself 
as especially impressed (τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην, 367e7-368a1) by their arguments but concedes that 
the challenge put to him may be too much: “I don’t know how I can help. For I seem to be 
incapable” (οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω. δοκῶ γάρ µοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι, 368b4-5). Clearly, both 
Herodotus’ account of the Gyges tale and Glaucon’s altered version pack the proverbial punch.   
																																																								
349 Griffith 1990: 195. 
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Socrates then compliments the men with an appellation contained in what purports to be a 
saying but the origins of which remain obscure: “Sons of Ariston, godlike progeny of a glorious 
man” (παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός, 368a3). While Shorey believes the line 
originates in certain Pythagorean sayings,350 Adam convincingly argues that Aristôn suggests 
aristos and thus “the pun conveys a friendly, if halfironical, compliment to ‘his excellency’ 
Thrasymachus, whose παῖδες (so far as the argument is concerned) Glaucon and his brother 
are.”351  Adam rightly sees a parallel here to similar wordplay with a proper name, combined 
with a proverb, that Socrates makes in the Symposium when he invites Aristodemus to come 
along as an uninvited guest to dinner with Agathon, an obvious pun on agathos: “Then come 
along, so that we might undermine the proverb by changing it, so that it’s now ‘Good men go of 
their own accord to Goodman’s table’” (Ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιµίαν διαφθείρωµεν 
µεταβαλόντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ Ἀγάθων' ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόµατοι ἀγαθοί., Symp. 174b3-5).352 The 
specific proverb (παροιµία) which the men will “undermine by altering” is, as the Scholiast 
remarks, “Good men go of their own accord to the feasts of inferior men” (παροιµία αὐτόµατοι δ' 
ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴωσιν).353 Kenneth Dover observes that “such a proverb is insulting if 
uttered by a guest and obsequious on the lips of a host.” By contrast, Socrates’ reformulation is 
																																																								
350 Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
351 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
352 MSS B, T, and W have ἀγαθῶν which, while less explicitly a pun on “Agathon,” nevertheless brings out the 
upshot of the proverb: “Unbidden do good men dine at good men’s tables.” Burnet, whose text I use, opts for 
Lachmann’s Ἀγάθων᾽. 
353 Greene 1938: ad loc.; Dover 1980: ad loc., remarks that while δειλῶν connotes “cowardly” in Plato’s Attic, the 
meaning is “much less specific in archaic poetry, sometimes simply ‘poor.’”    
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“useful on a greater variety of occasions.”354 Moreover, variations of this proverb are found in 
both Hesiod355 and Bacchylides.356 
Socrates’ remark that the men are “undermining the proverb by changing it” amounts to 
nothing less than a programmatic statement of what I maintain to be Plato’s overarching goal 
with respect to proverbs and gnômai throughout his oeuvre. This dynamic is especially on 
display in the Republic: reformulate and thereby “reform” the existing Greek proverbial tradition 
so as to provide for legomena that comprise a critical component of Plato’s new discourse – in 
Rorty’s parlance, new “vocabulary” – concerning justice, to be found in his new literary genre, 
philosophy.   
Thus in Book 10, at the conclusion of Socrates’ exhaustive and extensive effort to meet 
Glaucon and Adeimantus’ challenge of defending justice for its own sake, Socrates re-crafts the 
moral of Glaucon’s Gyges story to be the following: “Haven’t we discovered that justice itself is 
the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do the just, whether it possesses the 
ring of Gyges or not . . .?” (ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον ηὕροµεν, καὶ ποιητέον 
εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάντ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἐάντε µή, 612b2-4). At this juncture 
Socrates is now conflating the “ancestor of Gyges” with Gyges himself, and the apparent 
confusion is, according to Laird, one of the reasons that the expression, “the ring of Gyges” 
ultimately “came to enjoy proverbial status in Greek authors after Plato.”357 It is no doubt a 
matter of legitimate debate whether Socrates’ precise words in Book 10 constitute a genuine 																																																								
354 Dover 1980: ad loc. 
355 αὐτόµατοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἵενται (Hesiod, frag. 264 Merkelbach and West). Zenobius comments that 
“Hesiod used the proverb as follows: Heracles was going towards the house of Ceyx the Trachinian and said this” 
(trans. Most 2007: 278-9). 
356 Αὐτόµατοι δ' ἀγαθῶν ἐς δαῖτας εὐόχθους ἐπέρχονται δίκαιοι φῶτες (Bacchylides, frag. 1.23-26 [Paeanes] 
Irigoin).   
357 Laird 2001: 15. 
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proverb, but they are, at the very least, a stepping stone on the path toward endowing the phrase 
“the soul ought to do justice whether it has Gyges ring or not” with its own proverbial ring (pun 
intended). Irrespective of whether Plato’s text coins a phrase that meets precisely whatever 
formal qualifications we may demand of a proverb, the phrase “ring of Gyges” ultimately 
became shorthand for a proverb, albeit one not expressly articulated (just as many proverbs 
operate via a virtual shorthand phrase, e.g., “Birds of a feather . . .”).358 As wielded by Glaucon, 
it stands for the proposition that injustice is superior to justice if the perpetrator possesses the 
means to be sure of impunity,359 but in Socrates’ reformulation and reformation, it amounts to an 
exhortation to a higher standard of conduct: act justly even when the profits from injustice are 
attainable free of both punishment and the resulting disrepute (doxa), by means of the “ring of 
Gyges.” 
Indeed, Socrates’ reformation constitutes the reason why Cicero in his De Officiis 
expressly invokes Plato’s version and relates the story, like Socrates, as centering not upon an 
ancestor of Gyges but on Gyges himself (3.37-8): 
satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus, persuasum esse 
debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, 
nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a 
Platone . . . Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihil plus sibi licere putet 
peccare, quam si non haberet; honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur. 
 
For only having made some progress in philosophy, we should be sufficiently 
convinced that, even if we can escape the detection of gods and men, we must still 
never act in a greedy, unjust, lustful or intemperate way. This is why that figure of 
Gyges is introduced by Plato . . . So then if a wise man had a ring like this, he 
would no more be able to do wrong than if he did not have it; for good men seek 
what is moral, not what is secret.360 
 																																																								
358 See my discussion in Chapter 2.6 of how both the “wolf proverb” and the proverb “like as to like” are not 
expressly articulated in the text. 
359 Shorey 1946: 118 astutely notes the similar “moral” to H.G. Wells’ The Invisible Man. 
360 Trans. Laird. 
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Plato’s “ring of Gyges” ultimately became the definitive Gyges tale.361 Indeed, Adam 
goes so far as to call Plato’s entire Gyges story a “proverb” and refers to the ring (as do Laird 
and many other commentators) as the “proverbial ring of Gyges.”362 While I do not believe that a 
mythic tale or fable can constitute a proverb under any reasonable definition of proverb as 
provided by modern paroemiology, it is certainly possible to imagine how a tale might ultimately 
be crystallized into a legomenon that meets the requisite defintional standards. Such a potential 
evolution is what I believe Plato is after: Plato is altering the discourse – in Rorty’s parlance, the 
vocabulary – of justice, by competing in the broader literary agon of storytellers and would-be 
proverb-makers to alter the older, standard versions of proverbial wisdom, offering new 
suggestions to take their place. Plato reworks the Gyges tale so that it might be distilled into a 
proverb.  
Indeed it is arguable that Cicero is following in Plato’s footsteps in tacking onto the end 
of his own retelling of Plato’s “ring of Gyges” a phrase that has the makings of a Latin sententia 
(the Latin equivalent of the Greek gnome363): “for good men seek what is moral, not what is 
secret” (honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur).364 The balanced binary structure, the 
opposition of the rhyming axiological terminology (honesta—occulta), and the use of a general 
category (bonis viris) are all hallmarks of proverbial expression.365  																																																								
361 See, e.g., Laird 2001: 25, who explains how Cicero sees Plato’s version of the story “as illustrating the 
immorality of secret or furtive behavior.” 
362 Adam 1980: 126-7. Dyck 1996: 539-40, n. 6, affirms that the “ring of Gyges was proverbial in antiquity . . . 
hence its appropriateness for illustrating teachings about the relation of morality to the fear of detection . . .” and 
claims in addition that “it has long been recognized that Plato’s folktale version . . . is original and Herodotus’ 
version a secondary rationalization . . .” In a not dissimilar vein, Danzig 2008: 186, describes Plato’s tale as having a 
“folk-story-like quality.”  
363 See, generally, Kirchner 2001. 
364 See Dyck 1996: 540-1, n. 38, who observes that in the sentence which launches what seems to be the sententia, 
the “sapiens substitutes for ὁ δίκαιος in Plato; the tale may have passed to Cicero via a Stoic intermediary, or he 
may have himself adjusted it to Stoic terminology.” 
365 Russo 1983: 122; Dundes 1981: 54-55; Most 2003: 146. 
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In addition to Cicero, both Lucian and Philostratus would go on to use Plato’s “ring of 
Gyges” in their writings, although simply with reference to the power of invisibility conferred by 
the ring.366 However, the twelfth-century Persian Sunni Muslim poet Nizámi Ganjavi depicts 
Plato himself telling the story of the ring without even mentioning the name of Gyges, in 
Nizámi’s poem, the Sikander Námah-i Bahrí.367 In Nizámi’s version, Plato is in attendance at the 
court of the young royal, Sikander, along with other Greek philosophers. Moreover Nizámi uses 
the Arabic term rusul, which can mean both “messenger” and “prophet,” for the messengers of 
the king with whom Gyges intermingles in Plato’s version (τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν 
βασιλέα, 360a8) in order to kill the king. This allows Nizámi’s nameless shepherd to claim that 
he is a prophet, which, according to Nizámi scholar J.C. Bürgel, invests the story with new 
meaning that I find entirely consonant with Socrates’ reformation of the tale: “It is no longer just 
about magic power and the danger involved in its being misused by an irresponsible person; it is 
about false prophets and their unscrupulous use of power and violence.”368 That Plato’s Gyges 
tale became for some writers the tale about the proverbial “ring of Gyges” stands as a lasting 
testament to the success of Plato’s efforts to re-craft proverbial wisdom in the service of his own 
philosophic project. 369 
  
																																																								
366 Lucian Nav. 41, Bis Acc. 21; Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 3.8.22. 
367 Cowell 1861: 151-57; Adam 1980: 127. 
368 Bürgel 2000: 135-6. 
369 See generally Laird 2001, 29, who affirms that Plato’s version “has engaged the attention of both philosophers 
and novelists.” Of these, Laird offers the reflection by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Les Rêveries du Promeneur 
Solitaire (1782) on what he would do if he owned a ring of invisibility -- a reflection that bears the unmistakeable 
stamp of Socrates’ reformation of the proverbial ring of Gyges: “Tout bien considéré, je crois que je ferais mieux de 
jeter mon anneau magique avant qu’il m’a fait faire quelque sottise.” 
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3.4. Finding and Crafting Better Legomena 
 
 Midway through Book 3, Socrates offers yet another programmatic statement, this time 
on the question of language’s relation to whatever degree of justice may exist in a state. He does 
this in the portion of the dialogue where, notoriously, he opines on specific poetic passages that 
he believes should be excluded from a just society’s educational framework and conversely, 
those verses he finds appropriate. These particular sections of the Republic that fall at the close 
of Book 2 and the first third or so of Book 3 (in addition to a related section in Book 10, to which 
I will return in Chapter Five) have long been decried as censorship on the part of Plato, leading 
in turn to the widespread view that Plato is an enemy of poetry, tout court, especially insofar as 
Socrates appears to “banish” the greatest poets from the ideal city.370 And, indeed, the passage 
that provides the clearest textual support for the idea of literal “banishment” is precisely 
Socrates’ programmatic statement on language vis-à-vis justice. Let us examine closely just what 
it is that Socrates says (398a1-b4): 
Ἄνδρα δή, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνάµενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ µιµεῖσθαι 
πάντα χρήµατα, εἰ ἡµῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήµατα 
βουλόµενος ἐπιδείξασθαι, προσκυνοῖµεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυµαστὸν 
καὶἡδύν, εἴποιµεν δ’ ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ’ ἡµῖν οὔτε 
θέµις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποπέµποιµέν τε εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν µύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς 
καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ στέψαντες, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ 
ποιητῇ χρῴµεθα καὶ µυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ὃς ἡµῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν 
µιµοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόµενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις οἷς κατ’ ἀρχὰς 
ἐνοµοθετησάµεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦµεν παιδεύειν.   
 
If a man should arrive in our city seemingly capable of imitating everything and 
of assuming every shape by virtue of his poetic artistry and eager to show himself 
off with his poems, we would fall down and worship him as godlike, astounding, 
and delightful, but we would say that there is no man of this sort in our city, nor is 
it lawful for any such man to arise among us, and we would send him off to some 																																																								
370 See Halliwell 2011: 158-9, who observes that the “dominant consensus” today – a “consensus” to which 
Halliwell takes strong exception, as do I – is that “Plato was consistently, uncompromisingly ‘hostile’ to poetry per 
se (and even to ‘art’ more generally).  For such orthodoxy, the hypothetical banishment of the greatest poets from 
the ideal city of the Republic is the supreme, unequivocal symbol of Plato’s verdict on the subject, his definitive 
pronouncement of condemnation.” 
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other city after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with wool 
fillets, but we ourselves make use of a more austere and less entertaining poet and 
wordsmith for the sake of our soul’s benefit, who emulates the diction of a good 
man and speaks the sayings in the patterns we ordained from the outset, when we 
set out to educate our protectors. 
 
Taken in the narrowest of readings, the passage can certainly be made the culprit as 
Plato’s detractors would have it: Socrates and his like would literally “send away” (ἀποπέµπειν) 
any poet or storyteller whose style does not conform to what Socrates describes as the “more 
severe and less entertaining” (αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ) one practiced in their imagined 
society. But leaving aside this critique’s glaring omission of how Socrates and company in fact 
heap lavish praise on such a literary artist notwithstanding their decision that his artistry would 
be out of place in the world they conjure, the closing, crucial section of the passage makes clear 
that poetry is not only to be allowed but employed (χρῆσθαι). Why? Precisely for the benefit 
(ὠφελία) conferred. And how do we come to know this benefit? It takes its shape in the “diction 
that befits a good man” (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν) and the “sayings” (τὰ λεγόµενα) that adhere in 
the “patterns” and “impressions” or “models” (i.e., τοῖς τύποις) which the society “prescribes” 
(νοµοθετεῖν).   
Here we are remarkably close to the thinking of modern philosophers like both Rorty and 
Michael Oakeshott, who view morality as an integral component and critical function of 
language. As Rorty paraphrases Oakeshott, “We can keep the notion of ‘morality’ just insofar as 
we can cease to think of morality as the voice of the divine part of ourselves and instead think of 
it as the voice of ourselves as members of a community, speakers of a common language.”371  
																																																								
371 Rorty 1989: 59. 
153 
Oakeshott himself makes the point in even blunter terms: “A morality is neither a system of 
general principles nor a code of rules but a vernacular language.”372 
Socrates and his companions are creating a world – ideally a just world – in and via 
language: “Come then, let us create a state in discourse, from the beginning” (Ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 
τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶµεν πόλιν), exhorts Socrates, adding that “Our need, it seems, will create 
it” (ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἡµετέρα χρεία, 369c9-10). Language and the just state and 
men’s “need” for the very things that comprise the just state, whatever they may be, are closely 
intertwined in Socrates’ vision of how the just community is created.  It is by a new discourse, a 
new vocabulary – a vocabulary, I would add, replete with its own gnômai and proverbs – that the 
just polis can be attained. Moreover, crucial to this enterprise is education: “Come then, let us 
educate our men with discourse, just as wordsmiths telling their tale and having ample leisure” 
(Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν µύθῳ µυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωµεν τοὺς ἄνδρας, 
376d9-10), exclaims Socrates again, echoing his own line a few Stephanus pages earlier, as he 
begins his discussion of which passages from poetry are detrimental and which conducive to the 
type of society the men are striving to create in logos. To presume that it is the literary genre per 
se of poetry that poses for Socrates the primary obstacle to moral improvement – in other words, 
poetry in our more contemporary sense of the term as opposed to poetry as it was conceptualized 
at the time – is to misunderstand the Republic and, more generally, the relationship between the 
writings of Plato and ancient Greek poetry.   
In addition, to read Plato as categorically opposed to poetry is, ironically, to assume the 
position of a “metaphysician” with respect to the concepts of language and morality, that is, the 
very sort of stance many would-be critics of Plato would presumably be loathe to occupy insofar 
																																																								
372 Oakeshott 1975: 78-9. 
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as they view Plato himself as the arch-metaphysician.373 I use “metaphysician” in the sense 
employed by Rorty, adapted from Heidegger: a metaphysician is someone who takes a question 
like “What is the intrinsic nature of morality?” at face value. As Rorty puts it, the metaphysician 
“assumes that the presence of a term in his own final vocabulary ensures that it refers to 
something which has a real essence” and, as a result, “does not question the platitudes which 
encapsulate the use of a given final vocabulary . . .”374 By “final vocabulary,” Rorty means the 
set of words which all humans “carry about” and “employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, 
and their lives.” Such a vocabulary is “final” only in the limited sense that there is no 
“noncircular argumentative recourse” if doubt is cast on the worth of the words: they are as far as 
one can go with language; “beyond them there is only helpless passivity or resort to force.”375 
But someone who, in contrast to the metaphysician, takes a stance that is more nominalist and 
historicist – someone whom Rorty deems an “ironist” – has a set of different concerns: she  
spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the 
wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process 
of socialization that turned her into a human being by giving her a language may 
have given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the wrong kind of 
human being.376 
 
This “worry” is identical to that of Socrates in the Republic (and by extension, to that of his 
author-creator, Plato).  
																																																								
373 See Nightingale 1995: 2, for a good discussion of how “Plato is often scripted as a villain by theorists of 
postmodernism . . .” 
374 Rorty 1989: 74 (emphasis in original). 
375 Rorty 1989: 73. The opening lines of the Republic would seem to present a vivid illustration of Rorty’s point 
about the limits of a “final vocabulary” and the possibility of a resort to force should one’s vocabulary be thrown 
into question, when Polemarchus playfully raises the prospect of the use of force if Socrates and Glaucon prove 
themselves unable, through use of language, to persuade Polemarchus and his companions to let them go. See my 
discussion in Chapter 2.1.  
376 Rorty 1989: 75. 
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We might pause here for a moment to reflect that despite the seeming innovation of 
Plato’s approach to language, Plato is actually following in the footsteps of earlier authors and, 
in particular, one for whom gnômai assumed primary importance, namely, Hesiod. I have 
already pointed out several of the instances when Socrates and his interlocutors make reference 
to, employ for their own purposes, or alter outright several of the proverbs from Works and Days 
(most prominently, the ubiquitous “twin roads of virtue and vice” passage). Here we must 
recognize that intimately connected with Hesiod’s didactic work is the idea of language 
intertwined with morality. Deborah Steiner has demonstrated how the famous “fable” (ainos) of 
the hawk and nightingale is a thinly disguised morality tale, symbolizing the divide between the 
poetry of Homeric epic, with its emphasis on war and martial valor, in the figure of the hawk, 
and the poetry of wisdom literature (read Hesiod himself) concerned with the resolution of 
disputes and peacetime activities like agriculture, in the figure of the nightingale. The hawk 
embodies in its aggression against the nightingale not only a value system that Hesiod rejects but 
also, in Steiner’s words, “a genre of poetry (and the ethics that genre foregrounds) that prove 
antithetical to the larger composition in which the bird appears.”377 The point here, as Steiner 
makes clear, is that the “larger composition” of the Works and Days articulates not just a 
community governed by dikê but, significant for my thesis, the view that “modes of speaking, 
diction, and style can determine and reveal a speaker’s ethos, values, and moral outlook” given 
that “morality is bound up with discourse and with speeches and songs performed by gods and 
men.”378 Steiner’s analysis aligns precisely with the thinking of Rorty and Oakeshott. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that in such a work where morality and language 
amount to virtually two sides of the same coin, arguably the single most prevalent syntactic 																																																								
377 Steiner 2007: 181. 
378 Steiner 2007: 179. 
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element of the Works and Days is the gnome,379 given that expression’s close association with 
justice. As mentioned earlier, Lardinois emphasizes that because the Greeks cited gnômai in their 
law courts, even the difference between “laws” (νόµοι) and gnomic expressions “was not always 
clear cut.”380  For an author to employ a gnome/proverb, then, is to signal the close connection 
existing between language and justice. 
Just before Socrates begins his disquisition on what constitute proper educational extracts 
from poetry, he gives voice to a number of phrases that echo Hesiod’s Works and Days. While 
not proverbs per se, these phrases may be seen as the beginnings of Socrates’ attempt to 
articulate a new vocabulary that will be a crucial underpinning for his vision of a just society, 
fundamentally different from the Hesiodic conception. For example, in contrast to Hesiod’s set 
of instructions to farmers on how to make their own tools, along with the admonition to have two 
plows at the ready (δοιὰ δὲ θέσθαι ἄροτρα, Op. 432), Socrates articulates the beginnings of what 
will ultimately come to be the definition of justice, each citizen performing the task to which he 
is best suited: “One man is naturally fitted for one task and another for another” (ἀλλὰ διαφέρων 
τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου, 370b1-2). In a society governed by such proverbs, there will 
be no need for the farmer to make his own, single plow, nor any of his other farming tools.381  
But Socrates does not simply reject outright all Hesiodic formulations; rather, he does as Plato 
has been demonstrating throughout the Republic with respect to his characters’ various citations 
of and quotations from verse: he mines the extant corpus of poetry, including that of Hesiod, for 
the building blocks of persuasive speech that will come to comprise the vocabulary of a 																																																								
379 Lardinois 1995: 190-1, identifies no less than 124 gnômai, many of which are quite elaborate, a fact that causes 
Richard Hamilton to worry that classical scholarship does not yet possess “analytical equipment” sufficient to 
handle what he calls the poem’s “massive chaos of gnomic material” (Hamilton 1989: 49). 
380 Lardinois 1995: 5-6. 
381 Resp. 370c9-d1: ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ µέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ 
σµινύην, οὐδὲ τἆλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν. 
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reformed, more just society. This process is evident in Socrates’ coining of a proverb that could 
have come straight out of Hesiod: “Whenever one lets slip the right season of any task, work is 
destroyed” (ἐάν τίς τινος παρῇ ἔργου καιρόν, διόλλυται, 370b7-8). Socrates parrots Hesiod’s 
own gnome on the subject, “The seasonable moment is best in everything” (καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 
ἄριστος, Op. 694).  
That gnômai and proverbs are closely allied with concerns about justice and morality 
becomes all the more significant to the extent that such gnômai and proverbs were being 
committed to memory and anthologized as part of Greek educational practice and tradition. 
Indeed, the argument can be made that it was Hesiod’s pronounced use of gnômai that led to the 
very idea of the creation of poetic, gnomic anthologies, which became wildly popular in the 
fourth century and an integral part of the educational framework.382 One of our earliest 
representations of a Greek book roll is on a kyathos from the beginning of the 5th century, 
depicting a youth holding open a papyrus roll while two other lads with walking sticks stand on 
either side of him listening. On top of a box in front of the reading youth is another volume 
inscribed Cheironeia. Andrew Ford makes the reasonable suggestion that this might well refer to 
Hesiod’s Precepts of Cheiron, which certainly contained the sort of legomena one was likely to 
have committed to memory as part of a proper education.383 Such were some of the critical 
components of one of the prevailing “vocabularies” of Plato’s time, a source of potential worry 
for Socratees in the Republic. It is only by reading with an appreciation of the central role of 
memorized legomena in Greek educational practices that we can begin to understand fully those 
sections of Books 2 and 3 that all too often are interpreted solely – and, thus, condemned – as 
instances of censorship and suppression of artistic freedom. 																																																								
382 Hunter 2014: 77. 
383 Ford 2010: 147. 
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Indeed, in light of the importance of the memorization of legomena to education and the 
fact that such legomena are a key element of one of Athen’s prevailing “vocabularies” we can 
now grasp more fundamentally the import of an abrupt question – indeed, one possessing an 
almost existential urgency – that Socrates poses at the onset of the men’s exploration of what 
poetic passages are conducive to a healthy polis: “What then is our education? Or is it difficult to 
find a better one than that discovered by time immemorial?” (Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν 
εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ηὑρηµένης; 376e2-3). Socrates recognizes full well 
the magnitude of the task at hand: it is nothing less than an attempt to alter in significant part the 
practice of memorizing legomena – many of which were necessarily proverbs and gnômai – by 
asking hard questions about what sort of legomena foreground an ethics (to borrow Steiner’s 
terminology) co-extensive with the morality, with justice pursued for its own sake, to which 
Socrates and his companions aspire. Socrates is searching (in Rorty’s parlance) for a better “final 
vocabulary” than the one that his society is currently using.384 As Socrates asks rhetorically 
(377b5-9), 
Ἆρ' οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω παρήσοµεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων µύθους 
πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαµβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ 
ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις ἅς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόµεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; 
 
Will we so carelessly allow our students to hear any random tales fashioned by 
any random teachers so that they possess in their souls opinions by and large 
contrary to those which we shall think they ought to have, when they reach 
maturity? 
 
Wordcraft is soulcraft, which, in turn, is statecraft. 
Socrates certainly does not have in mind any set of anodyne, shallow sentiments, the 
fourth-century equivalent of “New Age” platitudes. Far from it. Indeed, just before Socrates 
presents the first example of proverbs (from the Iliad) that he finds at odds with the type of 																																																								
384 Rorty 1992: 77. 
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society and education he and his companions are in the process of envisioning, he leads off by 
quoting approvingly an unattributed proverb remarkable for its degree of pessimism: “For 
blessings are far fewer with us than ills” (πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡµῖν, 379c4-5). 
Both Adam and Jowett and Campbell in their respective commentaries find surprising in Plato’s 
text the level of “melancholy” and “pessimism” evinced by Socrates’ unattributed proverb, as 
does Shorey in the comments to his translation of the Republic.385 Jowett and Campbell view the 
saying as an echo of the Homeric gnome (Il. 17.446-7)  
οὐ µὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν ὀϊζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς 
πάντων, ὅσσά τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει. 
 
Nowhere is there anything more miserable than man of all the things,  
however so many, that draw breath and creep upon the earth.386  
 
Adam, however, locates a more intriguing and, in my opinion, more accurate gnomic 
precursor of Socrates’ proverb in Pindar’s Pythian 3, presented here along with the poet’s 
introductory words (80-3):   
εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέµεν κορυφάν, Ἱέρων, 
ὀρθὰν ἐπίστᾳ, µανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων 
ἓν παρ' ἐσλὸν πήµατα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς 
ἀθάνατοι. τὰ µὲν ὦν 
οὐ δύνανται νήπιοι κόσµῳ φέρειν, 
ἀλλ' ἀγαθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω.  (80-3). 
 
But, Hieron, if you can understand the true point of sayings, you know the lesson 
of former poets: the immortals apportion to humans a pair of evils for every good. 
Now fools cannot bear them gracefully, but good men can, by turning the noble 
portion outward. 387 
 
The statement that introduces this Pindaric version of Socrates’ own bleak meditation 
would seem to reflect a concern on the part of the epinician praise poet strikingly similar to what 																																																								
385 Adam 1980, Jowett and Campbell 1894, Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
386 Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc. 
387 Trans. Race. 
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I maintain is Plato’s own: of paramount importance are one’s understanding of and fluency with 
gnômai and proverbs, critical components as they are of any society’s prevailing discursive 
practices, of its influential vocabularies. In addition, the Pindaric gnome is the more likely 
candidate for Socrates’ version given its proximity to a specific Homeric gnome which will be 
the first to draw fire from Socrates in his singling out of various poetic excerpts as inconsistent 
with the ideal polis, namely, the “two urns” gnome from Iliad 24 (527-8): 
δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει 
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων  
 
Two urns stand on the floor of Zeus of such gifts,  
one bestows evils and the other blessings;  
 
William Race reads Pindar’s text as both drawing from this gnome and, tellingly, interpreting it 
to mean that there were in fact two urns of evil gifts but only one of good.388  
Socrates disapproves of Homer’s gnome because it stands in opposition to his position 
that “god” (ὁ θεός) cannot be the source of any evil.389 However, he, unlike Pindar, interprets 
there to be only two urns at issue. This reading is apparent in his altered rendering of Homer’s 
original (379d3-4): 
δοιοί τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει 
κηρῶν ἔµπλειοι, ὁ µὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὃ δειλῶν· 
 
Two urns stand on the floor of Zeus, filled with dooms, 
one of blessings, the other, banes;390 
 
Penelope Murray attempts to explain the alteration in part by claiming that while “Homer 
mentions first the bad things then the good . . ., P[lato] reverses that order because he wants to 
																																																								
388 Race 2012: ad loc. 
389 Resp. 379c6-7. 
390Socrates continues to abbreviate and to alter subsequent lines from Homer’s original as well as to add another, 
unattributed line, one found nowhere in Homer: ταµίας ἡµῖν Ζεὺς – ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται (379d5-e2).  
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show that god is the cause of the good.”391 However, Plato is not crafting a new proverb with this 
verse; on the contrary, Socrates urges that Homer’s original be rejected entirely, irrespective of 
whatever alteration he has made in his less-than-verbatim quotation, when he says before quoting 
the gnome, “Then we must not accept from Homer or from any other poet such an error made 
foolishily about the gods as when he says . . .” (Οὐκ ἄρα . . . ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὁµήρου οὔτ' 
ἄλλου ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁµαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁµαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος, 
379c9-d2). The only proverb that retains unalloyed approbation by Socrates is his earlier, 
grimmer admonition that we live in a world where evils outnumber goods. This is the sort of 
“real-world” advice that ought to instilled in people’s collective memory via quotable legomena. 
Under no circumstances should those ills be blamed on the gods, as the Homeric “two urns” 
gnome would prescribe. 
In other words, while the key reason behind Socrates’ disapproval of verses is found in 
their portrayal of the gods as sometimes perpetrating horrific acts and, further, describing the 
underworld as a place to be dreaded and death as something to be feared, Socrates’ vision of 
human existence is by no means rose colored. The gnômai and proverbs he commends (and 
coins) are those that best equip one to confront a world where evils do, in fact, outweigh 
blessings. For example, not long before he begins his examination of “proper” legomena from 
poetry, he echoes a gnome from Heraclitus with his claim that “invincible and unconquerable is 
the spirit, in whose presence the entire soul stands fearless and undefeatable” (ἄµαχόν τε καὶ 
ἀνίκητον θυµός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος, 375b1-2).  
While the language is relatively plain, the line’s parallel structure with its elegant use of 
chiasmus (amachon/anikeiton—thumos—psychê—aphobos/aeiteitos), highlighted by the jingle 
																																																								
391 Murray 2008: ad loc. 
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and echo of its opposing sets of near synonyms (amachon/anikeiton and aphobos/aeiteitos), 
employs several key features of ancient Greek proverbs.392 In addition, numerous scholars 
through the years have been struck by the line’s proximity to the Heraclitean gnome “Hard it is, 
to fight against the spirit, for its will is bought with the cost of life” (θυµῶι µάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὃ 
γὰρ ἂν θέληι, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται).393   
With respect to matters concerning one’s psyche and thumos, Socrates’ rendition of the 
Heraclitean legomenon is the type of saying that the young men should be committing to 
memory, rather than Achilles’ despairing gnome uttered after encountering Patroclus’ shade, 
which he is unable to embrace as it disappears like smoke beneath the earth (Resp. 386d4-5 and 
Il. 23.103-4):   
ὢ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἔστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόµοισιν 
ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάµπαν· 
 
Alas, so too, even in the halls of Hades 
there is soul and wraith but no nowhere within resides understanding; 
  
Socrates demonstrates the proper use of legomena, while those teachers who compel their 
students to memorize such gnômai as these particular verses from the Iliad are misusing proverb 
– “misusing” it in the sense that their proverb does not approximate the vocabulary that Socrates 
believes is fundamental to a just society.   
One could justifiably describe Socrates’ efforts in this regard as “literary criticism” if we 
think of dialectic in a manner consistent with Rorty’s conception of the language game in which 
discourses compete against each other for prominence. Dialectic as literary criticim amounts to 
“the attempt to play off vocabularies [i.e. various discursive practices] against one another, rather 
than merely to infer propositions from one another, and thus as the partial substitution of 																																																								
392 Russo 1983: 124-5. 
393 Heraclitus, fragment 85.1-2 Diels-Kranz. See Adam 1980, Jowett and Campbell 1894, and Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
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redescription for inference.”394 Socrates trains his eye over a wide array of excerpts from archaic 
and classical poetry, discerning the value (or lack thereof) such passages embody with respect to 
the type of discourse that is conducive to a state where justice is to be sought for its own sake. 
Moreover, Socrates proves himself capable even of transforming passages that might seem to 
lack gnomic status into genuine proverbs in their own right, recasting them as critical legomena 
to be stored up in one’s soul (λαµβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, 377b7), from the extant corpus of Greek 
poetry. For example, in order to inspire young men to rise to the challenges of a world where ills 
outweigh blessings and in which the proverbial road to virtue is far harder than that to vice, 
Socrates commends Odysseus’ stirring self-admonition in Book 20 of the Odyssey. While 
disguised as a beggar, Odysseus experiences a sort of “dark night of the soul” as he attempts to 
sleep huddled on the forecourt, a stranger in his own house: “Bear up heart of mine. For you 
have endured far worse than this” (τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης, Resp. 
390d5 and Od. 20.18).   
To understand why this constitutes a proverb we must recall one of the key insights 
provided by modern paroemiology into proverb use and meaning: context is critical. What might 
not seem a proverb in one context can, in a separate context as part of another speaker’s 
performance, become a proverb. As Charles Briggs discovered in studying Mexicano proverbs in 
northern New Mexico, his informants had trouble at times identifying a proverb text as a proverb 
per se once it was stripped of its normal contextual features. For example, the phrase “They don’t 
just cook horse beans here” (no mas aqui se cuecen habas) can appear to be nothing more than 
mere words (no más palabras es) based on the reaction by Briggs’ consultants. However, if 																																																								
394 Rorty 1989: 78-9. This is not, of course, to imply that Rorty’s attempts to “de-metaphysize philosophy” can be 
mapped squarely onto Plato’s philosophic project, only that Plato’s aptitude in and familiarity with the fourth-
century equivalent of Rorty’s “language game,” as demonstrated by Plato’s leading character of Socrates, discloses a 
discursive strategy not dissimilar from that of Rorty. This aptitude and familiarity are particularly on display in the 
juxtaposition of kompsoi and sophoi that occurs in Book 8 (as well as the Gorgias), which I will discuss in chapter 5.  
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linked with what Briggs calls a “tying phrase” such as “And an elder of bygone days used to say” 
(y decía un viejito de antes) it becomes more recognizable as a genuine proverb – one that can 
mean either “everyone has his faults, and we should look for our own first” or “if you try hard 
enough, you can accomplish anything” depending upon its application.395 In order to make sense 
of this phenomenon, Briggs looks to the work of Czech literary theorist Jan Mukařovský 
concerning the “dialogization of texts” in which proverbs, voices outside of the present context, 
intervene. By virtue of what Mukařovský calls the “‘theatricalization of an utterance’ with the 
use of a quote,” a speaker’s quoted speech takes on the features of a proverb and may be 
identifiable by listeners as such. What might not seem a proverb in one context can, within a 
separate context as part of another speaker’s performance (i.e., in her “theatricalization of the 
utterance”), become a proverb. As Mukařovský explains, “the effect of the context may give this 
quotation a meaning which it does not have of itself . . .”396 In Briggs’ analysis, it was as if the 
speaker had moved to the back of the stage and the spirit of a deceased elder had intervened into 
contemporary affairs.397 The anthropologist Greg Urban calls such a phenomenon “replication” 
which constitutes a marker of proverbiality. Sentences which did not constitute proverbs in their 
original use can become proverbs via replication in a different context, such as the famous line 
from the movie, The Wizard of Oz, “Toto, I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.”398 
By quoting Odysseus, Socrates in essence “theatricalizes” his pained utterance in 
beggar’s guise on the forecourt, thereby transforming it into a generalizing statement about the 																																																								
395 Briggs 1998: 3, 101-35; Martin 2005: 6-10. 
396 Mukařovský 1971: 299, 302 (trans. Garvin, in Penfield 1983: 99, 101). 
397 Briggs 1988: 132-35. See also Martin 2005: 8-9.  Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1981: 119, summarizes well what is at 
play here: “Proverb meaning ultimately emerges from a proverb’s use in a specific context and . . . it is not the 
meaning of a proverb per se that need be our central concern but the meaning of proverb performances . . .” For a 
good discussion of modern paroemiology’s emphasis on the importance of context see Winick 1998: 4-19; Russo 
1983: 126; Lardinois 1995: 1-2. 
398 Winick 1998: 76-7; Urban 1996: 21-4, 37-8, 41-3. 
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inevitability of hardships to be borne in life coupled with a demand for action – in effect, a call to 
rise to the challenge. It is rather as if Socrates combines the sentiment of the American proverb 
“When the going gets tough, the tough get going” with another quote that has achieved the status 
of a proverb, Henry V’s rousing exhortation to his troops in Shakespeare’s eponymous play, 
Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more 
or close up the wall with our English dead.399 
   
This is the sort of vocabulary that Socrates aspires to have the citizens of the just polis incant. 
Socrates understands well the power that those phrases possessing a fair degree of 
quotability hold over the imagination. Indeed, Socrates is more concerned about certain passages 
precisely because they are “more poetical” (ποιητικώτερα, 387b4) – and, thus, more quotable – if 
they are also not conducive to a just polis, if they do not accord with the new lexicon that 
Socrates envisions. Moreover, Plato affords us a window into Socrates’ own attempts to build 
phrases “more poetical” than the ordinary, a process which we might describe as “proverbs under 
construction.”  
For example, when Socrates warns against the harm posed to a just state by laypersons 
who tell falsehoods, he solders a piece of a proverb from Homer’s Odyssey onto his own phrase 
that deftly incorporates another word, anatreptikos – “turning upside down,” “upsetting” – 
whose metaphorical range renders it applicable to both “ship” and “state,” hence, a seeming 
precursor to the famous ship-of-state metaphor (389d1-5):  
Ἂν ἄρ' ἄλλον τινὰ λαµβάνῃ ψευδόµενον ἐν τῇ πόλει –   
τῶν οἳ δηµιοεργοὶ ἔασι, 
µάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, 
κολάσει ὡς ἐπιτήδευµα εἰσάγοντα πόλεως ὥσπερ νεὼς 
ἀνατρεπτικόν τε καὶ ὀλέθριον. 
 
																																																								
399 Act 3, sc. 1. 
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If [a ruler] should catch anyone else speaking falsehoods in the city, “any of the 
craftsmen, be he prophet or healer of ills or builder of beams,” he will rebuke him 
for having brought in a practice as subversive and destructive of the state as if it 
were a ship. 
 
In this remarkable sentence, Plato allows the reader to witness firsthand the creative 
process involved in the attempt to craft memorable phrases that may, by virtue of their 
quotability, have the potential to achieve the fourth century’s equivalent of “going viral,” that is, 
to be committed to memory by students as part of their education and perhaps anthologized in a 
manner akin to Hesiod’s Precepts of Cheiron. 
First Socrates opts for an eminently “quotable” proverb from Book 17 of Homer’s 
Odyssey. It is the swineherd Eumaios’ brave rebuke to Antinoos, who chastises Eumaios and 
Telemachus for having brought the beggar – that is, Odysseus in disguise – to the palace where 
the suitors hound Penelope unceasingly. Eumaios asks Antinoos rhetorically what man who 
himself arrives from elsewhere would ever “invite” along yet another stranger, in addition to 
himself, if that stranger were not a “worker of the people” (deimioergos), and then lists off the 
aforementioned tradesmen, in addition to a bard (aoidos) (17.382-85): 
τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν 
ἄλλον γ', εἰ µὴ τῶν, οἳ δηµιοεργοὶ ἔασι; 
µάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, 
ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων. 
 
For who, himself a stranger, invites yet another stranger, 
unless he is one of the craftstmen, 
be he prophet or healer of ills or builder of beams 
or also inspired bard, one who delights by his singing? 
 
  Aside from constituting a crucial component of Eumaios’ gnome, this list of various “workers 
of the people” – i.e., prophet, doctor carpenter, bard – is perhaps one of the earliest verbal 
codifications of a list of professions and/or social professional identities that serves to enhance 
the quotability and memorability of a phrase or series of phrases. One thinks here of the counting 
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game and nursery rhyme “Tinker, Tailor” with its list of professions (“tinker, tailor, soldier, 
sailor . . .) or the phrase “the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker” from the nursery rhyme, 
“Rub-a-Dub-Dub.” The latter contains the moral to avoid gossip,400 and, thus, mere mention of 
only the phrase “butcher, baker, candlestick maker” can serve as synecdoche for the meaning of 
the rhyme, a feature that proverbs often share (e.g., “Birds of a feather” is shorthand for the full 
proverb’s meaning). Socrates may well intend to have the already memorable phrase listing the 
professions from Eumaios’ gnome serve as the synecdochic signal for his new “proverb under 
construction” that laypersons should not lie. But the simple power of using Homer’s “more 
poetical” (ποιητικώτερα) language – “more poetical” by dint of its poetic features such as meter, 
rhythm, and its ABAB structure (ieiteira/kakôn–tektona/dourôn) – has by itself educational 
ramifications. 
Indeed, “Tinker, Tailor” is arguably nothing more than a rhyming scheme to count by, 
and yet a sizeable number of authors, including Thomas Hardy and Virginia Woolf, have 
incorporated its suggestive language into their works.401 In addition, the British novelist James 
Crace makes a point apposite to Socrates’ emphasis on the educational impact of phrases “more 
poetical” in describing the effect that hearing “Tinker, Tailor” as a child had on his becoming a 
writer and how similar “poetical” language can influence future writers. In a 2013 interview, 
after detailing at length the specifics of what Crace believes constitutes the melodic and rhythmic 
beauty of the lines in “Tinker, Tailor,” he asserted the following:   
This poem registered profoundly in my imagination. . . . [I]t created a literary 
consciousness in me. We should never underestimate what it is that will turn a 
young person into someone who wants to love literature. . . . How are these 																																																								
400 Dating back to the 14th century, the original nursery rhyme seems to have referred to the men having gone to a 
fair in order to view maids in a tub, a fairground attraction akin to a modern peep show. 
401 Others include J.M. Coetzee, Michael Ondaatje, John le Carré, Irwin Shaw, Dorothy Sayers, and Tom Clancy.  
The list could go on. 
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people formed? They’re not formed by being sent to do MFAs in creative writing. 
That’s too late. They’re formed by early encounters. They’re formed by 
something that their mother said that made them laugh because it was so well 
shaped.402 
 
Crace’s point is on par with historical linguist Calvert Watkins having dubbed the 
traditional English round, “Oats, peas, beans, and barley grow” a “masterpiece of the Indo-
European poet’s formulaic art” by virtue of its “essential semantics, formulaics, and poetics”: 
what today is little more than a formulaic utterance that serves to amuse children might well be 
the continued “ringing in our ears [of] the transformation of the central merism of an Indo-
European agricultural prayer, harverst song, or the like.”403 
It is in a similar vein that Socrates recognizes Homer’s impressive capacity for producing 
“well-shaped,” “more poetical” turns of phrase. It is one’s “early encounters” with such language 
that proves determinative in character formation. Socrates will use those “more poetical” 
expressions that are conducive to his larger project and reject those he considers detrimental to a 
just society and the vocabulary that comprises it. To use gnômai and proverbs in any other way 
would constitute an abuse. 
 However, Socrates is not yet finished with the excerpt from Homer. He completes the 
aforementioned proverb by joining Homer’s gnome to an adjective and noun pairing, 
anatreptikos and polin, that echoes a fragment from Alcaeus, “This man who seeks supreme 
power will soon overturn the city” (ὤ]νηρ οὖτ[ος ὀ µαιόµενος τὸ µέγα κρέτος ὀν]τρέψ[ει τάχα 
τὰν πόλιν)404 which Aristophanes also parodies in Wasps.405 Again, Plato has Socrates make use 
of poetic language that may well be very familiar to and even memorized verbatim by much of 																																																								
402 Fassler 2013 (emphasis added). 
403 Watkins 1995: 47. 
404 Alcaeus, frag. 141 Lobel and Page. 
405 Vespae 1232-5. 
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Plato’s reading audience. This serves to increase all the more the potential for quotability 
possessed by Socrates’ new “proverb under construction,” which holds that no private layperson 
ought to lie, lest the ship of state be overturned. Indeed, to the extent that discourse has been 
“turned upside down” by the cataclysmic events of the Peloponnesian War and the sophists’ 
manipulation of language, Socrates is attempting to set the discourse right. With Socrates, Plato 
begins to build a new discourse, a new vocabulary.   
It is in this light, then, that everything Socrates says about poetry in Books 2 and 3 must 
be read and understood – that is, which passages are harmful, which beneficial, and, in addition, 
which might be employed in Socrates’ own wordcraft. The world is to be made anew through 
this new discursive practice that is philosophy, possessing its own vocabulary, its own set of 
gnômai and proverbs, hopefully to be memorized and anthologized. In Books 2 and 3 of Plato’s 
Republic, the reader is given the unique opportunity to witness firsthand the beginnings of the 
creation of a new, just state in discourse (ἐν λόγοις, 592a10), with words and phrases “more 
poetical” that might serve as the building blocks for a new “vocabulary” that would, by itself, 
constitute a morality. Proverbs and gnômai necessarily play a crucial role in any vocabulary, in 
any morality. 
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Chapter Four – Republic 3-7: Proverbs and the Construction of the Ideal State 
 
 
And we should always be eager to recognize our kinsmen through discourse. 
          Plato, Statesman406 
 
Therefore, poetic language – as, after all, every functional language – is rooted in the system of a 
particular national language.           
Jan Mukařovský, On Poetic Language  
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
After the critique of poetry that Books 2 and 3 have as their focus, the Republic returns to 
a lengthy discussion about what an ideally just state would look like and how it might be 
realized. While this subject had been initially taken up in Book 2, considerations of the proper 
education for the ideal state’s “guardian” class necessitated a detailed examination (and resulting 
critique) of poetry. Now, from roughly the latter third of Book 3 to the close of Book 7, Socrates 
and his interlocutors grapple with the task of constructing Kallipolis. Proverbs play a crucial role 
in the progression of the dialogue and the attempt to articulate what would constitute the 
foundations of a more just society. 
The importance of proverbs to this endeavor is not surprising given that the practice of 
expressing conceptions of justice by way of proverbs had rich poetic antecedents. We have it on 
authority from the twelfth century commentator on Aristotle, Michael of Ephesus, that according 
to the philosopher Theophrastus, two of the most famous coiners of ancient gnômai, Theognis 
and Phocylides, are credited with a famous gnomic saying, “In justice there is the sum total of 
every excellence” (ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι) – a statement which, as Aristotle 
explains in his Nicomachean Ethics, “we say, making it into a proverb” (παροιµιαζόµενοί φαµεν, 
																																																								
406 257d5-6, trans. Jowett (with modification): δεῖ δὴ τούς γε συγγενεῖς ἡµᾶς ἀεὶ προθύµως διὰ λόγων ἀναγνωρίζειν. 
171 
1129b29-30).407 (Aristotle’s view in this regard is consistent with his conception that proverbs 
were gnômai that over time became “frequently quoted and common”408 as I explained in 
Chapter One.) If Plato aspires for the Republic to be the definitive tractate on a new, reformed 
vision of justice – to be the foundation of the ideal polis – then the coinage of new and improved 
gnômai and proverbs on that same subject, expressions which bear the potential to become 
frequently quoted and common in the manner of Plato’s literary gnomologic forebears such as 
Theognis and Phocylides, seems all but a requirement of the genre in which Plato writes. 
Here again, as I explained in Chapter Two, Richard Rorty’s conception of different 
“vocabularies” competing in a culture’s larger “language game” lies behind my claim that by 
attempting to reformulate and hence “reform” proverbial sayings, Plato is in fact writing genuine 
philosophy, even by contemporary standards: 
Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis. 
Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary 
which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely 
promises great things.409 
   
Socrates and his interlocutors draw time after time from the pre-existing reservoir of 
proverbial sayings and gnômai. They do this either to bring attention to the help – or hindrance, 
as the case may be – of such sayings in imagining an ideally just state or, alternatively, to 
reformulate and thereby “reform” various legomena to achieve a new discourse consistent with 
Plato’s characters’ imaginings, a state founded on the idea of justice pursued as an end in itself. 
The middle books of the Republic provide us with the opportunity to see such legomena at work 
in the construction of the ideal state. As I hope to make clear, Plato at times displays a near-
dizzying number and variety of proverbs in his text – including, among others, bits of Hesiodic 																																																								
407 Mich., Comm. in Arist. Gr. xxii (3).8.10; cf. xx.210.11 (cited in Gerber 1999: 399, n.1). 
408 τεθρυληµέναις καὶ κοιναῖς, Rhet. 1395a10-11 
409 Rorty 1989: 9. 
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gnômai, Homeric formulae, pieces of maxims and sententiae by Phocylides and Theognis, 
apothegms quoted by Pindar, Alcaeus, and Aristodemus, folk sayings from popular cultural 
practices such as board games – but then subtly shows how they can be re-worked, re-fashioned 
so as to be consonant with the Republic’s vision of an ideally just state. 
The structure of my argument in this chapter is as follows: I begin with a telling example 
of how Socrates reforms Hesiodic proverb to craft what will become the definition of justice for 
the ideal state: “Justice is the doing of one’s own” (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί). This 
illustration of proverbial reform occurs in Book 4, which has as its central focus the parallel 
between the individual soul and the civic structure of the ideal state.410 Socrates’ proverb-like 
definition is consistent with the principal of justice central to Kallipolis: what is just for the state 
is identical to what is just for the individual soul. I turn briefly to illustrate how this development 
follows naturally from a discussion of wealth’s relationship to justice in the latter part of Book 3, 
which also advances by way of Socrates’ reformulation of proverb from early Greek poetry, akin 
to what he accomplishes with Hesiod. 
I then turn to an examination of how a colloquial proverb with seemingly no poetic 
origin, “Cities upon cities, but no city!” (πόλεις µέν εἰσι παµπόλεις, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις) highlights just 
how distant the ideal polis stands in relation to then-current Greek cities, as embodied by the 
term polis. Socrates refers to this proverb in Book 4 when the men ponder the question of how 
their ideal city, lacking wealth, could ever survive in the current brutal political environment. 
Drawing upon Kierkegaard’s conception of Socratic irony, as developed more recently by 
Jonathan Lear and Richard Bernstein, I demonstrate how the riddling character of this common 
proverb – a riddling character enjoyed by many proverbs, as discussed in Chapter Two – 
																																																								
410 Halliwell 1993: 1. 
173 
discloses the “gap’ between the “pretense” of an expression like “city” and the “aspiration” 
embedded in that same term. Socrates and his interlocutors long for a more just world, and the 
use of this riddling proverb reveals the larger irony of the Greek world’s having many “cities” 
but no “city” in the sense of the ideal, just city. 
I end my exploration of the proverbs in Book 4 by highlighting the rhetorical power 
possessed by common (κοινά) and seemingly insignificant (σµικρά) proverbs, using Socrates’ 
invocation of the proverb “Friends have things in common” (κοινὰ τὰ φίλων) as a prime 
example. This inconspicuous and ostensibly uncontroversial saying sets the stage in fact for the 
introduction of the three great waves (τῆς τρικυµίας, 472a2) of radical reform that occupy Book 
5 – i.e., the equality of women and men, the abolition of the private family, and the rule of 
philosopher-kings. I suggest that common, colloquial proverbs possess enormous transformative 
potential, which, conversely, also becomes a source of worry if legomena antithetical to a just 
society hold influence. Discursive and civic practices are intertwined. 
Thus, proverbs, while essential to persuasive discourse given their familiarity and 
quotability, must not be considered all-powerful discursive tools that preempt any further 
examination. As I show in the next section that explores Book 5’s elaboration of “sharing” 
(κοινωνία), Socrates’ use of the common saying koina ta philôn proves insufficient to the task of 
convincing his interlocutors of the necessity of having the guardian class share wives and 
children, an utterly laughable proposition from society’s current vantage point. Moreover, as the 
interlocutors reel off proverb after proverb in response to Socrates’ attempt to gloss over so 
radical a proposal with a mere commonplace, the reader is left with the distinct impression that 
there is no “last word” to be had on any subject. I demonstrate how this dynamic accords with 
both Rorty’s notion of the “language game” and the traditional agon of Greek poetic 
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competition. I then end my exploration of the proverbs in Book 5 by showing how with an initial 
nod to the comic and iambic tradition of Sophronic mime and the aphorisms of Epicharmus, 
Plato depicts Socrates both coining new proverbs and transforming several traditional ones to 
demonstrate how radical ideas of reform, such as those represented by the three waves, will 
invariably be subject to scorn and ridicule by a society itself in need of just such reform. 
Lastly, I conclude the chapter by revealing how proverbs help support the metaphysical 
framework presented in Books 6 and 7 for the ideal of governance by philosopher rulers, the last 
of the three waves. While these books are much more famous for the Sun, Line, and Cave 
analogies, I show how proverbs work alongside the vividness of Plato’s imagery, culminating in 
the Cave, itself seemingly fashioned from imagery in Hesiodic proverb, to show how the world, 
including its discursive practices, might be reimagined in a way consistent with the foundation of 
Kallipolis. 
 
4.2. Proverbial Reform 
 
A watershed moment occurs midway through Book 4, when Socrates and his 
interlocutors begin to perceive that their long-sought definition of justice is tantamount to 
modern political theory’s Unique Aptitude Doctrine (UAD), the notion that society is best served 
by each individual doing what she is best suited for and nothing else. They arrive at this 
conclusion, which ultimately will play a significant role in the development of Western political 
and economic thought,411 by way of proverb – or, more precisely, by reformulating the elements 
of several proverbs that originate in Hesiod’s Works and Days.   
																																																								
411 For example, the UAD principle as articulated by Plato’s characters bears more than a slight resemblance to 
Adam Smith’s theory as to how the efficient division of labour necessarily leads to exponential increases in 
productivity, and in this sense, history’s most famous idealist presages its most famous economist by some 2000 
years. 
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Socrates worries aloud that to afford the “greatest happiness” (πλείστη εὐδαιµονία) to the 
various practitioners of the different professions that comprise society would result in a world 
where “a farmer would no longer be a farmer nor a potter a potter” (οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς 
ἔσται οὔτε ὁ κεραµεὺς κεραµεὺς). Instead, it would lead to a society of “merrymakers” 
(ἑστιάτορας), where “the potters recline by the fire, engaged in drinking bouts” (τοὺς κεραµέας 
κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς, 420d5-421b5). This is decidedly not a picture 
of the “good Strife” (ἀγαθὴ δ᾽ Ἔρις) famously described by Hesiod in a series of proverbs in the 
opening lines of the Works and Days – that is, the sort of strife that fosters a community where 
“potter vies with potter and builder with builder” (κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 
24-5). One cannot help but be struck by the semantic proximity of Plato’s ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς 
ἔσται οὔτε ὁ κεραµεὺς κεραµεὺς to Hesiod’s κεραµεὺς κεραµεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, along 
with the stark contrast between the Hesiodic “good Strife” fostering competition among 
tradesmen and the leisurely drinking for sport (διαπίνειν) of the shiftless potters in Socrates’ 
imagined world-gone-wrong. Socrates seems to be saying that such a world would be guilty of 
having ignored the wisdom imparted by the gnômai in the opening of the Works and Days.   
But not so fast. Socrates immediately pivots so as to upend the core maxim underlying 
much of Hesiod’s Iron Age anthology of gnômai – namely, that one should strive to avoid 
poverty and to work hard in order to become wealthy during such an unforgiving time – when he 
tells his interlocutors without equivocation that craftsmen are destroyed by both poverty (πενία) 
and wealth (πλοῦτος, 421d4). Moreover, in expressing this sentiment, Socrates introduces a new 
term for “potter,” khutreus  (421d6), in place of the previous kerameus. It is as if Plato has 
embarked on the coinage of a new proverb, replete with revised terminology, to replace the older 
and – in Plato’s Socrates’ estimation – ultimately faulty, gnomic statements of Hesiod. Whereas 
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envy of a wealthy man, in the Hesiodic formulation, is what catalyzes the “good Strife” of 
competition between tradesmen so that the impoverished may become wealthy themselves, it is 
the very attainment of wealth, under Plato’s reformulation of the proverb, that in fact makes a 
potter (now deemed χυτρεύς instead of κεραµεύς) “more idle and negligent” (Ἀργὸς δὲ καὶ 
ἀµελὴς . . . µᾶλλον) and “much worse” (κακίων . . . πολύ, 421d9-12) than he was before he 
became wealthy. Now it is both poverty and wealth that cause harm, as framed in a generalizing 
statement that has the syntactic shape of a proverb: “From both wealth and poverty then it is that 
the works of the craftsmen are worse and that they themselves are worse” (Ὑπ' ἀµφοτέρων δή, 
πενίας τε καὶ πλούτου, χείρω µὲν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χείρους δὲ αὐτοί, 421e4-5). The 
parallelism of erga with the intensive autoi, the use of the axiological terminology 
cheirô/cheirous as part of that parallelism and heightened by polyptoton, the suppressed copula – 
all of these are stylistic markers of proverbs.412         
With this new formulation, Plato has deftly equated a surfeit of happiness, which he first 
had Socrates conjoin with the idleness that Hesiod condemns throughout his didactic poem, to a 
surfeit of wealth, to which Hesiod presumably would have no objection. Nothing short of the 
transformation of Hesiod’s proverbial wisdom is underway. As Book 4 continues to unfold, 
Socrates ultimately concludes that the way to avoid such detrimental surfeit is for everyone to 
practice the craft for which his natural aptitude is highest (i.e., the UAD) and that this is, in fact, 
the very definition of justice (433a1-434d1). What the state requires of us turns out to be the 
same as what is best for the health of our indidivual soul. This revelation, too, he articulates in an 
expression that has the shape of a proverb: “Justice is the doing of one’s own” (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ 
πράττειν . . . δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, 433a8-9). The use of the neuter (τὸ) has the effect of turning a 
																																																								
412 See Most 2003: 146. 
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statement into a kind of proverb,413 and Socrates’ newly coined phrase qualifies as what modern 
paroemiologists deem “literal nonoppositional proverbs” such as “Virtue is its own reward” and 
“Honesty is the best policy.”414 Plato’s reformulation of Hesiodic proverb, thus, results in world 
literature’s first articulation of the UAD. 
From the Republic’s opening, it is clear that Plato is concerned about the relationship of 
both wealth and work – and, conversely, lack thereof – to justice. We recall that one of the initial 
questions Socrates poses to his first interlocutor in the dialogue, the old man Cephalus, concerns 
the effect that Cephalus’ enormous wealth may have had on Cephalus’ ability to live a just life. 
As I explained in Chapter Two, this exchange between Socrates and Cephalus amounts to a 
virtual duel of proverbs and gnômai wielded by the two men in support of their respective 
positions.415 It comes as no surprise, then, that Socrates should confront Plato’s precursor and 
competitor at gnômai-coining, Hesiod, as he begins to construct the ideal state, on the 
relationship of both wealth and work to a just society – a society which is, of course, the 
principal topic of both authors’ texts (i.e., the Works and Days and the Republic).   
We see in fact the stage set for Socrates’ engagement with this subject toward the close of 
Book 3, when Socrates considers the relationship of both wealth and work (or, again, their lack) 
to excellence (ἀρετή). While explaining to Glaucon how a man who has work (ἔργον) to 
perform, such as a carpenter, has no time for excessive and prolonged medical treatment, 
Socrates raises the contrasting image of a wealthy man and frames the point he wishes to make 
by way of a purportedly common saying: “But a rich man, as we say, has no such work set 
																																																								
413 Morgan 2009: 555, n. 19 (citing Adam and Adam 1940) in reference to Plato’s Protagoras, 309c11-12. Although 
Morgan uses the term “maxim,” modern paroemiology reveals there is little difference between the two, as I 
explained in Chapter One. 
414 See Dundes 1981: 52-3; Russo 1997: 52. 
415 See Chapter 2.2 for a full discussion of this proverbial “duel.” 
178 
before him, a man for whom life becomes intolerable being compelled to keep away from work” 
(ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὥς φαµεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείµενον, οὗ ἀναγκαζοµένῳ 
ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον, 407a4-5). Glaucon, interestingly, denies having heard this adage. 416 
Socrates, in turn, responds with a proverb from Phocylides: “Why, you haven’t heard that saying 
of Phocylides ‘For whom there is already livelihood, he must practice excellence’” (Φωκυλίδου 
γάρ . . . οὐκ ἀκούεις πῶς φησι δεῖν, ὅταν τῳ ἤδη βίος ᾖ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν, 407a7-8)? Now Glaucon 
takes the point: “I think even before that, too [i.e., before he has a livelihood]” (οἶµαι δέ γε . . . 
καὶ πρότερον, 407a9). For Socrates to cite a maxim by Phocylides is certainly consistent with 
Phocylides’ reputation in antiquity as one of the best advisors on human living, precisely because 
he authored numerous gnômai in his poetry. 417 
But even more importantly, Socrates has deftly altered Phocylides’ original proverb to 
highlight what he now wants to emphasize: the need to practice aretê, irrespective of one’s 
material circumstances. Here is Phocylides’ original: “Seek a livelihood, and after you have it, 
excellence” (δίζησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ', ὅταν ἦι βίος ἤδη).418 Adam, in his commentary, notes 
that Phocylides’ maxim “is one of the earliest expressions of the all but universal cry χρήµατα 
χρήµατ' ἄνηρ” – “money, money is the man” – which we find in Pindar’s Second Isthmian.419 
Τhe Pindaric Scholiast informs us that the expression “is classed among the proverbs 
(ἀναγράφεται µὲν εἰς τὰς παροιµίας) by some, but it is really an apothegm of Aristodemus, as 
Chrysippus tells us in his work On Proverbs (ἐν τῷ περὶ παροιµιῶν)” and, further, that Alcaeus 
quoted Aristodemus’ apothegm in his poetry: “For they say that Aristodemus once expressed it 
																																																								
416 407a6: Οὔκουν δὴ λέγεταί γε. 
417 See, e.g., Isoc., Ad Nicoclem 43-4.  
418 Phocylides, frag. 9.1 Diehl. 
419 Adam 1980: ad loc.; Pi., I. 2.10: χρήµατα χρήµατ' ἀνήρ.  
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shrewdly at Sparta, ‘Money is the man (χρήµατ' ἀνήρ), and no poor man is good or 
honorable.’”420 Diogenes Laertius also mentions Alcaeus’ quotation of Aristodemus’ apothegm 
in relaying a story told by Andron of Ephesus in his work on The Tripod, about how 
Aristodemus won the tripod from the Argives as a prize of virtue for being the wisest of the 
Greeks but retired in favor of Chilon, one of the Seven Sages.421 Phocylides’ original saying thus 
belongs to a long and distinguished pedigree of proverbial expression that emphasized the 
overarching importance of wealth to Greek culture and society.422 
Plato, thus, has Socrates make use of the esteemed lineage enjoyed by Phocylides’ saying 
in the context of the men’s discussion about work, wealth and justice but alters it ever so subtly. 
As Adam explains, “Plato for his own purposes represents Phocylides as laying the stress on 
ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν rather than on δίζησθαι βιοτήν, where it really falls.”423 Now the proverb 
emphasizes the cultivation of virtue rather than the accumulation of wealth. On my reading, Plato 
is re-working traditional proverbs in the service of his vision of discursive reform. The ancient 
conversation concerning the relationship of wealth and work to justice and excellence must be 
changed, “re-formed.” In contrast to a literary heritage that includes proverbial sayings by 
Pindar, Alcaeus, and wise men on par with the legendary Seven Sages (e.g., Aristodemus), all 
articulating the virtues of wealth, Plato means to lay a new gnomological foundation for future 
sayings, now emphasizing the values expressed in the Republic, notably, aretê, and dikê pursued 
																																																								
420 Scholia vetera I 2.17.1-3 (trans. Campbell). There is no functional difference between a proverb and an apothegm 
insofar as (i) the two separate terms represented for the Greeks the development over time of multiple terminology 
with overlapping meanings and (ii) modern paroemiologists define an apothegm as closely akin to a proverb, 
namely, as a “wise and pithy saying uttered by a distinguished individual at [an] opportune or critical moment . . .” 
(Russo 1997: 58, 63; see my definitional parameters of “proverb” in Chapter 1.2). 
421 Vitae philosophorum 1.30.11-1.31.6. 
422 See my analysis in Chapter 3 of how Plato artfully distorts the conventional notions of who should be considered 
Sages and just what sort of wisdom may or may not be contained in their reputedly “wise” maxims. 
423 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
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for its own sake, the guiding principle of the ideal state. A new “vocabulary” (to employ Rorty’s 
terminology), complete with its own proverbs, is a prerequisite for Plato’s project. The ideal state 
cannot be envisioned without such a reformed discourse. 
 
4.3. “Cities upon Cities, but No City!” – Colloquial Proverb and Ironic Longing 
 
As we saw in Book 1 with Socrates’ reference to folk sayings in the volatile exchange 
with Thrasymachus, the central books of the Republic also disclose Plato’s seeming fondness for 
colloquial proverbs, the sort of sayings that one would be more likely to encounter on the street 
or in the agora than in the classroom or symposium. In Book 4, Socrates’ allusion to one of these 
in particular – “Cities upon cities, but no city!” (πόλεις µέν εἰσι παµπόλεις, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις) – 
illuminates the magnitude of the task faced by anyone who, like Socrates and his interlocutors, 
attempts to articulate the ideal in language, which is precisely the challenge of constructing 
Kallipolis in the men’s dialogue with each other. 
Not long after Socrates subverts Hesiodic proverb about the superiority of wealth, 
Adeimantus responds with his own challenge to Socrates: How will Kallipolis be able to defend 
itself in war without resources, without wealth? Will it not be easy prey for some rich and large 
(µεγάλην τε καὶ πλουσίαν) rival state? Socrates replies with a revised version of a colloquial 
proverb that the Athenian Stranger employs in Plato’s Laws: “the old and true saying how it is 
hard to fight against the attack of two foes on the opposite side” (ὀρθὸν µὲν δὴ πάλαι τε 
εἰρηµένον ὡς πρὸς δύο µάχεσθαι καὶ ἐναντία χαλεπόν, Laws 919b4-5). Socrates, however, alters 
the saying significantly: “It is clear that it would be harder [to fight] against one, but easier 
against two such kind” (δῆλον . . . ὅτι πρὸς µὲν µίαν χαλεπώτερον [πολεµεῖν], πρὸς δὲ δύο 
τοιαύτας ῥᾷον, 422a8-b1). 
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Adeimantus is perplexed. “How can you say that?” (πῶς εἶπες; 422b2), he asks, 
bewildered by Socrates’ strange reformulation. That Socrates’ new version has a riddling 
component comes as no surprise given what modern paroemiology has revealed: certain sayings 
can lead double lives as both proverbs and riddles.424 More importantly, however, Plato is setting 
the stage for the introduction of the still-more puzzling colloquial proverb, “Cities upon cities, 
but no city!” which will have profound ramifications for how we ought to conceive of an ideal 
city in the real-world context of the threat posed by rich and powerful rival states. As was the 
case with justice and aretê, we are about to learn that considerations of wealth are entirely 
irrelevant to a just state, even when forced to defend itself against hostile powers. This is no 
academic discussion. 
First we should note a telling connection between Socrates’ revised saying about fighting 
“two foes of opposite quarters” and the two specific “foes” that the Athenian Stranger has in 
mind in Plato’s Laws, when he quotes the original, quasi-proverb. Those “enemies” are none 
other than “wealth” (πλοῦτος) and “poverty” (πενία, Laws, 919b7-8) – in other words, the very 
same constructs that barely half a Stephanus page ago we witnessed Socrates configure in a new 
proverb so as to counter the old Hesiodic proverb that lionized wealth and demonized poverty.425 
Now we have Socrates offering yet another new proverb but one that seems at odds with the “old 
and true saying” voiced by the Athenian Stranger. Moreover, the Athenian Stranger’s “saying” 
would itself appear to have aligned nicely with how Socrates previously reformed Hesiod’s 
retrograde wisdom: it may be hard to do battle against such formidable foes as poverty and 																																																								
424 See Chapter 2.5 where I discuss the explanation by Dundes 1981: 51, of why the Burmese phrase “The one who 
does not know about it may walk over it; the one who knows about it will dig it up and eat it” qualifies as both a 
riddle and a proverb. 
425 To repeat, Socrates “re-formed” Hesiodic proverb is “From both wealth and poverty then it is that the works of 
the craftsmen are worse and that they themselves are worse” (Ὑπ' ἀµφοτέρων δή, πενίας τε καὶ πλούτου, χείρω µὲν 
τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χείρους δὲ αὐτοί, 421e4-5). 
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wealth, but then – to paraphrase another proverb we see quoted elsewhere in the Republic – 
“Hard is the way of the good” (χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά).426  
However, even leaving aside the disjunction between Socrates’ earlier and later “revised” 
proverbs, how can it be easier to fight two than one? Shorey explains the riddling proverb as an 
“apparent paradox to stimulate attention.”427 While this is no doubt true, the bewilderment 
engendered by the proverb is the precursor to an even deeper aporia that necessarily accompanies   
the radical undermining of traditional thinking concerning the relationship of wealth and power 
to justice, now pursued for its own sake. 
Socrates begins to clarify things by arguing that a virtuous and well-trained man – the 
ideal exemplified by the guardians – could easily best two, fat, rich men (πλουσίοιν δὲ καὶ 
πιόνοιν, 422b8) in a boxing match. Adeimantus concedes the point and acknowledges further 
that since the rich are likely to be more skilled in boxing than warfare, the ideal city’s virtual 
“athletes of war” (πολέµου ἀθληταί, 422b8) will likely be able to fight two times, even three 
times (διπλασίοις τε καὶ τριπλασίοις, 422c8-9) their own number. However, Adeimantus raises a 
valid concern after Socrates imagines the ideal polis sending an embassy to another city and then 
announcing that because neither gold nor silver is lawful (θέµις) to its own inhabitants, the other 
city, honoring wealth, would naturally make common cause with the ideal polis, preferring not to 
do battle with the ideal city’s “sturdy and strong hounds” (κυσὶ. . .στερεοῖς τε καὶ ἰσχνοῖς) but 
instead against the “fat and tender sheep” (προβάτοις πίοσί τε καὶ ἁπαλοῖς 422d1-7)428 who 
inhabit the wealthy cities, in order to acquire those wealthy cities’ spoils. Adeimantus, senses 
danger in this way of thinking and cautions Socrates, “But consider whether the wealth of other 																																																								
426 At 435c8 and 497d10. 
427 Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
428 Trans. Shorey. 
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cities gathered together into a single city should not pose a danger to our city that is not 
wealthy.”429 
Socrates’ rejoinder is remarkable in its multi-leveled irony, setting up the introduction of 
the pivotal colloquial proverb, “Cities upon cities, but no city!”: “You are happily innocent to 
think that you can properly deem any city other than the one we are founding ‘a city’” (εὐδαίµων 
εἶ . . . ὅτι οἴει ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπεῖν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οἵαν ἡµεῖς 
κατεσκευάζοµεν, 422e3-5).430 This rejoinder is part of Socrates’ larger point that the so-called 
“cities” to which Adeimantus refers are not so much cities as rival groups within a polity, not 
truly “one city” (πόλιν µίαν, 423a9) in the sense that Kallipolis is. The commentators note that 
Socrates must, then, be ironic in calling Adeimantus “happy” or “fortunate” (εὐδαίµων – which 
I, following Shorey’s lead, translate as “happily innocent”), since in Socrates’ estimation, 
Adeimantus has failed to employ the term polis accurately.431 The other so-called “cities” that 
prize wealth are not genuine “cities” in the true sense of the word but merely collections of 
competing factions. Socrates’ irony, thus, conforms to the standard definition: “the use of words 
to express something other than, and especially the opposite of [their] literal meaning” 
(Webster’s).432 To call Adeimantus eudaimôn – literally, “fortunate”, “blessed with a good 
genius” (LSJ, s.v. 1) – is to pull his leg. 
However, there is yet another, more profound sense in which irony operates here, which 
is critical to ascertain if we are to grasp the full import of the coming proverb, “Cities upon 																																																								
429 422d8-e2: ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς µίαν . . . πόλιν συναθροισθῇ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήµατα, ὅρα µὴ κίνδυνον φέρῃ τῇ µὴ 
πλουτούσῃ. 
430 Trans. Shorey (with modification). 
431 See, e.g., Adam 1980 ad loc.: “εὐδαίµων is less common in this ironical sense than µακάριος.” 
432 The standard, modern definition of irony conforms to the classic definition provided by Quintilian, namely, a 
figure of speech or trope “in which something contrary to what is said must be understood” (in utroque enim 
contrarium ei quod dicitur intellegendum est, 9.2.44.7-9). 
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cities, but no city!” In one sense, Adeimantus is, in fact, “blessed” to be able to employ words in 
a unidimensional way, where there exists no gap between a word’s pretense and what further, 
larger aspiration the person employing a single, blunt term like “city” may associate with that 
single term. It is in this gap that one glimpses the deeper irony in Socrates’ statement. Here I 
look to the work of the philosopher Jonathan Lear (and Richard Bernstein’s treatment of Lear’s 
ideas), who, drawing from Kierkegaard’s writings on Socratic irony (specifically, from Plato’s 
portrayal of Socrates), introduces the concept of a “gap” between Kierkegaard’s notion of 
“pretense” (that is, a putting forward of oneself, the making of a claim – i.e., not making 
something up in the sense of “to pretend”) and the “aspiration” that is embedded in that pretense. 
It is in this gap that a potential for irony arises. Lear puts it thus: 
The possibility of irony arises when a gap opens between pretense as it is made 
available in a social practice [e.g., in Lear’s thinking, the practice of being a 
“teacher” or a “citizen” or a “businessman” or a “Christian” – or, in my analysis 
here, the practice of a polity’s being a “city”] and an aspiration or ideal which, on 
the one hand, is embedded in the pretense – indeed which expresses what the 
pretense is all about – but which, on the other hand, seems to transcend the life 
and the social practice in which that pretense is made. The pretense seems at once 
to capture and miss the aspiration.433 
 
As Bernstein explains in elucidating Lear’s conception of Kierkegaard’s pretense, the 
fundamental ironic question for Kierkegaard becomes “In all of Christendom is there a 
Christian?” or as Lear rephrases it, “Among all Christians, is there a Christian?” These questions 
are not tautologies. Rather, they are means of focusing our attention on the gap between the 
pretense of being a Christian and the task of living up to the aspiration embedded in the pretense.  
In my reading of the Republic, it is precisely this same sort of gap that exists between 
Adeimantus’ use of the term polis and the aspiration embedded in the pretense of that term, to 
which Socrates’ draws our attention by telling Adeimantus how “fortunate/blessed/innocent” 																																																								
433 Lear 2011: 11; Bernstein 2016: 17. 
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(εὐδαίµων) he is to be able to use the term polis as if it were limited solely to its pretense, as 
opposed to the aspiration which arguably only the ideal polis that the men have been 
“constructing” (κατασκευάζειν) in the dialogue can meet. Socrates and his interlocutors in 
Plato’s Republic are longing for the attainment of the aspiration embedded in the pretense of the 
term, polis. If they were already satisfied with the word in the sense that the gap between 
pretense and aspiration had been bridged, they would all be eudaimones, indeed. 
Adeimantus is puzzled by Socrates’ irony. “Why, what should we say then?” he asks.434  
Now Socrates deploys the colloquial proverb: “You ought to refer to the other [‘cities’] more 
numerously. For each of them is, as the saying of the game goes, not ‘a city but a-many cities.’” 
(Μειζόνως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὰς ἄλλας· ἑκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάµπολλαι 
ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, 422e7-9).435 Socrates seems to refer here to an ancient board 
game. The scholiast informs us that the phrase “playing cities” (πόλεις παίζειν) pertains to a type 
of draughts board game (εἰδός ἐστι πεττευτικῆς παιδιᾶς) and that the phrase “has also been 
translated into a proverb” (µετῆκται δὲ καὶ εἰς παροιµίαν).436 Both the Suda and Hesychius 
confirm, too, that the phrase poleis paizein came to have proverbial signification.437 Adam adds 
that the “the phrase τὸ τῶν παιζόντων in Plato seems always to mean ‘as they say in the proverb’ 
. . .”438 He hypothesizes that “it is probable from the position of τὸ τῶν παιζόντων that ἀλλ' οὐ 
πόλις forms part of the proverb: so that the whole saying may have run πόλεις µέν εἰσι 
παµπόλεις, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις – translated roughly as “Cities upon cities but no ‘city’!”439 If we 																																																								
434 422e6: ἀλλὰ τί µήν; ἔφη (trans. Shorey). 
435 Trans. Adam (with modification). 
436 Greene 1938: ad loc. 
437 Hsch. pi.2757.1-3 (in Schmidt 1965); Suid. pi.1911.1 (in Adler 1971). 
438 Adam 1980: ad loc. See, e.g., Resp. 9.573d1 and Laws 6.780c8 (cf. 4.723d8-e1). 
439 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
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suppose, then, that a compact body of pieces was called a polis which in turn constituted the 
whole of a player’s side, one can imagine, as Adam puts it, a “defeated player, gazing ruefully at 
his depopulated squares, each of which, as well as the whole of his side is a ‘city’” exclaiming 
this phrase that became the proverb (as reconstructed by Adam) to which Socrates refers in 
responding to Adeimantus: “Cities upon cities but no city!”  
As is the case with many proverbs, the phrase has to be riddled through. What in the 
world is Socrates driving at? Fortunately, he goes on to explain in making his larger point about 
how Adeimantus mistakes rival groups within a polity for a “city” in the same sense as Kallipolis 
(422e9-423b2): 
δύο µέν, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ᾖ, πολεµία ἀλλήλαις, ἡ µὲν πενήτων, ἡ δὲ πλουσίων· τούτων 
δ’ ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ πάνυ πολλαί, αἷς ἐὰν µὲν ὡς µιᾷ προσφέρῃ, παντὸς ἂν ἁµάρτοις, 
ἐὰν δὲ ὡς πολλαῖς, διδοὺς τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις χρήµατά τε καὶ δυνάµεις ἢ 
καὶ αὐτούς, συµµάχοις µὲν ἀεὶ πολλοῖς χρήσῃ, πολεµίοις δ’ ὀλίγοις. καὶ ἕως ἂν ἡ 
πόλις σοι οἰκῇ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη, µεγίστη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκιµεῖν λέγω, 
ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς µεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν µόνον ᾖ χιλίων τῶν προπολεµούντων· οὕτω γὰρ 
µεγάλην πόλιν µίαν οὐ ῥᾳδίως οὔτε ἐν Ἕλλησιν οὔτε ἐν βαρβάροις εὑρήσεις, 
δοκούσας δὲ πολλὰς καὶ πολλαπλασίας τῆς τηλικαύτης. 
 
There are two [cities] – if there be even anything – hostile to one another, one of 
paupers, and one of rich men. And in each of these are many more, which, if you 
should treat them as one, you would err altogether, but if you treat them as many, 
giving the wealth, powers, and the men themselves of one group to the other, you 
will always make many allies and few enemies. And so long as your city is 
governed wisely, in the way recently established, it will be the greatest – I don’t 
mean in reputation, but truly the greatest, even though it count no more than one 
thousand defenders. You will not easily discover among either the Greeks or the 
barbarians a city of this magnitude that is truly one, although there are many that 
seem to be so and many times the size of this. 
 
In other words, to call “cities” those polities that the dialogue’s participants were 
formerly accustomed to think of as “cities” is to be at sea with respect to the true meaning of 
“city.” Such cities, although many in number and many times larger (πολλὰς καὶ πολλαπλασίας) 
than the ideal city, are merely the sort that “seem to be” cities (δοκούσας). To use Lear’s 
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terminology (derived from the thought of Kierkegaard), there is a wide gap between the pretense 
of being a city and the aspiration which the term “city” embeds in its pretense. Hence the irony 
of the board-game player’s cry, “Cities upon cities but no city!” It is the same irony realized in 
the despairing cry of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s ancient mariner: “Water, water, everywhere, 
Nor any drop to drink”, which has developed over time into its own proverb, “Water, water 
everywhere, but not a drop to drink.” What appears to be a surfeit is, ironically, a paucity. 
It is here, in the irony arising from the gap between the pretense of an expression and its 
aspiration, that the extent of our longing for a unity between the two, between pretense and 
aspiration, becomes manifest. Despite the fact that the ancient mariner is surrounded on all sides 
by “water,” he ironically has no “water.” Yet he longs desperately for what the term “water” 
aspires to – life-sustaining liquid. Kierkegaard asks whether one can find a single “Christian” in 
a “Christendom” that is peopled, ironically, with many “Christians.” Kierkegaard’s question 
signals a longing for those who in fact fulfill the aspiration of what it means to be a Christian. 
Socrates’ use of the popular proverb from players of the board game poleis – indeed, so popular 
a proverb that the phrases poleis paizein and to tôn paizontôn themselves took on proverbial 
signification, meaning in effect “as they say in the proverb” – reveals the irony of the Greeks 
having many “cities” but no true “city.” Socrates and his interlocutors long for just such a city. 
Its realization is the theme of the Republic and in the middle books of the dialogue, Socrates and 
company set about constructing it. 
 
4.4. Sharing the “Small Stuff” (ta smikra) – the Transformative Potential of the “Common” (ta 
koina) 
 
Plato’s use of colloquial proverbs in his text like “Cities upon cities but no city!” suggests 
a writer’s acute sensitivity to the persuasive power of such commonplaces, as well as the manner 
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in which they operate in discourse. Whatever degree of rhetorical force and persuasion a proverb 
exerts over an audience seems in direct proportion to the amount of consonance the proverbial 
expression enjoys with that same audience’s experience. Is it one that the audience has heard 
before (or at least something similar), an expression thereby possessing a pre-established level of 
credibility with its listeners? We might re-describe this idea of consonance as “commonality.” 
Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, uses the adjective “common” – koinos – to describe why proverbs 
prove so compelling to people. He advises that, “one should even use trite and common (κοιναῖς) 
gnômai, if they are applicable; for because they are common (κοιναί), they seem true, as though 
everyone agreed.”440 Aristotle’s position accords with modern paroemiologists’ conception of a 
proverb as “a general truth that everyone would accept as important and useful to recall . . .”441 
This “generality” of whatever “truth” a proverb contains seems closely related to Aristotle’s 
notion of koinos and what I am choosing to call a proverb’s “commonality.” 
Such commonality may obviate the need even to articulate an entire proverb in full, as 
with the expressions, “Birds of a feather” and “Different strokes,” both of which are shorthand 
for the larger proverbs called swiftly to mind.442 Socrates’ success at using a pre-established 
stock of familiar proverbial expressions to emphasize his points depends in part upon the 
commonality those sayings enjoy among his listeners. Moreover, by subtly altering the wording 
of some of the sayings and reframing them within a dialogue that seeks to envision a perfectly 																																																								
440 Rhet. 1395a10-12: χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυληµέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώµαις, ἐὰν ὦσι χρήσιµοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ 
εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ὁµολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν (trans. Kennedy with modification).  
441 Russo 1983: 121. 
442 As described in Chapter 2.2, Cephalus’ mere mention of the words “old proverb” (τὴν παλαιὰν παροιµίαν), 
coupled with the phrase “having about the same age” (παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, 329a2-4), suffices to trigger 
his listeners’ recognition of the proverb, ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, which translates roughly as “like unto like.” See, e.g., 
Adam 1980: ad loc.; Allan 1965: ad loc.; Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc.; Shorey 1982: ad loc. See Chapter 2.6 
for a discussion of how, just as with Cephalus’ reference to (but not direct quotation of) the proverb “like unto like,» 
we are not provided with the folk proverb “If a wolf catches sight of a man it renders him voiceless” which Socrates 
obliquely references when he describes his reaction to Thrasymachus’ forceful intervention in the colloquy. 
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just state, Socrates begins to change the common (that is, shared) understanding of the proverbs’ 
meaning. In this manner our author, Plato, is “re-forming” the element in proverbs that Aristotle 
describes as koinos, by virtue of which all agree that any given proverb is true.443 Or, using the 
terminology of modern paroemiologists, the “general truth” represented by a proverb is 
refashioned – sometimes only slightly, but in furtherance of Plato’s discursive reform, as 
Socrates and his companions construct the ideal polis. 
For example, just after illustrating in Book 4 that Adeimantus’ conception of “city” is 
impoverished, Socrates turns to address the proper size and makeup of a “true” city. The true city 
must be neither “too small, nor great only in seeming to be so” (µήτε σµικρὰ . . . µήτε µεγάλη 
δοκοῦσα) but  “sufficient and one” (ἱκανὴ καὶ µία, 423c3-4), and the class of guardians of the 
city (as well as the other classes) must be properly maintained in accordance with the UAD: one 
man to one work (πρὸς τοῦτο ἕνα πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κοµίζειν), i.e., each person to that 
task “for which he is fitted by nature” (πρὸς ὅ τις πέφυκεν, 423d3-4). Throughout Socrates’ 
exposition, Adeimantus wryly comments that following all of Socrates’ instructions on how the 
true city must be composed and governed will not be an easy task for the guardians. 
Socrates’ rejoinder to Adeimantus incorporates, once again, a segment from a famous 
proverb (423d8-e2):   
Οὔτοι . . . ὦ ἀγαθὲ Ἀδείµαντε, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν τις, ταῦτα πολλὰ καὶ µεγάλα αὐτοῖς 
προστάττοµεν ἀλλὰ πάντα φαῦλα, ἐὰν τὸ λεγόµενον ἓν µέγα φυλάττωσι, µᾶλλον 
δ' ἀντὶ µεγάλου ἱκανόν. 
 
In fact, my dear Adeimantus, our injunctions to them are not many and difficult, 
as one might suppose, but easy, every one of them, if, they attend to the 
proverbial “one great thing,” or rather not “great,” but “adequate.”444 
 																																																								
443 Rhet. 1395a11-12: ὡς ὁµολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν. 
444 Trans. Adam (with modification).  See Adam 1980: ad loc.: “J[owett] and C[ampbell err in translating ἱκανόν ‘to 
a sufficient extent’ . . .”  
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We are reminded here of Archilochus’ saying, “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog 
one big thing” (πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν µέγα, fr. 201), which has enjoyed relevance to 
this day.445 As is the case with so many other proverbs whose meanings are not self-evident, we 
are required to puzzle over what precisely Socrates has in mind. Jowett and Campbell propose 
that here, Socrates “reflects that the whole spirit of his previous remarks is against aiming at 
bigness in anything.”446 
We recall that up to this point, Socrates had been repeatedly offering somewhat enigmatic 
variations on established truisms handed down in the form of sayings, some of which stem from 
Plato’s literary precursors. Here are Socrates’ reworkings: (1) it’s not poverty that makes a man 
worse but both poverty and wealth (pace Hesiod), (2) let him practice excellence, for whom 
there is already livelihood (pace Phocylides), (3) it’s actually easier to fight against two than one 
(pace the source of the Athenian Stranger’s “old saying” [πάλαι τε εἰρηµένον] to the opposite 
effect in Plato’s Laws). Now Socrates carves off a piece from Archilochus’ oft-quoted “the 
hedgehog-knows-one-big-thing” proverb in order to counter Adeimantus’ quite reasonable 
concern that Socrates and his companions are imposing too many burdensome commands on 
their idealized city’s guardians. Socrates, however, re-fashions the saying so that its focus is now 
on what will prove adequate, hikanos, for the ideal polis. 
Wealth and size are no longer to be the markers of a state’s greatness. Indeed, the very 
idea of greatness needs to be replaced with the concept of hikanos – the adequate, the sufficient, 																																																								
445 Shorey 1982: ad loc. Making use of Archilochus’ maxim, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1953) famously divided 
thinkers and writers into those whose work conceives of and describes the world via a single, unifying idea and 
those who view the world as manifold. In the former, Berlin places authors such as Plato and Dostoyevsky and in 
the latter, writers such as Herodotus and Shakespeare. The philosopher Michael Walzer (1995) extended Berlin’s 
pattern of description to apply to Berlin himself, arguing that in contrast to some of the more narrow-minded 
contemporary philosophers obsessed with a single way of explaining reality, Berlin’s classical liberalism allowed for 
a great variety of approaches to the world in all its complexity. 
446 Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc. 
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what constitutes “enough” and lacks excess. Socrates then wastes no time defining what should 
be called to mind any time a person henceforth encounters his new proverbial “one sufficient 
thing” (ἓν ἱκανόν) known by Archilochus’ hedgehog. Socrates describes, in yet again a 
somewhat paradoxical fashion, this new, one sufficient thing: it is in fact twofold in nature, 
consisting of  “education and upbringing” (παιδείαν . . . καὶ τροφήν, 423e4). Proper education 
and rearing are, together, the one sufficient thing for the ideal polis, not wealth and size. 
Now Socrates rolls smoothly and easily from this “re-formed” adage into yet another 
common proverb, one that on its face seems relatively benign but which in fact has far-reaching 
consequences for society, as used by Socrates: “Friends have things in common” (κοινὰ τὰ 
φίλων, 424a1-2). Indeed, it is this proverb in particular that provides the basis for what will be a 
major “structural pivot” in the Republic’s narrative, i.e., Book 5’s discussion of the three great 
waves of reform.447 Here is how Socrates first casually broaches in Book 4 the subject of the 
second wave, the abolition of the private family (423e4-424a2): 
ἐὰν γὰρ εὖ παιδευόµενοι µέτριοι ἄνδρες γίγνωνται, πάντα ταῦτα ῥᾳδίως 
διόψονται, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν ἡµεῖς παραλείποµεν, τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν 
καὶ γάµων καὶ παιδοποιίας, ὅτι δεῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν πάντα ὅτι µάλιστα 
κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ποιεῖσθαι. 
 
For if men are right-minded by virtue of having been educated well, then easily 
will they understand all of these [injunctions], as well as however many of them 
we now pass over, such as the acquisition of wives and marriage and procreation, 
these things that ought to be rendered, as much as possible, “common among 
friends,” according to the proverb. 
  
Both the scholiast and Diogenes Laertius attribute the proverb koina ta philôn to Pythagoras, 
based upon statements by Timaeus.448 Adam offers the intriguing suggestion that ta philôn might 
well have been added by a scribe to the Respublica MS, since “it is more elegant to suggest than 
																																																								
447 Ferrari 2015: 7, aptly calls this juncture in Book 5 one of the dialogue’s “structural pivots.” 
448 Greene 1938: ad loc.; Vitae philosophorum 8.10.5-7. 
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to quote so familiar a proverb.”449 That practice is certainly consistent with Socrates’ previous 
references to only pieces and fragments of gnômai and proverbs, rather than quoting them 
verbatim (although he does quote the full proverb in Lysis450).  
Socrates’ use of this proverb in conjunction with marriage and procreation envisions the 
communistic possession of wives and children by the ideal state’s guardians. It may well be that 
the suggestion of so radical a proposition is best introduced by way of a familiar proverb, in 
order to lessen the shock effect on the audience. The proverb’s easy consonance with the men’s 
experience – why wouldn’t friends have “things in common”? – and its commonality in the 
discourse of the day soften, at least for the moment, the strangeness of Socrates’ transformative 
utopianism. As we shall see, the proverb ultimately proves insufficient, since Glaucon and 
Adeimantus will compel Socrates in Book 5 to explain more fully his radical proposal and not 
simply rely on a familiar proverb. 
There is, however, a method to Socrates’ madness. A parallel exists between the 
commonality enjoyed by the proverb Socrates employs and the commonality in the shared 
possession of guardians’ wives and children. Language – that is, discursive practice – and social 
and civic practices are mutually interactive, mutually reinforcing, reflecting back onto one 
another. Discourse is close kin to the customs and traditional institutions that comprise a society. 
Socrates opines that a state composed in the way he prescribes (partly by use of apt proverbs) 
then “proceeds to accumulate in force just like a whirl” (ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος αὐξανοµένη, 
424a4-5). The momentum at play in Socrates’ progression from proverb to proverb as he 
																																																								
449 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
450 207c10. Phaedrus also quotes the full proverb at the close of the eponymous dialogue (297c6-7), as does the 
Athenian Stranger in the Laws (739c2-3). 
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instructs how the ideal polity should be constructed runs alongside the vis inertiae of that same 
polity, now “growing” (αὐξανοµένη). Discursive practice is intertwined with civic practice.  
This interweave of wordcraft and statecraft is the focus of a discussion shortly afterwards 
about music, when Socrates reworks a famous piece of Homeric wisdom. Socrates cautions 
against a particular interpretation of a well-known gnome from the Odyssey. The gnome consists 
of Telemachos famous upbraid of his mother, Penelope, for her request that the bard Phemios 
end his song of the Achaians’ bitter homecoming from Troy: “Men praise more the song, 
whichever is the latest to hover around the listeners” (τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν µᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ' 
ἄνθρωποι, / ἥ τις ἀκουόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀµφιπέληται, Od. 1.351-2)451 Plato, however, substitutes 
ἐπιφρονέουσ' (literally, “they are thoughtful/prudent”) in place of Homer’s ἐπικλείουσ' (“they 
praise”) and ἀειδόντεσσι (“men singing”) for ἀκουόντεσσι (“men hearing”).452 Socrates’ version 
thus becomes, “Men are thoughtful more for the song / whichever hovers newest on the singers.” 
Adam attributes the alterations to Plato’s likely having had a different Homeric recension. 
George Howes explains the latter of the two differences as Plato’s “parodying the verse 
somewhat.”453 Irrespective of whatever recension Plato had available, more is at work here than 
mere parody. Plato alters the gnome in order to mark the version in the Republic, to highlight it 
so that people will henceforth remember the verse as one that is problematic, not one that merits 
praise.  
Why is this? Because, as Socrates worries aloud, someone might think, upon hearing the 
gnome, that “the poet did not mean new songs but a new mode (τρόπον) of song, and he is 
																																																								
451 Trans. Lattimore (with modification). Lardinois 1995: 339, classifies the verse as a gnome. 
452 Resp. 424b9-10: ἀοιδὴν µᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσ' ἄνθρωποι, ἥτις ἀειδόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀµφιπέληται, 
453 Adam 1980: ad loc.; Howes 1895: 205. 
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praising this.”454 Why does this interpretation pose a problem? Because, as Socrates explains, 
“the modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and 
social conventions” (οὐδαµοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται µουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόµων τῶν 
µεγίστων, 424c5-6).455 While the subject matter here concerns music, there is little doubt that the 
lyric verse accompanying song is connected in some important way to Socrates’ critique, since 
so much of the poetry of antiquity was accompanied by music. Adam rightly observes that any 
innovations in music “were accompanied by changes not only in rhythm, but also in the quality, 
ethical and otherwise of the words sung.”456 In short, words and music go hand in hand for 
Socrates.457 While a thoroughgoing exploration of why the “New Music” of poets like Timotheus 
might have been a source of concern for Plato exceeds the scope of this dissertation, to the extent 
that any deterioration (in Plato’s estimation) occurred in the practices that produced the words 
sung in such music, reform of those practices is essential.458 Why? Because, as Socrates tells us, 
“the most fundamental political and social conventions” turn upon them. What might seem a 
countervailing gnome from Homer must not to cause people to believe otherwise. 
Indeed, proper discursive practices necessarily precede and are even more important than 
lawmaking and legislation. Laws are no guarantee of a healthy society, insofar as they 																																																								
454 Resp. 424c1-2: µὴ πολλάκις τὸν ποιητήν τις οἴηται λέγειν οὐκ ᾄσµατα νέα ἀλλὰ τρόπον ᾠδῆς νέον, καὶ τοῦτο 
ἐπαινῇ. 
455 Trans. Shorey. 
456 Adam 1980: 216.  
457 He states this expressly in Book 3: “Indeed, good rhythm and bad rhythym follow, the one corresponding to fine 
discourse, and the other to its opposite, as do the harmonious and the discordant, if in fact rhthym and harmony 
follow the language, just as we were saying, and not vice versa” (Ἀλλὰ µὴν τὸ εὔρυθµόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθµον τὸ µὲν 
τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἕπεται ὁµοιούµενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρµοστον καὶ ἀνάρµοστον ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθµός γε 
καὶ ἁρµονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ἀλλὰ µὴ λόγος τούτοις, 400d1-4). 
 
458 See, generally, Moreau 2017, who, drawing from scholarship that posits a fifth-century revolution in aulos music 
(e.g., Wallace 2003), argues convincingly that “the New Music compromised the foundational jurisprudential tenet 
essential to Athenian civic virtue, namely, an understanding of the law (nomos) as necessarily instantiating a musical 
ethos” (Moreau 2017: 201). 
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themselves are also a product of discursive practice. The inculcation of salutary modes of 
discourse at an early age is crucial for the development of a just state. Adeimantus takes 
Socrates’ point about the importance of the discursive practice that comprises the musical 
education of the young, noting that “lawlessness itself easily slips in, escaping notice” in early 
education.459 Socrates readily confirms as much: “Yes, because it is supposed to be only a form 
of play and to work no harm” (Ναί . . . ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς γε µέρει καὶ ὡς κακὸν οὐδὲν ἐργαζοµένη, 
424d5-6). In Chapter Three, I discussed the profound influence that the counting game and 
nursery rhyme “Tinker, Tailor” with its list of professions (“tinker, tailor, soldier, sailor . . .”) has 
had on scores of writers and thinkers. Adeimantus, grasping the full import of Socrates’ view, 
makes this wry observation about such a seemingly inconsequential mode of discourse – in the 
parlance of Socrates, mousikês tropoi (424d7-e2): 
Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται . . . ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ σµικρὸν εἰσοικισαµένη ἠρέµα ὑπορρεῖ 
πρὸς τὰ ἤθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύµατα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
συµβόλαια µείζων ἐκβαίνει, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν συµβολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόµους 
καὶ πολιτείας σὺν πολλῇ . . . ἀσελγείᾳ, ἕως ἂν τελευτῶσα πάντα ἰδίᾳ καὶ δηµοσίᾳ 
ἀνατρέψῃ.   
 
It certainly causes no harm other than when infiltrating little-by-little, it softly 
flows into men’s characters and pursuits; and as a result overtakes with greater 
force men’s business dealings with one another and then moves from their 
business relations against their laws and constitutions with great recklessness until 
finally overthrowing everything, both public and private. 
 
This is the danger posed by blithely ignoring deleterious alterations of “seemingly trifling 
conventions” (τὰ σµικρὰ . . . δοκοῦντα εἶναι νόµιµα, 425a8),460 i.e. the smikra that exist at the 
level of a society’s discursive practices. 
Moreover, attempting to ward off such a devolution of society and degradation of its 
institutions (as sketched by Adeimantus) by the “enactment of laws” would amount to a “fool’s 																																																								
459 424d3-4: Ἡ γοῦν παρανοµία, ἔφη, ῥᾳδίως αὕτη λανθάνει παραδυοµένη. 
460 Trans. Shorey. 
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errand” (Νοµοθετεῖν . . . εὔηθες, 425b7). Indeed, Plato goes on to coin a new proverbial 
expression with a metaphor capable of being deployed in any proverb that concerns attempting 
the impossible: Socrates describes anyone who tries to reform corruption in a state by merely 
enacting laws (νοµοθετεῖν, 426e5) as “trying to cut off a Hydra’s head” (Ὕδραν τέµνουσιν, 
426e8).461 Zenobius classifies this saying as “a proverb that is said about things impossible” (ἐπὶ 
τῶν ἀµηχάνων εἴρηται ἡ παροιµία),462 and authors ranging from Plutarch to Horace went on to 
use Plato’s new proverbial phrase in their writings.463 Thus, Plato caps off the men’s discussion 
of the overarching importance to society possessed by seemingly meager, insignificant discursive 
practices (τὰ σµικρὰ) – practices which doubtless include proverbs and proverbial expressions – 
by crafting, ironically, a new proverbial expression, one that has become common (koinê) in 
discourse. 
 
4.5. Socrates Hoist with His Own (Proverbial) Petard 
 
Notwithstanding their rhetorical force and the persuasive punch they can deliver in 
conversation or debate by a speaker’s skillful deployment, proverbs are not all-powerful 
discursive tools, the mere summons of which guarantees success in convincing an audience of 
the merits of a speaker’s position. While Plato displays a keen awareness of the indispensable 
role proverbs play in achieving a shared discourse that achieves sympathy with its audience, he 
also reveals the limitations of proverbs. For a proverb to work, it must accord with the listeners’ 
understanding of the proverbial phrase in relation to its particular discursive context. None other 
than Socrates himself serves as Plato’s model for how an out-of-tune proverb results in the 
																																																								
461 Trans. Shorey. 
462 Zen. 6.26.1-2. 
463 See Plu. Cat.Ma. 16.7.4; Hor. Carm. iv.4.61. Tarrant 1958: 115, describes the saying as a semi-proverb.  
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speaker being “hoist with his own petard,” to quote the well-known line from Hamlet that has 
evolved into a proverb in its own right.464 
As he did in the opening passages of both Books 1 and 2, Plato now draws our attention 
at the beginning of Book 5 once again to the possible impotence of discourse. Socrates worries 
aloud about the task set before him, of communicating the particulars of the ideal polis: he 
doubts whether he has the ability even to know what he should say (πιστεύοντος µὲν γὰρ ἐµοῦ 
ἐµοὶ εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, 450d8-9). Indeed, Socrates goes so far as to call this venture “dangerous and 
slippery” (φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, 451a1),” that is, to “speak with knowledge the truth about 
the greatest and dearest matters” (περὶ τῶν µεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων τἀληθῆ εἰδότα λέγειν, 450d10-
e1) when he himself is “doubtful and is seeking at the same time the words to be employed” 
(ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅµα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, 450e1-2). What has caused such self-
doubt? It is Socrates’ failure to convince his interlocutors of the merits of shared possession of 
wives and children by using the proverb koina ta philôn without further explanation. 
Moreover, just as occurred at the opening of Book 1, the prospect of logos’ failure to 
persuade raises the specter of the use of force, albeit in the same seriocomic vein as the 
dialogue’s opening. Socrates narrates directly to the reader how, just at the point where he was 
about to expound the four kinds of “bad states” (κακὰς πολιτείας: “bad states” in the sense of 
both political entities and men’s souls), Polemarchus, who had been noticeably silent until then, 
suddenly seized Adeimantus’ cloak – an action described in exactly the same way the slave boy 
was depicted as grabbing Socrates’ cloak on Polemarchus’ order, in the opening lines of Book 1 
(λαβόµενος τοῦ ἱµατίου, 1.327b4 and 5.449b3). Socrates describes how Polemarchus then asks 
Adeimantus whether they should “release” (ἀφήσοµεν) Socrates. This event, of course, parallels 
																																																								
464 Act 3, sc. 4: “For ‘tis the sport to have the enginer / Hoist with his own petar . . .”  
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Polemarchus’ playful refusal to “release” (ἀφεῖναι) Socrates and Glaucon at the dialogue’s 
opening, even if the two men should try to persuade Polemarchus and his companions 
otherwise.465 
After Socrates queries Adeimantus as to what concern has prompted Polemarchus and 
him to consider not “releasing” him (τί µάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑµεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε; 449b8), Adeimantus 
reveals that the fault lies with Socrates’ use of the proverb, koina ta philôn (449c2-5): 
ἀπορρᾳθυµεῖν ἡµῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὅλον οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ 
λόγου ἵνα µὴ διέλθῃς, καὶ λήσειν οἰηθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὡς ἄρα περὶ 
γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται. 
 
“You seem to us to be slacking off on the job,” he said, “and to be cheating us out 
of the whole portion, not the least of the argument, so as to avoid having to 
explain it, thinking we won’t even notice by breezily saying how it’s obvious to 
everyone that as concerns wives and children, ‘Friends have things in common.’”   
 
Adeimantus’ reply is remarkable in the degree of attention it focuses on the question of how one 
should properly deploy a proverb. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find anywhere else in ancient 
literature a more explicit consideration of the efficacy (or lack thereof) of a proverb as used in a 
particular context than here.  
Socrates depicts himself as taken aback somewhat by Adeimantus’ objection to his use of 
the bare proverb, without any further elaboration: “‘Isn’t that right, Adeimantus?’ I said” 
(Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείµαντε, 449c6). Adeimantus then proves himself an adept student of 
paroemiology (449c7-d6): 
Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ τἆλλα, λόγου δεῖται τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς 
κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο. µὴ οὖν παρῇς ὅντινα σὺ λέγεις· . . . µέγα γάρ 
τι οἰόµεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ µὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόµενον. 
 
“Yes,” said he, “but this word ‘right,’ like many other things, requires defining as 
to the way and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don’t, 
then, pass over the one that you have in mind; . . . We think that the right or 																																																								
465 327b2-c14. See Chapter 2.1 for an extensive analysis of this episode in the opening pages of the Republic. 
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wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the 
world, in the constitution of a state.” 
 
In other words, Adeimantus grasps one of the essentials concerning proverbs and their use: they 
are malleable, multivalent, capable of taking on different meanings in different contexts. 
Socrates has not come close to explaining sufficiently (ἱκανῶς διελέσθαι, 449d7) why the 
proverb “friends have things in common” is “rightly” (ὀρθῶς, 449c7) applicable to and 
supportive of the radical and far-reaching proposition that the guardian class should enjoy 
koinônia (“common possession”) of wives and children. There is still much to be unpacked with 
respect to the term koina as used in the proverb koina ta philôn, with its multiple possible 
meanings as applied to koinônia. 
Indeed, almost as if taking a cue from Adeimantus singling out of the vagueness of the 
term koina as Socrates has used it thus far, Glaucon responds with his own clever bit of 
wordplay, a colloquial expression that makes use of polyptoton: “Count me too then as a partner 
– [literally “man in common,” koinônon] – in that vote.”466 If Socrates can wield koina with 
seemingly unfettered abandon, then so too can his companions. After all, “friends have things in 
common,” including liberal use of the term koina and its cognates. 
Now Thrasymachus, long silent since Book 1, seems impatient to get in on the act of 
wielding colloquial expressions against Socrates as payback for his proverb’s insufficiency. 
When Socrates complains that by pressing him on this point, his interlocutors are stirring up a 
virtual hornet’s nest of arguments (ὅσον ἑσµὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρειν, 450b1) that he had hoped to 
avoid, Thraysmachus turns on him with a proverb whose origins are found in an obscure 
anecdote: “What’s this? Did you think we came here now to prospect gold from ore rather than 
																																																								
466 450a3-4: καὶ ἐµὲ τοίνυν . . . κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε. 
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to listen to arguments?” (Τί δέ; . . . χρυσοχοήσοντας οἴει τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφῖχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ 
λόγων ἀκουσοµένους; 450b3-4).   
Thrasymachus has masterfully turned the tables on Socrates, demonstrating via, tellingly, 
a proverb, how Socrates’ own proverb cannot alone convince the assembled gathering of the 
merits of communal possession of wives and children. The second century grammarian 
Harpocration tells us that Plato was the first to use the verb chrûsochorein (“to smelt ore in order 
to extract gold”) in a phrase that evolved into a proverb. The verb derives from an arcane story 
about a mob of Athenians who abandoned their usual work to seize a heap of gold dust that had 
been discovered on Hymettus and was guarded by giant ants. Failing to seize the gold, they 
returned defeated and were jeered by their neighbors, “Did you think that you were going to 
extract gold from ore?” (σὺ δὲ ᾤου χρυσοχοήσειν, Harp. 308.10). The proverb, thus, came to 
mean attempting to do what is impossible while also neglecting the duty that lies nearest.467 
Thrasymachus’ criticism draws blood. The arch sophist is in fact making a point that one 
would have expected to hear from Socrates: clever wordplay and pleasant-sounding adages taken 
at face value (like koina ta philôn) are no substitute for reasoned argument.468 The piquancy of 
Thrasymachus’ critique is matched only by the irony that he scores his point against Socrates by 
coining a proverb that will enjoy its own Nachleben. Socrates is being hoist on his own 
proverbial petard. If Socrates expects his proverbs to provide a discursive basis for a more just 
society, to be learned and memorized by students in the manner accorded other foundational 
texts like Hesiod’s Precepts of Cheiron, he is going to have to do better than simply saying koina 
ta philôn.  
																																																								
467 Adam 1980: 277. See also Leutsch and Scheidewin 1839: 464; 1851: 91, 727. 
468 See Morgan 2009: 563: “Aphorisms are not arguments and do not explain themselves.” 
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Thrown back on his heels by Thrasymachus’ question as to whether he really thinks his 
interlocutors have assembled to “prospect gold from ore rather than listen to arguments,” 
Socrates responds with somewhat less than his usual verve, “Yes, in measure” (Ναί . . . µετρίων 
γε, 450b5). 469  Now Glaucon enters the conversation and, following Thrasymachus’ lead, 
employs Socrates’ just-uttered words against him in yet another new proverb: “But for 
reasonable men, Socrates, the ‘measure’ of hearing such arguments is the whole of one’s life” 
(Μέτρον δέ γ' . . . ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν, 
450b6-7). Once again, we have a response in the form of a proverb that one could better imagine 
coming from Socrates himself than those whom he is supposed to be guiding in conceiving the 
ideal polis. Glaucon’s coinage constitutes a “literal nonoppositional proverb,” such as 
“Experience is the best teacher.”470 In addition, the ethic dative (νοῦν ἔχουσιν), the quantifier 
(ὅλος), the generalizing deictic (τοιούτων), the particle (γε), the suppressed copula, as well as the 
phrase’s brevity and condensation all contribute to imbue the saying with the qualities of a 
proverb.471   
This legomenon also seems to look back to another proverb about “measure,” a gnome 
from Hesiod’s Works and Days: “The greatest treasure among men is a sparing tongue, and by 
its going according to measure, the most pleasure” (γλώσσης τοι θησαυρὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν 
ἄριστος φειδωλῆς, πλείστη δὲ χάρις κατὰ µέτρον ἰούσης, 719-20). Given Hesiod’s apparent 
praise of the virtues of reticence, Glaucon now seems to be playing the role of proverb-reformer: 
the real and proper “measure” of discourse is, contra Hesiod, one’s hearing a multitude of logoi 
																																																								
469 Trans. Shorey. Jowett’s translation (1911) has the effect of making Socrates seem even more taken aback by 
Thrasymachus’ question: “‘Yes,’ said I, ‘but discourse should have a limit.’” 
470 Dundes 1981: 52-3; Russo 1997: 52. 
471 Most 2003: 146.  
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for the entire duration of life. Socrates, by contrast, appears to hew to the older line of thought: 
observe measure, even in logos. 
Glaucon then changes tack by making what may be an approving reference – albeit very 
subtle – to Hesiodic proverb when he urges Socrates “not to grow weary” (µηδαµῶς ἀποκάµῃς, 
450b8) of explaining why shared possession of wives and children is appropriate for the guardian 
class. Glaucon’s use of the verb apokamnein (“to grow quite weary, fail, flag utterly,” LSJ, s.v. 
1) recalls Socrates’ own use of the verb near the close of Book 4 when he tells Glaucon that they 
“must not grow weary” (οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάµνειν, 445b7) in their investigation of why justice 
practiced for its own sake is superior to committing unjust acts even if the doer escapes 
punishment, given that Socrates and his interlocutors have come so far (ὅµως ἐπείπερ ἐνταῦθα 
ἐληλύθαµεν, 445b5-6) in their examination of the subject, so that they are “looking down most 
clearly” (σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν, 445b6). Here there is a hint of Hesiod’s famous “hard and steep 
road” (µακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶµος) leading up to “excellence” (ἀρετήν), which although “rough 
at first” (τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον) then “becomes easier once you reach the top” (ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον 
ἵκηται, / ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει) notwithstanding the unavoidable fact that it “is still difficult” 
(χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα).472 Earlier in Book 4, Glaucon employs a more succinct version of Hesiod’s 
“hard-road-to-virtue” gnome, the popular Greek proverb, “Hard is the good” (χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά)473 
in buoying Socrates to undertake the exploration of whether both the state and the human soul 
are threefold in nature, parallel with respect to their three respective parts, urging Socrates again 
“not to grow weary but to go on with the inquiry” (Μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάµῃς . . . ἀλλὰ σκόπει, 
435d9).474 																																																								
472 Hes., Op. 289-92. 
473 The scholiast attributes the proverb to Solon. See my discussion in Chapters 1.2 and 3.2. 
474 Trans. Shorey (with modification). 
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One may, thus, reasonably conclude that in Plato’s prose, a speaker’s use of the verb 
apokamnein in a negative imperative construction signals at the very least the moral of the story 
embodied in both Hesiod’s famous “easy-road-to-vice, hard-road-to-virtue” gnome and its 
popular counterpart, the common Greek proverb, chalepa ta kala. We have then, in Glaucon’s 
new proverb about measure (i.e., that the only real “measure” or “limit” to hearing discourse is 
one’s entire life) and his admonition that Socrates not grow weary (µηδαµῶς ἀποκαµεῖν) in 
explaining (διεξιέναι) through discourse his conception of the guardians’ joint-possession of 
wives and children, respectively both a rebuttal to and an affirmation of Hesiod’s proverbial 
wisdom. 
Why this ambiguity of position in Plato’s prose toward Hesiodic gnômai? Does Plato 
mean to reform proverbs in the service of his philosophic project or not? As I discussed in 
Chapter Two, to imagine that Plato sought to condemn the wisdom tradition root and branch 
would be to assume that he meant to overturn the entire rhetorical and educational framework of 
Greek society, based as it was in significant part on the memorization and citation of poetic 
authority. One of the chief methods of persuasion was to cite the wisdom of the poets, much of 
which was formulated with proverbs (as in Hesiod’s Works and Days) in support of one’s 
argument. Plato cannot dispense wholesale with the primary discursive tools at his disposal (just 
as he does not dispense with poetry altogether, a point to which I shall return in Chapter Five). 
Proverbs that are at odds with conceiving a just polis (e.g., “a sparing tongue, going in measure, 
affords the most pleasure”) must be rethought while those that hold true within the discursive 
context of contemplating a non-instrumental definition of justice (e.g., “hard is the good”) prove 
useful. 
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What Plato decidedly does not do in this episode is present Socrates’ interlocutors 
decimating with water-tight arguments Socrates’ lackluster explanation of the guardians’ 
koinônia. On the contrary, we see these interlocutors, one after another, coining new proverbs 
and referencing older established ones in taking Socrates to task for not yet having provided an 
extended argument in support of his idea of koinônia. And even after having being flogged 
verbally with such proverbs, Socrates remains skeptical about the efficacy of any discourse in 
support of the concept of koinônia that he is being asked to expound, save presumably the pithy 
proverb koina ta philôn that he recently employed (450d6-c2):   
Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ εὔδαιµον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διελθεῖν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἔτι µᾶλλον 
τῶν ἔµπροσθεν ὧν διήλθοµεν. καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν, καὶ εἰ ὅτι 
µάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἄριστ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, καὶ ταύτῃ ἀπιστήσεται. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὄκνος 
τις αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι, µὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε. 
 
“It’s not easy to explain, my dear fellow,” I said. “For it raises many doubts, even 
more than the things I’ve previously gone through. One might doubt whether 
what is said is even possible, and even if it were, one will be skeptical as to 
whether it would be the best arrangement. And because of this, one shrinks from 
grasping it, lest the argument (logos) seem an impossible wish, my dear friend.” 
 
Indeed, Socrates fears that he will drag his companions down with him (συνεπισπασάµενος) as 
he is overthrown (σφαλεὶς, 451a2) while searching for the proper arguments (ζητοῦντα ἅµα τοὺς 
λόγους, 450e2) concerning the most important subjects imaginable (ἃ ἥκιστα δεῖ σφάλλεσθαι, 
451a4): “noble and good and just institutions” (καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νοµίµων, 
451a7). 
These statements reveal a remarkable level of skepticism about the presumed efficacy of 
logos. When faced with the task of giving voice to the ideal state, logos may prove a mere 
“wish” or “aspiration” (εὐχὴ). I want to suggest that such skepticism, coupled with the back-and-
forth exchange of proverbs – all arising from the concerted effort to chastise Socrates for 
attempting to explain and justify the guardians’ communistic possession of wives and children 
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by means of a bare proverb – is indicative of a larger reflection by Plato on the futility of striving 
to have the last word on anything. No gnome from an inspired poet, no colloquial proverb, no 
pithy saying – in sum, no exercise in the medium of language – can possess and wield final 
authority. Indeed, in this passage Plato demonstrates a keen awareness of the contingency of any 
“final vocabulary” in the sense of that term as used by Rorty: the set of words any particular 
individual (including, obviously, Plato himself) uses to justify their actions, beliefs, and lives, 
beyond which lies only “helpless passivity or a resort to force” insofar as there is no “noncircular 
argumentative recourse” by which to provide justification.475 There is no final, overarching meta-
vocabulary that outpaces all others. There are only the particular “final vocabularies” of separate 
individuals that play off against each other in the innumerable discursive contexts that make up 
the world of the written and spoken word. 
To a certain degree, Plato simply illustrates here in this passage the agonistic dynamic 
that was a central feature of the Greek literary tradition. And yet, paradoxically, as Mark Griffith 
has written in analyzing the agonistic stance of Greek poetry in particular, instances of 
deterministic outcomes and clear-cut victories are remarkably rare despite what would seem to 
be the key requirement of any practice involving competition: a definitive winner and loser. In 
the Contest between Hesiod and Homer for example, Homer receives universal approbation of 
the assembled Greeks based upon his technical poetic skill, but the sole verdict of the king 
pronounces Hesiod the winner, as his is the more peaceful poetic message.476  
In Socrates’ exchange with his interlocutors over the appropriateness of koina ta philôn, 
it is next to impossible to say who precisely has “won” this duel of the adages. Certainly not 
																																																								
475 Rorty 1989: 73. See Bernstein 2016: 118-19, for his use of the terms “vertical” and “horizontal” justification to 
describe more precisely the limitations imposed by Rorty’s conception of “circular justification.”  
476 Griffith 1990: 190. 
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Socrates, and this outcome may surprise anyone who supposes that as Plato’s chief protagonist, 
Socrates should have the last word. On the contrary, it is the arch-sophist Thrasymachus who 
offers a proverb that, ironically, supports what Socrates ought to be championing: reason-based 
discourse – you convince someone by arguments, not by requiring them “to prospect gold from 
the ore” of a bare proverbial expression. However, further irony lies in the fact both that 
Thrasymachus employs a proverb in scoring this argumentative point and that such proverb will 
go on to have its own Nachleben. So who or what exactly has won in Plato’s depiction of 
Thrasymachus’ reply? 
There are those, of course, who will argue that Plato’s larger meaning in his Republic lies 
beyond the dizzying wordplay on display in passages like these: the elaborate edifice and 
exceptional beauty of Plato’s metaphysics, epitomized most famously in the Forms; the 
radicalism of his unparalleled political theory of rule by philosopher kings; the single most 
memorable metaphor in all of philosophy, the cave with its shadow images of the real and 
ignorant inhabitants freed from their blindness into the dawn of enlightenment. All of these, 
many will argue, are far more revelatory of Plato’s grander design than any unresolved fisticuffs 
waged with proverbial expressions that only result in Socrates having to return to the proverbial 
drawing board to justify anew a single component of the ideal state, albeit one with far-reaching 
implications for familial relations.   
I would agree with such a critique to the extent that all of the above-recited “grander” 
features of the Republic contribute to the reformist vision that I maintain is the primary animus 
behind not just this dialogue but all of Plato’s oeuvre. I do not doubt what G.R.F. Ferrari 
describes as the “sincerity of Plato’s utopianism and its instantiation in Callipolis.”477 Indeed, the 																																																								
477 Ferrari 2015: 11-12. Ferarri states unabashedly, “I take Plato to be a sincere utopian in general, and I take the 
particular reforms represented by Callipolis as sincerely meant.” 
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crux of my entire thesis turns on the proposition that proverbs and gnômai are essential 
discursive tools in Plato’s articulation of that utopianism, and that re-working and “re-forming” 
such discursive practices contributes mightily to instantiating Plato’s reforms in the ideal polis. 
Plato, however, works within a certain larger literary tradition and, thus, necessarily follows the 
dynamics of that tradition and its attendant discursive practices. One of the most fundamental of 
Greek literary dynamics adheres in the recognition that poetic aspirations – in the words of 
Griffith – “to say ‘the last word’ on their subject and to render all previous and future attempts 
futile” prove illusory.478  Far better, in Griffith’s words, “to leave loopholes for possible 
exceptions, pegs on which to hang possible additions, open ends to accommodate codas or 
modifications . . .”479 Indeed, it is the open-endedness of the proverb koina ta philôn that serves 
as the discursive vehicle for the introduction of the three waves of reform. 
Moreover and of particular relevance to my thesis, there is a remarkable degree of 
consonance between the dynamic as described by Griffith and more contemporary conceptions 
of philosophy and philosophic writing that recognize the contingency of language. Having the 
last word is impossible. Philosophers like Rorty and Bernstein who hew to what they describe as 
an “ironist” approach to philosophy make the claim that “from the ironist’s perspective, it is only 
a temporary illusion to think that in philosophy there are (or even that there ought to) be knock-
down theoretical arguments or rigorous ahistorical transcendental arguments that are immune 
from revision.” 480  One is reminded here of the economist and political theorist Albert 
Hirschman’s observation that all dialectical thinkers ultimately display a “propensity for self-
subversion” – that is, a “skepticism . . . toward one’s own generalizations or theoretical 																																																								
478 Griffith 1990: 195. 
479 Griffith 1990: 195. 
480 Bernstein 2016: 118. 
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constructs.”481 As Kierkegaard famously remarked about Hegel’s Science of Logic, “If Hegel had 
prefaced his work with ‘This is all just a thought-experiment,’ he would have been the greatest 
thinker who ever lived.”482 
To the extent that Plato’s writing contains passages seemingly emblematic of the thinking 
behind such modern perspectives, the dialogues prove remarkably durable and current in their 
continued relevance. Plato’s prose consistently foregrounds the interplay of not just proverbs and 
gnômai but a multitude of assorted fragments and quotations from poetry (not all of which are 
axiological in character like the proverbs quoted from poetry), excerpts from and retellings of 
mythological accounts, countless figurative expressions, multiple usages of numerous genre 
types such as high tragedy, low comedy, Sophronic mime, erotic verse, forensic oratory, to name 
but a few – the list could go on. Such a “‘hetero-voiced’ hybridity” (in the words of Leslie Kurke 
paraphrasing Mikhail Bakhtin) is usually thought to be more a feature of the novel than a 
philosophic work purporting to establish a unified and doctrinaire metaphysics, utterly incapable 
of alteration.483 As Andrea Nightingale has observed, Plato’s “positive hankering for the hybrid” 
is more symptomatic of a thinker who refuses to “fix the boundaries of philosophy once and for 
all”, sensing perhaps “that philosophy is not well served by a permanent and closed border.”484 
This is not to say that Plato’s work founders on relativism. Rather it is to posit that 
Plato’s writerly philosophy demonstrates by its hetero-voiced hybridity a recognition of what 
Rorty describes as the problem faced by (in his parlance) “ironist theory,” a term I would define 
more generally as any way of thinking that acknowledges the contingency of language: “The 
																																																								
481 Hirschman 1995: 87. See also Naddaff 2002: 3. 
482 Rorty 1989: 104. 
483 Kurke 2006: 18. 
484 Nightingale 1995: 2, 12. 
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problem of how to finitize while exhibiting a knowledge of one’s own finitude – of satisfying 
Kierkegaard’s demand on Hegel.”485 
Plato reveals at the opening of Book 5 that notwithstanding the persuasive power and 
durable Nachleben of certain proverbs, no one should ever imagine that they render the “last 
word” on anything, just as no discursive practice can claim absolute and final authority, the new 
genre of philosophy included. There is no final and absolute (i.e., noncircular) justification for 
one’s actions, beliefs, and life that is not subject to redescription. One’s final vocabulary is not 
really “final;” it is “final” only in the sense that beyond it lies only passivity or the use of force 
(the specter of which was raised at the opening of Books 1, 2, and 5). Other possible final 
vocabularies exist that have the potential to justify the most heinous of practices – torture, for 
example. Bernstein offers the compelling example of the recent “redescription” of torture as 
“enhanced interrogation.”486 Such a redescription calls to mind Thucydides’ account of the 
manipulation of language during the Peloponnesian War, an event through which I maintain 
Plato’s discursive reform must be understood: the participants in the Corcyrean stasis 
redescribed, among other things, “reckless audacity” (τόλµα. . .ἀλόγιστος) as “loyal partisan 
courage” (ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος) and “careful hesitancy” (µέλλησις. . .προµηθὴς) as “thinly-veiled 
cowardice” (δειλία εὐπρεπής, 3.82.4).487 
In order to justify anything – Plato’s philosophy included, along with Socrates’ 
prescribed koinônia – one must recognize, commensurate with Rorty’s and Bernstein’s thinking, 
that 
																																																								
485 Rorty 1992: 104-5. 
486 Bernstein 2016: 119. 
487 Thucyd. 3.82.4. 
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justification involves the use of metaphors [à la Nietzsche’s definition of truth as 
“a mobile army of metaphors” 488 ], stories, narratives, indirect discourse, 
redescriptions, imaginative speculations and humor – indeed, the full range of 
rhetorical and persuasive devices that are frequently blended together. These are 
not simply accidental accretions to the justification of final vocabularies; they are 
intrinsic to the activity of justifying.489 
 
It is through the lens of such a perspective that Plato’s use of proverbs is best viewed, 
including the head-spinning interplay of proverbs at Book 5’s opening, which is a key structural 
pivot in the narrative of the Republic. The proverb koina ta philôn cannot shoulder alone the task 
of justifying the communal possession of the guardians’ wives and children. But the subsequent 
exchange of proverbs that explores whether that proverb has been “rightly” (ὀρθῶς, 449c7) 
employed in this context results in the coinage of even more new proverbs and moves the 
narrative arc of the Republic inexorably forward, providing still further discursive tools by which 
Plato may aspire to articulate a “winning” description of the ideal state within a larger literary 
tradition that itself recognized no final and permanent “winners.” Plato’s writerly philosophy 
discloses an understanding of that tradition notwithstanding its aspirations of discursive reform. 
No text can ever have the proverbial “last word.” 
 
4.6. Radical Proverbs and Ridicule 
 
Taken aback by his interlocutors’ demand to explain his radical proposal that the 
guardians share wives and children, Socrates turns again to proverbs to bolster his case. First, 
however, he makes an apparent reference to the mimes of Sophron, for which Plato had an 
especial fondness according to an ancient tradition that stretches back to the fourth century 
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historian Duris of Samos.490 Socrates muses that “it might be right to go through with the female 
drama after the male drama has been thoroughly completed” (τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, µετὰ 
ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶµα παντελῶς διαπερανθὲν τὸ γυναικεῖον αὖ περαίνειν, 451c1-3). The low, 
sometimes obscene, Sicilian mimes of Sophron were classified as “male mimes” (ἀνδρεῖοι µῖµοι) 
and “female mimes” (γυναικεῖοι µῖµοι), according to the Suda, with male characters represented 
in the former, female in the latter.491 Socrates is about to attempt a justification for why the 
guardians should jointly possess their wives and children (i.e., the abolition of the private 
family). In doing this, he will, as a first step, present the equally radical (for the times) proposal 
that women be educated with men and share all tasks in common. This is the first of the set of 
three great “waves” (τῆς τρικυµίας, 472a2), so-called in part because of the “waves” of laughter 
and ridicule they seem likely to provoke (µέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦµα ἐκγελῶν καὶ 
ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν, 473c8-9).492 To set the stage for this ambitious line of argument likely to 
draw guffaws, Socrates refers to Sophron’s comic oeuvre – in particular, to the male-female 
divide in the mimes. Socrates will explain first the male capacity to be educated and to govern – 
in other words, he will perform the “male drama” first – and then, in turn, the female version of 
the same principle (i.e., the “female drama”). 
Sophronic mime, with its low-class affiliations and scurrilous subject matter, might seem 
a curious generic motif through which to frame as profound and far-reaching a proposal as 
effecting equality between the sexes. We may understand Plato’s nod to Sophron in a number of 
ways. First, as argued earlier, Plato’s hybrid, multi-voiced text pulls out the generic stops in 																																																								
490 Halliwell 1993: ad loc.; Kurke 2011: 258-9, argues convincingly that the “tradition of Plato’s admiration and 
imitation of Sophron was very robust in antiquity.” See generally Riginos 1976: 174-6; Hordern 2004: 26-7 (cited 
by Kurke 2011). 
491 Adam 1980: ad loc.; Kurke 2006: 16, describes Sophron’s mimes as “low, sometimes obscene.” 
492 The second two waves are the abolition of the private family with respect to the guardian class and rule by 
philosopher kings. 
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upending our notions of traditional generic boundaries in creating the new genre of philosophy, 
mixing, in the words of Bakhtin, “high and low, serious and comic” and making wide use of 
“inserted genres” including “retold dialogues, parodies on the high genres, parodically 
reinterpreted citations . . . living dialects and jargons . . .”493 Indeed, Plato’s multi-toned 
approach is precisely what makes proverbs such appropriate candidates for inclusion in the 
generically-hybrid Republic. A significant reason why Hesiod’s Works and Days – the closest 
forerunner to Plato’s own meditation on a just society – belongs to the genre of wisdom 
composition is, according to Richard Martin, “the inclusion of a number of other genres,” two of 
which, not surprisingly, are “songs and proverbs.”494 In describing Plato’s purported penchant 
for Sophron’s mimes (copies of which Plato supposedly kept under his pillow), Diogenes 
Laertius also preserves a tradition that Plato borrowed extensively from another Sicilian comic 
poet, Epicharmus, famous for his own proverbs like “The hand washes the hand: give something 
and you may get something” (ἁ δὲ χεὶρ τὰν χεῖρα νίζει· δός τι καὶ λάβ' αἴ τι <λῆις>)” – 
aphorisms that were presumably collected from his plays.495 Indeed, Diogenes Laertius quotes a 
fragment in which Epicharmus predicts that some later writer will memorialize his logoi, 
“stripping them of the meter that now holds them and clothing them in purple garment, 
elaborating them with fine phrases.”496 Diogenes Laertius further records how a certain Alcimus 
maintained that Plato derived much of his doctrine from Epicharmus.497  
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495 Epicharmus, frag. 273.1 Kaibel.  
496 Kurke 2011: 258, n. 20 (quoting Diog. Laert. 3.17). 
497 Dover 2003: 532 (citing Diog. Laert. 3.9ff). Dover clarifies, however, that the Pseudepicharmeia were regarded 
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While doubt has been cast upon the validity of such accounts, Socrates’ seemingly 
unmistakable reference to Sophronic mime in the immediate wake of his failure to sway his 
audience by use of the proverb koina ta philôn is certainly indicative of the Republic’s generic 
porousness – much of which is achieved, to repeat, by Plato’s inclusion of proverbs and 
colloquial sayings. We have already seen how a number of these legomena have lower generic 
origins than higher-register poetry, for instance, the board-game saying about “city” playing-
pieces and the folk proverb describing how you lose your voice if seen by a wolf (in Book 1). 
Such expressions, like the invocation of mime here, contributed to the ancient literary tradition 
that viewed the wider genre of Sôkratikoi logoi as having what Kurke describes as “(real or 
imagined) humble, banausic origins.”498 The most famous example of this line of interpretation 
is Aristotle’s affiliation, at the beginning of his Poetics, of Sôkratikoi logoi with the mimes of 
Sophron and Xenarchus.499  
In mentioning the “male” and “female drama,” Socrates seems to go out of his way to 
refer to the vocabulary and imagery of a “low” idiom, that falls more on what Nancy Worman 
describes as “the blaming, iambic side of the poetic divide.500 In doing so at this particular 
juncture in the dialogue, he sets the stage for a deliberate contrast between both his own 
discursive practice (epitomized by his use of just such “lower” idioms) that articulate the ideal 
state and the discursive practices of a more elite, sophisticated set and their corresponding 
notions of proper society. As Socrates explains in turning first to consideration of men’s capacity 
to be guardians (the “male drama”), he is attempting “to establish by discourse the men as 
guardians of the flock” (ὡς ἀγέλης φύλακας τοὺς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ, 451c7-8). 																																																								
498 Kurke 2011: 257-8. 
499 Poet. 1, 1447a28-b13. 
500 Worman 2008: 155. 
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Moreover, in accomplishing this, he will bring to bear yet more proverbs to stress the rightness 
of his vision of a just polis. 
Socrates and his companions begin to explore the question of whether men and women 
ought to “perform in common” (κοινῇ πράττειν, 451d5) all the duties of governance. We are 
again struck by the prominence of that adjective, koinos, “common”, “shared in common” (LSJ, 
s.v. I) which Plato seems to highlight deliberately and which lies at the heart of Socrates’ 
previous, “failed” proverb. As the discussants begin to reach the groundbreaking conclusion that 
male and female natures are equal, Socrates emphasizes that “much concerning the things now 
being said contrary to established custom might seem laughable if they were to be achieved in 
the way that is said” (παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόµενα, εἰ πράξεται 
ᾗ λέγεται, 452a7-8). This is a remarkable statement when one pauses to consider the particulars 
of Plato’s Greek: it is the legomena – literally, “the sayings” – that might appear to be 
“laughable,” “ludicrous” (γελοῖα) insofar as they are contrary to the prevailing ethos, particularly 
if they are “brought about” (πράξεται) in the “manner” by which they “are said” (ᾗ λέγεται). 
Socrates’ point seems to be a distillation of my larger thesis: all social and political practices are 
nothing less than discursive practices – legomena – made a reality: praxetai. Moreover, truly 
transformative legomena and their resulting praxis may well seem ludicrous (γελοῖα) in 
juxtaposition with current custom (ἔθος). Socrates’ previous allusion to the comic mimes of 
Sophron now takes on new significance. The radical proposition that men and women are in fact 
equal in nature, articulated by means of “sayings” (legomena) – some of which are proverbs such 
as koina ta philôn – might well appear to be as laughable as Sophron’s obscene and low mimes. 
The likelihood of Socrates inviting ridicule with his argument reaches its peak when the 
discussion of male-female equality leads to the conclusion that women should exercise naked in 
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the palestra along with the men. Socrates acknowledges that this is the “most laughable” 
(γελοιότατον) of the ramifications resulting from the men’s utopian imaginings concerning 
equality of the sexes, and Glaucon readily agrees that this “would indeed appear ludicrous under 
present circumstances” (γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν, ὥς γε ἐν τῷ παρεστῶτι, φανείη, 452a10-b5).501 Socrates, 
however, is about to overturn traditional notions of what ought to be considered laughable and 
ludicrous, and he will coin new proverbs in the process. 
He begins by advising that “one must not fear the jibes by members of the witty class, 
however many and whatever sort they may cast against so great a revolution becoming a reality” 
(οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώµµατα, ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἂν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην µεταβολὴν 
γενοµένην, 452b6-8). While commentators have been tempted to see in this an allusion to 
Aristophanes and his Ecclesiazusae,502 Socrates seems to be establishing the more general point 
that all great social and political reform is likely to be met initially with jeers and insults. Calling 
Sophron’s mimes laughable is an understatement when compared to the likely reception of 
Socrates’ “howler,” namely, the proposal that men and women are in fact equal in nature. Now 
that’s funny. 
Socrates does not back down but rather exhorts his interlocutors that together they “must 
proceed to the rough part of the law” (πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόµου, 452c4-5), an 
admonition which, with its trachu (“rough”), faintly echoes yet again the single-most quoted 
gnome in Greek literature, Hesiod’s proverbial two-roads – the easy way leading to vice and the 
“rough” (τρηχύς) to excellence.503 The men must continue on their difficult journey of creating 
																																																								
501 Indeed, to this day Plato’s description of this proposal in Republic 5 elicits laughter in the classroom when 
students first encounter it. 
502 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
503 Op. 289-92.  
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the ideal state with all of its radical ramifications, including equality of the sexes. Mockery by 
the clever, the wits (τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώµµατα), be damned.  
Indeed, Socrates now labels the would-be mockers asteioi – literally, “men of the town” – 
with its not-so-subtle suggestion of a contrast between city sophisticates and rubes. Socrates 
asserts that he and his companions must remind the scoffers of today that it was not so long ago 
(οὐ πολὺς χρόνος) that the very idea of men training in the nude – forget women – seemed 
shameful and laughable to the Greeks (Ἕλλησιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα), just as it does 
now to the majority of barbarians (νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων). In addition, when the 
Cretans and later the Spartans began the practice of men exercising naked, “It was open to the 
town-bred to mock it entirely” (ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωµῳδεῖν, 452c6-d1). These 
statements and Socrates’ earlier allusion to Sophronic mime with its low-class affiliations have 
together the effect, once again, of casting Socrates in the role of, in Worman’s words, “a low 
outsider who is . . . really more noble than those around him.”504 What the asteioi mock, the 
déclassé Socrates champions, with history on his side. 
Now Socrates fashions a new proverb that makes short work of any who would mock the 
reforms he proposes to bring about the ideal polis. First, he states that the ridicule against men 
exercising naked ultimately lost its power when “experience showed it is better to strip than to 
veil all things of this sort” (ἐπειδὴ . . . χρωµένοις ἄµεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν 
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, 452d3-4).505 In a remarkable statement Socrates then explains that 
“What seemed laughable to the eyes faded away beneath the best, revealed by discourse” (τὸ ἐν 
τοῖς ὀφθαλµοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις µηνυθέντος ἀρίστου, 452d4-6). We 
are reminded again of the power of legomena; it is in discourse that the best (ἄριστος) is made 																																																								
504 Worman 2008: 155. 
505 Trans. Shorey. 
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manifest. We should also note Plato’s use of the verb exerruē, the aorist passive of ekrein, “to 
flow out”, which is difficult to translate into English (the LSJ [s.v. I.3] offers “fade away”). It is 
not surprising that Plato has chosen a verb that evokes water flowing out. Such imagery is 
consonant with the three great “waves” (κῦµατα) of radical reform. While the “wave” image 
certainly connotes in part “waves of laughter,” Socrates’ phraseology also implies that retrograde 
thinking on the subjects under discussion will be incapable of withstanding the coming “waves” 
of reform and will be compelled to do the opposite of “flowing out” (ἐκρεῖν), overwhelmed 
“beneath the best revealed by discourse.” 
Socrates then offers an example of the type of discourse which in fact reveals the best. He 
sums up with a proverb the larger point he has been making about what is really worthy of 
ridicule: “Foolish is he who considers laughable anything but evil” (µάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι 
ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, 452d6-7). Once again we have a literal, non-oppositional proverb, but one 
that also varies the standard “equational” quality (A=B) that modern paroemiologists like 
Dundes associate with non-oppositional proverbs. As Dundes explains, “Proverbs of the form 
‘He who A is B’ seem to be transformations of the basic A=B formula” that characterize literal, 
non-oppositional proverbs. Dundes gives the example of “He who hesitates is lost.” This well-
known proverb implies that “hesitating” = “losing.” In Socrates’ new proverb, “considering 
anything other than evil to be worthy of ridicule” equals “being foolish.” Socrates goes on to 
elaborate his new proverb (452d7-e2): 
καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν 
τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ 
σκοπὸν στησάµενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 
 
And [foolish is] he who attempts to make sport, looking toward any other sight as 
laughable than that of folly and evil, and conversely sets his sights seriously on 
any other target he has set up than the beautiful or the good. 
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Plato seems to be attempting to shift prevailing attitudes as to what society ought to 
consider geloia, “laughable.” Numerous scholars have found it irresistible to conclude that Plato 
must have had in mind Aristophanes and his satirical portrait of an imagined gynocracy in 
Ecclesiazusae when he wrote these remarks, as well as the whole of Book 5’s idealized notion of 
the community of wives and children. August Krohn made the fascinating claim in the late 
nineteenth century that the order of publication was Republic 1-4, Ecclesiazusae, Republic 5. 
This theory led Krohn to claim that the reference to the guardians’ joint possession of wives and 
children in Book 4 via the proverb koina ta philōn and its cultivation as a topic of conversation 
among influential Athenian circles resulted in Aristophanes’ ridicule of the same in his 
Ecclesiazusae. Other scholars went even further, positing that Socrates’ remark alone was 
sufficient to inspire Aristophanes, without any wider diffusion of the idea among the lettered 
class. 506  According to these theories, Plato then in Republic 5 responded in detail to 
Aristophanes’ send-up of koina ta philôn as applied to women and governance.   
Such claims, if true, would certainly provide a rich illustration of the power of proverb. 
They would also explain Socrates’ elaboration of his new proverb – a proverb we now 
understand as offered in response to Aristophanes’ ridicule of the application of the previous 
proverb, koina ta philôn, to women’s participation in political activity – when he uses the verb 
gelôtopoiein not long after kômoidein (452d1) to describe how the asteioi at onetime mocked 
even the now customary practice of men performing their physical training in the nude. Beyond 
the scope of this dissertation is any attempt to resolve definitively the question of whether 
Republic 5’s extensive treatment of the subject of women’s equality constitutes a direct response 
by Plato to Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, itself written as a parody of the bare reference to the 
																																																								
506 Krohn 1976: 72-83. Adam 1980, vol.1: 353-4. 
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larger subject by the proverb koina ta philôn in Republic 4. However, it would seem 
unreasonable to rule out categorically any connection between the existence of Aristophanes’ 
play and Plato’s composition of Republic 5, given numerous findings by scholars dating back to 
the late nineteenth century that tradition-breaking notions of Weibergemeinschaft (“community 
of women”) were in wide circulation at Plato’s time.507 Moreover, what better way to oppose the 
ridicule likely invited by such radical notions of Weibergemeinschaft than to compose a new 
proverb, a new “quotable,” that takes direct aim at would-be mockers of unorthodox efforts to 
improve society – indeed, mockers of anything other than what is evil? 
Socrates goes farther and next deploys proverb as a way of framing how any debate with 
his ridiculers ought to proceed. He asserts that the first point that must be agreed upon 
(πρῶτον . . . ἀνοµολογητέον) regarding any proposals about equality of the sexes is “whether 
they are possible or not” (εἰ δυνατὰ ἢ οὔ). Furthermore, the question to be given (δοτέον) to 
anyone who wants to debate the matter (ἐθέλει ἀµφισβητῆσαι), irrespective of whether they are 
jesting or in earnest (εἴτε τις φιλοπαίσµων εἴτε σπουδαστικὸς), is whether “female human nature 
is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others” (452e4-
453a3).508 At this point, Socrates offers a proverb to sum up the merits of any debate on the 
question of female-male equality that is conducted in the manner he has suggested: “In this way 
who begins best likely also ends best” (οὕτως ἂν κάλλιστά τις ἀρχόµενος ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ 
κάλλιστα τελευτήσειεν, 453a4-5). The parallelism and repetition of kallista archomenos—																																																								
507 Adam 1980, vol.1: 355. See also Schofield 2006: 228, and Halliwell 1993: 225, who support my reading. 
Schofield goes even further and claims that while “there is no self-consciously signposted echo of Aristophanes’ 
play in the text of Book 5, . . . it is highly probable that the Assemblywomen lies behind it” insofar as Plato seems to 
be “arguing out in all seriousness and from first principles a social and political programme which (as the author and 
his first readers knew very well) had quite recently been most memorably acted out as a sexual extravaganza on the 
Attic stage.” Somewhat more equivocally, Halliwell opines that with respect to the question of whether Plato had 
“Eccl. in mind when composing Rep. 5 . . .[,] the most we can say is that he may well, but need not have.” 
508 Trans. Shorey (with modification). 
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kallista teleutêseien with its axiological terminology (κάλλιστα) clearly mark this saying as a 
proverb, not dissimilar from Shakespeare’s “All’s well that ends well.” Paul Shorey finds 
Socrates’ saying to be “an overlooked reference to a proverb also overlooked by commentators 
on Pindar, Pyth. i.35.”509  The relevant lines are (Pyth. 1.33-5): 
ναυσιφορήτοις δ' ἀνδράσι πρώτα χάρις 
ἐς πλόον ἀρχοµένοις ποµπαῖον ἐλθεῖν 
    οὖρον· ἐοικότα γάρ 
καὶ τελευτᾷ φερτέρου νόστου τυχεῖν. 
 
For seafaring men the first blessing 
as they set out on a voyage is the coming of a favorable 
    wind, since it is likely that they will attain 
a more successful return at the end as well.510 
 
Pindar describes these lines as ὁ λόγος, which William Race translates as “this saying.”511 If 
Shorey’s attribution is correct, then Socrates is refashioning a proverb found in Pindar (and 
likely elsewhere) to guide the debate on the radical proposition that women and men are equal in 
nature. Ludicrous or not, the utopian proposal that men and women share equally in the tasks of 
society ought to be considered in the fashion Socrates has suggested. 
Socrates goes on to acknowledge that there exists a deep contradiction in the arguments 
he and the others have been expressing up to this point, when they attempt to posit the equality 
of men and women. Moreover, he advises that the proper procedure of the debate he has just 
suggested necessitates that he and his companions give voice to that contradiction, even on 
behalf of those who would ridicule them, “in order that the other side not be besieged without a 
defense” (ἵνα µὴ ἔρηµα τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου λόγου πολιορκῆται, 453a8-9). Socrates’ procedural 
																																																								
509 Shorey 1982: ad loc. 
510 Trans. Race. 
511 Race 2012: ad loc. 
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fairness toward his opponents, even those who mock him, arguably sets a new standard by which 
significant issues of the day should be addressed.   
Thus, with one proverb, Socrates redefines what is truly worthy of ridicule (γελοῖα). With 
another, he sums up the best way (κάλλιστα) to conduct any debate on a subject that some people 
deem ridiculous. The manner of discourse about such topics, the way in which one debates over 
deeply contested issues, is crucial to a healthy and properly functioning civil society.  
The dialogue’s participants have already concluded that the ideal city is to be founded 
(οἰκίζεσθαι) on the principle that each person should perform the task that accords with their 
individual nature (δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἕνα ἓν τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, 453b4-5), i.e., the UAD. 
However, it is difficult not to acknowledge that men and women differ to some extent.512 Thus, 
Socrates and his companions have seemingly erred (ἁµαρτάνειν) and contradicted themselves 
(τἀναντία ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς . . . φάσκοντες, 453c3-4). 
Glaucon in particular is thrown off balance by this realization and exclaims to Socrates: 
“I will beg and I do beg of you to expound the logos, whatever it is, on our behalf” (σοῦ 
δεήσοµαί τε καὶ δέοµαι καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡµῶν λόγον, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, ἑρµηνεῦσαι, 453c7-9.) Here I 
have left logos untranslated, since Socrates is about to coin another proverb to encourage 
Glaucon and the others not to lose heart in making an argument that might face a charge of 
inconsistency. While logos could be rendered as “argument,” intriguing possibilities arise when 
one leaves the range of possible meanings open. The logos that Glaucon seeks might well come 
in the shape of a proverb. 
Socrates acknowledges the unsettling nature of the uncertainty Glaucon experiences and 
tells his companions that they are now able to understand why he was initially hard-pressed to 
																																																								
512 453b7-9: “Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάµπολυ διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς τὴν φύσιν;” Πῶς δ' οὐ διαφέρει; 
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explain in detail the communistic possession of wives and children – put differently, to unpack 
fully the ramifications of the proverb koina ta philôn: “These and many similar difficulties, 
Glaucon . . . I foresaw and feared and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting 
and breeding of children.”513 
Now Socrates offers his new proverb of encouragement: “Whether someone dives into a 
small swimming hole or into the middle of the great sea, he swims all the same” (ἄντε τις εἰς 
κολυµβήθραν µικρὰν ἐµπέσῃ ἄντε εἰς τὸ µέγιστον πέλαγος µέσον, ὅµως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον, 
453d5-7). Despite the ridicule of the wits (τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώµµατα) and the town-bred 
(ἀστείοις) who parody everything of this sort (πάντα ταῦτα κωµῳδεῖν) – i.e., men like 
Aristophanes – and despite the seeming inconsistencies that invariably arise in propounding 
almost any argument, all great and transformative proposals require one to argue his position, 
just as one must do with respect to a smaller, less radical proposition. Here the imagery of 
swimming in the vast sea accords well with the metaphor of the three great waves that occupy 
Book 5 – the equality of women and men with respect to both educational ability and the 
performance of social duties, the abolition of the private family, and the rule of philosopher-
kings. It is easy to be swept away by the far-reaching ramifications of such radical proposals and 
the laughter they may engender. Socrates and his companions must be able “swimmers,” indeed. 
In addition, only a few Stephanus pages later, Socrates employs yet another proverb to 
preempt those who would mock the idealized equality of the sexes, epitomized in the caricature-
like image of women exercising naked alongside men. He slices off a verse from Pindar to form 
a proverb and then appends a second proverb to his first, Pindar-inspired formulation (457a10-
b5): 																																																								
513 453c10-d2 (trans. Shorey): Ταῦτ' ἐστίν . . . ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν 
ἐφοβούµην τε καὶ ὤκνουν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ νόµου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων κτῆσιν καὶ τροφήν. 
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ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυµναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυµναζοµέναις, ἀτελῆ 
τοῦ γελοίου [σοφίας] δρέπων καρπόν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅτι 
πράττει·κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ µὲν ὠφέλιµον τὸ 
µὲν ὠφέλιµον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν. 
 
He “plucks the unripe fruit of laughter,” the man who mocks women exercising 
naked for the sake of the highest good, and it is likely that he knows nothing 
about what he mocks or what he does. For the fairest thing that is said and ever 
will be said is that “Beautiful is the beneficial, and ugly the harmful.” 
 
A fragment from Pindar contains the line, “He plucks the unripe fruit of wisdom” (ἀτελῆ σοφίας 
καρπὸν δρέπ(ειν)), which, according to Stobaeus, refers to natural philosophers.514 Adam, 
accordingly, brackets as corrupt “sophias” in the appendix to his edition of the text, assuming it 
to be a gloss interpolated to complete the quotation. 515 It appears that Plato employs a 
presumably well-known verse from Pindar, deletes the reference to “wisdom” (σοφίας) and 
substitutes in its place “laughter” (τοῦ γελοίου), to create a proverb. Thus we have yet another 
instance of a proverb belonging to the ‘He-who-A-is-B’ variety which itself is a transformation 
of the basic “A=B” formula, characteristic of literal, non-oppositional proverbs. Plato is “re-
forming” Pindaric verse for his ideal of social and political “reform”: women enjoy equal 
capacity with men to share in the responsibilities of governance. Moreover, by then appending 
his own proverb (i.e., “Beautiful is the beneficial, and ugly the harmful”) to this “re-formation” 
of Pindar’s original, Plato solidifies further the new meaning: Henceforth only harmful things are 
to be considered ugly and shameful. Women exercising nude – even those equal in age to their 
older male counterparts who are “wrinkled and unpleasant to look at” (ῥυσοὶκαὶ µὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν 
ὄψιν, 452b2-3)516 – are by no means a revolting sight; indeed, the very opposite. The new 
proverb (τὸ µὲν ὠφέλιµον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν) – replete with parallel structure, 																																																								
514 Pindar, frag. 209 Maehler; Race 2012: 418-19. 
515 Adam 1980, vol. 1: ad loc. and App. III (to Resp. Book 5), p. 357; Following Adam’s lead, I have bracketed 
sophias in the quotation of the text from Burnet’s edition. 
516 Trans. Shorey. 
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suppressed copula, axiological terminology, and general categories – sets up well the contrast to 
come toward the close of Book 5 between the mere “lovers of sights and sounds” (φιλήκοοι καὶ 
φιλοθεάµονες, 476b4) and those capable of “apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the 
beautiful itself” (αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ . . . αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι, 
476b6-8)517 – namely, the philosophers. In this way, Plato foreshadows the third great “wave” to 
come: rule by philosopher-kings. 
Moreover, by re-forming a verse from Pindar that leveled criticism at natural 
philosophers, Plato draws an important distinction between natural philosophers and the type of 
philosopher that Socrates embodies: a moral and political philosopher concerned with human 
affairs. Aristophanes’ earlier satirical portrait of Socrates in Clouds presented him as the arch-
caricature of a natural philosopher: a man utterly divorced from daily reality, a “ponderer of the 
heavens and subterranean realm” (τά τε µετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς) one literally 
“walking in air” (ἀεροβατεῖν), as Socrates describes Arisophanes’ parody of himself in Plato’s 
Apology.518 We learn from Plato’s Phaedo that although Socrates in his earlier years did in fact 
study natural philosophy, he ultimately grew dissatisfied with its account of causality and turned 
to seeking wisdom through dialogue with his fellow Athenians – his so-called “second 
sailing.”519 Knowing this we can discern Plato’s larger theme: while the natural philosophers are 
deserving of “ridicule by the wits” (τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώµµατα) like Aristophanes, moral and 
political philosophers are the ones capable of appreciating what is truly beautiful (τὸ καλόν), 
namely, the beneficial (τὸ ὠφέλιµον) and, conversely, what is truly ugly or disgraceful (τὸ 
αἰσχρόν), namely, that which is harmful (τὸ βλαβερὸν). Aristophanes’ parody of Socrates is of a 																																																								
517 Trans. Shorey. 
518 Ap. 18b7-8, 19c2-3. 
519 Ph. 96a6-100b3. 
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piece with those who would mock women exercising naked alongside men – indeed, those who 
would mock any person so idealistic as to take seriously the radical notion of equality between 
the sexes. Plato refashions a Pindaric verse (originally targeting natural philosophers) and coins 
new proverbs, new quotables, that one can recall to rebut swiftly and conclusively all those who 
would mock such an ideal. In providing such discursive support for his utopian vision, Plato sets 
the stage for the third great “wave,” rule by philosopher-kings. Only philosophers of Socrates’ 
cut will be able to know what is truly “beautiful” and “beneficial” for society and, conversely, 
will recognize what is truly “shameful” and “harmful.” 
 
4.7. Proverbs and the Metaphysical Framework for Philosopher Kings 
 
In Books 6 and 7 of the Republic, Plato presents the metaphysical framework to support 
an ideal of philosopher rulers.520 This section of the dialogue is perhaps most famous for the 
vivid Sun and Line analogies in Book 6 and the unforgettable metaphor of the Cave in Book 7. 
Interestingly, there appear relatively few proverbs and gnômai in Books 6-7, compared to the rest 
of the Republic. It is arguably the presence of just such compelling literary images as the Sun, 
Line, and Cave that inclines Plato to forego the use of other stylized literary devices like 
proverbs. In addition, the complex metaphysics supporting philosopher-king rule may be more 
suited to an elevated style than that afforded by colloquial proverbs or oft-quoted gnômai. 
However, the few proverbial expressions that Plato does employ serve to enhance a metaphysical 
structure that cannot be attained via the usual dialectic exchange. Indeed, right from the opening 
of Book 6, Adeimantus reveals the limit of dialectic, disclosing that while people may well agree 
with Socrates that the rule of their polis should be entrusted to philosophers, they will not be 
wholly convinced (487b1-c4): 																																																								
520 Halliwell 1993: 1; Halliwell provides a useful, book-by-book summary of the structure of the Republic. 
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Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείµαντος, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς µὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη 
ἀντειπεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· 
ἡγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον 
τὸ ἐρώτηµα σµικρὸν παραγόµενοι, ἁθροισθέντων τῶν σµικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν 
λόγων µέγα τὸ σφάλµα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ 
τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ µὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι 
φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγωσιν 
ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε 
ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι µᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν. 
 
And Adeimantus replied, “No would one be able to contest you in these matters, 
but on each occasion that your audience hears the things that you’re now saying, 
they experience something along these lines: they feel that due to their 
inexperience in ‘question and answer,’ they’re led astray bit by bit by the 
argument at each question, and when these bits are taken together as a whole at 
the close of the exchange, a great fall is revealed, the opposite of what they first 
said, and just as men not accomplished in playing draughts are trapped by skilled 
players and are unable to make a move, in this way, too, they are finally trapped 
and lack anything to say because of this different sort of draughts game, played 
not with game pieces but words; for in fact the truth has nothing whatsoever to do 
with this.” 
 
We might well ask after reading the entire Republic, what remains foremost in our 
collective conscious. It is certainly not Socrates besting anyone in dialectic with some tour-de-
force argument. Rather, it is for most people – even those who have only a passing familiarity 
with the work – the allegory of the Cave. I want to suggest that for Plato’s ancient audience, the 
experience was not dissimilar. Winning dialectic exchanges is ultimately not how one achieves a 
lasting grasp over an audience’s collective imagination. Compelling images, striking similes and 
metaphors, and yes, memorable sayings such as proverbs and gnômai, often prove the most 
durable.521 
Socrates himself acknowledges the limits of dialectical exchange when he responds to 
Adeimantus’ further queries about why philosophers ought to govern: “You’re asking a question 																																																								
521 The durability of proverbs coupled with an author’s reputation for coining them may even result in that author’s 
receiving credit for a proverb whose origin is in doubt. As recently as May 2019, a prominent columnist for the New 
York Times attributed to Plato the saying of uncertain provenance “Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a hard 
battle” (R. Cohen, “Reflections on the Graduation of My Daughter,” NY Times, May 18, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/opinion/graduation-2019.html). 
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that requires an answer expressed by way of an image” (Ἐρωτᾷς . . . ἐρώτηµα δεόµενον 
ἀποκρίσεως δι' εἰκόνος λεγοµένης, 487e4-5). Kathryn Morgan suggests that we may explain 
Socrates’ turn to imagery by the fact that Socrates “is actually advancing ideas rather than . . . 
engaged in the cut and thrust of the elenchus.”522 The idea that Socrates advances here is, of 
course, the last – and arguably most incredible – of the “three waves,” i.e., governance by 
philosophers. Dialectic will only get you so far with your audience as Adeimantus makes clear, 
and thus we can see at this juncture, in the words of Morgan, a “move in the corpus from simple 
question and answer to a more positive and fleshed-out presentation of Socrates’ ideas.”523 That 
presentation of a metaphysics consonant with philosopher rule will culminate in the image of the 
Cave. As Morgan suggests, we have in the Republic an “almost unparalleled opportunity to 
watch systems of imagery develop and transform . . .”524 I would add to Morgan’s analysis that 
with respect to imagery, that opportunity is especially evident in Books 6-7 and, moreover, that 
we have in the Republic precisely the same opportunity to observe Plato’s development and 
transformation of proverbs. Where the elenchus reaches its limits, images and proverbs remain to 
advance Plato’s vision of the ideal city. While the proverbs in Books 6-7 are fewer in number 
given what I suspect is Plato’s writerly strategy not to overwhelm his text with too many stylized 
literary devices in close proximity, those that are present play an important role in advancing the 
dialogue and rendering Plato’s ideas all the more vivid and memorable. Indeed, as we shall see, 
one of the most stunning and creative uses of proverb occurs in conjunction with the very 
memorable allegory of the Cave. 
 																																																								
522 Morgan 2017: 181. Morgan provides a fascinating analysis of the image of the “goat-stag” (τραγέλαφος) which 
Socrates conjures before proceeding to the ship of state analogy. 
523 Morgan 2017: 182. 
524 Morgan 2017: 181. 
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4.7.1. Education, Logos, and the Divine 
 
In an attempt to resolve Adeimantus’ (and the others’) doubts about the suitability of 
philosophers for ruling the polis, Socrates delivers the image that he opined was needed for a 
response: the famous ship of state analogy. The polis is like a ship with a slightly deaf shipmaster 
who neither sees well nor knows very much about navigation, with the sailors all vying to seize 
the helm in various unscrupulous ways, unaware that only someone truly skilled in navigation 
can successfully guide the ship; however, any such person would be dismissed as a “stargazer” 
(µετεωροσκόπος) and a “babbler” (ἀδολέσχης) and generally “useless” (ἄχρηστος, 488a7-
489a2). Such a person is the philosopher, and the sailors’ attitudes toward the true navigator are 
analogous to those of Athenian society toward philosophers. 
This ship-of-state analogy is justly famous and has received much commentary.525 But 
what has been generally left unexamined is a proverb that follows the analogy, which Socrates 
immediately reformulates once he articulates it. Socrates intends this proverb as a heuristic 
device, to be used together with the ship analogy by Adeimantus and the rest, in teaching others 
why Athenian society does not presently honor philosophers. After Adeimantus acknowledges 
that the ship-of-state analogy is an accurate depiction of the Athenians’ disposition toward true 
philosophers (ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, 489a5-6), 
Socrates urges him to then “teach” (δίδασκέ) anyone who is surprised that philosophers are not 
esteemed in Athenian society by means of the ship-of-state image (τὴν εἰκόνα, 489a8-b1). 
Adeimantus heartily agrees: “Indeed, I shall so teach” (Ἀλλὰ διδάξω, 489b2). 
Socrates then puts himself in the role of Adeimantus instructing the skeptic (489b2-c2): 
Καὶ ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν 
φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς µέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς µὴ χρωµένους κέλευε αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ µὴ 																																																								
525 See, e.g., Keyt 2006; Long 2017; Reeve 2006. 
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τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὑτοῦ 
οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο 
κοµψευσάµενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάντε πλούσιος ἐάντε πένης 
κάµνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόµενον 
ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναµένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχοµένων ἄρχεσθαι, 
οὗ ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος ᾖ.” 
 
And [say] further that “You speak the truth about how the best and the brightest 
are useless to the multitude in philosophy.” But bid him to blame such uselessness 
not on the best and brightest but on the ones who don’t make use of them. For it is 
not natural for a helmsman to beg the sailors to be ruled by him nor “for the wise 
to go to the doors of the rich.” And the man who coined that gem was a liar, but 
the truth is this, be he wealthy or poor, a sick man has to go to the doctors’ doors, 
and everyone in need of governance to the doors of one capable of governing, not 
that the ruler should beg his charges to be governed by him, if he truly is to be of 
any value. 
 
Aristotle attributes to Simonides the proverb “Wise men go to the doors of the rich.” As 
Aristotle recounts the story, when Simonides was visiting Hieron, the tyrant of Syracuse, 
Hieron’s wife reportedly asked him whether it was better to be wise or rich. Simonides replied 
“Rich, for one sees wise men spending time at the doors of the rich” (πλούσιον . . . τοὺς σοφοὺς 
γὰρ . . . ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας, Rhet.1391a10-12).526 We have, then, 
yet another adage representative of a tradition that prized the accumulation of wealth and, 
accordingly, formulated numerous sayings in furtherance of that value. The generalizing 
terminology of “the wise” and “the wealthy” (τοὺς σοφοὺς, τῶν πλουσίων) coupled with the 
poetic imagery of “going to the doors” (ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἰέναι) of a general group marks the phrase 
as a proverb. Further, Socrates expressly denotes it as such and implies that many people have 
already heard it when he calls the phrase’s coiner a liar. We are reminded of the place in Book 1 
where a saying whose origins seemingly lie with Simonides poses an obstacle to Plato’s vision of 
a just society.527 Indeed, Adam states unequivocally that this passage reveals how “Plato liked to 
																																																								
526 Trans., Kennedy. 
527 See my discussion in Chapter 2.4-5. 
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get his knife into Simonides.”528 I would argue for a more cautious reading: Socrates does not 
mention Simonides by name and has already taken pains both to defend him and to uphold his 
position within the Greek wisdom tradition during the previous exchange in Book 1 with 
Polemarchus over whether Simonides authored the maxim “Just it is, to render to each what is 
owed him.” As I argued in Chapter Two, Plato risks losing the confidence of his readership if his 
chief protagonist condemns the wisdom tradition in its entirety. 
The proverb itself, however, and its contributing role to Athenian society’s prioritizing 
wealth over everything else deserve reproof and are grist for Plato’s discourse-reforming mill. 
Adeimantus and others should not use the ship-of-state analogy by itself (vivid though it may be) 
in “teaching” Athenians why their values have left them at sea. The teachers of Plato’s vision of 
the ideal state must also replace the earlier saying with new proverbs. Indeed, we witness in this 
extraordinary passage several proverbs embedded in an argument about which proverbs ought to 
be used for educational ends. Socrates counters the older saying first with an express declaration 
that his coinages articulate the truth (τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν), whereas the proverb “wise men go 
to the doors of the rich,” lies (ἐψεύσατο). He then makes use of one of the traditional and 
recurrent formulae for introducing gnomic statements in the form of a third person imperative: 
constructions such as (οὐ) χρή, ἔοικε, or (οὔκ) ἐστίν + infinitive which “express the need or 
desirability of certain actions.”529 As Andre Lardinois explains, “Such patterns helped the 
speaker to create a saying on the spot and, at the same time, the listener to identify that statement 
as gnomic.”530 Socrates uses ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι to coin his new proverbs to rebut the older wisdom 
																																																								
528 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
529 Lardinois 1995: 22, 78. 
530 Lardinois 1995: 22. Lardinois provides a useful list of examples from archaic poetry of χρή + infinitive, among 
which are Odyssey 15.74 (χρὴ ξεῖνον παρεόντα φιλεῖν, ἐθέλοντα δὲ πέµπειν) and Iliad 2.24 (οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον 
εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα). In his Rhetoric, Aristotle cites as an example of a gnome, θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ 
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saying. These are “Be he wealthy or poor, a sick man must go to the doctors’ doors” (ἐάντε 
πλούσιος ἐάντε πένης κάµνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι), followed immediately by  
“And all in need of rule should go to the doors of the man who can rule” (καὶ πάντα τὸν 
ἄρχεσθαι δεόµενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναµένου, 489c1-2). We can imagine that the fully 
developed new proverb, to be taught alongside the ship-of-state analogy, might run something 
along the lines of “Just as sick men, whether wealthy or poor, must go to the doctor’s doors, so 
too must everyone in need of rule go to the doors of men equipped to rule.”  
The essential component of this new proverb – i.e., “all in need of rule should go to the 
doors of the man who can rule” (πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόµενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναµένου) – 
sounds less artful in English than in the original Greek, where it enjoys grammatical parallelism 
in a quadripartite structure – archesthai deomenon . . . archein dunamenou – and a generalizing 
term, pavta. Moreover, Socrates’ new formulation is surely a proverb, if only because its 
semantic force and lexical structure trade upon that of its less-than-salutary precursor. As modern 
paroemiology has revealed, one of the simplest methods of creating a proverbial utterance is 
“replication.” While replication often refers to quoting a previously heard utterance in a new 
context – which Socrates certainly does here with his new version of the “going-to-the-doors-of” 
proverb – the borrowing of semantic and lexical features with explicit and intentional intertextual 
reference is also a clear marker of a proverb.531 In this instance, of course, Socrates borrows from 
the original only to transform the meaning entirely.  
Socrates’ express reference to a larger didactic purpose, with his use of both the ship-of-
state analogy and the new proverb, points toward the educational and rhetorical framework of 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν (1394b25), which is itself a saying from the aphorisms of Epicharmus (frag. 263 
Kaibel). 
531 Winick 1998: 75, 99 (citing Urban 1996). 
232 
Greek society, in which the memorization and anthologizing of quotables from literature played 
a significant role. Plato is laying a new gnomological foundation for his educational program. 
Images may well prove more compelling than dialectic exchange as this section of the Republic 
suggests, but proverbs have a fundamental purpose in education as well – to inculcate the values 
underlying the ideal state. 
Plato may even have faced some competition in his reformation of this particular proverb. 
Diogenes Laertius records that when asked by the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius why it is that 
philosophers go to the doors of rich men but not vice versa,532 the philosopher Aristippus replied, 
“While one group knows what it needs, the other does not know” (οἱ µὲν ἴσασιν ὧν δέονται, οἱ δ' 
οὐκ ἴσασιν, 2.69.3-4). A similar saying was attributed to the philosopher Antisthenes: 
ὁ αὐτὸς πυνθανοµένου του τυράννου, τί δήποτε οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι πρὸς τοὺς 
σοφοὺς ἀπίασιν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάπαλιν, εἶπεν· “Ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ µὲν ἴσασιν ὧν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς 
χρεία πρὸς τὸν βίον, οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἐπεὶ µᾶλλον χρηµάτων ἢ σοφίας 
ἐπεµελοῦντο.” 
 
The same man [Antisthenes], when a tyrant asked him why rich men do not go in 
quest of wise men, but the opposite, he said, “Because wise men know what they 
need for life, but rich men do not know, since they have concerned themselves 
more for money than for wisdom.”533 
 
These passages suggest a robust tradition of sayings concerning the topic of wealth’s relationship 
to wisdom. Plato is not about to be outdone by his proverb-composing rivals and, accordingly, 
appends his own version to the unforgettable image of the ship of state. Both the image and the 
reformed proverb are part of Plato’s paideia. 
Of course, the paideia that Plato conceives as essential to the creation of the ideal polis is 
worlds apart from then-current educational practice. Not long after he recommends use of the 
																																																								
532 Vitae philosophorum 2.69.2-3: διὰ τί οἱ µὲν φιλόσοφοι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι ἐπὶ 
τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐκέτι . . . 
533 Gnomologium Vaticanum no. 6 (Sternbach) reprinted in Prince 2015: 552 (frag. 166; trans. Prince). 
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ship-of-state analogy and the reformed “going-to-the-doors-of” proverb in teaching Athenians 
why philosophers should govern the state, Socrates roundly condemns what passes for paideia in 
contemporary Athens. After opining that it is crucial for a philosopher to be educated in a proper 
environment, without which only a god could save him (492a1-5), Socrates makes clear that the 
censure and approval of the mob when it is gathered in courtrooms, assemblies, and other public 
meetings renders impossible any philosophically minded education that aspires to virtue.534 
Signicantly for my thesis, he drives this point home with a proverb (492e3-6):  
οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν µὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν 
παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευµένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε – θεῖον µέντοι 
κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν ἐξαιρῶµεν λόγου· 
 
For there isn’t now, hasn’t been in the past, nor ever will be in the future anyone 
with a character so unusual that he has been educated to virtue in spite of the 
contrary education he received from the mob – I mean, a human character; the 
divine, as the proverb goes, is the exception to the rule.535 
 
If we translate Socrates’ paroimia literally, we can see that he may in fact be referencing, but not 
expressly quoting, the proverb per se in his formulation: “The human – my friend, since we 
should remove the divine from our logos, according to the proverb” (ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε – 
θεῖον µέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν ἐξαιρῶµεν λόγου, 492e5-6). Adam believes that Plato is 
“playing on the proverb τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου,” a deduction he makes by looking to other 
similar expressions in other dialogues, one of which, the Symposium, I shall address in a 
moment. But even if τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου was not in fact the original proverb, it may have 
been something along the lines of  “The divine is the exception to the rule” or even a saying that 
followed the simplest of all “proverbial patterns,” namely, “x is x,” i.e., “The divine is the 
																																																								
534 492b5-8: συγκαθεζόµενοι ἁθρόοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεκα ἤ τινα ἄλλον 
κοινὸν πλήθους σύλλογον σὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ µὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγοµένων ἢ πραττοµένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν . . .  
535 Trans. Grube (with modification). 
234 
divine.”536 Irrespective of its exact formulation, the upshot of the proverb in this context seems 
clear: under the present circumstances, only someone who in some way has access to “the 
divine” (θεῖον) can ever hope to be educated in the proper manner. Indeed, Socrates confirms as 
much when he continues (492e6-493a2),  
εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτιπερ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει 
πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ µοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς. 
 
For you should know well that if anything is saved and becomes what it ought to 
be, given the present condition of society, you will not err in saying that it is the 
dispensation of the divine that preserves it. 
 
We now see how the proverb both sets up Plato’s higher order metaphysics with its Sun, Line, 
and Cave images to come and refers to Socrates himself as the one capable of expounding on 
such “divine” subjects. If anyone is possessed of a θεῖον ἧθος, it is surely Socrates. Elsewhere in 
Plato’s dialogues, language reminiscent of the proverb is used to describe Socrates. In the 
Symposium, Socrates is portrayed as possessing nearly superhuman abilities, such as his 
remarkable resistance to severe cold during a winter military campaign (220a6-c1), his singular 
power of concentration which enables him to stand all day and night in the same position, 
thinking about a particular problem (220c3-d5), and, “the most amazing thing of all” (ὃ πάντων 
θαυµαστότατον) his utter imperviousness to the effects of alcohol (220a4-5).  
With respect to this last ability, Eryximachus uses the same phraseology (as Adam notes) 
that Socrates employs in his own proverb when Eryximachus describes his relief that the 
attendees at Agathon’s dinner have ultimately decided not to drink to excess after their previous 
night’s debauch: “I remove Socrates from the logos. For he could either drink or not, with the 
result that whatever we do will suffice for him” (Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ 																																																								
536 The “x is x” formula represents not a meaningless tautology as Winick has argued but rather creates a proverb 
based upon intertextual reference, as, for example, in the phrase “a promise is a promise” which is shorthand for the 
larger sentence contemplated: “A promise is a promise, so don’t try to get out of this one” (Winick 1998: 68). 
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ἀµφότερα, ὥστ' ἐξαρκέσει αὐτῷ ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῶµεν, 176c3-5). In both Socrates’ proverb and 
Eryximachus’ statement I have deliberately left λόγου untranslated again, given the manifold 
meanings attributable to the word. In general terms, however, we can define it thus: Just as the 
divine must be removed from any human consideration or calculation (λόγου), so too must 
Socrates. He is the exception to the “human” rule. Indeed, only a few Stephanus pages further, 
Socrates mentions his “divine sign” – his daimonion (τὸ δαιµόνιον σηµεῖον, 496c40), which also 
appears in several other dialogues.537 To put the matter in slightly different terms, society’s 
present logos, its dominant discursive practices (to which the divine, like Socrates, is an 
exception) are at odds with what is needed to create the ideal polis. A new logos, one fostered by 
and consistent with the θεῖον ἧθος which animates the ideal state, is necessary. In short, the ideal 
polis requires a philosopher king, for it is the philosopher who has unique access to the divine. 
Unfortunately, absent divine intervention (θεοῦ µοῖραν, 493a1-2), “it is impossible for the 
multitude to be a philosopher” (Φιλόσοφον µὲν ἄρα . . . πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι, 494a4). A new 
logos is needed, one to which the divine is no longer an exception. 
 
4.7.2. The Hard Way to the Good, Up and Out of the Cave 
 
To be sure, Socrates and his companions harbor no illusion about the magnitude of the 
task involved in building such a world, with its concomitant discursive practices, where 
philosophy would be the animating spirit of governance. Socrates articulates the seeming 
impossibility of the men’s endeavor with – in the terminology of Lardinois – a double gnome: 
“For all great things are prone to fall, and, it is true, as the saying goes, ‘Hard is the good’” (τὰ 
γὰρ δὴ µεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ τὸ λεγόµενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά, 497d9-10). We have 
already seen how Plato either deploys or makes oblique reference to the latter proverb 																																																								
537 See, e.g., Ap. 31c-d; Phaedr. 242c. 
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throughout the Republic. In many ways, that proverb comes to signify the core task in the 
Republic and serves to motivate the men to press on in their quest to give birth to the ideal polis. 
Now, however, Socrates conjoins the proverb with another phrase that is itself apparently a new 
proverb: “All great things are prone to fall.” With its neuter predicate and suppressed copula 
coupled with axiological terminology in a general category (“prone to fall” + “all great things”), 
the phrase was sufficiently quotable for Longinus to use in On the Sublime. Moreover, Longinus 
quotes the “new” proverb – made companion to the older chalepa ta kala – during his treatise’s 
curious digression on the notion of the “flawed genius,” in which he defends a number of Plato’s 
stylistic “failures” such as inelegant metaphors (33.2):  
ἐγὼ δ' οἶδα µὲν ὡς αἱ ὑπερµεγέθεις φύσεις ἥκιστα καθαραί· <τὸ> γὰρ ἐν παντὶ 
ἀκριβὲς κίνδυνος µικρότητος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς µεγέθεσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄγαν πλούτοις, 
εἶναί τι χρὴ καὶ παρολιγωρούµενον· µήποτε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ, τὸ τὰς µὲν 
ταπεινὰς καὶ µέσας φύσεις διὰ τὸ µηδαµῆ παρακινδυνεύειν µηδὲ ἐφίεσθαι τῶν 
ἄκρων ἀναµαρτήτους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρας διαµένειν, τὰ δὲ µεγάλα 
ἐπισφαλῆ δι' αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι τὸ µέγεθος. 
 
I know that exceedingly great natures are the least pure.  For there is a risk of 
pettiness in being entirely accurate, but in grandeur, just as in great wealth, 
something must be neglected.  It may be inevitable that low and middling natures, 
on account of never taking risks nor aiming for the heights, free from error, 
remain largely secure, but greatness is prone to fall on account of its very 
greatness. 
 
The meaning the phase takes on seems clear: truly great endeavors transcend more petty – one 
could even say more human – considerations. Greatness is not achieved on the scale of the 
merely human. The task of creating (that is, articulating via logos) an ideal polis is extremely 
difficult – superhuman even, an exception to any ἀνθρωπείου λόγου – but then “hard things are 
truly good things” (τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά) and any great endeavor is riskier precisely because 
of its greatness (τὰ γὰρ δὴ µεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ). Plato’s new proverbial wisdom, built on the 
foundations of an older proverb (τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά) – which, as I explained previously, 
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was attributed to another foundational figure in the origins of Greek political thought, Solon – 
serves as a rallying cry of sorts for Socrates and his interlocutors in their dogged pursuit of the 
ideal polis, irrespective of the laughter and disbelief which the idea of philosopher kings, the last 
of the three great waves, may elicit. This sort of edifying function of proverbs has long been 
noted by pareomiologists and literary theorists: “Proverbs are strategies for dealing with 
situations,” as Kenneth Burke famously noted. 538 Burke proposed going even further and 
extending such a “sociological approach” to the whole field of literature, asking whether the 
most complex and sophisticated works of art [could] legitimately be considered somewhat as 
‘proverbs writ large’?”539 Burke’s question, as applied to the Republic, is certainly worth 
considering. 
The challenge faced by Socrates and his interlocutors is to construct in logoi a foundation 
for the ideal state that the rest of society will find convincing. However, then-present discursive 
practice blocks their way. Socrates puns about this difficulty when he playfully ridicules the 
overly-elaborate epideictic maneuvers of rhetoricians like Gorgias, “For of the thing now being 
spoken (legomenon) men have never beheld a token (genomenon),” explaining that “jingles of 
this sort were artificially made to agree with one another, not as those here, dashed together 
spontaneously.”540 One can reasonably interpret Socrates’ rhyme as a proverb unto itself, a meta-
commentary on discourse: the legomena which Socrates and his companions are attempting to 
speak have never yet come into being (genomena). What passes for discourse, for logos, there 
and then, are the verbal games of sophists and rhetoricians. Socrates shows that he is more than 																																																								
538 Burke 1967: 296 (emphasis in original). 
539 Burke 1967: 296. 
540 498d6-e3 (trans. Shorey, with modification): οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόµενον τὸ νῦν λεγόµενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ 
µᾶλλον τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήµατα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡµοιωµένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοµάτου ὥσπερ νῦν συµπεσόντα. 
This passage is extremely challenging to translate in a way that successfully communicates in English Socrates’ pun. 
Grube’s version is as follows: “They’ve never seen a man that fits our plan . . .” (emphasis in original). 
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equal to the task of composing clever rhymes, suitable for memorizing and quoting, but unlike 
those of the sophists, his coinages have a larger educational purpose, consistent with the values 
of the ideal polis. His are the legomena that in an ideal state would also be genomena. His poetic 
language is to be the new, national language. 
The petty artificiality and trivial verbal tricks deployed by the sophists and rhetoricians 
are at odds with the discursive practice that Plato is after. Indeed, any petty, purely human-scale 
standard necessarily interferes with the conceptualization of a perfectly just polis. Socrates 
demonstrates this point with another new proverb that seems to take direct aim at one of the most 
famous proverbs in all of Greek thought: the sophist Protagoras who is reported to have said that 
“man is the measure of all things” (πάντων χρηµάτων εἶναι µέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον).541 After first 
referencing a “longer road” (µακροτέρα περίοδος) that one must journey in order to see best the 
matters they have been discussing (κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν), Socrates corrects Adeimantus’ 
belief that in fact the men have already covered such topics “in good measure” (µετρίως) (504c2-
3):  
Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, . . . µέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ 
µετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς µέτρον. 
 
But my dear friend, the measure of such matters left unfinished to even the 
slightest degree as to what exists provides no good measure whatsoever; for 
nothing imperfect is the measure of anything. 
 
Socrates’ use of the phrase µακροτέρα περίοδος puts us once again in mind of Hesiod’s 
proverbial longer and more difficult path to virtue, as well as its vernacular analogue, chalepa ta 
kala, which has become essentially a clarion call for the men in their dialogic quest. Now, 
Socrates has deftly one-upped his interlocutors, surpassing Glaucon, who had previously coined 
his own proverb about measure – “But for reasonable men, Socrates, the ‘measure’ of hearing 																																																								
541 Protagoras, frag. 13.2.2 Diels-Kranz; see also Pl., Cra.385e6-386a1. 
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such arguments is the whole of one’s life” (Μέτρον δέ γ' . . . ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων 
λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν, 450b6-7) – for the purpose of admonishing Socrates 
that he had not sufficiently elucidated the proverb koina ta philōn with respect to the 
communistic ownership of wive and children. At that point in the dialogue, it was Socrates who 
believed that he had addressed the subject “in measure” (µετρίων γε, 450b5), and Glaucon 
chided him that he must not grow weary (µηδαµῶς ἀποκάµῃς, 450b8) in arguing his position 
more clearly. As I argued earlier, the phrase µηδαµῶς ἀποκάµῃς used in this context carries the 
discernible echo of Hesiod’s longer, more arduous path toward virtue. 
The vehicle by which Socrates reveals that he and his interlocutors have now traded 
places as to who exactly has spoken “in good measure” is a proverb that audaciously challenges 
Protagoras’ more famous version. Man, imperfect as he is, and his necessarily imperfect 
discourse and argumentation, are ultimately not the measure of anything, certainly not the ideal 
polis. In the Laws, Plato will complete the expected rejoinder to Protagoras’ human-centered 
maxim: “For us, God will be ‘the measure of all things’ in the higest degree” (ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡµῖν 
πάντων χρηµάτων µέτρον ἂν εἴη µάλιστα, 716c4-5).542 For now, however, it is enough simply to 
signal first, that the superficial discursive practices of the sophists and rhetoricians are no 
measure of anything, least of all assessing the adequacy of the ideal state and, second, the larger 
point that discourse in and of itself is necessarily limited; ultimately it cannot bring about the 
divine. Yet, discourse remains the sole means at our disposal for envisioning the ideal. Glaucon 
will recognize this at the close of Book 9 when he surmises, “I understand you to mean that the 
city whose founding we have described is established in words (τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειµένῃ), for I think 
it exists nowhere on earth (γῆς γε οὐδαµοῦ, 592a10-b1).” Plato’s task is to create a better, less 
																																																								
542 Trans. Bury (with modification). 
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“imperfect” (ἀτελὲς) discursive practice that people might use in striving for a more just 
society.543 
Such a society would embody what Socrates insists he and his interlocutors strive to 
attain: “the form of the good” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, 505a2), which is the “greatest subject for 
learning” (µέγιστον µάθηµα) and “by which both just things and other things useful become in 
fact both useful and beneficial” (ᾗ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάµενα χρήσιµα καὶ 
ὠφέλιµα γίγνεται, 505a1-3). Unfortunately, the majority of people do not think it “necessary to 
seek further” (οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν) than the “imperfect measure” (ἀτελὲς µέτρον) of 
their present discourse because of “laziness” (διὰ ῥᾳθυµίαν, 504c2-5). This posture is 
“completely unsuited for [any] guardian of the state and its laws” (ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι 
πόλεώς τε καὶ νόµων, 504c6-7). Instead, Socrates urges that a guardian “must take the longer 
road” (Τὴν µακροτέραν τοίνυν . . . περιιτέον, 504c9), thereby calling to mind yet again Hesiod’s 
longer, steeper path to virtue. To be satisfied with traveling as far as current Athenian discursive 
practices allow means that a guardian “will never arrive at the culmination of the greatest and 
most appropriate subject for learning of all” (τοῦ µεγίστου τε καὶ µάλιστα προσήκοντος 
µαθήµατος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει, 504d2-3) – namely the “form of the good” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
ἰδέα). Plato has deftly intertwined a proverb about the inadequacy of incomplete, unfinished 
(ἀτελές) discourse that “seems sufficient” to many in contemporary Athens (δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοτέ τισιν 
ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν, 504c3) with the imagery of the proverbial longer and harder path that “requires 
a learner to toil no less than in physical training” (ἧττον µανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυµναζοµένῳ) 
																																																								
543 In his Seventh Letter, the authenticity of which admittedly remains in serious doubt, Plato goes even farther and 
expresses what he sees as language’s inadequacy ever to articulate the ideal: “There is no – nor will there ever be – 
any treatise of mine on such things, for they are not communicable in words like other studies” (οὔκουν ἐµόν γε περὶ 
αὐτῶν ἔστιν σύγγραµµα οὐδὲ µήποτε γένηται· ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαµῶς ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα µαθήµατα, 341c4-6). Even if the 
authorship of the Seventh Letter is spurious, the content nonetheless reflects an established, ancient tradition that 
saw Plato as recognizing the potential impotence of language. 
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and has now added a phrase that will come to enjoy its own proverbial status: the “form of the 
good” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα). Diogenes Laertius, for example, writes of how Amphis, a poet of 
Middle Comedy, made use of Plato’s proverbial “good” in his Amphicrates: “The good, 
whatever in the world it is that you are likely to get on this woman’s account, I know less of that, 
master, than I do of ‘Plato’s good.’”544 Adam explains that “τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν was in 
antiquity a proverb for any dark or obscure saying.”545 
Thus, Plato has created a new set of sayings that, taken together, aim to inspire his 
audience to traverse the longer, more laborious road than that afforded by the clever but 
superficial wordplay of the sophists and rhetoricians, toward the very form itself of the good, 
enigmatic though it may be. Plato posits this route as the only way forward for those who aspire 
to a truly just society, as embodied in the ideal polis. 
These memorable sayings that Plato attempts to craft will reach their culmination in what 
is the single most famous analogy in all of philosophic writing: the Cave in Book 7. Even to call 
the image a “cave” is somewhat of a misnomer, since “cave” can imply a ground-level cavern. 
Plato’s Cave, however, is an “underground cavern-like dwelling with a long (µακρὰν) entrance 
that opens toward the light, as wide as the cave (καταγείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταµένην 
πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ µακρὰν παρὰ πᾶν τὸ σπήλαιον, 514a3-5).546 Indeed, the 
“ascent” (ἀνάβασις) out of the Cave is “rough” (τραχεία) and “steep” (ἀνάντης), which one 
cannot climb without “suffering pain” (ὀδυνᾶσθαί, 515e7-8). The parallel between the 
																																																								
544 Vitae philosophorum, 3.27.9-11: τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, οὗ σὺ τυγχάνειν µέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἧττον οἶδα 
τοῦτ' ἐγώ, ὦ δέσποτ', ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν. 
545 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
546 Adam 1980: ad loc. Adam argues convincingly that παρὰ πᾶν τὸ σπήλαιον should be taken separately from 
µακρὰν which describes the εἴσοδος. The words, thus, define the width of the entrance, which is “along the whole 
of,” i.e., “as wide as” the cave’s mouth at the surface. It is the ingress leading down to the prisoners that Plato in fact 
describes as µακρά.  
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philosopher’s difficult climb out of the Cave and Hesiod’s long (µακρὸς), steep (ὄρθιος) and 
rough (τρηχὺς) road to “virtue, before which the gods have placed sweaty toil” (τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς 
ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν, Op. 289), is unmistakable. Plato has appropriated the imagery 
of the single most-quoted proverb in all of ancient literature to create what will become the 
single most-cited analogy in philosophy. Of course, Plato’s Cave is not itself a proverb, but it 
audaciously integrates elements of Hesiod’s original gnômai so as to provide a new context for 
the proverb. The aretê to be attained by enduring what lies along Hesiod’s harder path (οἶµος) 
can now be understood – after Plato’s transformation – as the “form of the good, the last thing to 
be seen and reached only with difficulty” (τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ µόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, 
517b8-c1).547 
One may argue that any connection between the anabasis out of Plato’s Cave and 
Hesiod’s uphill oimos is too attenuated to be of interpretive value. Such an objection would 
mirror the complaint made by an anomymous Cambridge University Press reader to Richard 
Hunter’s 2014 monograph on Hesiod’s palpable presence throughout ancient literature: “Not 
every uphill climb is an allusion to Hesiod, surely . . .”548 As Hunter himself observes, there 
doubtless exists a weakness on the part of both ancient and modern scholars to be too quick to 
link together two passages on a similar theme that survived by chance. However, as Hunter 
argues, Hesiod’s Works and Days is a “special case” insofar as it was  
one of those central texts of ancient literate culture which were, through 
educational practice, so ingrained in habits of expression and thought that the 
search for its influence must indeed sometimes take the form of deep-trench 
archaeology, rather than surface survey. In the context of that literate culture, 
quite a few uphill climbs may indeed be claimed to be indeed “Hesiodic”, 
particularly in the context of the acquisition of forms of knowledge . . .549 																																																								
547 Trans. Grube. 
548 Hunter 2014: 34-5. 
549 Hunter 2014: 35 (emphasis added). 
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I believe Hunter’s analysis is especially true with respect to the single-most quoted proverbial 
passage in all antiquity.550 Here, both the lexical and semantic coincidences – the Cave’s “rough” 
(τραχεία) and “steep” (ἀνάντης) anabasis to the “form of the good” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα) that is 
painful to ascend (ὀδυνᾶσθαί), and Hesiod’s long (µακρὸς), steep (ὄρθιος) and rough (τρηχὺς) 
oimos to “virtue” (τὴν ἀρετήν) that necessitates “sweaty toil” (ἱδρῶτα) – are too close to be 
discounted. Just as Plato “re-formed” traditional, Hesiodic proverb at the opening of Book 4 
about the benefits of accumulating wealth in order to fashion the defining maxim of justice in the 
ideal city – “Justice is the doing of one’s own” (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν . . . δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, 
433a8-9), i.e., the UAD – so too does he recast Hesiod’s hard road to virtue as the philosopher’s 
difficult ascent out of the Cave of delusion – indeed, literally of “nonsense” (φλυαρίας, 515d2), 
according to Socrates – to behold the true form of the good. 
We have then, in effect, the conclusion of a ring composition, centering on Plato’s 
description of how the ideal state is to be constructed. Recall that Book 4 (as well as this 
Chapter) opened with Socrates’ worries about affording the “greatest happiness” (πλείστη 
εὐδαιµονία) to the various practitioners of the different professions. These worries arose because 
Adeimantus pressed Socrates on what seemed inadequate rewards to the guardians for their 
labors in protecting the city. In Adeimantus’ estimation, Socrates did not seem to have made the 
guardians all that happy in his assembly of the ideal polis, since they did not enjoy the benefits of 
the city that by rights belonged to them. While other men acquired estates and huge, beautiful 
homes along with gold and silver and all the other things associated with those who are truly 
blessed, the guardians seemed to be hired mercenaries, there for no other purpose than to guard 
the state (419a1-420a1). It was in response to Adeimantus’ concerns that Socrates reworked 																																																								
550 Canevaro 2015: 7; see Koning 2010a: 144, n. 74. 
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Hesiodic proverbs lionizing the aggrandizement of wealth to reveal that excessive wealth was 
harmful both to the individual and society. Instead, it is the UAD that will guarantee a truly just 
society. 
Now, with the Cave analogy – fashioned in significant part from the imagery of Hesiod’s 
hard-road-to-virtue gnome – Socrates reveals that scaling the difficult anabasis out of the Cave 
and ultimately beholding the form of the good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα) is the guardian’s true reward. 
Below is only the nonsense (φλυαρίας, 515d2) of an unenlightened existence. With Plato’s use of 
the word phluarias, we are reminded, too, of Thrasymachus accusing Socrates in Book 1 of 
spouting “nonsense.”551 The discursive practices of sophists like Thrasymachus are in fact the 
“nonsense,” both symptom and cause of a world with values precisely in reverse of what they 
should be, just as the traditional reward of wealth to successful men described in the Works and 
Days’ vision of an ideally just world is the exact opposite of where one finds true reward: in the 
form of the good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα). As Socrates explains, those who are to be the philosopher 
rulers, i.e., those having beheld the good (519c10), are the “truly wealthy, not in gold, but in that 
with which happiness makes one wealthy, a good and intelligent life” (521a2-3). 
So dramatic is the contrast between the unenlightened life lived in the dark recesses of 
the Cave and the world of the good above, that Socrates stunningly reimagines and reformulates 
one of the most famous verses from Homer’s Odyssey – indeed, lines that he had previously 
announced in Book 3 should be “banned” (ἐξαλείφειν, 386c) – as a virtual credo for the newly 
enlightened philosopher. In essence, Plato has Socrates transform the formerly censored verse 
into an edifying proverb. After the arduous ascent to behold the form of the good, the 
philosopher will neither desire what passes for honors, commendations, and prizes bestowed by 
																																																								
551 See my discussion in Chapter 2.6. 
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the philosopher’s former fellow prisoners on that man best able to discern the shadow images 
passing by, nor will he envy those who are so honored and who rule because of such honor 
(516c8-d4). No, the philosopher will have come to recognize the Cave’s nonsenses (φλυαρίας) 
for what they truly are. Rather than “hold such opinions and live again in such a way” ('κεῖνά τε 
δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν), the philosopher would, instead, “identify with that line of Homer and 
prefer very much ‘to work as a serf, beside another, unpropertied man’” (τὸ τοῦ Ὁµήρου ἂν 
πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι “ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέµεν ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, 
516d4-7).552 In Book 3, this underworld lament by the shade of Achilles was the first verse to 
receive Socrates’ reprobation as unfitting for the education of the future leaders of the state, the 
guardians who must not fear death, but instead, prefer it to slavery and defeat (αἱρήσεσθαι πρὸ 
ἥττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον, 386b5-6). In that context, Socrates quoted the full three lines of 
the ghost of Achilles’ despairing protest against Odysseus’ exhortation not to grieve in death 
(Resp. 386c5-7 = Od. 11.489-91):  
βουλοίµην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέµεν ἄλλῳ 
ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ µὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη 
ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιµένοισιν ἀνάσσειν 
 
I would rather work as a serf beside another  
unpropertied man, to whom there is not much livelihood 
than to rule over all the perished dead.  
  
To understand why a previously-banned quotation from Homer’s Achilles can, in a 
different context, constitute a proverb, we should recall Czech literary theorist Jan Mukařovský’s 
theory of the “‘theatricalization of an utterance’ by the use of a quote,” in which quoted speech 
takes on the features of a proverb and may be identifiable by listeners as such. What might not 
seem a proverb in one context can, within a separate context as part of another speaker’s 
																																																								
552 Cf. Homer, Od.11.489-90: βουλοίµην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέµεν ἄλλῳ / ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ. 
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performance (i.e., in her “theatricalization of the utterance”), become a proverb. As Mukařovský 
explains, “the effect of the context may give this quotation a meaning which it does not have of 
itself . . .”553 Socrates has effectively “theatricalized” the previously-banned utterance into a 
proverb that advances what Socrates calls “our work as the founders” (ἡµέτερον δὴ ἔργον . . . 
τῶν οἰκιστῶν) of the ideal polis: to “compel the best natures” (τάς τε βελτίστας φύσεις 
ἀναγκάσαι) to “scale that ascent” (ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν) and “behold the good” (ἰδεῖν 
τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν, 519c7-d2). The shade of Achilles’ underworld lament has been transmuted into a 
motivating proverb for the philosopher rulers. The prizes and honors of the cave are nonsense 
(phluaria) when compared with the “form of the good” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα). 
Moreover, the reintegration of the censored line into acceptable discourse amounts to a 
meta-commentary on the transformative potential of discursive practice when coupled with 
philosophy – a transformation which, I maintain, is the Republic’s primary theme. It is by access 
to the “form of the good” – an access reached, we should recall, by traversing a re-imagined 
version of Hesiod’s proverbial hard road to virtue – that instances of a formerly harmful 
discursive practice (e.g., Homeric verse that arguably fosters fear of death) can be re-framed as 
potentially edifying injuctions. Such is the metamorphic power to be attained by enlightened 
philosophers, those who are to able to make the hard journey out of the Cave, behold the good, 
and thereby qualify to govern the ideal polis. Previously discredited discourse has the potential to 
be renewed, restored, and ulimately “re-formed” by the “form of the good.” Everything else is 
just so much phluaria, so much nonsense. 
																																																								
553 Mukařovský 1971: 299, 302 (trans. Garvin, in Penfield 1983: 101, 103). 
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Chapter Five – Republic 8 – 10: Proverbs and the Discourse of the Ideal State 
 
“I understand,” he said. “You mean the city whose establishment we have described resides in 
words.” 
Plato, Republic554 
 
There, my blessing with thee, 
And these few precepts in thy memory . . . 
 
Polonius to Laertes – William Shakespeare, Hamlet555 
 
 
The closing books of the Republic evince an increasing self-reflexivity on the part of 
Plato as author. Indeed, they offer a meta-commentary of sorts on the communicative process 
and the task of conveying Plato’s philosophy via the medium of language – philosophy, which, it 
must be remembered, constituted a new literary genre – so that it comes to prevail in the 
discursive practice of the ideal state which is necessarily “established in language” (τῇ ἐν λόγοις 
κειµένῃ, 9.592a11). In this concluding chapter, I will offer a reading that looks to Plato’s use of 
proverbs and gnomic statements to frame what it means to communicate philosophy “in 
language” and the significant role that discursive practices which transcend strictly analytic 
vocabulary necessarily play in the ideal polis and the foundation of philosophy as a prevailing 
discourse. 
 
5.1. Communicating the Incommunicable with Proverbs 
 
Books 8 and 9 are famous for illustrating how political evil and injustice find their exact 
correlates in the individual soul. Towards the opening of Book 8, as Socrates prepares to 
expound the different forms of government (πολιτειῶν), he asks Glaucon two questions designed 
																																																								
554 9.592a10-11: Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθοµεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειµένῃ (trans. Shorey, 
with modification). 
555 Act 1, sc. 3. 
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to prompt recognition that such polities correspond in fact to the different characters (εἴδη) of 
men. The second of these questions is both rhetorical and proverbial (544d6-e3): 
Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, 
ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, 
ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα 
τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται; 
Οὐδαµῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐντεῦθεν. 
 
“Do you know, then,” I said, “that there are necessarily just as many types of 
men as there are of governments? Or do you suppose that the types of government 
are born from oak or rock, but not from the characters of the individuals in the 
city-states, which, just like the falling of the scales’ weight, drag other things after 
them?” 
“They certainly don’t come from anywhere else,” he replied, “but there.” 
 
Adam likens the saying “not born from oak or rock” to a German proverb, “Es ist doch 
nicht aus der Luft gefallen.”556 While on the most basic interpretive level, Adam’s reading is 
correct in light of the passage’s seeming derivation from Odyssey 19.162ff, where Penelope asks 
Odysseus disguised as a beggar to tell her of his lineage (γένος) as he surely was “not born from 
any fabled oak or rock” (οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης, Od. 19.163),557 the 
phrase has deeper associations with language and communication.   
M.L. West draws our attention to such connotations, conjured by a similar proverb in the 
proem of Hesiod’s Theogony: “But what do matters concerning an oak or rock have to do with 
me?” (ἀλλὰ τίη µοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῦν ἢ περὶ πέτρην; 35).558 Among a number of possible 
interpretations of this line, West suggests, “Why do I relate what no one will believe?” – an 
interpretation (1) supported by a similar proverb in Macarius which West urges “does not look 
																																																								
556 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
557 Indeed, Socrates employs the metaphor in this same manner at Ap. 34d3-5: Ἐµοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν µέν πού τινες 
καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁµήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ‘ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης’ πέφυκα ἀλλ' ἐξ 
ἀνθρώπων . . . 
558 West 1966: ad loc. 
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like a mere regurgitation of Hesiod”559 and (2) whose essential meaning, i.e., ἀπίθανα λέγειν (“to 
say what is not believable”) accords with both Plato’s own use of the phrase and Homer’s. In the 
Phaedrus, Socrates uses it to berate Phaedrus for questioning the source of his story about an 
Egyptian king’s condemnation of writing as the ruin of memory.560 In Book 22 of the Iliad, 
Hector invokes the oak/rock adage when he despairs on the futility of attempting to speak reason 
to Achilles.561 In both of these texts, the central idea of the phrase concerns not the impossibility 
of being born from rock or oak but, rather, the question of whether communicating with such 
entities is ever possible.  
Plato’s use of this enigmatic proverb foregrounds the conundrum of communicating to 
others that which seems, as West puts it, “unbelievable” (ἀπίθανον) – in other words, that which 
cannot be communicated effectively in way that is heard and understood, just as conversing with 
a rock or oak seems impossible. Yet this is essentially what Plato must do: compose a literary 
work that will represent the establishment in language (ἐν λόγοις κειµένῃ, 592a11) of the ideal 
polis – that is, a state where what is just for the individual is made identical to what is just for the 
state, thereby overcoming the challenge put by Glaucon and Adeimantus to Socrates in Book 2, 
to define justice as a good in and of itself. Even an average person would more likely listen to an 
oak or rock speak than hear and believe the apithana contained in Plato’s Republic. However, 
returning now to the proverb’s more superficial meaning as read by Adam, the characters of men 
do align with those of the different polities they comprise – they are not “born from oak or rock – 
																																																								
559 West 1966: ad loc., citing Leutsch and Schneidewin, vol. 2, 1851: 158: δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας λόγοι· ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἀδολεσχούντῶν καὶ µυθολογοῦντων παράδοξα. 
560 “For the people at that time, since they were not wise like you young men, were content simply to listen to an oak 
or rock, provided only that they spoke the truth” (τοῖς µὲν οὖν τότε, ἅτε οὐκ οὖσι σοφοῖς ὥσπερ ὑµεῖς οἱ νέοι, 
ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐηθείας, εἰ µόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν, Phaedr. 275b7-c1). 
561 “There is no way from an oak or rock to chat with him” (οὐ µέν πως νῦν ἔστιν ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης//τῷ 
ὀαριζέµεναι, Il. 22.126-7). 
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and, so it follows, a polity’s justice will align with its individuals’ justice. Thus, the oak/rock 
proverb serves a dual purpose in the text: it affirms Socrates’ argument that polities correspond 
to their inhabitants’ characters, while also serving as a meta-commentary on the challenges in 
communicating that argument en logois. 
Socrates reinforces the idea that polities are a function of their citizens’ characters a few 
Stephanus pages later when he describes the devolution of the different types of governance – 
i.e., from aristocracy to timocracy to oligarchy to democracy to tyranny. Here, he coins a proverb 
that will be frequently quoted beginning in antiquity and continuing to the present: “That which 
men honor, at any time, is what is practiced, while what is dishonored is neglected” (Ἀσκεῖται δὴ 
τὸ ἀεὶ τιµώµενον, ἀµελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιµαζόµενον, 551a4-5). The American Christian clergyman 
and longtime peace activist, Reverend William Sloane Coffin, often quoted the modern version 
of the proverb in his sermons and speeches, attributing it to Plato: “What’s honored in a country 
will be cultivated there.” 562  In so doing, Coffin followed in the footsteps of the Greek 
rhetoricians Themistius and Libanius who worked the proverb into numerous orations,563 and the 
Christian Neoplatonist, Synesius, who used a version of the maxim in his Aegyptus sive de 
providentia. 564  Cicero, too, employed his own rendering in the opening of his Tusculan 
Disputations: “Public esteem nourishes the arts, and everyone is fired to pursuit by renown, but 
what is generally disdained is that which always lies neglected” (honos alit artes, omnesque 
incenduntur ad studia gloria, iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur, 1.4.5-7). 
With the coinage of this proverb, thus, Plato achieved a “quotable” that approximates the 
enduring Nachleben of Hesiod’s eminently quotable “easy-road-to-vice, hard-road-to-virtue” 																																																								
562 See, e.g., Merritt 2014. 
563 See, e.g., Lib., Or. 18.156.11-13, Or. 62.15.15-17 (in Foerster 1977); Them., Or. 15.195d5-6, Or. 31.353.a5-6 (in 
Schenkl, Downey, and Norman 1971). 
564 1.12.17-18 (in Terzaghi 1944). 
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gnome. Synesius mentions the Seven Sages – sophoi known in large part for the wisdom they 
“performed” in their quotations from poetry that served as proverbs – in the same breath as he 
quotes the proverb and names its author, as if to include Plato among their number. Apithana or 
not, Plato’s articulations in support of the general idea that individual justice and societal justice 
are necessarily and inextricably intertwined result in a proverb that retains force and credibility 
to this day. 
It is somewhat ironic that such gnomological success occurs in the context of a bleak 
discussion of how government devolves in successive stages from aristocracy to tyranny. Plato is 
unsparing in his grim portrait, in Adam’s words, of “the gradual descent of the perfect State and 
the perfect Man through successive phases of ever-growing degeneration down to the lowest 
depths of wickedness and crime.” Indeed, these last Books of the Republic present “an ideal 
history of evil, [where]as the previous books put before us an ideal history of the good.”565  
Socrates articulates the pervasive sense that all is ultimately for naught by means of a 
proverb. Even a polis constructed according to an ideal design will not endure indefinitely, 
“since for everything that comes into being, there is destruction” (ἐπεὶ γενοµένῳ παντὶ φθορά 
ἐστιν, 546a2). The brevity of the phrase, with its pronounced ethic dative expressing the general 
category of literally “everything that is,” coupled with the sweeping concept of “ceasing to be” 
(φθορά), marks this plainly as a gnomic pronouncement, worthy of proverbial status.566 Indeed, it 
articulates what came to be a universally recognized principle of ancient philosophy, to which 
Plato also alludes in the Timaeus and which Aristotle later acknowledged.567  
																																																								
565 Adam 1980: 195-6. 
566 Most 2003: 146. 
567 Pl. Tim.41a8-b1: τὸ µὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν. Arist.  De Cae.279b20-21: ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ γινόµενα καὶ 
φθειρόµενα φαίνεται. 
252 
Interestingly, Plato does not have Socrates take credit for the saying. Rather, this entire 
section of Book 8 is ascribed to the Muses – they relate the story of humankind’s downfall, as 
has been their assigned role throughout Greek literary tradition from Homer forward. Socrates 
explicitly invokes them in a mock-epic style: “Shall we, just like Homer, beseech the Muses to 
tell us ‘how’ civil war ‘first came to pass?’” (βούλει, ὥσπερ Ὅµηρος, εὐχώµεθα ταῖς Μούσαις 
εἰπεῖν ἡµῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔµπεσε, 545d7-e1). Numerous invocations of this sort by 
other authors – Plato’s literary rivals, to be sure – come to mind, perhaps most notably Homer’s 
famous appeal at the turning point in the Iliad: “Tell me now, Muses, how fire first fell upon the 
ships of the Achaians?” (Ἔσπετε νῦν µοι Μοῦσαι . . . ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔµπεσε νηυσὶν 
Ἀχαιῶν, Il. 16.112-13). The concurrence of hoppôs proton empese in both texts is a dead 
giveaway: Plato is tagging Homer – and, more broadly, the epic tradition – with discursive 
responsibility for the language that communicates the downfall of humankind, including 
generalizing proverbs such as “for everything that comes into being, there is destruction.” 
By contrast, Plato is attempting to birth a new discourse that moves beyond the older 
tradition auguring the inevitable ruin of humankind. If the world could only grasp the wisdom 
and full implication of Socrates’ new proverb “A society cultivates what it honors,” the 
destruction foretold by the Muses might be avoided. To achieve that, however, would require a 
wholly new discursive means by which to re-imagine both the world and humankind’s place in 
it. Plato can only approximate that new, thoroughly transformative discourse; he cannot bring it 
to pass forever. He and his writings are, too, a creation of the larger Greek literary tradition. 
He can, however, bring that tradition to bear in illuminating the ills suffered by a society 
that does not strive for the ideal polis imagined in the Republic. For example, after describing via 
a complex exposition of metaphysics how human societies will invariably fail to recognize the 
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metaphysically perfect numerical cycle for bearing children, Plato has Socrates explain how 
those societies will then see their grooms and brides marry at inauspicious times (παρὰ καιρόν, 
546d1), contrary to Hesiodic proverb in the Works and Days.568 This in turn will lead to the 
improper commingling of the different “metals” of the races as described by Hesiod and adopted 
by Plato in Book 3 – e.g, “iron mixed with silver and bronze with gold” (µιγέντος σιδηροῦ 
ἀργυρῷ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ, 547a1). “Discordant inequality” (ἀνωµαλία ἀνάρµοστος, 547a2) will 
ultimately result, which, according to the Muses, “always begets war and hatred” (ἀεὶ τίκτει 
πόλεµον καὶ ἔχθραν, 547a4). 
Socrates then deploys a devastating proverb, seemingly both a pained meditation on the 
human condition and a commentary on the pretense of Greek literary tradition to represent that 
condition. Socrates opines that with respect to the “war and hatred” (πόλεµον καὶ ἔχθραν, 547a4) 
which are the inevitable products of a degenerating society, “You must boast civil war to be ‘of 
this lineage’ whenever it comes to pass and on every occasion” (ταύτης τοι γενεῆς χρὴ φάναι 
εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἀεί, 547a4-5). Socrates appears to be quoting part of an Homeric 
formula, the proud reply on the battlefield by both Glaucus and Aeneas to challenges, 
respectively, by Diomedes to Glaucus in Iliad 6 and by Achilles to Aeneas in Iliad 20: “I boast to 
be of this lineage and bloodline” (ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵµατος εὔχοµαι εἶναι, Il. 6.211, 
20.241).569 As I explained in previous chapters, a quotation can serve as a proverb when used in 
another context. As paroemiologist Stephen Winick explains, drawing upon anthropologist Greg 
																																																								
568 See Op. 694-705. 
569That Socrates’ choice of words amounts in fact to a reference to Iliad 6.211 and/or 20.241 is a point upon which 
the Republic’s commentators and translators are generally – if not unanimously – agreed. See, e.g., Adam 1980 ad 
loc., who translates the sentence in a proverb-like manner as “Such, as we must say, is the pedigree of Sedition, 
wheresoever she arises”; Jowett and Campbell 1894, Shorey 1982, Grube and Reeve 1992: ad loc. See also Grg. 
449a7-8 (ὅ γε εὔχοµαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅµηρος), which Dodd 1959: ad loc., describes as “the stock Homeric formula,” 
citing Iliad 6.211. So too does the scholiast trace the origin of the statement in the Gorgias to both Iliad 6.211 and 
20.241. 
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Urban’s idea of “entextualization,” “The simplest method of creating a proverbial utterance is 
what Urban (1996) calls ‘entextualization,’ the quoting of a previously-heard utterance in a new 
context . . .”570 Relevant here, too, is Winick’s description of a proverb as “more a quality of 
language activity than an atomistic item, more verb than noun” which, it follows, means that “to 
speak or write proverbially, ‘to proverb,’ is to use certain strategies of intertextual reference in 
order to achieve a rhetorical end.”571 If we follow Winick’s conception of how “proverbing” 
works, we can see that Socrates employs specific Homeric language (ταύτης τοι γενεῆς) that has 
strong associations for his listeners with the sorts of lineages and heritages that one can be proud 
of, indeed, something to boast about. But he employs that intertextual reference in order to 
conjoin it with the horror of civil war, thereby constructing a proverb that works by virtue of its 
irony, in stark juxtaposition with Homer’s original. In Socrates’ reformulation of the Homeric 
phrase, humankind has nothing to “boast” of. On the contrary, war and hatred are to be society’s 
inheritance, if the state is allowed to degenerate in the manner that Socrates describes in Book 8.  
Moreover, this is the Muses’ own pronouncement, as Glaucon quickly affirms: “And 
rightly, too, indeed, we will say that they [the Muses] answer” (Καὶ ὀρθῶς . . . αὐτὰς 
ἀποκρίνεσθαι φήσοµεν), to which Socrates replies, “And necessarily so, since they are Muses” 
(Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε οὔσας, 547a6-7). Socrates, channeling the Muses, 
essentially turns the Homeric and epic tradition back on itself. To even mouth the words ταύτης 
τοι γενεῆς is to summon not membership in a glorious heritage but rather kinship with 																																																								
570 Winick 1998: 99. We should recall, too, Czech literary theorist Jan Mukařovský’s theory of the 
“‘theatricalization of an utterance’ by the use of a quote,” in which quoted speech takes on the features of a proverb 
and may be identifiable by listeners as such. What might not seem a proverb in one context can, within a separate 
context as part of another speaker’s performance (i.e., in her “theatricalization of the utterance”), become a proverb. 
Urban calls such a phenomenon “replication” which constitutes a marker of proverbiality. Sentences which were not 
initially proverbs become proverbs via replication in a different context, such as Dorothy’s “Toto, I’ve a feeling 
we’re not in Kansas anymore” from The Wizard of Oz (Winick 1998: 76-7; Urban 1996: 21-4, 37-8, 41-3). 
571 Winick 1998: 25.  
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“everything that comes into being, for which there is destruction.”572 It is of a piece with Tacitus’ 
later, pained sententia on the state of the Roman Republic under Tiberius: “as if that were a 
republic . . . (quasi . . . illud res publica esset, Annals, 4.19.3). Socrates employs the Muses to 
proclaim, “As if your lineage were something to boast about.”573 By invoking the Muses, 
Socrates marks the quotation as a wisdom statement, investing it with proverbial status.  
Moreover, Socrates make clear that the reason a society descends into civil strife is “on 
account of neglecting the true Muse, of discourse and philosophy” (διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης 
τῆς µετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠµεληκέναι, 548b8-c1). During his explanation later in Book 
8 about how a polity devolves from oligarchy to democracy, Socrates describes how society is 
“just like an ailing body that needs but a slight tip of the scales from without to fall into 
sickness” (ὥσπερ σῶµα νοσῶδες µικρᾶς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάµνειν, 
556e3-4). This simile, so illustrative of the weak society debilitated with debased discourse, 
seemingly originates from a proverb that has been described as “the most beautiful line in 
Sophocles,”574 the Corinthian messenger’s summary (and somewhat philosophical) explanation 
to Oedipus of the death of the man whom Oedipus had falsely believed to be his father, Polybus: 
“A slight tilt of the balance is all it needs to lay an aged frame to rest” (Σµικρὰ παλαιὰ σώµατ' 
εὐνάζει ῥοπή).575 In Socrates’ reformulation of the Sophoclean adage, a polity’s successive 
decline from oligarchy to democracy corresponds to an already ailing man’s death, invariably 
occasioned by even a “small cause” (σµικρᾶς προφάσεως, 556e6). In addition, the scale 
metaphor hearkens back to a similar metaphor that Socrates used to end his previous oak/rock 																																																								
572 Resp. 546a2. 
573 One is reminded of Ronald Syme’s knowing observation on Tacitean sententiae: “Ever and again the pitiless 
diagnosis . . . condenses into an aphorism, acrid, intense and unanswerable” (Syme 1958: 417). 
574 Dawe 1982: 194. 
575 Soph., OT. 961 (trans. Dawe). 
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proverb, reinforcing his claim that polities conform to the characters of the people who comprise 
them: the different types of government are born “from the characters of the individuals in the 
city-states, which, just like the falling of the scales’ weight, drag other things after them” (ἐκ τῶν 
ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα, 544e1-2). Now the meta-commentary offered 
by the oak/rock proverb becomes even more significant: The challenges faced by anyone who 
attempts to articulate the ideal in words are especially difficult in a society where discourse itself 
has become corrupted and enfeebled, just like a sick body. The logos of a society in which true 
justice – i.e., justice pursued as an end in itself – cannot be envisioned and articulated, insofar as 
such a thing would be utterly apithanos and incommunicable to the men whose characters 
comprise that type of society, would be a sick and enfeebled logos, indeed. 
And what is the logos of such a world? Socrates goes on to offer a chilling description of 
the descent of a polis, from oligarchy into democracy, with unrestrained license. He describes the 
logos of such a retrograde polis as the “false discourse of a charlatan braggart” (Ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ 
ἀλαζόνες . . . λόγοι), who names reverence as folly (τὴν µὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα ὀνοµάζοντες) and 
deems prudence to be cowardice (σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές), by teaching that 
moderation and orderly expenditure are in fact boorishness and servility (µετριότητα δὲ καὶ 
κοσµίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν πείθοντες) while euphemistically 
calling violence, good education; lawlessness, freedom; wastefulness, magnificence; and 
shamelessness, courage (ὑποκοριζόµενοι, ὕβριν µὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ 
ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ µεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, 560c2-561a1). 
This is precisely the debased state of discourse described in Thucydides’ famous 
narrative of what amounted to a secondary theatre of operations between Athens and Sparta in 
the bloody Corcyrean Revolution during the Peloponnesian War: the opposing sides were 
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perversely shifting (ἀντήλλαξαν) the customary value of words (τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν 
ὀνοµάτων) in order to suit the individual facts (ἐς τὰ ἔργα) of the situation as they deemed fit (τῇ 
δικαιώσει, 3.82.4).576 There, the combatants in deadly seriousness defined “reckless audacity” 
(τόλµα. . .ἀλόγιστος) as “loyal partisan courage” (ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος) and “careful hesitance” 
(µέλλησις. . .προµηθὴς) as “thinly veiled cowardice” (δειλία εὐπρεπής, 3.82.4). As Jonathan 
Price emphasizes, we can see in Thucydides’ Corcyrean stasis narrative how linguistic change 
necessarily attends civil strife via a phenomenon that Price aptly calls “the transvaluation of 
words”: 
There is a general breakdown in communication. Two or more contending groups, 
who in the past had shared language, religious beliefs and institutions, moral 
systems, and social and political institutions, not only stop sharing all those 
elements of mutual identity and purpose but also lose the ability to communicate 
effectively once those bases for mutuality disappear. Words, aside from failing as 
a vehicle for mutual understanding, become another violent and especially 
treacherous weapon in the arsenals of contending factions. . . .  A speech will not 
be listened to receptively or openly and thus will be misunderstood, and 
conversely the one who gives a speech will not be able to find the right words to 
persuade his hearers since he uses words like weapons.577 
 
So, too, do we learn from Socrates’ own, more general sketch of a state’s devolution from 
aristocracy all the way down, ultimately to tyranny, just how closely political and civic decay is 
accompanied by discursive decay, with exactly the same sort of transvaluation in terminology as 
Price describes. 
 
5.2. The Discourse of the Ideal State 
 
Discourse and societal health (or infirmity) are thus integrally related. The dialogue’s 
own version of a Corcyrean-stasis state of discursive decline, coupled with the preceding “scale” 
proverbs about the ease with which ill people perish and the difficulty of articulating the ideal 																																																								
576 See Gomme and Dover 1970: ad loc., who cite and explain Dionysios’ paraphrase of τῇ δικαιώσει: “ἄλλως 
ἠξίουν αὐτὰ καλεῖν; they ‘claimed the right’ to impose new interpretations on old words.” 
577 Price 2001: 81. 
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polis to people whose ailing characters and discourse weigh down and oppress the state, vividly 
demonstrates the high stakes in the clash of competing discourses – a battle, which as the events 
in Corcyra reveal, can have deadly consequences. What is ultimately needed in any society that 
aspires to a healthy condition are “fine practices and discourses that hold true, which are the best 
sentinels and guardians of the thoughts of those beloved to the gods” (ἐπιτηδευµάτων καλῶν καὶ 
λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἳ δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι διανοίαις, 
560b8-10). The creation of such “discourses” is, I maintain, a chief aim of Plato’s Republic. 
Blocking the path to this preferred language, however, is the presently corrupted 
discourse. Socrates makes this clear when he describes how a tyrant brutally seizes power on 
account of a democracy’s excessive liberty and then must acquire an armed bodyguard of more 
and more trustworthy men (πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δεήσεται), to protect him – 
men whom Socrates reviles as “drones, an alien and motley gang of mercenaries” (Κηφῆνας. . 
.ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς, 567d12-e1) and “freed slaves (δούλους ἀφελόµενος, 567e5). 
Socrates sarcastically derides this “blessed tyrant business” (µακάριον. . .	τυράννου χρῆµα) – a 
business in which men such as the tyrant’s bodyguards are considered “trusted friends and 
associates” (τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ πιστοῖς) – indeed the most trustworthy of all (πιστότατοι) – 
as opposed to the tyrant’s former supporters whom the tyrant had to destroy in order to seize 
power (τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας, 567e8-568a2). 
Most problematic of all is the discourse of a society that acknowledges such 
developments as normal, even beneficial, as when such men are deemed pistoi. According to 
Socrates, no less a figure than the tragedian Euripides is partly to blame, given a proverb that 
Socrates attributes to Euripides. Socrates explains why the blame should be laid on Euripides – 
and by extension, on tragedy in general – after Adeimantus acknowledges that a tyrant is 
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compelled to rely on mercenaries and freed slaves for his support, since he has destroyed all of 
his former allies (568a4-b1): 
Ἀλλὰ µήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται. 
Καὶ θαυµάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτὸν καὶ σύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, 
οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς µισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι; 
Τί δ' οὐ µέλλουσιν; 
Οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης 
διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. 
Τί δή; 
Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόµενον ἐφθέγξατο, ὡς ἄρα “σοφοὶ τύραννοί” 
εἰσι “τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.” 
 
“But of course,” he said, “he would make use of just such men.” 
“And these companions,” I said, “admire him, and his associates are the new 
citizens, whereas the upstanding sort detest and shun him.” 
“Why would they not?” 
“It’s no wonder then,” I said, “that tragedy in general is considered wise and 
Euripides above all the rest.” 
“Why’s that?” 
“Because he was the author of this saying of pregnant thought, “Wise are 
tyrants by converse with the wise.” 
 
The line σοφοὶ τύραννοί τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ was ascribed by the scholiasts both to an 
unknown play by Euripides and to Sophocles’ lost tragedy, Ajax Locrus.578 The spurious Platonic 
dialogue Theages also references the verse. 579  The scholiast on Aristophanes’ 
Thesmophoriazusae believes that either it was the case that both Sophocles and Euripides wrote 
the same line independently or that the attribution to Euripides is a mistake due to Aristophanes 
misleading others, such as Antisthenes.580 In short, no less than fourteen authorities in antiquity 
quoted the line, a fact that demonstrates its onetime prominence.581 That the line constitutes a 
proverb no doubt helps explain the frequency of citation: the parallelism of the axiological and 
																																																								
578 Greene 1938: ad loc.; Sophocles frag., 14.1 Radt. 
579 Greene 1938: ad loc. 
580 Adam 1980: 260; Sch. Thesm. 21.1-15 (in Dübner 1877). 
581 Lloyd-Jones 1996: 16. 
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general terminology (σοφοὶ . . . σοφῶν) coupled with homioptoton (σοφοὶ τύραννοί) and a 
suppressed copula in a generalizing statement mark the phrase as proverbial. Attributing the line 
to Euripides is also understandable in light of the playwright’s pronounced reputation in 
antiquity for using gnômai and proverbs in his tragedies. Indeed, Quintilian called Euripides 
sententiis densus, and it was to the works of Euripides that Aristotle turned in citing examples of 
gnômai and proverbs for his Rhetoric. 582 
The upshot of Plato’s use of the proverb here seems clear: Euripides – a purported sophos 
in his own right – is to be condemned for having coined a memorable but morally bankrupt 
saying that conjoins tyrants with wisdom and wise men. As Adam remarks in his commentary, 
“None but a σοφός could have written σοφοὶ τύραννοί τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.”583 Socrates’ 
apparently sarcastic remark that it’s not surprising people think that tragedy is “wise” and that 
Euripides is the best of the tragedians would seem to confirm Adam’s view. We are reminded, 
too, of Socrates taking aim at a similar proverb in Book 6 about wise men going to the doors of 
the rich (τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι).584 Indeed, Adam asserts that this is 
what the poet “really meant . . . but Plato maliciously twists the words into compliment to tyrants 
and their rabble rout . . .”585 So, too, do G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve maintain that “Plato 
twists [Euripides’] words to mean that the drones and slaves, who are the tyrant’s last resort, 
must be deemed wise, since they associate with him.”586  Moreover, Adam believes that 
Sophocles was in fact the author of the suspect line and that the “reduplication of the cant 
Euripidean σοφός is responsible for a kind of error [i.e., in the attribution of authorship] which 																																																								
582 Arist. Rhet. 2.21; Quint. Inst.10.1.68; See generally Most 2003. 
583 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
584 489b7-8. See my discussion in Chapter 4.7.1. 
585 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
586 Grube and Reeve 1992: ad loc. 
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was easier in antiquity than it would be now.”587 If nothing else, the prevalence of citation of the 
proverbial verse and the amount of attention the line received in antiquity remove any doubt as to 
why Plato would fasten upon it, if he were at all concerned about the influence of proverbs on 
the broader public and society. 
 
5.2.1. The Ethical Reception of Legomena 
 
There is a larger problem here, irrespective of the verse’s source. Is Socrates guilty of 
simplistic, even faulty, hermeneutics in his condemnation of the line and Euripides – not to 
mention the rest of the tragedians – along with it? Moreover, are we to believe that Plato himself 
actually interpreted Euripides to mean by the line that the sort of men a tyrant conscripts as his 
bodyguards are in fact “wise” men – the same men whom he portrays Socrates deriding as 
“drones” and “mercenary slaves”? Here is Socrates’ and Adeimantus’ exchange on Euripides’ 
meaning and its ramifications (567b1-c1): 
. . . καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς σύνεστιν. 
Καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωµιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος 
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. 
Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ συγγιγνώσκουσιν 
ἡµῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις ὅσοι ἡµῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν 
οὐ παραδεξόµεθα ἅτε τυραννίδος ὑµνητάς.   
Οἶµαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη, συγγιγνώσκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε αὐτῶν κοµψοί. 
 
“. . . and he clearly meant that those men are wise with whom [the tyrant] 
associates.” 
“Yes, both he and the other poets,” he said, “extol the tyrant’s power as 
godlike and they praise it many other ways.” 
“Well then,” I said, “since these poets of tragedy are wise, they will forgive 
us, along with however many people there are who practice politics like us, for 
the fact that we will not admit them into our polity, since they are lauders of 
tyranny.” 
“Indeed, I think,” he said, “that however many of them are subtly minded will 
forgive us.” 
 																																																								
587 Adam 1980: ad loc. 
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Before condemning Socrates (and by extension, arguably Plato himself) for naïve 
hermeneutics, we should first recall Adeimantus’ concerns in Book 2 about how the poets are 
cited as authorities for all manner of claims and positions, many of which are fundamentally at 
odds with the non-instrumental definition of justice that the Republic’s interlocutors press 
Socrates to articulate and which is to serve as the basis for the ideal state.588 Moreover, 
Adeimantus demonstrates how certain lines of poetry can even be cited for the precise opposite 
of their original meaning, as derived from internal context. For example, Adeimantus distorts 
Hesiod’s famous easy-road-to-vice, hard-road-to-virtue proverb to show why people choose vice 
over virtue: it’s the easier of the two roads, and they cite Hesiod precisely in support of their 
immoral acts.589 
In other words, Plato’s text evinces a greater concern about the ethical reception of 
citations from poetry (many of which are proverbs) than about what an arguably more 
sophisticated hermeneutics would interpret a cited verse to mean. The two may be very different. 
It would be a mistake to limit our understanding of the meaning of a verse cited in Plato’s text 
solely to the situation of that particular poetic saying within its original location. Turning back to 
Euripides’ “wise-are-the-tyrants” proverb, it would be too easy, for example, to look, to a similar 
line from Euripides Trojan Women, where Hecuba laments Hektor’s death and the fact that her 
son will never enjoy “youth and wedlock and tyrannical power” (ἥβης τυχὼν γάµων τε καὶ τῆς 
ἰσοθέου τυραννίδος, 1168-9) and then claim that the meaning of this verse is utterly divorced 
from Socrates’ charge against Euripides. We must instead, as Halliwell convincingly argues, 
“consider Plato’s citations in relation to a double model of meaning as, on the one hand, 
grounded in internal context, and, on the other, modified by a further interpretive act of 																																																								
588 See, e.g., Resp. 364c5-6, 365a4-366b2. 
589 Resp. 364c5-d2 quoting Op. 287-92. 
263 
application or appropriation.”590 To accuse Plato of anti-contextualism is to ignore what for Plato 
is the more relevant standard of interpretation: Plato is not so much disregarding the internal 
context of narrative voice and situation as he is giving priority to, in Halliwell’s words, “the 
external context of ethical reception and influence.”591 The widespread Greek practice of citing 
poets reveals, in Halliwell’s words, “a mentality which penetrates as far as the deepest ethical 
convictions both of individuals and the culture as a whole.” We cannot imagine that those 
citations ever served “a single invariable function” but were necessarily intertwined with those 
ethical convictions, thereby “generating, exemplifying, and corroborating them in various 
patterns . . .” 592 
Glaucon had lamented, earlier in the dialogue, that in Athens at that time, “every man 
believes, and believes truly, that injustice is much more profitable for him personally than 
justice” (λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ µᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, 
ἀληθῆ οἰόµενος, 360c8-d1). If this is the case, it is no wonder that people might think that those 
who associate with tyrants are “wise,” insofar as such men prove capable of using the levers of 
power to their own advantage. Indeed, the Republic is not the only dialogue that exhibits a 
concern that people might admire tyrants. In the Gorgias, for example, Polus and Callicles 
confirm Glaucon’s perception of popular opinion, professing, as they do, admiration for brutal 
tyrants and authoritarian rulers (Polus for Archelaus and Callicles for Xerxes and Darius), men 
who act however they please, safe in the knowledge that power renders irrelevant considerations 
of what is just.593 Polus considers such men to be “happy” (εὐδαίµων, 470d). When Socrates 
																																																								
590 Halliwell 2000: 100-01. 
591 Halliwell 2000: 112. 
592 Halliwell 2000: 100. 
593 Gorg. 471c6-d2, 483d2-7. Here I cannot help but be reminded of Alger Hiss’s admiring comment on the Moscow 
show trials, “Joe Stalin certainly plays for keeps” (Kempton 1955: 37). The infatuation with power and brute force 
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disputes this, Polus responds with a sarcastic tirade about how according to Socrates’ logic, 
Archelaus must be the most wretched of men (ἀθλιώτατος) rather than the happiest 
(εὐδαιµονέστατος), given the multitude of crimes he committed in seizing absolute rule over 
Macedonia, and that Athenians “would prefer to be any other Macedonia than Archelaus” 
(δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος, 471c6-d2). 
The upshot seems clear: tyrants and their friends and associates are the wise ones, the rest 
are dupes and rubes. This notion of “justice,” manifest in both a society’s rules and its prevailing 
discursive practices, is precisely that described by the Athenians in Thucydides’ Melian 
Dialogue: “What is just is arrived at in human discourse when the necessity on both sides is 
equal, and the powerful exact what they can and the weak have to comply” (δίκαια µὲν ἐν τῷ 
ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ 
ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν, 5.89).594 
To the extent the proverb attributed to Euripides (i.e., σοφοὶ τύραννοί τῶν σοφῶν 
συνουσίᾳ) adds further rhetorical heft and poetic authority to such a conception of “justice” – 
irrespective of whether the particular dramatic context in which the phrase appears even supports 
that conception – the proverb and its purported coiner become appropriate targets for one whose 
aim is discursive reform. To accuse Plato of hermeneutical naiveté is to adopt a decidedly one-
dimensional approach to literary criticism – one that looks solely to authorial intent and textual 
context to the exclusion of all else, overlooking the myriad ways in which language can take on 
multiple meanings and be subject to radically divergent interpretations, all depending on the 
audience and the context.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
disclosed by such a comment would seem to contradict whatever egalitarian aspirations an adherent of Marxist 
ideology might claim. 
594 Trans. Hornblower (with modification). 
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It is ironic that Plato, an author who is so often “scripted as a villain by theorists of 
postmodernism” (to borrow Nightingale’s phrase)595 had an approach to hermeneutics that 
expands well beyond the bounds of the relatively circumscribed school of literary interpretation 
that had its origins in American New Criticism. As Halliwell comments, 
If American New Criticism is often singled out as stringently and 
programmatically contextualist, it needs stressing here that there is a much 
broader set of contextualist instincts which have become common to almost all 
literary critics. But this is not, one must insist, because of any timelessly or 
naturally self-evident quality which recommends those instincts, but because (in 
part) of the combined and cumulative effect, over two centuries or more, of 
cultural forces which have increasingly resisted a directly moral, religious, or 
didactic function for the category of literature, and have instead claimed for it a 
status which makes it imaginatively autonomous.596 
 
How language becomes quoted (or “mis”-quoted), used, reused, recycled, re-integrated 
and even transformed over successive iterations is of enormous interest and importance to Plato. 
Plato’s recognition of how particular phrases and sayings have a repercussive effect over time – 
“repercussing” and resounding in different ways, in new and different situations – marks him as 
a sensitive literary critic, one who also understands the moral and ethical dimensions of the use 
and reuse of language with its varying repercussions in different contexts. By first identifying 
just how multi-dimensional and complex Plato’s critical citation and singling out of certain 
extracts from the Greek literary corpus (including proverbs) is, we can begin to comprehend 
better the curious juxtaposition of the words sophoi and kompsoi, which occurs only here in 
Socrates’ condemnation of the Euripidean proverb and in Plato’s Gorgias, as we shall see in a 
moment.597 
																																																								
595 Nightingale 1995: 2. 
596 Halliwell 2000: 111. 
597 While Plato’s Statesman also juxtaposes κοµψός with σοφός, it is only the former that denotes a plural group of 
men, while the latter refers to a statement that the κοµψοί believe to be “something profound” (τι σοφὸν, 284e11-
285a2). See Blank 1991: 24-5, for a good overview of the dialogues in which Plato uses κοµψός.   
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5.2.2. Kompsoi and the “Language Game” 
 
I want to argue that the kompsoi – as that term is used by Plato vis-à-vis the sophoi – are 
those who understand what I described earlier as “the language game,” in the terminology of the 
philosopher Richard Rorty. The way that human beings form their beliefs about, and 
corresponding behavior in, the world around them, is a function of a language game, of 
competing “vocabularies” (e.g., “the vocabulary of ancient Athenian politics versus 
Jefferson’s . . .”).598 Rorty makes the significant point that those vocabularies that prevail in the 
language game create, in turn, “new forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for example, the adoption 
of . . . new social institutions.”599 
To be sure, the language game itself has no definitive terminus. There will always arise 
new vocabularies in new instantiations of the language game that ultimately come to outpace 
other, pre-established vocabularies. There is no final, proverbial “last word” on anything. 
Moreover, Rorty’s postmodern vision of how language operates is strikingly consonant with the 
marked agonistic tradition of Greek literature. As I argued in the previous chapter, the aspiration 
to have the “last word” on a subject, thereby rendering worthless all previous and future literary 
efforts, was widely recognized as futile. Mark Griffith explains that a principal feature of the 
Greek literary agon was “to leave loopholes for possible exceptions, pegs on which to hang 
possible additions, open ends to accommodate codas or modifications desired by particular 
audiences in the light of other existing songs or cult traditions.”600 My claim is that the two times 
that Plato uses the term kompsos expressly juxtaposed with sophos (i.e., in the Republic and 
Gorgias), he is referring to someone who both understands and exploits this dynamic. 																																																								
598 Rorty 1992: 5. See my discussion in Chapters 1.1 and 3.2. 
599 Rorty 1992: 9. 
600 Griffith 1990: 195. See Nagy 1992 for an opposing view with respect to Hesiod’s Theogony. 
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Under this analysis, writers who are kompsoi will come to sugignôskein (“agree with,” 
“have a fellow feeling with,” LSJ, s.v. I, IV) the reason that they and their writings – specifically, 
those writings that are presently at odds with the customs and social institutions that Socrates and 
his companions seek to inculcate in the ideal polis – are not going to be paradekhthênai 
(“received,” “admitted”) into such a society (568b6-7). They recognize the contingency of 
competing vocabularies, operating within the culture’s larger language game and that such a 
game necessarily entails winners and losers. They understand that the best they can hope for is to 
create a linguistic basis for their audiences to think as they have intended them to think. 
Socrates’ use of Euripides in the Republic to illustrate this dynamic is telling, since 
competing Euripidean proverbs within the context of the other sophos-kompsos juxtaposition in 
the Gorgias also assume prominence, specifically, in the allegory of the water-carriers in Hades 
which has received much attention from classical scholars.601 In the Gorgias, Socrates faces a 
challenge similar to that posed by the Euripidean proverb in Book 8 (i.e., σοφοὶ τύραννοί τῶν 
σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ): his opponents, Polus and Callicles, admire tyrants and believe them to be the 
happiest of men. We encounter the sophos-kompsos juxtaposition when Socrates attempts to 
refute Callicles’ claim that for a man to be happy and live correctly, he must allow his appetites 
to become as great as possible and then satisfy them by means of his courage and intelligence (δι' 
ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, 492a1-2), something that a tyrant is uniquely equipped to accomplish. 
Socrates retorts by referencing a proverb, one that appears to be an oft-quoted (λέγονται) piece of 
wisdom reflecting an ascetic ideal of happiness: “So those who are in need of nothing are not 
rightly said to be happy” (Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ µηδενὸς δεόµενοι εὐδαίµονες εἶναι, 
																																																								
601 See, e.g., Linforth 1944; Blank 1991. 
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492e3-4). 602  The phrase οἱ µηδενὸς δεόµενοι εὐδαίµονες is a lovely example of a non-
oppositional proverb with an “equational” aspect (A=B),603 the effect of which is heightened by 
the alliterative assonance of the delta and mu combinations in the phrase’s principal words. We 
might translate Socrates’ proverb-wielding retort idiomatically as, “So, the saying that ‘Happy 
are those who need nothing’ isn’t true after all?” 
This translation facilitates our understanding of Callicles’ deft reply: “No, for in that 
case, corpses and stones would be the happiest of all” (Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ 
εὐδαιµονέστατοι εἶεν, 492e5-6). By a skillful deployment of rhyme in articulating the general 
categories of stones and corpses (λίθοι. . .νεκροὶ), together with the use of another general 
category, “those who are happiest” (εὐδαιµονέστατοι), Callicles subverts Socrates’ proverbial 
wisdom with his own pithy legomenon. His new saying is the equivalent of John Maynard 
Keynes’ famous reformulation of any expression that turns upon the purported benefit of having 
a larger perspective and looking to the proverbial “long run:” “In the long run, we are all 
dead.”604 Callicles has cast Socrates squarely on the side of what is non-feeling, non-human. We 
are witness here to a mini-duel of proverb formation by the two men.605 
Now Socrates responds by quoting a gnomê from Euripides’ Polydius (frag. 638) (492e7-
11):  																																																								
602 Dodds 1959: ad loc., describes how the sentiment contained in this saying can found in collected fragments of 
apothegms attributed to Socrates, which reflect a doctrine not peculiar to Socrates but one that runs from Democritus 
through Epicurus to Lucretius and from Socrates through Antisthenes to the Stoics, who in turn came to have 
influence on the Christian ideal of the saint.  
603 Dundes 1981: 52-3. 
604 Keynes 1923: 80. 
605 Any argument that Callicles’ response does not amount to a stand-alone proverb in its own right would be 
misplaced. Many proverbs are recognizable only because they are responses to and/or modifications of previously 
existing proverbs. A striking example of this is a phrase attributed (perhaps erroneously) to Mahatma Gandhi, “And 
the whole world goes blind”, which can be recognized only in relation to – and as a moral condemnation of – the 
proverbial formulation of the lex talionis in Exodus 21: 24-5: “eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . .” See generally Fischer 
1950: 77. 
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Ἀλλὰ µὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος.   
οὐ γάρ τοι θαυµάζοιµ' ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων –   
τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν µέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, 
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν; 
 
Well then life as you describe it is certainly a strange business. And I wouldn’t 
be surprised then, you know, if Euripides spoke the truth when he said,  
“Who knows, if to be alive in fact is to be dead, 
and to be dead is to be alive?” 
 
The Euripidean gnome here is a splendid example of a chiastic proverb.606 The lines have 
rhythmic balance in the standard binary structure that is so common to proverbs,607 which 
becomes even more elegant with the addition of chiasmus: ABBA: ζῆν – κατθανεῖν – κατθανεῖν 
– ζῆν. The verse may well be Heraclitean or Orphic in origin, and Euripides said the same thing 
in the Phrixos (frag. 833).608 
Socrates’ citation of Euripides here is particularly important because earlier in the 
dialogue during his great rhêsis, Callicles quoted no less than four passages from Euripides’ 
Antiope to demonstrate how Socrates with his philosophizing is akin to the play’s character 
Amphion, lost in self-indulgent thought, whom his brother, Zethus – the archetypal exemplar of 
the “man of action” – summons into the real world of the polis.609 In other words, Callicles had 
used Euripides’ poetic authority to attempt to convince Socrates of just how atopos he is. Now 
Socrates quotes Euripides’ chiastic proverb about how life equals death, which, upon first 
examination, would appear to support Callicles’ claim that “stones and corpses” would be the 																																																								
606 Russo 1983: 124-5, cites as a “prize specimen” of a chiastic proverb that quoted by Aristotle in his Rhetoric: οὐ 
δεῖ . . . φιλεῖν ὡς µισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον µισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας – “Don’t love as one who is going to hate, but 
hate as one who is going to love” (1395a26-7). 
607 See, e.g., Russo 1983: 124: hina gar deos, entha kai aidôs – “where there’s fear, there is also shame.”  
608 Linforth 1944: 295. 
609 Gorg. 484e2-486a3. The lines that read “Each man shines in and eagerly pursues – allotting the greatest share of 
the day to it – that in which he discovers himself to be best of all” (λαµπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' 
ἐπείγεται νέµων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡµέρας τούτῳ µέρος, ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν, 484e2-7) were cited 
frequently in antiquity, a fact that speaks to the authority and influence of the passage, which arguably constitutes a 
proverb. See Dodds 1959: ad loc. Nightingale 1995: 69-87, provides an extensive analysis of how Plato uses the 
entire tragedy of Euripides’ Antiope as a subtext for the philosophical drama of the Gorgias. 
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happiest if one subscribes to what Callicles believes is the erroneous view represented by 
Socrates’ proverb that “Happiest are those who need nothing.” 
Socrates, however, is not yet finished. First he segues directly from the Euripidean 
proverb to a supporting quotation by a “wise man” (sophos) (493a1-5):  
καὶ ἡµεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναµεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς 
νῦν ἡµεῖς τέθναµεν καὶ τὸ µὲν σῶµά ἐστιν ἡµῖν σῆµα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ 
ἐπι	θυµίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ µεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω . . . . 
 
And perhaps we are actually dead. For I once heard from one of the wise men 
how we are now dead and the body is our tomb, and the part of the soul in which 
desires are, happens to be the sort that can be swayed and shifts up and down . . . 
 
The phrase τὸ µὲν σῶµά ἐστιν ἡµῖν σῆµα is possibly a Pythagorean or Orphic formulation.610 
The parallelism of the rhyming σῶµά—σῆµα and brevity of the phrase mark it as proverbial. 
Socrates has apparently reinforced his citation of Euripides’ chiastic proverb with yet another 
proverb from the wisdom tradition of the sages (του . . . τῶν σοφῶν). Just as to be alive is in fact 
to be dead, so too is the body our tomb. However, as we shall see, the unnamed sophos’ 
elaboration of his enigmatic proverb contains the basis for overturning Callicles’ previous 
undermining of Socrates’ ascetic adage (i.e., “Happiest are they who need nothing”): the sophos 
characterizes the part of the soul where the desires reside as “the sort that can be swayed and 
shifts up and down” (ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ µεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω). 
Now Socrates turns from his unnamed sophos to the famous allegory of the water carriers 
in Hades by quoting another nameless figure, this time a kompsos (493a5-b7): 
καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις µυθολογῶν κοµψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, 
παράγων τῷ ὀνόµατι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόµασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ 
ἀνοήτους ἀµυήτους, τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυµίαι εἰσί, τὸ 
ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρηµένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν 
ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου 
																																																								
610 Linforth 1944: 296. 
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– τὸ ἀιδὲς δὴ λέγων – οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν, οἱ ἀµύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν 
τετρηµένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρηµένῳ κοσκίνῳ. 
 
And this [i.e., the part of the soul where the desires are located] a certain 
mythologizing, clever man, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian, by misleading with 
the name, on account of both its “persuasive” and “convincing” nature, deemed it 
a “jar,” and the “ignorant” the “uninitiated,” and that part of the soul of the 
ignorant where the desires are – unrestrained and unable to hold water – he 
likened to a perforated jar, because of its inability to be filled. Indeed, this man, 
Callicles, opposite to you, demonstrates how those in Hades – meaning “the 
unseen” – may well be the most miserable, and they bear water into the perforated 
jar from another such perforated sieve.611 
 
By dint of the kompsos’ wordplay, Socrates regains the upper hand and preserves the 
force of his initial proverb, albeit it in a parable as opposed to a proverb, while at the same time 
demonstrating the bankruptcy of Callicles’ estimation of an orator’s power and offering a meta-
commentary on how the “language game” is played. Let me explain. The kompsos’ skillful 
wordplay lies in the fact that the phrase πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν does not strictly conform to the 
sophos’ elaboration of his aphorism, namely, that the part of our soul where the emotions are 
located is “the sort that can be swayed and shifts up and down” (ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ 
µεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω). On the contrary, taken in their most natural sense, the words πιθανόν τε 
καὶ πειστικὸν, which the kompsos uses to describe this same part of the soul, both mean 
“persuasive” as opposed to “credulous and suggestible” as numerous translators and 
																																																								
611 It is possible that the reference to “some Italian or Sicilian” (Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός), coupled with the mention of 
the “uninitiated” (ἀµυήτους), is Plato’s means of drawing attention to the Pythagorean and/or Orphic origins of the 
myth, since the Pythagoreans came from Italy and there were Orphic “initiations.” (I am grateful to Andrea 
Nightingale for this observation.) However, contrary to Linforth 1944, I am reluctant to hazard a conjecture on any 
specific reference intended in Socrates’ description of the κοµψὸς ἀνήρ as a Sicilian or Italian other than to note that 
it gives the account a greater hint of realism. Any good story ought to contain references to particular locations and 
details that render the account less than generic. If the reference happens to conjure notions in the audience’s mind 
of Pythagoreans, who came from Italy, or the fact that two of the dialogues main characters, Polus and Gorgias, are 
Sicilian, so much the better. The poet Joseph Brodsky’s take on overuse of this practice is instructive, as outlined in 
Brodsky’s famous apostrophic Letter to Horace 1995: 443: “It seems to me that you were all overdoing it a bit with 
the references; they often strike one as filler. Although euphonically of course they – the Greek ones especially – do 
marvels for the texture.” 
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commentators have rendered them.612 The latter meaning is obtained by taking πιθανόν in the 
passive sense and translating πειστικὸν as the equivalent of πειστὸν, which Dodds confesses he 
“is strongly tempted to write.”613 As David Blank explains, the difference between the two 
meanings allows us to understand the two different descriptions of the soul that they represent as 
corresponding respectively to Socrates’ and Callicles’ view of the orator: whereas Callicles 
believes an orator to be “persuasive,” with πιθανόν taken in the active sense (together with 
πειστικὸν), Socrates sees him as easily “persuadable,” with πιθανόν taken in the passive sense – 
in other words, he is subject to the whim of the mob because he must say whatever pleases 
them.614  
Moreover, it is by “playing with the name” (παράγων τῷ ὀνόµατι) of πιθανόν that the 
kompsos – in my interpretation, someone who understands the dynamics of Rorty’s language 
game – analogizes a leaky “jar” (πίθος) to the appetitive part of the soul, which in turn serves as 
the basis for the allegory of the water carriers, the meaning of which is precisely the opposite 
(τοὐναντίον) of Callicles’ position. Of course, if rendered grammatically correct, the phrase 
πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν, means “persuasive and convincing” and thereby undermines the 
sophos’ view of the appetitive part of the soul as “the sort that can be swayed and shifts up and 
down” (ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ µεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω), a position which is essential to the 
formulation of the water carrier allegory. But it is the dual meaning of πιθανόν with its contrary 
active and passive senses and the proximity of πειστικὸν to πειστὸν that allows us to see the skill 
of a kompsos, who is able, on the one hand, to exploit the ambiguity of πιθανόν to create the 
water carrier myth while on the other, highlighting the enormous difference between Socrates’ 																																																								
612 Dodds 1959: ad loc. 
613 Dodds 1959: ad loc. 
614 Blank 1991: 26-7. 
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and Callicles’ respective visions of the orator, all the while offering a meta-commentary on the 
language game. Indeed, one could go further and argue that the Janus-faced nature of πιθανόs, 
with its active and passive meanings, is itself Plato’s linguistic representation of something that 
shifts to and fro (µεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω) depending on a skillful author’s deployment of the 
adjective.615 The kompsos understands how words can be manipulated because of their ambiguity 
and reconfigured in different contexts, thereby creating new “vocabularies” in Rorty’s sense of 
the term, that can underpin new ways of thinking and behavior.616 It may even result that words 
used in new and different contexts take on new meanings that are contrary to those meanings 
represented in their prior usage. 
Turning back to the Republic and Socrates’ seeming blame of a Euripidean gnome (σοφοὶ 
τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ, 568b1) for the widespread belief that one acts wisely in 
becoming a willing associate of a tyrant, we can better understand Plato’s larger meaning, 
notwithstanding what might initially appear to be hermeneutical naiveté. Euripides is a member 
of those who qualify as sophoi, the tragedians (σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ, 568b5-6). 
Indeed, Euripides is even described as the best of the tragedians (ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ, 
568a9), a compliment that arguably is attributable to his reputation as sententiis densus. Such 
sophoi as Euripides, writers who by their mastery of language succeed in authoring numerous 
legomena that come to have an impact on how people think and behave, will surely understand 
																																																								
615 I am grateful to Kathryn Morgan for this observation. 
616 I see as a potential over-simplification Blank’s characterization of Plato’s view of the kompsos as usually 
“derogatory” (Blank 1991: 24). While Plato may well object to what Blank describes as a kompsos’ “tricky brand of 
philosophizing, opposed to truth,” Plato’s use of the term in the contexts I describe seems to reveal something more 
nuanced than a univocal condemnation. Moreover, the conception of “truth” that underlies Blank’s phrase “opposed 
to truth” would seem to be at odds both with the thinking of philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn and Mary 
Hesse who have argued that scientific revolutions are “metaphoric redescriptions” of nature, not “insights into the 
intrinsic nature of nature” and with Nietzsche’s definition of “truth” as “a mobile army of metaphors.” Such ways of 
conceiving “truth” are critical to Rorty’s notion of the language game and its competing vocabularies, over which I 
maintain Plato’s kompsos enjoys a knowing command. See Rorty 1989: 16-17.  
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that the intended meanings of their legomena may well alter and metamorphose in changing 
circumstances and new, different contexts, if such men are also kompsoi – that is, those who 
understand the contingency of language and who are themselves superbly skilled in formulating 
their own competing vocabularies, replete with eminently quotable proverbs and gnômai, so as to 
participate fully in their culture’s larger language game.617 
We can now better understand why Socrates uses the participial form of κοµψεύω, i.e., 
κοµψευσάµενος, to describe in Book 6 the man who coined the objectionable proverb about how 
“wise men go to the doors of the rich” (τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, 489b7-
8). Such men are Plato’s rivals, able competitors in the language game, the ultimate aim of which 
is to create new vocabularies that win the hearts and minds of the Athenian public. If Plato’s 
utopian aspirations are to be realized, the new “vocabulary” that he coins, the new genre of 
philosophy, must prevail over the vocabularies of his kompsoi competitors.  
Throughout much of Plato’s corpus we find numerous instances of what Kathryn Morgan 
describes as “the obtrusive layering of multiple sources.”618 In the Gorgias’ allegory of the water 
carriers, for example, we start with a proverb from Euripides about the possible inversion of life 
and death, quoted also in order to match Callicles’ earlier appeal to Euripides’ Antiope, then 
move on to the legomenon of a “wise man” (σοφός) which parallels the Euripidean gnome, and 
finally to the speculations of a kompsos that seem to be allegorical and are based on a kind of 
wordplay. Morgan is understandably skeptical of whether these “three approaches . . . 
necessarily form part of a cohesive whole,” particularly since Socrates himself signals the 																																																								
617 One should resist the temptation to equate the kompsoi with the sophistoi, although there are no doubt overlaps 
between the two categories. Plato’s list of sophists, culled from the dialogues, is relatively short: Protagoras, 
Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and Miccus. Nowhere is Euripides held out as a 
potential candidate for inclusion in their ranks. Moreover, as numerous scholars such as Hakan Tell have argued in 
recent years, the “workings of language” were not the “exclusive interest” of the sophists, nor had the subject “gone 
unexplored by earlier practitioners of wisdom” (Tell 2011: 10). See also Griffith 1990: 187; Kerferd 1981: 71. 
618 Morgan: forthcoming. 
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oddness of the material by calling it atopa.619 I propose, however, that we view such “obtrusive 
layering” as Plato’s illustration of various and varied sayings, phrases, verbal formulations – a 
virtual flotsam and jetsam of linguistic material – all vying for prominence in the larger language 
game, represented in miniature within the Platonic dialogue. Instructive here is Adi Ophir’s 
observation that  
Platonic dialogue brings to the surface of discourse what is so often forbidden – 
perhaps never again allowed – to appear there: the struggle to establish a new 
order within discourse, a strife for every discursive practice, the power invested in 
the process of establishing and maintaining discourse as a set of rules, 
differentiations and exclusions.620 
 
Indeed, the final section of Book 8 of the Republic contains varied citations from multiple 
sources. For example, as Socrates and his interlocutors explore how a democracy devolves into a 
tyranny, there occurs what appears to be an almost free association of phrases within less than 
two Stephanus pages, as the men somewhat randomly cycle through various legomena that 
concern democratic ideology. First we have a “saying” (ῥῆμα) that amounts to a political truism, 
one that Glaucon and Adeimantus claim to have heard everywhere (Λέγεται γὰρ δή . . . καὶ πολὺ 
τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆµα, 562c3): “In a [democracy] alone is it worthwhile for a man, who is free by 
nature, to live” (ἐν µόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος, 562c1-2). Then Socrates 
employs metaphor in describing how the “democratic city, thirsting for [the wine of] liberty 
obtains evil cupbearers and becomes intoxicated on too much of that unmixed [wine]” 
(δηµοκρατουµένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, καὶ 
πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς µεθυσθῇ, 562c8-d2), an image that will have a lasting 
																																																								
619 Morgan: forthcoming; See Grg. 493c3-4: ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς µέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα . . .  
620 Ophir 1991: 6. 
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Nachleben among later authors, historians, and social critics.621 This adage then metamorphoses 
into a variation on a prophecy from Hesiod about the ruin of the Iron Race, where instead of 
Hesiod’s foreshadowing of fathers no longer resembling their sons and sons their fathers,622 
Socrates claims that a democracy is actually the sort of regime where “a father is accustomed to 
become like his son and fears his sons, and the son becomes like the father and dishonors and 
does not revere his parents, in order that he should become a free man” (πατέρα µὲν ἐθίζεσθαι 
παιδὶ ὅµοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑεῖς, ὑὸν δὲ πατρί, καὶ µήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι µήτε 
δεδιέναι τοὺς γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖ, 562e7-9). This adage-in-reverse of Hesiod’s prophecy 
then moves by way of a saying attributed to Aeschylus – “Shall we not say whatever rises to our 
lips” (Οὐκοῦν ἐροῦµεν ὅτι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόµα; 563c1-2)?623 – to a self-described “proverb” 
(κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν): “dogs literally become like their mistresses” (ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἵ τε κύνες . . . 
οἷαίπερ αἱ δέσποιναι γίγνονταί, 563c6).624 Plato is no doubt demonstrating the discursive 
manifestations of poikilia, with its connotation of neverending variety and unrestraint, that is a 
hallmark of democratic forms of government in his estimation. “Shall we not say whatever rises 
to our lips,” indeed. And yet, additional purchase is gained by recognizing that this virtual free 
fall of phrases further illumines the dynamic of competing vocabularies in play for a larger hold 
on the public imagination. It is a mark of Plato’s writerly genius that his illustration of this 
dynamic achieves almost slapstick proportions. It is as if the interlocutors are introducing the 
																																																								
621 See, eg., Livy 39.26: velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem”; Seneca, De benfic. 1.10: 
male dispensata libertas; H. Taine Letter, Jan. 2, 1867: “ nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’egalité . . .  C’est un vin 
pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre.”  
622 Op. 182: οὐδὲ πατὴρ παίδεσσιν ὁµοίιος οὐδέ τι παῖδες. 
623 TrGF 351: (ὅ τι) νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόµα (trans. Shorey with modification). 
624 Adam 1980: ad loc., interestingly, notes how a traveller in modern Greece will be reminded of “the ‘democratic 
dogs’ of Peloponnesian villages.” He explains that “the proverb was οἷαίπερ ἡ δέσποινα, τοία χά κύων (Schol.), and 
meant ὄτι ὁποία δέσποινα, τοιαύτη καὶ ἡ θεραπαινίς ‘like mistress, like maid.’ Plato takes κύων literally: hence 
ἀτεχνῶς” (citation omitted). 
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various legomena one after another in the comedic manner of “Hey, have you heard the old 
saying about so and so?” 
Indeed, as Book 8 closes, Socrates uses one of the most familiar of all proverbs, still in 
currency to this day, in describing how the need to support the tyrant’s bodyguard of slaves will 
impoverish a city: “Out of the frying pan and into the fire.” Moreover, in doing this, he appends 
a reformulation of a proverb from Pindar that we first witnessed Cephalus use in Book 1, 625 
characterizing Hope as a heart-fostering nurse of old age (569b6-c2): 
Πατραλοίαν λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ 
ὁµολογουµένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί, τὸ λεγόµενον, ὁ δῆµος φεύγων ἂν 
καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐµπεπτωκὼς εἴη 
 
You mean the tyrant would be a parricide and a “harsh nurse of old age,” and 
since it seems that this would be tyranny without question, then, as the old saying 
goes, the demos fleeing the smoke of servitude to free men would have fallen into 
the fire of the despotism of slaves . . . 
 
It is an open question whether the saying “out of the smoke, into the fire” achieved in 
Plato’s time the clichéd status that its modern analogue enjoys today, although Leutsch and 
Schneidewin’s citation of numerous instances of its use certainly is evidence of a fair degree of 
prominence.626 However, Plato’s coupling of the proverb with a perverse reformulation of the 
Pindaric gnome to close out what has been a nearly comic cavalcade of sayings in Socrates’ 
tracing the decline and devolution of timocracy all the way into tyranny illustrates well the 
seemingly random interplay of legomena, all vying to achieve a quasi-permanent discursive 
foothold. Just as governments prove unstable, so too is the discourse that underlies such polities. 
By Plato’s portrayal of these various sayings all coming to the fore within the different contexts 
that Socrates and his interlocutor use them and their various iterations, we are able to witness the 																																																								
625 331a6-9; Pindar, frag. 214 Maehler: γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν / ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ / ἐλπὶς ἃ µάλιστα 
θνατῶν πολύστροφον / γνώµαν κυβερνᾷ. See my discussion in Chapter 2.2. 
626 Leutsch and Schneidewin 1839: 314. 
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instability of discourse as competing vocabularies jockey with one another for lasting influence. 
Plato seems to demonstrate a self-reflexive understanding that all writing, his own included, is 
necessarily contingent and subject to the language game. 
Of course, Plato is himself a willing and able competitor in the discursive agon, ready to 
best the competing sophoi and kompsoi at their own game. He also allows the sensitive reader to 
glimpse his own authorial self-reflexivity with respect to competing in that game. In Chapter 
Five, I argued that Plato audaciously integrates elements of Hesiod’ famous “two-roads” gnome, 
which subsequently became the single most-quoted proverb in antiquity, to create the image of 
the Cave, the single most famous analogy in all of Western philosophy. In Book 9, we find a 
seemingly self-reflexive reference to that literary creation on Plato’s part, signaled by a proverb 
and, once again, with a reference to something overheard from one of the “wise men” (τῶν 
σοφῶν τινος, 583b5). To a couple of “victories” that Socrates describes in which a just man 
triumphs over the unjust, Socrates adds another, indeed, the “greatest” (µέγιστον) and “most 
decisive” (κυριώτατον) triumph. More importantly, he does so by what the scholiast describes as 
a proverb (παροιµία): “the third [victory] in Olympian fashion to the savior and to Olympian 
Zeus” (τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυµπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυµπίῳ Διί, 583b2-3) – a phrase Plato uses 
on occasion to introduce the third or culminating stage in an argument or demonstration and 
which became proverbial.627 The mere use of the proverbial τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, i.e., the third 
libation poured at banquets to Zeus Soter, alone would be interesting enough, but Socrates (read 
Plato) then links it with what seems to be a reference to a previous saying of his own: the third, 
greatest triumph is that “any pleasure other than that of the intelligence is not altogether real or 
pure but is a sort of shadow-painting, as I seem to have heard from a certain wise man” (οὐδὲ 																																																								
627 See, e.g., Phlb. 66d4; Charm. 167a9; Lg. 692a3; Adam 1980: ad loc.; Jowett and Campbell 1894: ad loc.; Greene 
1938: 116. 
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παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίµου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφηµένη 
τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ µοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι, 583b). This seems a thinly veiled reference to 
Plato’s Socrates’ own description of the cave and the shadows cast upon its walls, an image 
starkly juxtaposed with the light of intelligence, which triumphs over the ignorance possessed by 
a cave-dweller in the manner of an Olympic victor, deserving of the proverbial τὸ τρίτον τῷ 
σωτῆρι.628 Socrates (read Plato) is quoting himself. Socrates (Plato) himself is the unnamed 
sophos, drawing reference to his own contribution to the literary agon. He is creating his own 
brand of proverbial wisdom. Getting quoted and cited is precisely how proverbial wisdom is 
generated in the first place and is, in turn, how it comes to be handed down to posterity. One is 
reminded of the mistaken attribution of the flawed definition of justice, “Just it is, to render to 
each what is owed him” to Simonides in Book 1.629 The act of attribution is part and parcel of 
proverbial constructions, and Plato is ensuring that his own proverbs are already in a state of 
attribution, even if only by his own writerly hand.  
Moreover, he reveals how he is “playing” in the language game of constructing a new 
vocabulary, the genre of philosophy, to outpace his rivals. During a discussion of which of the 
three types of human beings – that is, the lover of wealth (φιλοκερδής), the lover of honor/lover 
of victory (φιλότιµος/φιλόνικος), and the lover of wisdom (φιλόσοφος), each of whom 
corresponds to one of the three different parts of the soul – might possess the “instrument of 
judgment (ὀργάνου κρίνεσθαι),” Socrates makes a bold claim. Since it is “by means of discourse 
that judgment must be reached (διὰ λόγων. . .δεῖν κρίνεσθαι),” and “discourse is especially the 
instrument of the philosopher (Λόγοι δὲ τούτου [φιλοσόφου] µάλιστα ὄργανον),” it is the 
																																																								
628 Of Plato’s commentators, Stallbaum and Wilamowitz agree with my reading, Jowett and Shorey disagree (ad 
loc.).  
629 Resp. 331d4-e4. 
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philosopher’s judgments (κρινόµενα) that will be the most valid and true (ἀληθέστατα).630 For 
the other two types of people, “wealth and profit” (πλοῦτος καὶ κέρδος) and “victory and 
courage” (νίκη καὶ ἀνδρεία) are, respectively, the criteria by which judgment of anything is 
determined. In other words, Plato valorizes language and discourse (λόγοι) over competing 
criteria (e.g., riches, military triumphs) by which society determines the worth of anything, and 
claims that logos falls especially within the province of the philosopher. It is the philosopher who 
we may suppose is best equipped to use language and to construct discourse that will have a 
lasting and salutary societal impact.  
A philosopher grasps better than most the proverb that “more malleable than wax is 
speech” (εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ. . .λόγος, 588d1-2), which Glaucon introduces when Socrates 
begins to construct toward the close of Book 9 “an image of the soul in speech” (εἰκόνα 
πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, 588b10), an image that conjoins a many-headed beast with both a 
man and a lion. Glaucon’s phrase falls under the heading of what paroemiologists label an 
oppositional proverb that is “contrastive” as opposed to an oppositional proverb that relies on a 
strict negation of any identification.631 Compare, for example “Blood is thicker than water” 
(oppositional—contrastive) to “Two wrongs don’t make a right” (oppositional—strict-negation). 
Both Cicero and Pliny the Younger would later appropriate the contrastive image in Glaucon’s 
phrase.632  
Here, Plato is simultaneously depicting a philosopher’s aptitude for constructing 
memorable images, such as the tripartite nature of the soul, while also self-reflexively noting via 
the proverb how creating such images requires one to mold language like wax. This is how a 																																																								
630 Resp 582b7-e9. 
631 Dundes 1981: 54. 
632 See Cic De or. 3.45: sicut mollisimam ceram . . . fingimus; Pliny, Epist. 7.9: ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque 
sequatur. See also Shorey 1982: 401. 
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writer constructs discourse consonant with the ideal of the polis envisioned in the Republic, an 
ideal which Socrates expressly contrasts with what he describes, interestingly, as yet another 
“saying” (λεγόµενον) – indeed, the very saying with which the men’s entire dialogic endeavor 
began and which has brought them to this point (τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἥκοµεν): It is 
none other than “the saying that ‘it profits a perfectly unjust man, who seems to be just, to 
commit injustice’” (λεγόµενον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως µὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζοµένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ, 
588b2-4).633 Plato has to best such “sayings” with his own discourse if he is to have any hope of 
seeing his utopian aspirations realized. In Plato’s narrative, it is, not surprisingly, the philosopher 
who demonstrates the capability to mold language, “more malleable than wax,” to create 
memorable new images that will ultimately have a lasting impact on how Western thought will 
henceforth conceive of the soul. It is the philosopher who is just the man to outpace his rivals in 
the language game, as Plato reveals with his self-reflexive proverb. 
The stakes in this particular language game could not be higher. As Glaucon and Socrates 
recognize at the close of Book 9 when they consider the odds faced in actually achieving the 
ideal polis that they seek, their reformed polity necessarily “resides in discourse” (τῇ ἐν λόγοις 
κειµένῃ) since it is found “nowhere on earth” (γῆς γε οὐδαµοῦ, 592a10-b1). Reform and 
discourse are inextricable, and laying the discursive foundation for a reformed polis is a tall 
order. Moreover, Socrates does not fail to recognize the contingency of discursive practice, 
including that to which he and his interlocutors aspire in laying the discursive foundation for the 
new, ideal polis: “It doesn’t matter whether it exists now or ever will exist” (διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν 
εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται). What matters is that for the one who “aspires to see it and establish 
himself there” (τῷ βουλοµένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν), such a person “will take 
																																																								
633 Trans. Shorey (with modification). 
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part in the practices of only this city and no other” (τὰ γὰρ ταύτης µόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ 
οὐδεµιᾶς, 592b2-5). Such a position is very close to Rorty’s view of the intertwined 
contingencies of community and language: “If the demands of a morality are the demands of a 
language, and if languages are historical contingencies . . . then to ‘stand unflinchingly for one’s 
moral convictions’ is a matter of identifying oneself with such a contingency.”634 Put differently, 
the choice among competing discourses and fidelity to that which is ultimately chosen is of 
paramount importance to both the individual and the society which she and her fellow citizens 
comprise. 
 
5.2.3. Refusing to Banish Discourse with the Power to Charm (κηλεῖν, ἐπᾷδειν) 
 
By recognizing that Plato demonstrates the contingency of language throughout his text – 
in significant part by foregrounding proverbs – and, further, that such contingency necessarily 
affects the function of discourse in a society and its prevailing (but by no means permanent) 
mores, we can better grasp Book 10’s famous motif of the banishment of poetry, as well as that 
motif’s curious epilogue which appears to imagine a continuing engagement with poetry, even in 
the ideal polis.635 To be fair, Socrates does not actually banish (ἀποστέλλειν, 607b3) all poetry 
and all poets but, rather, allows an exception for religious hymns and encomia in praise of good 
men to be admitted into Kallipolis (µόνον ὕµνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώµια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως 
παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν, 607a2-4).636 Nonetheless, the proscription against existing poetry appears 
																																																								
634 Rorty 1989: 60 (quoting Sandel 1984: 8). 
635 607a1-608b2. Halliwell 2011: 180, 183, 190, deems this section an “epilogue” to the discussion of poetry’s 
banishment from the ideal state – indeed, an epilogue that is “remarkable yet relatively neglected.” 
636 There is also the matter of the ban’s encompassing as much of poetry that is mimetic in character (Τὸ µηδαµῇ 
παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση µιµητική, 595a5). This proscription would seem to conflict with the allowance made in 
Book 3 for certain passages of mimetic poetry – e.g., Odysseus’ stirring self-admonition, “Bear up heart of mine. 
For you have endured far worse than this” (τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης, Resp. 390d5 and Od. 
20.18) – and the poet who “imitates the discourse of a good man (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν µιµοῖτο, 398b1-2). I leave 
aside, however, this controversy over precisely how Book 10’s sense of mimesis squares with that discussed in Book 
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to be all but total. As Penelope Murray concludes, “What is clear . . . is that no existing poetry is 
acceptable (600e4-601c): all the great works of Greek literature are to be excluded.”637  
In recent years, however, scholars have begun to reassess what was formerly considered 
Plato’s uniformly hostile and monolithic antipathy towards poetry, as seemingly reflected in the 
banishment motif.638 Of these, Stephen Halliwell stands out in particular for the depth of his 
nuanced and highly sensitive reading of that motif. Halliwell argues that the verdict of exile “is 
dramatically undercut . . . by Socratic gestures of hesitation and ambivalence, in fact by 
indications of lingering if equivocal ‘love’ of poetry.”639 Yet even Halliwell remains perplexed 
by Socrates’ exclusion of the tragedians (presented at the close of Book 8, discussed above) “on 
the bizarre grounds that they praise tyranny,” as articulated in the proverb from Euripides (i.e., 
σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ, 568b1).640  But if such a verse is quoted (as I 
explained earlier) for the purpose of arguing that intelligent people always ensure that they are 
allied with those in power, the verse becomes in effect both a generalizing statement about how 
the world operates by a Machiavellian politics and an imperative that one act accordingly, i.e., 
expediently rather than morally. In other words, the verse becomes a proverb that affirms the 
practices of a society ruled by a tyrant. Such a reading might seem wildly at odds with the 
original textual context in which the Euripidean gnome first appeared, but as Adeimantus 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
3, given that by the time we reach 10.603b4-c9, all ποίησις appears to be a form of µιµητική which is to be banned. 
As Halliwell 2011: 184, n. 54, observes, at this juncture “it is hard to see any difference between mimetic poetry and 
poetry tout court.” Moreover, the personification of poetry in the epilogue to the banishment motif (in particular at 
607c4-5) seems to conceive of nearly all poetry as mimetic: ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ µίµησις. 
637 Murray 1997: 229. Gould 1992: 17, puts it even more severely: Plato’s “aim is directed not at the marginal, the 
allegedly outrageous fringe art-works that offend his moral sensibility, but at the entire literary heritage, including 
all its master-works, from the Iliad onwards to the greatest masterpieces of fifth-century tragedy” (cited by Murray). 
638 Halliwell 2011: 180-181, n. 45-46, provides an excellent summary of the state of the scholarship regarding 
readings of the banishment motif. 
639 Halliwell 2011: 180. 
640 Halliwell 2011: 180, n. 44. 
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demonstrates in Book 2 with his claim that people use Hesiod’s “two roads” proverb to justify 
taking the easy road to vice rather than the hard road to virtue, it is the reception of a quotation, 
together with its appropriation and re-use in a new and different context, that is ultimately 
determinative. Halliwell himself rightly emphasizes that for Plato what matters is “the external 
context of ethical reception and influence.”641 We can, however, go further still, using Euripides’ 
(perhaps mis-interpreted) proverb as a jumping-off point for a larger reflection on the ambiguity 
inherent in Plato’s proposed banishment of poetry. 
The seductive power of language framed in compelling modes of discourse – e.g., 
language enhanced with poetic features lending further memorability and authority to proverbial 
phrases such as Euripides’ own – cannot be underestimated. Indeed, in Book 10, Socrates cites 
the experience of being bewitched by poetry (κηλεῖσθαι, 607c7-8). As Halliwell observes, the 
word group of kêlein and kêlêsis was long associated in Greek thought with the psychotropic 
powers of poetry and song – powers that are usually thought to receive a “negative or uncertain 
shading in Plato’s work” insofar as they suggest a “non-rational susceptibility to the emotionally 
spellbinding qualities of language or music.”642 
Not surprisingly, then, one needs to be on guard (εὐλαβητέον, 608a7) given such power 
and given the contingency of rival vocabularies competing for dominance in the language game. 
As Rorty explains, anyone who is aware of the contingency of discourse and its overarching 
importance to the constitution of both a healthy society and a healthy individual, necessarily 
worries that she “has been taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process 
of socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given 
her the wrong language and so turned her into the wrong kind of human being.” Moreover, such 																																																								
641 Halliwell 2000: 112. 
642 Halliwell 2011: 196. 
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an individual thinks of “vocabularies as poetic achievements rather than as fruits of diligent 
inquiry according to antecedently formulated criteria.”643 
Such thinking mirrors that of Socrates in Book 10, when he worries about allowing the 
“honeyed Muse” (τὴν ἡδυσµένην Μοῦσαν) to rule as a king (βασιλύειν) instead of “that 
discourse which from time to time appears best in general” (τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι 
βελτίστου λόγου, 607a5-8). Particularly striking here is Socrates’ express recognition that the 
axiological component of any vocabulary (signified in this passage by the term βελτίστου) is 
necessarily contingent on how society as whole understands (or ultimately comes to understand) 
in common (κοινῇ) that vocabulary. Simon Goldhill makes the intriguing observation that the 
adverb κοινῇ (“in general” or “in common”) in this passage serves as a reminder of the backdrop 
to Plato’s text of democratic Athens, thereby suggesting the customary formula for recording 
state decisions: ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ και τῷ δηµῷ.644 
Put differently, Socrates’ view of the manner in which discourse operates in society 
makes no exceptions for the ideal polis. The vocabularies which come to prevail will ultimately 
be those approved within the context of the larger community, as signified by the adverb koinê. 
Such a view is remarkably consonant with Rorty’s vision of how language works in relation to 
society: “What binds societies together are common vocabularies” and, accordingly, “progress, 
for the community as for the individual, is a matter of using new words as well as arguing from 
premises phrased in old words . . .”645 Indeed, the fact that Socrates imagines the ideal state – 
what he calls here “the well-ordered polity” (πόλις εὐνοµουµένη) – as  necessarily subject to the 
contingencies of discourse like any other state, would seemingly afford justification for the 																																																								
643 Rorty 1989: 75, 76. Rorty calls such a person a “liberal ironist.” 
644 Goldhill 1991: 175; Murray 2008: ad loc., 230. 
645 Rorty 1989: 48, 86. 
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position held by many scholars that Plato’s text prescibes poetry’s banisment tout court. If 
building a community – and we should remember that this occurs en logois, as the close of Book 
9 makes clear – and whatever progress that community achieves is a function of “using words,” 
why should Socrates not banish discourse that is not salutary in his estimation, including 
whatever poetry he finds harmful, irrespective of the how broad or narrow the proscription 
ultimately turns out to be? However, as the epilogue reveals, outright banishment of even the 
poetry specifically targeted is a step that Socrates is simply unwilling to take. On the contrary, he 
expressly contemplates the possibility that he and his interlocutors would “gladly admit” 
(ἄσµενοι ἄν καταδέχοιντο) even poetry that is “pleasurable and mimetic” (ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν 
ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ µίµησις) into their “well-ordered state” (ἐν πόλει εὐνοµουµένῃ) if such poetry can 
provide some reason for her admission (τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν, 607c4-6). Moreover, he advises 
that even if such poetry is not able to mount a defense on her own behalf (δ' ἂν µὴ οἵα τ' ᾖ 
ἀπολογήσασθαι), he and his fellows will continue to listen to her (ἀκροσαόµεθ' αὐτῆς, 608a2-3), 
as we shall see shortly. 
Why does Socrates envision poetry’s continued presence in the ideal polity? It is because, 
he explains, “We know intimately that we have been bewitched by her” (ὡς σύνισµέν γε ἡµῖν 
αὐτοῖς κηλουµένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς, 607c6-7). Now this is an extremely strange rationale. To cite the 
bewitching power of poetry as the very reason not to banish poetry outright would seem to be the 
precise opposite of what the Republic has traditionally been interpreted to aver, and not without 
reason. Earlier in Book 10, Socrates had singled out kêlêsis (“bewitchment”) as responsible for 
people’s misguided belief that what they hear the poets “color with words and phrases” (τοῖς 
ὀνόµασι καὶ ῥήµασιν ἐπιχρωµατίζειν, 601a5-6) actually amounts to authoritative truth on any 
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subject.646 However, one is reminded here that a vast number of proverbs qualify in large part as 
proverbs precisely because of their poetic, figurative language. It follows then that to outlaw, in 
effect, a writer’s (or speaker’s) efforts to make language more vivid – to paraphrase Socrates’ 
terminology, more “colorful” – by using certain “words and phrases” that “color” discourse, 
would entail the abolition of great deal of proverbial wisdom, in addition to poetry itself. It 
would also result in a more philistine and boorish world, devoid in large part of artistry, which 
Socrates acknowledges when he divulges his fear that he and his companions will be accused 
(καταγνωσθῆναι) of “coarseness and rusticity” (σκληρότητα. . . καὶ ἀγροικία, 607b4-5) if they 
exile poetry from their ideal polis. 647  
Accordingly, contrary to such a strict and austere vision of society, poetry, personified as 
a defendant in court of law (and an alluring female at that, even though women did not appear in 
Athenian courts), is granted the right to make a defense speech (ἀπολογεῖσθαι) and, moreover, 
one that is in “lyric or any other meter” (ἐν µέλει ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ µέτρῳ, 607d3-4). Additionally, 
poetry’s “advocates” (προστάται) are permitted to make a defense on her behalf without any 
poetic embellishment (ἄνευ µέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, 607d7-8). Socrates and his 
companions “will gladly listen” (εὐµενῶς ἀκούεσθαι) because they “will profit” (κερδανεῖν) if 
poetry proves not only to be “pleasurable” (ἡδεῖα) but also “beneficial” (ὠφελίµη) for both “the 
state and for human living” (πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν (607d9-e2). In 
other words, Plato’s text holds out the express possibility that poetry can play a salutary role in 
																																																								
646 Halliwell 2011: 196-7 explains this phenomenon and Socrates’ critique of it as follows: “Socrates directly 
connect[s] poetic bewitchment (κήλησις, 601b) with the integral musico-verbal fabric of poetry as opposed to its 
paraphrasable content: he suggest[s] that the effect though powerfully natural (operating ‘by nature’ φύσει), is 
suspect precisely because it cannot be traced back to a rationally transparent basis in what the poetry ‘says’.” 
647 One is reminded here of Falstaff’s pointed observation in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1: “Banish plump Jack, 
and banish all the world” (Act 2, sc. 4). 
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the ideal state.648 Relevant to my thesis, a great many proverbs and gnômai are necessarily 
affected by this verdict, since so many have their origins in poetry, as I have attempted to show 
throughout this dissertation. 
Something seems to be gained – something arguably even essential – from having poetry 
(and figurative, poeticized language in general) present in the ideal polity. We might restate this 
thought in two ways: (1) the ideal polis, existing as it does en logois, has need of poetic speech; 
and (2) the ideal state is impossible to conceive without poetic speech. Why? The first reason has 
to do with the kêlêsis (bewitching power) of such language, as Socrates points out. While its 
effects may pose at times an impediment to analytic thought, what Socrates calls dianoia (595b6) 
and the goal of which is to arrive at an understanding of truth in reference to the Forms, its power 
to equip rival discursive practices with the ability to compete ably in the language game is 
undeniable, even if poeticized language is not entirely amenable to analytic argument, as 
Halliwell argues.649 That same objection also holds true for proverbs, as Kathryn Morgan has 
explained: authoritative gnômai “are useful only as a starting point for philosophic investigation 
and are not an end in themselves.”650  
It appears, however, that language which both satisfies the demands of philosophic 
analysis and eludes its boundaries by virtue of its kêlêsis is foundational in constructing a 
society, including an ideal one. Understanding this aspect of language opens an entirely new 
window into Socrates’ famous, enigmatic description of “the old quarrel beween philosophy and 																																																								
648 This is not to suggest that Kallipolis is on the verge of allowing full-scale performances of Aeschylian tragedy. 
However, even tragic and epic verse, re-formed and re-imagined within the radically new context of a society 
transformed by philosophic discourse consistent with the form of the good (as I described at the close of Chapter 4), 
is potentially eligible for admission, as demonstrated by Socrates’ rehabilitation and re-use of Achilles’ pained 
underworld lament in Book 7, despite having previously been banned in Book 3 (386b5-6): Resp. 386c5-7; Od. 
11.489-91 (βουλοίµην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέµεν ἄλλῳ / ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ µὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη / ἢ πᾶσιν 
νεκύεσσι καταφθιµένοισιν ἀνάσσειν). See my discussion in Chapter 4.2.7. 
649 Halliwell 2011: 159. 
650 Morgan 2009: 552. 
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poetry” (παλαιὰ µέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ, 607b5-6). It is not required that one 
should ultimately triumph over the other. Rather, the discourses traditionally conceived of as 
“philosophy” and “poetry” are dialogic and dialectic partners (amounting to a veritable “yin and 
yang,” as it were) of discourse within the larger language game.651 
Which brings us to the second reason why poetry and figurative speech cannot be 
banished entirely from the ideal state. The language game is the template upon which society and 
its discourse are constructed. To imagine the language game without poetic language is to 
consider the impossible: stepping outside of the discursive frame of the language game itself. 
This Plato could not do, even had he so desired. Morgan makes a similar point in describing how 
what she calls “the inescapable framework of thought” represented by the authority of the poetic 
and mythological tradition was necessarily composed of “linguistic and literary resources” that 
were impossible for early philosophic writers to transcend. As Morgan puts it in describing 
philosophy’s relation to myth, “Language is a tool of this world, and is tied to its incapacities. It 
cannot be taken for granted.”652 I would modify Morgan’s assessment only to the extent that 
“language” and the “world” are more mutually interdependent than even the tool analogy 
suggests. 
There is no society, no polis – ideal or otherwise it may even be argued – which exists 
apart from that “established in discourse (τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειµένῃ, 592a11), subject to the language 
game and all of its component, competing discursive practices, including poetry, myth, and – 																																																								
651 Nightingale 1995: 60, argues that Plato’s description of the “ancient quarrel” is not “true historical reportage” but 
rather a “bold rhetorical strategy designed to define philosophy and invest it with near timeless status.” Morgan 
2000: 4, makes a similar point with respect to myth and poetry’s heavy use of mythological material in arguing that 
“the incompatibility of myth and philosophy is a reflection of the polemic self-representation of some early 
philosophers.” Halliwell 2011: 192, argues that rather than amounting to a justification or proclamation of enmity 
between poetry and philosophy, the description of the παλαιὰ διαφορὰ is in fact a “self-exculpating step on Socrates’ 
part . . . and in some sense on Plato’s part, too: a gesture towards trying to move beyond the quarrel, not towards 
exacerbating it” (emphasis in original).  
652 Morgan 2000: 7-8. 
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relevant for my thesis – gnômai and proverbs. These practices, linked as they are with a larger 
poetic tradition, are not – per Halliwell’s formulation – “wholly amenable to rational 
analysis.”653 This is not to say that they are non-rational, only that they cannot be strictly 
bounded by analytic thought (διάνοια, in Socrates’ parlance). But why are such practices 
included within the scope of allowable discourse, as Book 10’s epilogue reveals? It is because of 
the bewitching power in their kêlêsis – a quality that I maintain Plato himself is keen to draw 
upon in his attempt to establish philosophy as a prevailing discursive practice and thereby reform 
society according to its vision of a just polis. 
One must be careful here not to assume that Plato draws upon discursive practices that 
contain kêlêsis simply because he is following the celebrated “honeyed-cup” approach to 
philosophic writing. As Morgan explains in describing myth’s own role in the creation of 
philosophy as a literary genre and how the standard, timeworn mythos-logos divide nearly 
amounts to a false dichotomy, the “honeyed-cup” writerly strategy presumes that traditionally 
non-philosophic discourses like poetry and myth add “colour to dry, technical, and forbidding 
material.” Any philosopher left to her own devices “would prefer to speak only in strictly 
analytic terms.”654 This, I maintain, does not account for Plato’s use of poetic speech, including 
the large number of proverbs and gnômai that permeate his work. 
Rather, Plato is following what Morgan describes as a “second approach” to philosophic 
writing, one that does not concede that discursive practices which transcend the boundaries of 
analytic reason (in Morgan’s analysis, myth) are “merely a reflex of literary ornamentation or 
audience expectation” but instead play a vital, philosophical role by “express[ing] what rational 
																																																								
653 Halliwell 2011: 159. 
654 Morgan 2000: 3-4. 
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and scientific language cannot . . .”655 This is the upshot of Book 10’s enigmatic epilogue and its 
evocation of the old quarrel. 
Certain discursive practices transcend purely analytic discourse because of their power to 
charm, to bewitch (κηλεῖν). Within this power reside both their potential danger and their 
potential utility to the ideal state. The danger is that such discourse – e.g., Euripides’ verse that is 
itself also a proverb (i.e., σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ) – might “incite us to be 
careless of all righteousness and all excellence” (ἄξιον ἀµελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης 
ἀρετῆς, 608b7-8).656 Nonetheless, the “pleasure” (ἡδεῖα) afforded by a discursive practice such 
as poetry, by virtue of its kêlêsis, cannot be jettisoned indiscriminately without reducing 
society’s discourse to the level of the “coarse and boorish” (σκληρὸς καὶ ἄγροικος), thereby 
depriving that society of the potential “benefit” (ὠφέλεια) of such discourse. The bewitching 
power of “Wise are tyrants by converse with the wise” results in harm to the body politic, 
whereas the proverbial verse attributed to Solon, “Hard is the good” (χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά) proves of 
fundamental value to the task of achieving a just society, as I have outlined earlier. The conflict 
between the potential harm represented by the former and the potential benefit represented by the 
latter encapsulates, I maintain, the “old quarrel,” which Socrates essentially renames at the close 
of the epilogue as a “great struggle” (µέγας . . .	ἀγών, 608b4). That struggle is to reconcile the 
bewitching power of discursive practices like poetry and proverbs, that cannot be strictly 
confined within the bounds of analytic argument (whose goal is the understanding and definition 
of truth),657 with philosophy that, as a literary genre, is itself inextricably bound with discursive 
reason and which relies heavily upon analytic terms. Plato demonstrates a steadfast refusal in his 																																																								
655 Morgan 2000: 4. 
656 Trans. Shorey. 
657 Halliwell 2011: 159.  
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philosophical writing to be constrained by and limit himself solely to the latter, a trait that has 
bedeviled scholars since at least the fifth century CE when the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus 
famously remarked that judging by Plato’s own writing, we are required to “banish not only 
Homer but Plato himself from the state.”658	  
Enclosed within Plato’s very act of positing the “old quarrel” between poetry and 
philosophy appears to be the simultaneous aspiration of transcending it. As Halliwell notes, 
Plato’s own engagement with poetry is unending; . . . Far from banishing 
poetry,  .  . . Plato’s writing constantly responds to it and lives with it on every 
level from verbal texture via characterization and thematic development, to the 
creation of large-scale dramatic, narrative, and mythological structures.659 
 
We see an illustration of this at the close of the Republic, in Socrates’ telling of the 
famous Myth of Er. Such a story does not satisfy the demands of analytic thought. However, 
attempting to conceive of the immortality of the soul in purely analytic terms would seem to 
push language to its breaking point. It would be the equivalent of attempting to view the original 
nature (ἀρχαίαν φύσιν) of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original body parts (τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ 
σώµατος µέρη) have been broken up and crushed and entirely pulled asunder by the waves 
(ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρῖφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυµάτων) while other 
encrustations such as oyster shells, sea weed, and rocks have become attached (ἄλλα δὲ 
προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, 611d1-5). Thus, a myth is required. Despite 
lacking the qualities of analytic argument, the Myth of Er, as Morgan persuasively argues, 
provides in language “an analogue for the unimaginable internal benefits of the soul.”660  
																																																								
658 In R. 1.161.9-11: ὁ αὐτὸς οὖν λόγος καὶ τὸν Ὅµηρον ἡµᾶς ἐκβάλλειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα 
αὐτόν . . . 
659 Halliwell 2011: 204. 
660 Morgan 2000: 207. 
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Plato employs a similar writerly strategy in the Phaedo. Socrates, imprisoned and about 
to be executed, constructs a transporting myth about the nature of the cosmos and the 
immortality of the soul, so as to comfort and reassure friends who have come to visit him before 
his death. Socrates first acknowledges that he, as a philosopher, is “not a maker of myths” (οὐκ ἦ 
µυθολογικός, 61b5), but then proceeds nonetheless to expound a mythological account of the 
soul’s immortality, asserting that “it is especially fitting for a man about to go to the other world 
both to examine and mythologize about it” (µάλιστα πρέπει µέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδηµεῖν 
διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ µυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδηµίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, 61e1-2). After relating the myth, 
Socrates first cautions his listeners that it is “not fitting for a man of sense to affirm that such 
matters are just as I have narrated” (Τὸ µὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ 
διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί, 114d1-2) but urges them nevertheless “to run the risk of 
believing . . . something like this, as the risk is noble” (κινδυνεῦσαι οἰοµένῳ οὕτωςἔχειν – καλὸς 
γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος, 114d5-6) and to “sing such things to himself as if they were incantatory charms” 
(τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ,114d6-7).  
To say that people quote and repeat proverbs as virtual “charms” (ἐπῳδαί) in order to 
make sense of their lives and impel themselves and others to act in ways consistent with the 
lessons they impart, even if wrongheaded, is a just description of how proverbs operate. 
Proverbial phrases like chalepa ta kala and koina ta philôn are quoted often in Plato’s corpus,661 
but they obviously have no more claim to accuracy than do the Myth of Er or the myth of the 
immortal soul in the Phaedo. Rather, they are quoted and repeated – one could reasonably say 
“sung as an incantation” (ἐπᾴδεσθαι) – for their generalizations about how the world works and 
																																																								
661 χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά appears at Resp. 4.435c8 and 6.497d10), Crat. 384b1, and Hipp.Ma. 304e8; κοινὰ τὰ φίλων 
appears at Resp. 4.424a1and 5.449c5, Leg. 739c2, Lys. 207c10, and Phaedr. 279c6. 
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their hortatory force. Of course, proverbs like sophoi tyrranoi tōn sophōn synousia function in 
the same way, despite their deleterious consequences, as alleged by Socrates. 
Accordingly, toward the close of the epilogue, Socrates announces how even if poetry (in 
the continued personification of an alluring woman on trial, but now analogized to a former 
lover) “is unable to defend herself, we shall listen to her, singing as an incantation to ourselves 
the logos that we repeat, this charm, being on our guard not to fall back into the boyish desire of 
the multitude” (ἂν µὴ οἵα τ' ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροσαόµεθ' αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον 
τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγοµεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούµενοι πάλιν ἐµπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε 
καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα, 608a2-5). During the course of the epilogue, Plato’s text has thus 
disclosed a parallel between some sort of logos likened to a “charm,” which is to be incanted, 
and poetry, whose bewitching power (κήλησις) constitutes the very reason not to ban it 
altogether. Significant here is the seemingly non-epistemic character of the logos suggested by 
the participle epadontes (“chanting as an incantation”) and the noun epoidê (“charm” or 
“spell”).662 It is as if Socrates is prescribing a type of discourse that, like poetry, while not wholly 
amenable to analytic thought, nevertheless remains necessary in what Socrates describes as his 
continuing engagement (ἀκούσεσθαι) with poetry. 
We are witness here to what seems almost an equivalence between (1) the logos to be 
incanted as a charm (ἐπᾷδειν) by those who listen to a poetry unable to defend herself along the 
lines prescribed (i.e., proving herself to be a benefit [ὠφελίµη] for human living, not just a  
source of enjoyment [ἡδεῖα], 607d8-9) and (2) that same type of poetry herself, to which one is 
necessarily both attracted and resistant at the same time, on account of poetry’s kêlêsis. The 
seductive quality of the logos to be used as a charm (ἐπῳδή) parallels poetry’s kêlêsis, which 																																																								
662 Given the strangeness of such a suggestion, at odds with what one normally associates with logos rendered as 
“argument,” I have deliberately left logos untranslated. 
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itself paradoxically constitutes the reason both why poetry is suspect in the ideal polis and why 
Socrates refuses to banish it.  
Indeed, the correspondence between the two mirrors the same relationship that exists 
within the conceit of a trial and legal defendant(s), as portrayed in the epilogue. What begins as a 
legal proceeding with the “gravest” accusation having been leveled first against poetry (µέγιστον 
κατηγορῆσθαι, 605c6) then evolves into the opposite scenario. Socrates suddenly occupies the 
position of defendant against charges of “coarseness and rusticity” (σκληρότητα. . . καὶ ἀγροικία, 
607b4). The scene then reverses back to poetry playing the role of defendant, pleading on her 
behalf a defense that, counterintuitively, Socrates and his companinons would gladly accept (“we 
would be glad to receive her back into the city” [ἅσµενοι ἂν καταδεχοίµεθα, 607c6]) because 
they recognize that they are subject to her “bewitchment” (ὡς σύνισµέν γε ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς 
κηλουµένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς, 607c6-7). Halliwell rightly notes that “the imagery expresses the idea of 
an unfinished series of trials and retrials with accuser and accused changing places” with the 
additional surprising image of “Socrates behav[ing] quite unlike a real defendant by hoping for 
his opponent’s success.”663 
However, the conceit’s conclusion proves even stranger. Socrates imagines poetry as 
incapable of defending herself (µὴ οἵα τ' ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, 608a2), but with himself and his 
companions nevertheless continuing to act as willing auditors of poetry (ἀκροσαόµεθ' αὐτῆς, 
608a2) so long as they incant to themselves logos in the form of a charm to themselves 
(ἐπᾴδοντες ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγοµεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, 608a3-4). In other 
words, not only does Socrates hope for his rival litigant’s success, he further contemplates in the 
alternative what amounts to a de facto (if not de jure) acquittal, where poetry is allowed to 
																																																								
663 Halliwell 2011: 194 (emphasis in original). 
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remain, even if she proves incapable of defending herself. Moreover, we witness in the 
conclusion of the conceit not just the equivalency of accuser and defendant but also of their 
respective means of communicative engagement with one another: poetry “bewitches” (κηλεῖν) 
and Socrates’ logos “charms” (ἐπᾷδειν). Furthermore, neither kêlêsis nor epoidai are 
encompassed fully within the bounds of analytic argument. Indeed, we may well ask whether 
anything necessarily precludes the epoidai that Socrates and his companions incant (ἐπᾷδειν) 
from consituting lines of poetry in their own right – more specifically, verses that double as 
gnômai and proverbs. 
I suggest that the engagement described here by Socrates, between bewitching poetry and 
her charm-incanting auditors, illustrates in its own way the encounter of the proverbs that are 
employed approvingly by both Socrates and his interlocutors throughout the course of the 
dialogue with those instances of discourse that are deemed potentially harmful to the ideal polis 
and its realization en logois. For example, in response to the proverb attributed to Simonides 
“Wise are they who go to the doors of the rich,” Socrates speaks – indeed, we might well say 
“incants as a charm” (ἐπᾷδειν) – his own logos, “All in need of rule go to the doors of those who 
can rule.”664 Neither of these phrases has any ultimate claim to accuracy or is otherwise 
subjected to rigorous philosophic inquiry during the course of the dialogue. However, the 
salutary nature of the latter, as we gather from the text, is to be used as a counter – one could 
well say a “charm” (ἐπῳδή) – in response to the deleterious effects attributed to the former. 
Along similar lines, Socrates makes clear his intention to use Odysseus’ stirring self-admonition 
in Book 20 of the Odyssey (“Bear up heart of mine; for you have endured far worse than this” 
(τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης, Resp. 390d5 and Od.20.18) as one of the 																																																								
664 As I argued in Chapter 4.7.1, Socrates’ new proverb sounds less artful in English than in the original Greek, 
where it enjoys grammatical parallelism in a quadripartite structure – archesthai deomenon, archein dunamenou – 
and a generalizing term, pavta. 
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critical legomena to be stored up in one’s soul (λαµβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, 377b7) from the extant 
corpus of Greek poetry. It is to be used to inspire young men to rise to the challenges of a world 
in which Hesiod’s two-roads proverb has been distorted (as Adeimantus demonstrates) to 
champion taking the easier road to vice rather than the harder road to virtue.665 As I argued in 
Chapter Three, Odysseus’ self-exhortation constitutes a proverb in Socrates’ use of it, consistent 
with the revelation by modern paroemiology and the work of literary theorist Jan Mukařovský, 
that “theatricalization of an utterance” occurs when a quotation is deployed in a new and different 
context from that of the original, thereby transforming the words quoted into a proverb. 
Whatever kêlêsis this particular line from Homer’s Odyssey possesses, Socrates clearly desires 
its continued presence in the ideal polis, “banishment” of poetry notwithstanding. 
The use of such proverbial discourse in Plato’s Republic in furtherance of the ideal state 
affords added textual support for the provisional answer that Halliwell offers in response to the 
question of why Socrates wants to retain kêlêsis as part of any discursive practice: 
If poetry can seduce the soul with a sort of rapture in words and images . . ., it has 
a psychagogic power which Platonic philosophy would ideally like to make its 
own. . . .  Control of ‘bewitchment’ is indeed part of the quarrel between 
philosophy, but a quarrel played out in the soul of Plato’s own writings.666 
 
Not only is it impossible for Plato to exempt his own writing from the language game and 
jettison entirely discursive practices that are presently established, Plato demonstrates a keen 
awareness of the persuasive power inherent in such practices that can assist his own 
philosophical discourse in competing against rival “vocabularies” so that his own discourse 
might become a prevailing vocabulary. Philosophy just might become the prevailing discursive 
practice with the help of such discourse. Nothing less than the realization of the ideal polis in 																																																								
665 Resp. 2.364c5-d2. 
666 Halliwell 2011: 206. 
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logos rests upon that possibility. Furthermore, to whatever extent the ideal state is achieved and 
rival discursive practices continue to operate within such a community that might prove harmful, 
Plato’s own proverbs – not to mention his philosophic writing as a whole – ought to be chanted 
just like a talismanic charm in the ongoing discursive engagement that constitutes the language 
game. Proverbs and gnômai, eminently memorably and quotable phrases possessed of their own 
kêlêsis, have a significant role to play within Plato’s own generic participation in the never-
ending language game by which a society is constituted. 
 
5.3. Epilogue 
 
In Tom Stoppard’s The Real Thing, an exchange occurs between the comedy’s 
protagonist, the playwright Henry and his daughter, Debbie, a teenager about to run off with her 
boyfriend, which illustrates in miniature the complex dynamic of how proverbs operate in 
discourse and why they might prove attractive to, yet also elicit antipathy from, any wordsmith 
who chooses to employ them. The Real Thing, like most of Stoppard’s other stage works, 
displays a manipulation of language and meta-theatricality to confront philosophically vexing 
questions. In this play, the question of what constitutes the proverbial “real thing” is taken up – 
most specifically, in the context of the principal plot, what constitutes the “real thing” in 
romantic love and, on a more linguistic level, how can the “real thing” ever be expressed in 
language? 
Henry is in the process of giving his daughter some parting advice. He grows 
increasingly troubled by his daughter’s revelations of her early and repeated sexual promiscuity 
– in particular the disclosure that she lost her virginity at an elite private school with the Latin 
instructor “in the boiler room.” Debbie responds to Henry’s discomfort with a proverb, one 
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seemingly of her own coinage, as she playfully chastises her father for naiveté in making “such a 
mystery” of sex: 
Debbie. Why would you want to make it such a crisis? 
Henry. I don’t know, why would I? 
Debbie. It’s what comes of making such a mystery of it. I was like that when I 
was twelve. Everything was sex. Latin was sex. The dictionary fell open at 
meretrix, a harlot. You could feel the mystery coming off the word like musk. 
Meretrix! This was none of your amo, amas, amat, this was a flash from the 
forbidden planet, and it was everywhere. History was sex, art was sex, the bible, 
poetry, penfriends, games, music, everything was sex except biology which was 
obviously sex but not really sex, not the one which was secret and ecstatic and 
wicked and a sacrament and all the things it was supposed to be but couldn’t be at 
one and the same time – I got that in the boiler room and it turned out to be 
biology after all. That’s what free love is free of – propaganda. 
Henry. Don’t get too good at that. 
Debbie. What? 
Henry: Persuasive nonsense. Sophistry in a phrase so neat you can’t see the loose 
end that would unravel it. It’s flawless but wrong. A perfect dud. You can do that 
with words, bless ‘em. How about, “What free love is free of, is love”? Another 
little gem. You could put a ‘what’ on the end of it, like Bertie Wooster, “What 
free love is free of is love, what?” – and the words would go on replicating 
themselves like a spiral of DNA. . . “What love is free of love? – free love is what 
love, what?667 
 
The parallel with what we witness at various places in Plato’s Republic is striking: a proverb is 
deployed in support of what may be presumed from textual context to be a morally dubious 
position. For example, one recalls Adeimantus reeling off proverb after proverb in Book 2 to 
illustrate how varied and numerous legomena are used in support of behavior that is precisely the 
opposite of justice pursued as an end in itself, rather than for its rewards.668 
A little further on in the exchange between Henry and his daughter, Debbie irritates her 
father yet again when she casually suggests that it would not be wrong for Henry’s current 
romantic partner, Annie – an actress, for whom Henry left Debbie’s mother, another actress who 
																																																								
667 Stoppard 1984: Act 2, sc. 3. 
668 Resp. 3.365b1-366b2; see my discussion in Chapter 2.2. 
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recently starred in Henry’s latest play and had her own history of adultery – to take another lover 
in addition to Henry. In advancing this argument, she seems to coin another proverb: 
Debbie. (pause) Has Annie got someone else then? 
Henry. Not as far as I know, thank you for asking. 
Debbie. Apologies. 
Henry. Don’t worry. 
Debbie. Don’t you. Exclusive rights isn’t love, it’s colonization. 
Henry. Christ almighty. Another ersatz masterpiece. Like Michelangelo working 
in polystyrene. 
 
We detect in Henry’s annoyance the hostility that Plato’s text evinces at times toward 
lines of verse, mythological accounts, gnômai and proverbs – in general, legomena of whatever 
sort – that are contrary to the ideal of justice envisioned as the foundation for the ideal state. 
Moreover, to the extent that such discourse lacks a claim to accuracy and cannot be encompassed 
exclusively within analytic thought, it courts the opprobrium leveled by Henry: “sophistry in a 
phrase so neat you can’t see the loose end that would unravel it” and “ersatz masterpiece,” a 
mere imitation of “the real thing” accomplished by mimesis. Substitute Plato’s notion of the 
“Forms” for Stoppard’s “real thing” and the parallel becomes clearer still. To “unravel” such 
legomena would require philosophic examination and scrutiny under the elenchus.  
However, Henry, not unlike Socrates and the highly-nuanced attitude toward poetry and 
its attendant kêlêsis that he demonstrates during Book 10’s epilogue to the discussion about 
poetry, cannot help but express admiration for the attraction that such discourse unceasingly 
exerts over its listeners: “You can do that with words, bless ‘em.” He understands full well the 
power of language that possesses kêlêsis. Henry’s admission in this regard parallels the rhetorical 
question that Socrates poses to Glaucon during the epilogue, “Are you yourself not bewitched by 
her [i.e., poetry] and especially when you contemplate Homer (ἦ γάρ. . .οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ 
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σύ, καὶ µάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὁµήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; 607c8-d1)?” Glaucon does not miss a beat: 
“Absolutely” (Πολύ γε, 607d2). 
Any wordsmith with aspirations to prevail in the language game ought not divest himself 
of the discursive tools required to compete ably in that game. Kêlêsis is too powerful a property 
of certain discursive practices to be abandoned entirely, including, of course, poetry and its 
subset of gnômai and proverbs within the larger Greek literary corpus that Plato draws upon 
frequently and abundantly. Nor could one dispense with such discourse even if one so desired, 
given that no individual speaker or writer gets to decide in advance the rules of the language 
game – in other words, to decide unilaterally which discourses may compete within it. Such 
authority belongs to the language game alone. 
And so, it is not surprising that Henry, like Plato, makes use of what might be considered 
questionable discourse from the perspective of one who would seek to express his ideals solely 
by means which satisfy the demands of analytic argument. After rebuking Debbie for the 
“sophistry in a phrase” that her newly-minted proverbs display – themselves, “ersatz 
masterpieces” – Henry ends his parting advice with some very familiar legomena:  
Henry. There; my blessing with thee. And these few precepts in thy memory. . . 
Debbie. Too late, Fa. Love you. 
 
Henry’s last words are an invocation of the lines that introduce some of the most memorable and 
famous proverbs in all of Western literature: Polonius’ proverb-rich, parting advice to his son, 
Laertes, in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, replete with such “gems” as “Neither a borrower nor a lender 
be” and “the apparel oft proclaims the man.”669 Henry is not going to let what he views as his 
daughter’s misguided proverbs be the last word. So too, neither in the Republic is Plato about to 
be outdone by the eminently memorable and quotable legeomena of his literary rivals – kompsoi 																																																								
669 Hamlet, Act 1, sc.3. 
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who understand precisely how the language game is played. Plato has a few of his own 
“precepts,” right up his proverbial sleeve. 
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